

REBUILDING UKRAINE:

A Youth Policy Agenda for Recovery
and EU Accession



EUROPEAN YOUTH PARLIAMENT

Schwarzkopf
Foundation
YOUNG EUROPE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Against the backdrop of Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine, the **Rebuild Ukraine Ambassadors Programme** of the European Youth Parliament (EYP) mobilises young people from across Europe to look to the future and to contribute to Ukraine's recovery and future resilience. Now in its third year, the programme brought together 30 people aged 17–27 from Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe as Rebuild Ukraine Ambassadors. Structured as a policy-focused learning journey, the programme combined thematic research, collaborative policy development, and a study trip to Ukraine, offering participants first-hand insights into the country's resilience, civic engagement, and reconstruction efforts. Grounded in these experiences, the Rebuild Ukraine Ambassadors developed policy papers across a range of issues, which are presented in this report.

The working group on **Rebuilding Trust in Public Institutions and Fighting Corruption** focused on restoring public trust through stronger judicial independence, transparency, and accountability. Its recommendations prioritised increased investment in the judiciary and anti-corruption bodies, EU-aligned legal education and training, tougher measures against corruption, and enhanced political finance oversight. Empowering civil society, protecting whistleblowers, and safeguarding media scrutiny were identified as essential to rebuilding civic trust.

The working group on **Combating Disinformation and Democratic Resilience** addressed the growing threat of disinformation through a combination of regulation, education, and civic engagement. Its key proposals included stronger oversight of high-risk digital platforms, piloting EU-aligned content authenticity standards, and improved transparency around political and war-related information. Embedding media literacy across education systems and scaling youth- and community-led initiatives were highlighted as vital to long-term democratic resilience.

The working group on **Support for SMEs and Tech-Driven Economic Recovery** focused on dual-use small and medium-sized enterprises as drivers of recovery and Euro-Atlantic integration. Its recommendations focused on accelerating access to international markets through co-production, empowering municipalities to support local businesses, and digitising certification and licensing systems to reduce costs, corruption, and administrative barriers.

The challenge of energy security was addressed in the working group on **Strategic Management of Natural Resources: Towards a Resilient Energy System**, with discussions on resilience and decentralisation. The group called for a shift toward decentralised renewable energy and storage, market-based electricity pricing with targeted consumer support, and simplified access to green financing. Deploying autonomous energy systems for critical public infrastructure was proposed as a scalable model for national resilience.

The working group on **Social Cohesion, Inclusion, and Youth Empowerment** focused on ensuring that recovery efforts are inclusive of young people with disabilities. Key recommendations included enforcing accessibility standards in reconstruction, modernising disability and rehabilitation systems, accelerating deinstitutionalisation, and expanding community-based support services. Central to the proposals was empowering young people with disabilities as active participants in decision-making and reconstruction processes.

The final working group considered **Reframing Ukraine's Narrative in a European Context**. It highlighted the need for a coherent, credible nation brand aligned with Ukraine's reform trajectory. Recommendations included adopting a countrywide Nation Brand Strategy, establishing permanent inter-ministerial co-ordination, and empowering youth as cultural diplomats through transnational networks. Linking strategic communication to tangible reform progress was seen as essential to strengthening international trust.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Rebuild Ukraine Ambassadors Programme shows that young people across Europe are deeply committed to Ukraine's recovery and future. Through collaboration and creativity, its participants demonstrated that youth are ready to step up not just as observers, but also as active contributors to rebuilding communities, to strengthening institutions, and to shaping a resilient, democratic, and European Ukraine. Their generation is invested in Ukraine's future and prepared to help make it a reality.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary	2
Rule of Law, Governance, and Civic Trust: Rebuilding Trust in Public Institutions and Fighting Corruption	5
Rule of Law, Governance, and Civic Trust: Combating Disinformation and Enhancing Democratic Resilience	14
Economic Integration & Innovation: Support for SMEs and Tech-Driven Economic Recovery	30
Strategic Management of Natural Resources: Toward a Resilient Energy System	41
Justice, Rights, & Social Inclusion: Social Cohesion, Inclusion, and Youth Empowerment	55
Culture, Identity, and European Solidarity: Reframing Ukraine's Narrative in a European Context	72
Acknowledgements	83

REBUILDING TRUST IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION



Authors: Mariia Hryhurko (Ukraine), Illia Kuksenko (Ukraine), Aybars Önder (Türkiye), Isabella Buhrow (Germany), Anna Vietrova (Ukraine)
Facilitator: Vasyl Babych (Ukraine)

Strengthen, modernise, and professionalise the judiciary system:

The parliament should strengthen the independence of judicial and anti-corruption institutions, double their budgets by 2030, and support digital case-management, infrastructure upgrades, and specialised courts. The High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission should recruit 3,000 judges and staff annually until all current vacancies are filled, prioritising EU-aligned and ethically trained professionals.

Extend or abolish corruption statutes of limitation:

Ukraine should extend the statute of limitations for corruption offences to at least 15 years and consider abolishing it for the most severe crimes, ensuring accountability in complex and high-level cases.

Modernise judicial education:

The Ministry of Education and Science in cooperation with the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers of the European Commission, the European Judicial Training Network, the National School of Judges, and top Ukrainian law schools should launch a comprehensive reform of judicial education, competency-based training, and continuous professional evaluation to reach EU standards by 2030.



Key Recommendations



Enhance political finance transparency and oversight:

The National Agency on Corruption Prevention should publicly audit the finances of political parties, retain records for 20 years, regulate online and in-kind contributions, and implement automated auditing responsibilities.

Strengthen civil society and media participation:

Ukraine should empower civil society oversight councils, co-fund citizens' assemblies for anti-corruption reform input, guarantee media access to parliamentary committee proceedings, and ensure that investigative journalists can work without being threatened.

Implement whistleblower protection systems nationwide:

Secure, anonymous reporting channels with legal protections should be introduced in schools, universities, and government institutions by 2027, aligning with EU laws.

SECTION 1 – SYNOPSIS

- While public trust in certain institutions, such as the army (93.5%) and civil society (60.5%), is rather high, trust in anti-corruption and judicial bodies is minimal, with only 12% trusting the courts, 9% trusting prosecutors, and 62% distrusting the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine.¹
- Nearly half of Ukrainians (48.5%) say that high-level corruption is the country's main problem, above even russian strikes or drone attacks.²
- 30% of Ukrainians say they or their relatives have personally faced corruption in the previous year, and only 7% of those who faced corruption reported it,³ showing that the perception of corruption runs deeper than daily experience. Decades of distrust of government and limited awareness of how entrenched corruption continues to shape these views lead to multiple issues that slow possible progress.
- There are significant challenges with understaffing and high workloads within the judicial system.⁴
- The judicial system is underfunded and overwhelmed. There are about 12,000 vacancies in it. The judiciary gets around 61% of the funding that it needs to function effectively.⁵ There are backlogs of cases⁶ and of complaints against judges,⁷ which are made worse by the very short statute of limitations. While digital systems may have been effective in helping the existing personnel process cases, the budget constraints do not allow the necessary modernisation and further digitalisation of the judiciary.
- The statute of limitations for corruption is three to five years in most cases,⁸ which is insufficient for a court system that has a massive backlog. Many people who engage in low-level corruption go without punishment because of the short statute of limitations,⁹ which is far below the 15–20 years in countries such as Italy and Portugal. Additionally, 55% of cases are impacted by procedural abuses intended to draw out the process.¹⁰
- There is a lack of robust whistleblower protection legislation, as the only existing protections are found within the wider law 'On Corruption Prevention',¹¹ and as such falls short of EU standards.
- The removal of representatives of media and civil society organisations from parliamentary committee meetings due to the state of martial law¹² has made oversight of the work of lawmakers difficult.

Context

¹ Hrushetskyi, A. (2025, January 9). Dynamics of trust in Social Institutions in 2021-2024. Press releases and reports. <https://www.ki-is.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1467&page=1>. Razumkov Center. (2025, March 24). Оцінка ситуації в країні, довіра до соціальних інститутів, політиків, посадовців та громадських діячів, ставлення до виборів під час війни, віра в перемогу (лютий–березень 2025р.) [Assessment of the situation in the country, trust in social institutions, politicians, officials and public figures, attitude towards elections during the war, belief in victory (February–March 2025)]. <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhen-nya/otsinka-sytuatsii-v-kraini-dovira-do-sotsialnykh-institutiv-politykiv-rosa-dovtsiv-ta-gromadskykh-diachiv-stavlennia-do-vyboriv-pid-chas-viiny-vira-v-peremogu-liutyiberezen-2025r>

² Socis, Янус [Yanus], & Барометр Громадських Настроїв [Barometer of Public Sentiment]. (2025, June). Соціально-політична ситуація в Україні [Socio-political situation in Ukraine] [Slide show]. <https://socis.kiev.ua/wp-content/plugins/pdfjs-viewer-short-code/pdfjs/web/viewer.php?file=/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/2025-06-25.pdf&dButton=true&pButton=true&oButton=false&sButton=true#zoom=auto&pagemode=none>

³ Transparency International Ukraine. (2025, September 9). One in three Ukrainians has personally encountered bribe demands. <https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/one-in-three-ukrainians-has-personally-encountered-bribe-demands>

⁴ European Commission. (2025, November 4). Staff Working Document 2025 Ukraine Report. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/17115494-8122-4d10-8a06-2cf275eecd7_en?filename=ukraine-report-2025.pdf

⁵ European Commission. (2025, November 4). Staff Working Document 2025 Ukraine Report. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/17115494-8122-4d10-8a06-2cf275eecd7_en?filename=ukraine-report-2025.pdf

⁶ Minakov, M. (2024, October 8). Functioning of Ukrainian Courts during the War. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/functioning-ukrainian-courts-during-war>

⁷ Shadow Report on Chapter 23 'Justice and Fundamental Rights' and Chapter 24 'Justice, Freedom and Security' of the European Commission's Report on Ukraine's Progress under the 2024 EU Enlargement Package, Coalition of civil society organisations, led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives. <https://parliament.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/shadow-report-2025-eng.pdf>

⁸ Sinichkina, L. & Svintsitskiy, V. (2022, June 21). White Collar Crime Laws and regulations in Ukraine. <https://arzinger.ua/en/press-center/news/white-collar-crime-laws-and-regulations-in-ukraine>

⁹ OECD. (2022). Ukraine Fifth Round of Anti-corruption Monitoring Follow-up Reports. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/05/anti-corruption-reforms-in-ukraine_858c915e/b1901b8c-en.pdf

¹⁰ Demchuk, P. (2025, February 21). Why are HACC cases not considered as quickly as we would like, and how to fix it? Transparency International Ukraine. <https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/why-are-hacc-cases-not-considered-as-quickly-as-we-would-like-and-how-to-fix-it/>

¹¹ tax.gov.ua. (2021, April 6). Who is a whistleblower? [tax.gov.uahttps://tax.gov.ua/en/mass-media/anticorruption-activity/628969.html#:~:text=The%20Law%20of%20Ukraine%20%E2%80%9COn,corruption%20who%20is%20a%20whistleblower](https://tax.gov.ua/en/mass-media/anticorruption-activity/628969.html#:~:text=The%20Law%20of%20Ukraine%20%E2%80%9COn,corruption%20who%20is%20a%20whistleblower)

¹² ZMINA. (2024, February 6). Ukrainian parliament should become more open to the media and the public: Zmina Human Rights Center. <https://zmina.ua/en/statements-en/the-ukrainian-parliament-should-become-more-open-to-the-media-and-the-public/>

SECTION 1 - SYNOPSIS

- What anti-corruption tools or judicial reforms should be prioritised in the EU accession process and reconstruction projects?
- How can Ukraine build long-term public trust in institutions beyond the wartime context and address the lack of faith arising from corruption by involving civil society and media?

Central Questions

- Decision-makers: Ukrainian government, Ukrainian parliament, president of Ukraine, Ukrainian civil society, European Commission including its Directorate- General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST) and Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST).
- Target audience: International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission, Ukrainian civil society, Ukrainian parliament, Ukrainian government, Office of the president of Ukraine, media, the Council of Europe, High Qualification Commission of Judges, High Council of Justice, National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).
- Impacted: Ukrainian judiciary (District Courts, High Council of Justice, High Qualification Commission of Judges), National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), NABU, High Anti- Corruption Court, Ukrainian civil society, Ukrainian business community, Ukrainian state officials, investors, Ukrainian anti-corruption institutions, Ukrainian media.


Stakeholders



Strategic Vision 1:

TOOLS AND REFORMS NECESSARY IN UKRAINE’S ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM FOR ITS PATH TOWARD EU ACCESSION

Despite significant reforms and strong, independent anti-corruption institutions supported by a highly digitalised system of declarations and public procurement, Ukraine’s judicial system still faces major challenges, including underfunding, personnel shortages, short statutes of limitations, limited independence, internal corruption risks, and selective justice. Restoring public confidence requires a system that demonstrates fairness and accountability.



Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✦ By 2030, significant legal reforms are undertaken to make corruption convictions easier, including the extension of the statute of limitations for corruption offences, robust whistleblower protections matching EU’s Directive 2019/1937, a thorough review of the bail system by the parliament to ensure defendants show up in court, more detailed lifestyle audits of public officials to find out cases of corruption, ensuring accountability in complex investigations, greater ease of discovery of evidence, and enabling the judiciary to process cases without premature expiration.
- ✦ By 2030, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges operate a fully staffed, digitally supported, and politically independent judicial appointment and case-management system, with all vacancies across the system filled.
- ✦ By 2032, Ukraine reduces corruption-related crimes by 30%, shortens average case review duration by 30%, and eliminates 90% of the backlog of corruption cases through measures including increasing the capacity of the High Anti-Corruption Court to process cases and ensuring a just trial for all accused, prioritising those nearing the statute of limitations. Through support from European partner institutions like the Venice Commission, the European Judicial Training Network, the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, and DG JUST, Ukrainian judicial training reaches EU standards by 2035.
- ✦ By 2030, elections in Ukraine are conducted without unaccounted-for external donations to political parties. The parliament passes laws limiting in-kind or monetary donations and thereby prevents the perversion of democratic processes by moneyed interests. Donations to political parties are closely monitored by the NACP and results shared with civil society for monitoring.
- ✦ By 2030, appointments of ethically qualified candidates to judicial positions are made without political interference and in a timely fashion. The parliament undertakes a comprehensive review of the role of political bodies in judicial appointments and enables the independence and self-governance of the judicial system, ensuring that the self-governance systems uphold ethical standards.
- ✦ By 2035, Ukraine ranks within the top 30 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and achieves a 20-point rise in public trust in the justice system.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1. Ensuring Stable Financing, Staffing, and Digitalisation

By the end of 2027, the parliament increases annual judiciary and anti-corruption funding by at least 20%, moving toward a doubling of the judiciary's budget by 2030. This funding supports the expansion of digital case-management systems, infrastructure upgrades, recruitment of judicial personnel, salary improvements, and the modernisation of NACP digital tools, including the roll-out of e-services and whistleblower systems across all tiers of government.

The European Commission provides funding to the High Qualification Commission of Judges for establishing an electronic career-management system and adopting advanced analytical tools so that judges can review corruption cases in the judiciary more efficiently.

Action 2. Strengthening the Legal Framework for Corruption Prosecutions

By 2027, the parliament extends to at least 15 years or, where appropriate, abolishes the statute of limitations for corruption offences, and ensures that limitation periods expire only after the first-instance verdict. The Ministry of Justice updates data-retention rules to guarantee that case materials are preserved through all stages of judicial review. The High Anti-Corruption Court, in co-ordination with the Supreme Court, implements standardised methodologies for bail decisions to minimise irregularities and to ensure proportionality and consistency across corruption proceedings. The whistleblower legislation is fully aligned with EU Directive 2019/1937.

Whistleblower protection mechanisms for civil servants are improved nationwide through secure and anonymous reporting channels within all public institutions.

Additionally, laws protect whistleblowers from dismissal, retaliation, or legal threats, encouraging the timely reporting of corruption as well as independent oversight units that investigate cases and enforce accountability.

Action 3. Attracting and Professionalising Judicial Personnel

By 2028, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges collaborate to onboard at least 3,000 judges and support staff annually. A targeted outreach campaign encourages applications from highly qualified Ukrainian legal professionals, including those with EU-aligned training. By 2027, the parliament amends legislation to expedite the appointment of representatives to the High Council of Judges and to enable its smoother functioning despite shortages by permitting old members to remain on it in a caretaker capacity for 3–5 months until their replacement is found. The parliament also considers legislative changes to expedite appointments and to minimise political influence in the judiciary. To avoid conflicts of interest, restrictions are introduced to prevent Category A and B civil servants from immediately transitioning into positions within specialised anti-corruption courts.

Action 4. Modernising Judicial Education

By 2027, the Ministry of Education and Science in cooperation with the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, DG JUST, the European Judicial Training Network, the National School of Judges, and top Ukrainian law schools will launch a comprehensive reform of judicial education. An advisory committee consisting of members from each of these organisations assists the parliament's Committee on Legal Policy and Justice and the Ministry of Education and Science in developing EU-aligned curricula, competency-based training, and continuous professional evaluation.

Action 5. Enhancing Transparency and Oversight of Political Finance

By 2027, the parliament adopts legislation to mandate full publication of NACP political-finance audits and extends the retention of party financial documentation to 20 years. Updated legislation introduces clearer rules on in-kind contributions, regulates online political advertising, and establishes automated allocation of audit responsibilities within the NACP, supporting a measurable increase in public confidence in political finance oversight.

Strategic Vision 2:

Despite Ukraine’s substantial progress in operationalising judicial and anti-corruption frameworks — including pioneering digitalisation of asset declarations, transparent public procurement, and the establishment of specialised anti-corruption institutions — a complex paradox remains. Historical legacies and the challenges of post-Soviet transition have contributed to a lingering divergence between pro-EU institutional reforms and lack of public trust in government institutions. Consequently, while the state anti-corruption infrastructure is in place, societal confi-

BUILDING UP CAPACITY FOR JUDICIAL REFORMS AND INTEGRATING THE VOICES OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA IN ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS

dence requires consolidation. In this landscape, civil society and independent media play a vital, synergistic role in maintaining accountability and bridging the perception gap. Moving forward, the strategic imperative lies in fortifying the social contract. This entails not only sustaining structural reforms but also revitalising the public sector through the infusion of new human capital. Empowering a new generation of professionals is essential to building sustainable institutional capacity and fostering a culture of trust between the state and its citizens.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

Success will be measured by a sustained increase in public trust in government institutions. This includes the following:

- ✦ By 2035, nationwide public opinion surveys show at least a 40% increase in public trust in key government institutions, including the parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, the judiciary (for example, the High Council of Justice and the High Anti-Corruption Court), and local self-government bodies, compared to 2025 levels. This improvement is supported by accessible judicial system performance dashboards, annual public accountability reports, members of the press conducting investigations freely, and expanded citizen oversight mechanisms.
- ✦ By 2032, substantiated cases of violation of academic integrity will decrease by 60%, driven by mandatory digital case-tracking, standardised integrity checks in universities, and strengthened whistleblower protections. Over 90% of academic assessments in higher-education institutions are conducted through secure online platforms with identity verification and transparent audit trails.
- ✦ By 2035, Ukraine achieves a 50% increase in young professionals entering judicial and public-service careers, supported by partnerships between universities and government bodies, expanded state-funded internships, and nationwide recruitment campaigns targeting regions with low public-sector participation.



MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1. Educational Reform

By the end of 2026, the Ministry of Education and Science develops and approves a national curriculum module on academic integrity and civic transparency for schools and universities. It works with curriculum experts and civil society organisations to integrate these modules into middle and high-school programmes as well as higher-education institutions, ensuring they are ready for implementation at the start of the 2027–2028 educational year. Starting in January 2027, the ministry formally establishes oversight committees composed of representatives from the National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance and accredited academic integrity experts. These committees begin conducting quarterly audits of academic institutions, reviewing disciplinary cases, and publishing annual reports on academic integrity trends.

Throughout 2027, the Ministry of Education and Science, in partnership with the Ministry of Digital Transformation, pilots anonymous online testing platforms that use encrypted student IDs instead of names. Regional teacher-training centres conduct mandatory training sessions for faculty, and by 2028 the system is expanded nationwide to support secure, bias-free assessments. By mid-2028, the Ministry of Education and Science, in cooperation with the NACP, will implement a national whistleblower protection protocol for school and university students. The system includes encrypted reporting channels, school-based integrity officers, and legally mandated protections ensuring all reports of bribery and other offences can be submitted safely, anonymously, and without academic retaliation.

Action 2. Democratic Participation and Strengthening Civil Society

By 2028, the participation of civil society in anti-corruption efforts is strengthened through two initiatives:

- By 2028, NABU's Civil Oversight Council, supported by funding from the European Commission, has its role expanded, while all public financial data (assets, tenders, audits of government bodies and political parties, etc.) are aggregated into one platform, with access granted to the council, which is able to flag suspicious activity, automatically making NABU responsible to investigate it.
- By the first quarter of 2027, civil society organisations, at the initiative of the parliament, organise a nationwide citizens' assembly in Lviv as a form of public consultation, with funding support from the European Commission and the Council of Europe, to discuss reforms to the anti-corruption infrastructure and enhancing good governance. The citizens' assembly consists of a randomly selected group of 1,000 Ukrainians, who are compensated for their participation and guided through the intricacies of anti-corruption policy by a balanced group of international experts chosen by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission or its subsidiaries. The citizens' assembly convenes at the latest in the second quarter of 2026 and arrives at its decisions after a sustained period of deliberation of up to a year. In 2027, detailed recommendations in the form of a resolution or policy paper are submitted to the European Commission, the Council of Europe, the parliament, and the government. After reaching its decision, the citizens' assembly decides on the best means of monitoring the adoption and implementation of its recommendations by the parliament and the government and, if necessary, meets on a regular basis to hold the authorities accountable.

Action 3. Enhancing the Role of Press

In 2026, Bill No 11321 is adopted and fully implemented, so that media representatives have access to parliamentary committee meetings. Moreover, every parliamentary committee broadcast their meetings, enabling the public to see which members participated, what was discussed, and who voted how. Journalists and representatives from civil society have the opportunity to ask the lawmakers questions directly. With the aforementioned adoption of whistleblower legislation,¹³ citizens who have information to share as whistleblowers are protected from retaliation after providing that information to journalists, and journalists do not face restrictions in reporting such information or threats of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) cases for reporting alleged crimes. Moreover, this aligns Ukraine closer with EU Directive 2019/1937 and solidifies the importance of investigative journalism by 2027. By 2027, Ukraine has fully harmonised its media legislation with the European Media Freedom Act, completing reforms necessary for EU accession and solidifying media independence and freedom.

¹³ In reference to Action 2 of Strategic Vision 1.

Strategic Vision 1:




- In 2026, the issue of procedural abuse in courts that prolongs the review of cases is addressed by the adoption of a law that prevents such an abuse. The law is prepared by the Ministry of Justice in consultation with civil society experts, enabling courts to reduce case backlogs and restore public confidence in the judiciary.
 - In 2026, the parliament raises the budget of the judiciary by 20% to increase the number of personnel in it and to expand the range of tools available to personnel to increase their efficiency. This boosts the fight against corruption by reducing the case backlog and strengthens the rule of law, as well as underscoring the government's commitment to EU accession.
 - In 2026, the government, with support of the European Commission and other international partners, provides the necessary funding to the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) to create an electronic cabinet for judicial careers (a system that digitalizes and speeds up interactions of applicants to court positions) and to enable the HQCJ and anti-corruption bodies to adopt analytical tools currently available to NABU. This reduces the case backlog as well as making it easier for judicial appointments to be conducted.
 - Starting immediately, the NACP retains its financial audit reports for the financing of political parties for at least 20 years, thus enabling civil society groups and state agencies to monitor corruption in elections and state institutions and to take action as necessary.
- In 2026, the president signs Bill No 11321 into law, allowing the media into parliamentary committee meetings, thus enabling civil society oversight over the parliament's actions and increasing democratic accountability for elected officials.
 - Taking into account the Ukraine 2025 report of the European Commission,¹⁴ the parliament immediately corrects Bill No 14057, removing norms that would enable more SLAPP cases against investigative journalists, especially taking into account the proposed Articles 277, 278, 280, and 297, thus ensuring that their work cannot be threatened.
 - In 2026, the Ministry of Education and Science launches a national awareness campaign about academic integrity and whistleblower protections across all universities and secondary schools to increase accountability and combat corruption through increased awareness.
 - In 2026, the National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance launches the public reporting of outcomes of academic integrity investigations within 90 days of receiving a complaint to ensure the cases are acted upon swiftly. Given the short statute of limitations, it is crucial that investigations proceed as fast as possible. This also increases public trust as the people see their representatives in action.

Strategic Vision 2:

- In 2026, the government simplifies and digitalises the process for public complaints regarding issues in the public procurement system Prozorro (e.g. through Dozoroo), eliminating the current standards requiring lengthy paperwork and postal mail. The public can file complaints more easily, rapidly, and effectively, which leads to cases being processed more easily, oiling the gears of the anti-corruption machine and raising the confidence of the people in the anti-corruption institutions and the government.
- In 2026, civil society organisations organise several pilot local citizens' assemblies focusing on corruption and good governance with funding from the Council of Europe and the European Commission. These assemblies prepare the ground for the national citizens' assembly in 2027. The people feel they have a voice in the fight against corruption and find means of expressing their dismay at the backsliding in anti-corruption efforts.

¹⁴ European Commission. (2025, July 8). Ukraine report 2025. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/17115494-8122-4d10-8a06-2cf275eecd7_en?filename=ukraine-report-2025.pdf



COMBATING DISINFORMATION AND ENHANCING DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE

Authors: Deppy Alafoyanni (Greece), Daria Perevertailo (Ukraine),
Nazarii Pomohaibo (Ukraine)
Facilitator: Anastasiia Ianovytska (Ukraine)

Ukraine should enact comprehensive national targeted legislation to regulate social media platforms that exceed 1 million monthly active users (MAU). Independent audits of platforms should be conducted annually, assessing compliance with transparency and disinformation mitigation standards. Audit results should be published, and at least 80% of recommendations should be implemented within 12 months of each report.

Establish an EU-wide Digital Content Authenticity Standard, adapted from the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity standard, with strong civil society engagement to ensure transparency and prevent governmental overreach. Mandate traceable metadata for political ads, news, and war-related materials while integrating real-time verification tools into major social media platforms and launch the pilot-testing programme of these standards in Ukraine before EU-wide implementation.

Develop a nationwide youth participation programme, enabling students to co-create fact-checking challenges, school media labs, peer-mentorship groups, and digital citizenship campaigns that make resilience to disinformation visible and youth-led.

Key Recommendations


Embed media and digital literacy in the national curriculum using UNESCO media and information literacy and UNICEF digital-safety standards, ensuring that every learner acquires critical thinking, verification skills, and online safety competencies.

Train and certify educators at scale by creating a national teacher upskilling track on media literacy and AI-manipulated content, integrated into teacher colleges, pedagogical institutes, and online platforms.


Scale community-based learning through the Digital Compass initiative, transforming libraries and cultural centres into Media Resilience Hubs that deliver practical media literacy sessions, intergenerational mentorship, and verified digital skills for adults aged 55+.

SECTION 1 – SYNOPSIS

- Telegram is the primary source of news for 73% of Ukrainians.¹⁵
- In 2024, the number of people in Ukraine consuming socio-political content on social media and messaging apps increased compared to the previous year (from 62% to 70% and from 55% to 62% respectively).¹⁶
- Public trust in Ukrainian media has continued to decrease, from a record 51% in 2022 to 27% in 2024, while distrust has reached a record high of 42%.¹⁷
- The share of the population with an above-average level of media literacy has decreased from 81% to 76% between 2022 and 2023, with people aged 18–25 demonstrating higher media literacy due to strong digital competence, while the 56–65 age group shows a significantly lower level.¹⁸
- Over 80% of teens rely on social media as their main news source, making them highly exposed to algorithm-driven misinformation.¹⁹
- Only 38% of teachers report feeling confident about teaching digital literacy, revealing a critical gap in educator preparedness.²⁰
- Over 60% of Ukrainians aged 55+ trust TV and social media as their main news sources, despite these being primary vectors of false information.²¹
- Digital exclusion remains significant: many older adults report either irregular Internet use or lack of digital skills, which limits their ability to verify news, use online civic tools, or fully engage with digital public services.²²



Context



¹⁵ Council of Europe. (2023). *Opinion on the Draft Law of Ukraine on Media (Lex-06)*. <https://rm.coe.int/lex-06-legal-opinion-ukraine/1680b5128a>

¹⁶ Detector Media. (2024). *Media literacy index of Ukrainians 2020-2024: Fifth wave*. <https://en.detector.media/post/media-literacy-index-of-ukrainians-2020-2024-fifth-wave>

¹⁷ Rating. (2025). *Ukrainians trust Telegram and YouTube more than traditional media Findings from a sociological survey*. https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/685c279caf66f4023ad2cab4/68b56060e327619e3d064c0b_FRG%20LMF%20IMS%20mediar%20aug%202025%20ENG.pdf

¹⁸ UNESCO. (2025). *UNESCO's campaigns on media and information literacy empower millions in Ukraine to think critically*. <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/unescos-campaigns-media-and-information-literacy-empower-millions-ukraine-think-critically>

¹⁹ UNICEF. (2022, December 27). *Fakes or facts. Can Ukrainian youth see the difference? U-Report*. <https://www.unicef.org/ukraine/en/stories/fakes-or-facts>

²⁰ Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine; European Commission Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture; European Training Foundation. (2025, November 14). *Ukraine launches study of teachers' digital competencies using SELFIE for Teachers*. <https://mon.gov.ua/news/v-ukraini-startuie-doslidzhennia-tsyfrovyykh-kompetentnostei-uchyteliv-za-dopomohoiu-selfie-for-teachers>

²¹ OPORA Public Network. (2023). *Media consumption habits of Ukrainians: the second year of full-scale war*. https://opora.org/en/polit_ad/24796-mediaspozhyvannia-ukrayintsiv-drugii-rik-povnomasshtabnoyi-viini-24796

²² United Nations Development Programme. (2024, January 26). *Ukrainians begin using Internet more, with 80% online every day, social survey finds*. <https://www.undp.org/ukraine/press-releases/ukrainians-begin-using-internet-more-80-online-every-day-social-survey-finds>
International Telecommunication Union. (2025). *Ukraine – Digital Development Country Profile. (2025 version)*. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Regional-Presence/Europe/Documents/Publications/Final_Ukraine%20Digital%20Development%20Country%20Profile%20version%203.0.pdf

SECTION 1 – SYNOPSIS

- How can EU–Ukraine cooperation and mutual learning transform the fight against disinformation into a model of resilient digital democracy in the context of hybrid warfare?
- What measures are required to build an effective digital ecosystem on the path to Ukraine’s accession to the EU?


TARGET AUDIENCES

- **Youth NGOs and Regional Education Departments:** Implement the Youth Media Mentorship Network, empowering students to act as Media Ambassadors in their schools and communities through peer learning and civic engagement. Implement the Digital Companions Network, mobilising young volunteers to mentor older adults and to promote intergenerational learning and digital inclusion.
- **Ukrainian Library Association:** Mobilises its library network to host Media Resilience Hubs, delivers localised workshops, and supports lifelong learning for older adults through accessible, community-based spaces.

WHO IS IMPACTED

- **Ukrainian citizens:** Directly affected by disinformation campaigns and platform regulation. Their media literacy, trust in government institutions, and political participation determine the resilience of democracy.
- **Journalists and media workers:** Need sustainable funding, training, and legal protections to operate independently. Their work underpins trustworthy communication in a hybrid warfare environment.
- **Youth and students:** The most active online users and, therefore, the most exposed to manipulation.²³ Hence, empowering them with digital literacy and civic engagement tools ensures long-term resilience.
- **Older adults (55+):** Among the most vulnerable to disinformation due to lower digital skills, limited access to reliable online resources, and high trust in traditional and social media, which are frequently exploited by malign actors. Strengthening their media and digital literacy, especially in rural and post-industrial regions, is essential to reducing systemic exposure and ensuring that all age groups contribute to Ukraine’s long-term democratic resilience.

Central Questions



Stakeholders

DECISION-MAKERS

- **National Security and Defence Council:** Sets national security priorities, including countering hybrid threats. Co-ordinates intelligence and inter-agency responses to information operations.
- **Ministry of Digital Transformation:** Oversees the digital infrastructure, hosting the Digital Companions Network on Diia.Education and ensuring accessibility of learning tools. Aligns national digital competence standards with EU frameworks. Oversees digital rights regulation and co-ordinates with tech companies and international partners.
- **Ministry of Social Policy:** Leads the Digital Compass initiative, co-ordinating curriculum development, facilitator training, and regional rollout. Integrates the initiative into the State Lifelong Learning Strategy and links it with social protection networks to reach vulnerable older adults.
- **Cabinet of Ministers:** Provides institutional anchoring, securing permanent budget lines and ensuring coherence with EU accession and acquis approximation commitments.
- **Ministry of Education and Science:** Leads the design, adoption, and rollout of the National Media and Digital Literacy Curriculum Integration Program. Ensures that media, digital, and AI literacy are embedded across all subjects and grades, co-ordinates teacher certification via the State Education Register, and oversees nationwide monitoring and audits of implementation.

²³ Horlach, P. (2024, August 13). TikTok and Telegram — the most popular social networks among Ukrainian children and youth. *Suspilne I News*. <https://suspihne-media/culture/812865-tiktok-youtube-telegram-najpopularnisi-socmerezji-sered-ukrainskih-ditej-ta-molodi-doslidzenna/>

DECISION-MAKERS

- **Parliamentary Committee on Education, Science and Innovation:** Provides political and legislative backing for integrating media literacy into the national curriculum, ensuring the necessary amendments to the National Curriculum Framework and alignment with education modernisation and EU integration commitments.
- **European Commission Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture:** Offers policy guidance, funding co-ordination, and technical expertise to align Ukraine's reforms with EU standards. Through Erasmus+ and the Digital Europe Programme, supports capacity-building, curriculum alignment, and eventual recognition of Ukrainian teacher certification within the European Education Area.
- **Erasmus+ and the Digital Europe Programme:** Finance key components such as teacher training, digital innovation, and educational infrastructure, ensuring alignment with the European Digital Education Action Plan and supporting Ukraine's integration into the European Education Area.
- **EU Delegation to Ukraine and Erasmus+:** Supply policy and financial support at the country level, ensuring the guidelines align with the EU Digital Education Action Plan and the European Pillar of Social Rights. Erasmus+ funds train mobility and peer exchanges among facilitators.
- **International Institute of Educational Planning (IIEP/UNESCO):** Provides global expertise in educational planning, policy design, and capacity-building, supporting school-based and lifelong learning reforms. Guides curriculum development, monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and teacher/facilitator training. Ensures that media and digital literacy initiatives for youth and older adults align with international standards in evidence-based educational planning, effective pedagogy, and inclusive lifelong learning.
- **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Ukraine:** Ensures inclusivity, gender responsiveness, and accessibility in rural and post-industrial communities. Strengthens facilitator capacity and local governance of learning initiatives.

Other relevant stakeholders

- **EU Member States:** Share threat intelligence and best practices. Cooperate with Ukraine through bilateral and EU mechanisms. Develop national and international hybrid defence strategies.
- **European Digital Rights:** Works to defend and advance digital rights across Europe. Provides expert analysis to policy-makers, co-ordinates advocacy campaigns, and ensures the interests of European citizens are reflected in digital policy debates.
- **European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE):** Strengthens informational security by providing expertise and training for countering hybrid threats. Shares best practices and gives opportunities to test new ideas and approaches.
- **Digital Security Lab Ukraine:** Conducts consultations and audits on digital security, advises on protecting accounts and devices, and explains security principles during trainings and webinars.
- **European External Action Service (EEAS), Strategic Communications Division:** Monitors foreign information manipulation and interference. Runs the EU Rapid Alert System and EUvsDisinfo. Supports EU member states and partners in countering disinformation.
- **European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO):** Identifies and analyses disinformation campaigns, often through collaboration with media organisations and online platforms. Provides tools and resources for fact-checkers and researchers.
- **Detector Media:** Supplies locally relevant content, disinformation case studies, and analysis for classroom integration. Contributes to the development of teaching materials and supports ongoing monitoring of youth digital engagement and media consumption.

Other relevant stakeholders

- **StopFake (Media Reforms Centre):** A flagship project that identifies and refutes cases of disinformation about events in Ukraine being circulated in the media. Also disseminates video digests online and on local television.
- **VoxCheck (VoxUkraine):** Provides analytical and fact-checking expertise, ensuring factual accuracy in educational materials and conducting youth-focused digital behaviour assessments to measure change in information discernment. Designs fact-checking exercises and collaborates with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on national surveys measuring changes in disinformation susceptibility and media engagement patterns.
- **Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law:** Develops independent public media and fosters active citizenship by monitoring and counteracting restrictive legislation, conducting research, and providing impartial legal expertise.
- **IREX (International Research and Exchanges Board):** Leads the train-the-trainer cascade model to equip 25,000 teachers with media and digital literacy competencies. Supports curriculum development, instructional design, and outcome-monitoring under the Learn to Discern methodology. Supports curriculum co-development, pilot evaluation, and refinement of adult learning materials.
- **Ukrainian Institute of Education Development:** Oversees teacher training logistics and maintains the State Education Register. Manages the National Media Literacy Dashboard to track progress and ensure transparent reporting.
- **Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Rating Group:** Conduct baseline and follow-up surveys on media literacy outcomes, misinformation exposure, and civic trust, providing data for policy refinement and accountability.
- **Internews Ukraine and EUvsDisinfo:** Lead the national storytelling and communication campaign, promoting narratives of older adults successfully countering disinformation and strengthening the social visibility of media literacy practices.



Strategic Vision 1:

To respond to an increase in AI-driven disinformation, major US technology companies launched the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), which introduced a technology to use digital fingerprints (metadata) to track content back to its original source, which may also be used in countering disinformation. Recognising that social media algorithms create echo chambers that may benefit from additional

TAILORING EU DIGITAL CONTENT AUTHENTICITY STANDARDS, COMBATING POLARISATION, AND EMPOWERING SOCIAL MEDIA SOURCE-CHECKING

fact-checking tools by tracing the origin of a publication, and acknowledging that an initiative led by US companies²⁴ may raise concerns regarding EU privacy laws and governmental outreach,²⁵ its standard should be adapted into a European standard with civil society oversight and a transparent legislative process, and piloting the programme in Ukraine's public sector.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ☀ By 2035, 90% of newly created and widely shared content in digital media in the EU is expected to be compliant with the EU's Authenticity Standards, based on the C2PA standard, tested and piloted in Ukraine, and tailored to meet EU legal and technical needs.
- ☀ By 2030:
 - All platforms with more than 1 million monthly users will adopt these authenticity standards, starting with political ads, news outlets, and social media.
 - Real-time verification tools will label 80% of harmful or misleading posts within 24 hours.
- ☀ By 2033:
 - 70% of digital media users in Ukraine trust that the digital media they consume is authentic and subject to regular community checks, and regularly use the transparently created verification tools before sharing content.
 - Russian-originated disinformation content sees a 50% drop in engagement in the EU and Ukraine.

²⁴ The C2PA provides an open technical standard for publishers, creators, and consumers to establish the origin and edits of digital content. <https://c2pa.org>

²⁵ Rand Corporation. (2025, June). *Overpromising on digital provenance and security*. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/06/overpromising-on-digital-provenance-and-security.html>

²⁶ A VeraAI report extensively explores the C2PA's pivotal role in addressing the challenges of content authentication and its potential to set a global standard for provenance and trust in digital media for broadcasters. Hoffmann, H., Arcidiacono, A., Badr Taddist, M., Gaye, L., & Verbaere, L. (2025, 30 July). *Content provenance and authentication for trusted content with C2PA*. vera.ai. <https://www.veraai.eu/posts/c2pa-report-published>

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By 2027, the European Commission Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT), in collaboration with the Ministry of Digital Transformation, the C2PA, and the EEAS, will develop EU-tailored authenticity standards, adapting the C2PA standard to the EU policy requirements with regard to privacy and data protection. These standards will be legally integrated into the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act and Digital Services Act (DSA) to ensure compliance. Following the cost assessment, the Digital Europe Programme will fund pilot testing, initially focusing on war-crime reporting and political ads. By 2028, compliance by social media platforms will be mandated for political ads and official news outlets (creators of which may voluntarily start working with the C2PA standard), expanding to social media and anonymous sources after impact and privacy assessment.

Action 2.

In 2027, DG CONNECT, in partnership with the Ministry of Digital Transformation, Eurostat, and civil society groups (e.g., the European Digital Media Observatory and Debunk.eu on the EU side, and StopFake, Texty, and Detector Media from Ukraine), will launch a 12-month joint pilot programme in Ukraine to co-develop and refine the EU Digital Content Authenticity Standards. This pilot will embed C2PA-based verification tools in war reporting, public communications, and political reporting, with automated monthly feedback sessions involving journalists, fact-checkers, and citizens to assess usability, trust, and technical gaps. This joint initiative becomes a shared response to disinformation threats, leveraging Ukraine's front-line experience with hybrid warfare to create a model for digital defence that benefits Ukraine and the EU. Pilot-testing the system in Ukraine will allow the EU to adapt and

refine it based on real-world challenges before full-scale adoption across member states. The lessons learned from this pilot will be used to adopt best practices for the benefit of EU and Ukrainian citizens, strengthening the overall digital resilience of the European information space.

Action 3.

During the pilot programme, the European Digital Media Observatory Ukraine Hub, in partnership with StopFake, Texty, and Detector Media, will develop and launch a Public Trust Dashboard to track real-time disinformation trends, content verification, and user trust metrics in Ukraine. The open-access dashboard can feature interactive elements for the average user, as well as detailed access tools for researchers upon request. Monthly public reports and policy labs with EU officials will ensure that pilot insights directly inform further improvements to the EU AI Act and DSA. By December 2027, the pilot's findings will be consolidated into a report, providing insights that will serve as a model for further programme improvements in the EU.

Action 4.

During the pilot programme, the European Digital Media Observatory Ukraine Hub, in partnership with StopFake, Texty, and Detector Media, will develop and launch a Public Trust Dashboard to track real-time disinformation trends, content verification, and user trust metrics in Ukraine. The open-access dashboard can feature interactive elements for the average user, as well as detailed access tools for researchers upon request. Monthly public reports and policy labs with EU officials will ensure that pilot insights directly inform further improvements to the EU AI Act and DSA. By December 2027, the pilot's findings will be consolidated into a report, providing insights that will serve as a model for further programme improvements in the EU.

Action 5.

To prevent overreach and foster dialogue with social media platforms, by 2028, EU-funded AI labs, such as ELLIS (the European Laboratory for Learning and Intelligent Systems) and the Institute for Ethical AI & Machine Learning, in cooperation with the European Commission, will partner with the very large online platforms and very large search engines (VLOPs and VLOSEs)²⁷ to explore the EU privacy concerns in creating and using one-click verification tools combining digital content

²⁷ European Commission. (n.d.). DSA: Very large online platforms and search engines. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops>


authenticity and AI natural language processing models. These tools, depending on the member states' current susceptibility to disinformation²⁸, may first prioritise the most vulnerable languages and be integrated into browsers and social media platforms in the form of extensions or fact-check pop-ups, and later promoted in Eastern Partnership states through EEAS-supported projects. By 2029, the European Commission, in collaboration with the abovementioned actors, will establish a fund to provide financial and technical support to small local media outlets to facilitate the integration of C2PA-based tools. This fund will offer grants, training programmes, and technical assistance to ensure that these outlets can comply with the new standards without facing significant financial or technical barriers.

Action 6.

By 2030, the European Commission will require VLOPs and VLOSEs to integrate the EU-tailored and transparently created C2PA verification tools into their systems. To prepare for full EU compliance, a pilot programme in 2029 will focus on the largest social media and messaging platforms in Ukraine. As part of the knowledge-sharing process, members of the public will receive training on labelling their content as verified and traceable. This training will prioritise recognising content such as war-related photos and political advertising, given their critical importance in combating disinformation. For wider access, the programme will use gamified tools and organise monthly hackathons, jointly created by the EU private-sector entities, Ukrainian tech companies, and Ukrainian civil society fact-checking organisations, supported by grants from the Digital Europe Programme.

Action 7.

To improve the up-to-date strategic awareness of the EU counter-disinformation initiatives and lower the impact of echo chambers on social polarisation, member states' and Ukrainian cyber forces will use the data collected from the Public Trust Dashboard during the pilot implementation of the EU Content Authenticity Standards. Powered by natural language processing AI, the tools mentioned above will be used to improve the mapping of algorithmic echo chambers, further allowing for the creation of tailored and algorithm-friendly narratives that prevent polarisation and echo chambers. The tools will be piloted in Ukraine by 2028, with the goal of improving the content production of EU institutions based on engagement metrics. An external Telegram fact-check add-on, jointly developed by the Ministry of Digital Transformation in cooperation with the EU, Ukraine's civil society, and relevant private companies, will be tested in Ukraine. Privacy safeguards will be transparently assessed and improved prior to the EU rollout. As part of the Tallinn Mechanism²⁹ and the IT Coalition cooperation frameworks, the decision-makers of the member states will use the analytics collected as a tool of strategic forecasting of the central destabilisation interests of adversaries, and allow for wider defence preparedness and cooperation.



²⁸ Disinformation Observatory. (n.d.). *The Pravda Ecosystem: Publications Analysis Dashboard*, Dec 2024-Mar 2025. <https://disinfobs.com/index.php/access-pravda-ecosystem-dashboard-report/>

²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Estonia. (n.d.). *Tallinn Mechanism*. <https://vm.ee/en/international-law-cyber-diplomacy/cyber-diplomacy/tallinn-mechanism>

Strategic Vision 2:

ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS TO TACKLE HYBRID WARFARE THREATS

The EU DSA's mandatory framework for VLOPs and VLOSEs was designed to regulate platforms that have a disproportionate societal impact and have a greater capacity to spread disinformation due to their extensive reach.^{30 31} Yet, it fails to account for platforms that do not exceed officially reported 45 million MAU in the EU, such as Telegram. Despite being one of the critical vectors for disinformation, Telegram's under-reporting of MAU in Europe allows it to avoid DSA obligations.³² To bridge this gap, Ukraine, the country most targeted by

Russian hybrid attacks, can leverage its regulatory agility to pilot targeted legislation for platforms that exceed 1 million MAU.³³ Furthermore, a 'wartime addendum' should be introduced for exceptional security circumstances. Such a transparent, rights-respecting regulatory model can complement and strengthen the DSA. Thus, a joint EU-Ukraine endeavour will yield better protection against disinformation online and enable knowledge exchange, making Ukraine a valuable partner and innovative leader.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✦ By 2030, comprehensive digital transparency legislation applying to all platforms with more than 1 million MAU is enacted by Ukraine, including clearly delimited exceptional measures aligned with human rights standards. The legislation explicitly defines criteria for what constitutes disinformation, transparency, and accountability.
- ✦ By 2031, independent audits of platforms exceeding 1 million MAU are conducted annually, assessing compliance with transparency and disinformation mitigation standards. Audit results are published, with a minimum of 80% of recommendations implemented within 12 months of each report.
- ✦ By 2035, Ukraine consistently applies enforcement mechanisms, such as fines, sanctions, and operational restrictions, to non-compliant platforms. Official annual reports by the Ministry of Digital Transformation demonstrate a 90% compliance rate among targeted platforms. To ensure that the addition for special circumstances is not utilised outside of its prescribed purpose, civil society is engaged at every stage of the regulation process, including development, implementation, and enforcement. Introducing levers for civil society to influence the regulation also mitigates the risk of state interference.
- ✦ By 2040, Ukraine's legislative and enforcement framework serves as a reference model for EU member states and is considered for incorporation into future revisions of the DSA.

³⁰ European Commission. (2025). DSA: Very large online platforms and search engines | Shaping Europe's digital future. Digital-Strategy.ec.europa.eu. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops>

³¹ Poldi, F., Alaphilippe, A., Jonusaite, R., & Sessa, M. G. (2022). Disinformation on Telegram: Research and Content Moderation Policies.

³² European Fact-Checking Standards Network. (2024). Fact-checking and related Risk-Mitigation Measures for Disinformation in the Very Large Online Platforms: A systematic review of the implementation of big tech commitments to the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation – European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). <https://efcsn.com/report-fact-checking-vlops-2024/>

³³ The threshold of 1 million MAU is used because platforms exceeding it have sufficient reach to influence public opinion, amplify co-ordinated disinformation campaigns, and shape national-level narratives. The threshold reflects Ukraine's media and population realities, as the country's digital ecosystem is significantly smaller than the EU's, which is regulated by the DSA. Moreover, the regulation is platform-neutral and content-agnostic, meaning it does not presume that certain platforms are inherently harmful. Instead, it adopts a forward-looking approach to mitigation of platforms that may emerge in the place of existing ones, and introduces predictable triggers for obligations, while remaining flexible enough to be paired with differentiated requirements.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By the end of 2026, the Ministry of Digital Transformation presents the draft of a platform-neutral legislative proposal for all digital services surpassing 1 million MAU. The ministry convenes a working group with EU specialists (representing organisations such as European Digital Rights, EUvsDisinfo, Hybrid CoE, and the EDMO), Ukrainian civil society actors (such as Digital Security Lab Ukraine, Detector Media, VoxCheck, and StopFake), and ministry representatives to define criteria and scope, establishing a bi-monthly feedback loop with the advisors to refine the proposal. The ministry continuously publishes public progress reports every six months to ensure transparency.

Action 2.


By the end of 2027, Ukraine and the EEAS establish a unified Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Response Hub, integrated into Ukraine's National Cybersecurity Strategy and the EU's Rapid Alert System.³⁴ The hub will use the STIX/TAXII data-exchange standard to collect, visualise, and share verified cases of disinformation and co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour, enabling a co-ordinated cross-border response within 24–48 hours of detection. The National Security and Defence Council fosters a deeper cooperative relationship with the countries most targeted by russia (e.g., Germany, France, Moldova, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) with the aim of conducting joint threat assessments and exercises to test response protocols. All parties are to track progress with quarterly milestone reviews and adjust timelines as needed.

Action 3.

By 2027, third parties and the government will conduct information-awareness campaigns with the aim of educating at least 85% of the adult population about the new legislation. The purpose is to explain what the new legislation entails, why it is enacted, and how it will impact the public. This will empower citizens to participate in decision-making through the expression of their opinion and ensure a more participatory and inclusive policy-making process. Special attention should be paid to groups that are traditionally excluded from political activity: persons with disabilities, rural communities, especially rural youth, socio-economically disadvantaged individuals, migrants, and ethnic minorities.

Action 4.

By 2028, independent audits are to be piloted by third-party digital rights groups for all platforms exceeding 1 million MAU to assess the transparency, quality of conduct, and compliance with the established legal norms.



³⁴ EEAS. (2025a). *EEAS Privacy Statement - Rapid Alert System (RAS), Communicators Portal (CP) and Network Against Disinformation (NAD)*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eeas-privacy-statement-rapid-alert-system-ras-communicators-portal-cp-and-network-against_en

³⁵ OASIS. (n.d.). *Introduction to Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX)*. https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/docs/Introduction_to_Structured_Threat_Information_Expression.pdf

Strategic Vision 3:

CROSS-CURRICULAR MEDIA LITERACY REFORM

The fragmentation of Ukraine’s media literacy initiatives, which are largely donor-driven and short-term, has left a generation of young Ukrainians vulnerable to manipulation, polarisation, and algorithmic echo chambers. To close this gap, by 2030, the Ministry of Education and Science will implement the National Media and Digital Literacy Curriculum Integration Programme, a reform initiative establishing media

and digital literacy as a mandatory cross-curricular competence across school grades 5–12. All secondary schools will be mandated to adopt the integrated curriculum, with compliance verified through annual ministry audits, setting a benchmark for the EU’s broader digital democracy agenda and demonstrating how education can be leveraged as a strategic instrument of national security and democratic resilience.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

By 2030:

- ✦ 100% of secondary schools (grades 5–12) integrate media, digital, and AI literacy across the national curriculum as cross-disciplinary competencies.
- ✦ 25,000³⁷ teachers receive relevant certification through accredited national professional development programmes, monitored via the State Education Register.
- ✦ 85% of students (ages 10–17) achieve verified proficiency in disinformation recognition and digital ethics (assessed through national testing aligned with PISA Global Competence frameworks).
- ✦ 70% reduction in the engagement of youth aged 10–17 with unverified or misleading digital content, measured through standardised national assessments, digital behaviour surveys, and independent monitoring conducted by Detector Media and VoxCheck, positioning Ukraine among the top five European countries on the Open Society Institute’s Media Literacy Index by 2035.
- ✦ Strengthen youth civic trust by achieving a 30% increase in trust in democratic institutions (baseline 32%), trust in independent media (baseline 28%), and youth voter intention (baseline 41%) by 2035, measured through annual Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Rating Group civic-attitude surveys. These indicators are viewed as long-term civic trust indicators.

³⁶ Other European countries provide relevant best-practice examples for media literacy integration, demonstrating scalable approaches that Ukraine can adapt to its national context: Finnish National Agency for Education. (n.d.). *Multiliteracy and media literacy: Making sense of the complex contemporary world*. <https://www.oph.fi/en/education-and-qualifications/multiliteracy-and-media-literacy>; Baltic Centre for Media Excellence. (2023). *Echoes of the Digital Age: Media literacy in Estonia*. SALTO-Youth. https://www.salto-youth.net/downloads/toolbox_tool_download-file-4753/ECHOES-OF-THE-DIGITAL-AGE_-ENG.pdf

³⁷ This target is based on an estimated secondary level (grades 5–12) teacher population of about 312,000 (ITU/UNESCO, 2019), amounting to around 8% of that cohort. Cascade ‘train-the-trainer’ models (e.g., IREX’s Learn to Discern and academic DEreform programmes) often train 20–30% of core multipliers in similar contexts, making this a realistic and scalable goal. International Telecommunication Union & UNESCO. (2019). *Education sector planning in Ukraine: Key figures and policy implications*. (Report). https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/phcb/D-PHCB-CONN_EDUC-2021-PDF-E.pdf; ElHamamsy, L., Monnier, E.-C., Avry, S., ChesselLazarotto, F., Liégeois, G., Bruno, B., Dehler Zufferey, J., & Mondada, F. (2023). *An adapted cascade model to scale primary school digital education curricular reforms and teacher professional development programs* [Preprint]. arXiv. <https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.02751>

³⁸ For the purposes of this paper, ‘youth’ refers to individuals aged 10–17, corresponding to students enrolled in grades 5–12 in the general secondary education system. This age range aligns with EU and UNESCO media literacy frameworks and reflects the group most exposed to early algorithmic influence, digital-platform use, and disinformation risks. UNESCO. (2022). *Global Standards for Media and Information Literacy Curricula Development Guidelines*. https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/2022/02/Global%20Standards%20for%20Media%20and%20Information%20Literacy%20Curricula%20Development%20Guidelines_EN.pdf; European Commission. (2025). *Guidelines for teachers to foster digital literacy and tackle disinformation*. European Education Area. <https://education.ec.europa.eu/focus-topics/digital-education/action-plan/action-7>

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

Between 2025 and 2027, the Ministry of Education and Science, together with the Parliamentary Committee on Education and with technical input from the European Commission Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, UNESCO, IIEP-UNESCO, IREX, StopFake, Detector Media, and VoxCheck, will develop and adopt an updated National Curriculum Framework introducing mandatory media, digital, and AI literacy competencies across all general secondary schools. The framework will explicitly link media literacy to civic education outcomes, defining practical competencies such as source verification, recognition of manipulated or AI-generated content, understanding algorithmic influence, and evaluating information in democratic contexts across subjects including history, Ukrainian language, and civic education.

Action 2.

From 2025 to 2028, the Ukrainian Institute of Education Development, in partnership with IREX and Ukrainian media literacy organisations, will implement a phased cascade train-the-trainer model to equip teachers with the skills needed to deliver the new curriculum. Training will begin with baseline competency assessment and foundational fact-checking skills, followed by advanced modules on AI-generated content, digital ethics, and civic reasoning. 25,000 teachers will be certified, with state-recognised digital badges recorded in the State Education Register to ensure quality assurance and accountability.

Action 3.

Between 2026 and 2028, the Ministry of Education and Science, supported by Erasmus+ and the Digital Europe Programme, will launch a national open-access digital platform supporting the integrated curriculum. The platform will provide cross-subject lesson plans, textbook-aligned exercises, and gamified verification tasks that link media analysis to real civic topics such as elections, public discourse, and information warfare. AI-enabled adaptive tools will allow students to practice critical decision-making while enabling teachers to monitor learning outcomes consistently nationwide.

Action 4.

Between 2026 and 2030, an independent evaluation consortium led by IREX, VoxCheck, and IIEP-UNESCO will conduct regular assessments of teacher readiness, student media literacy, and civic-reasoning skills. Results will be published through a publicly accessible National Media Literacy Dashboard, co-managed by the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ukrainian Institute of Education Development, tracking not only technical competencies but also indicators related to trust in democratic institutions, responsible participation, and resilience to disinformation.

Action 5.

From 2027 to 2029, the Ministry of Education and Science, in partnership with regional education departments, youth NGOs, parent associations, and supported by IREX and Detector Media, will establish the national Youth Media Mentorship Network. Integrated into civic education programming, the network will mobilise students as Media Ambassadors to lead peer workshops, school campaigns, and community initiatives linking fact-checking and digital ethics to democratic participation, public debate, and community dialogue, reinforcing media literacy as a lived civic practice beyond the classroom.

Strategic Vision 4:

Ukraine's older population, particularly people over 55 years living in rural and post-industrial regions, remains disproportionately exposed to disinformation,³⁹ which is compounded by limited digital access, low media literacy, and high trust in traditional and social media channels exploited by malign actors. To address this systemic vulnerability, the Ministry of Social Policy, in partnership with the Ministry of Digital Transformation, the EU Delegation to Ukraine, UNDP, IREX, Detector Media, and the Ukrainian Library Association, will implement the Digital Compass initiative,⁴⁰ a co-funded national programme to equip adults aged 55+ with verified information skills and practical digital competencies. Through the transformation of libraries, cultural centres, and community cafés into Media Resilience Hubs, the initiative will deliver small-group learning circles, intergenerational mentorship sessions under the Digital Companions Network, and online modules via Diia.Education, jointly designed with IIEP-UNESCO. Programme monitoring will be managed through the National Adult Education Registry and evaluated by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and VoxCheck, ensuring transparent measurement of behavioural change and programme impact, establishing Ukraine as a European leader in inclusive, community-based media resilience and lifelong digital empowerment.

EMPOWERING ADULTS WITH MEDIA AND DIGITAL LITERACY SKILLS**Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)**

- ✿ By the end of 2026, the Ministry of Social Policy, through open procurement of national polling services and in cooperation with relevant and interested NGOs, establishes the first nationally representative baseline on disinformation susceptibility among adults aged 55+. The baseline will use standardised tools including fact-checking comprehension tests, recognition of false or AI-manipulated content, and platform-specific exposure indicators. This dataset becomes the national reference point for tracking behavioural change and guiding EU–Ukraine digital resilience programming.
- ✿ By 2032, Ukraine achieves a 50% reduction in susceptibility to disinformation among adults aged 55+, as demonstrated through repeat national surveys benchmarked against the 2026 measurement. Improvements will be observed across recall accuracy, reduced engagement with false content, increased use of verification tools, and greater self-reported confidence in navigating digital information environments.
- ✿ By 2032, at least 1.5 million adults aged 55+ complete certified media and digital literacy training through the Digital Compass initiative or affiliated Ministry of Social Policy–Ministry of Digital Transformation initiatives, ensuring nationwide reach in rural and post-industrial regions. Completion rates will be verified through the National Adult Education Registry, which tracks regional participation, demographic reach, and learner progress.
- ✿ By 2028, over 10,000 facilitators, librarians, and community mentors are trained and certified under state-recognised lifelong learning standards, creating a professionalised workforce capable of delivering high-quality, community-based media literacy support. These facilitators will form the backbone of the Media Resilience Hub network and anchor long-term sustainability.
- ✿ By 2030, every oblast hosts at least one permanent Media Resilience Hub functioning as a civic learning centre dedicated to disinformation resilience, digital inclusion, and community outreach. Hubs will provide regular workshops, intergenerational mentorship sessions, open digital clinics, and verified-media access points, with annual reporting integrated into Ministry of Social Policy and Ministry of Digital Transformation monitoring systems.
- ✿ By 2032, national polling shows that at least 70% of older Ukrainians trust verified media sources and feel confident in identifying and challenging disinformation narratives, reflecting sustained behavioural and attitudinal change. This will be measured through longitudinal surveys conducted by public polling providers, monitoring from relevant NGOs, and digital user-behaviour analytics from Diia.Education.

³⁹ Detector Media. (2024). *Media Literacy Index of Ukrainians 2020–2023 (4th wave)*. <https://en.detector.media/post/media-literacy-index-of-ukrainians-2020-2023-fourth-wave>

⁴⁰ Two notable European initiatives provide precedent for the Digital Compass approach: *Information Matters Project, EAVI, 2024*; <https://informationmatters.eu/>; *SUM Project ('Seniors United Against Misinformation')*, Luksua, Tortajada, & Cremonini, 2024 <https://www.wearesum.eu/>

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

Between 2026 and 2028, the Ministry of Social Policy, with technical support from UNDP Ukraine, Detector Media, and IREX, implements the Digital Compass initiative through a phased rollout. The programme begins with the co-development of an adult-appropriate curriculum, facilitator guide, and open-access toolkits in Ukrainian, defining learning objectives that combine media literacy, digital skills, and trust in democratic and e-governance institutions. Pilot learning circles are then launched and refined before scaling to 150 Digital Compass learning circles across five pilot oblasts,⁴¹ selected to reflect regional, socio-economic, and digital access diversity. This approach enables evidence-based national expansion, with 1,000 facilitators trained and a monitoring system established to ensure quality, inclusivity, and measurable improvements in media literacy, digital confidence, and civic resilience.

Action 2.

From 2026, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, with support from Erasmus+, establishes the Digital Companions Network within Diia.Education, enabling structured intergenerational mentorship between youth volunteers and adults aged 55+. Beyond basic digital navigation, the network will focus on guided use of e-governance tools, safe online communication, and critical engagement with public information, directly strengthening trust in digital public services. Participation data and learning outcomes will be reported to the National Adult Education Registry.

Action 3.

Between 2026 and 2028, a national public information and storytelling campaign, led by qualified NGOs working on media literacy and civic education, showcases real-life examples of older adults successfully navigating disinformation, digital services, and civic processes. The campaign will link media literacy to everyday democratic agency, from informed voting to confident use of public platforms, reaching an estimated 2 million citizens through television, radio, and social media.

Action 4.

During 2027–2028, the Ministry of Social Policy commissions a nationally representative evaluation of adults' media literacy, digital competence, and civic confidence through public procurement of polling and research services, with advisory input from relevant NGOs. The assessment will measure not only exposure to disinformation, but also trust in verified media, confidence in e-governance tools, and perceived ability to participate in public life, establishing a baseline and midline for long-term democratic resilience tracking.

Action 5.

By 2029, the Cabinet of Ministers incorporates the Digital Compass initiative into the State Lifelong Learning Strategy, securing permanent budget lines and aligning its content and certification standards with relevant EU Lifelong Learning and Digital Competence frameworks, in line with Ukraine's EU accession process and acquis approximation commitments.

⁴¹ The selection of five oblasts is grounded in international best practice for policy piloting and evidence-based scaling. Piloting across multiple regions allows programmes to capture geographic, socio-economic, and digital-access diversity while remaining operationally manageable. Research indicates that piloting in 4-6 subnational units provides sufficient variation to test implementation models, assess cost-effectiveness, and identify contextual risks before nationwide rollout. This approach balances representativeness with evaluability and is commonly used in EU-funded education, digital inclusion, and governance reforms. OECD. (2019). *Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions*. <https://www.oecd.org/gov/innovative-citizen-participation-and-new-democratic-institutions.pdf>; European Commission. (2021). *Better Regulation Toolbox*. https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation/better-regulation-toolbox_en

Strategic Vision 1:

- Within the first eight weeks, the European Commission and the Ministry of Digital Transformation will jointly prepare a roadmap for tailoring Content Authenticity Standards, based on existing dialogue with C2PA representatives and existing documentation. The immediate outcome is a publicly available plan that includes relevant institutions, platforms, and civil society actors, as well as suggestions for areas of cooperation.
- The EDMO and Ukrainian fact-checking organisations run a three-month pilot programme in selected Ukrainian digital newsrooms to apply basic authenticity labels in war reporting and political content, supported by targeted grants from the Digital Europe Programme.
- Using existing analytics tools, the EDMO and EUvsDisinfo will launch a simple Public Trust Dashboard within two months, providing solidified and updated insights into disinformation trends and user trust levels of digital media platforms and channels. Along with the steps of implementing content verification tools in Ukraine and the EU, this platform will be updated.

Strategic Vision 2:

- Within the first six months, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, in partnership with Detector Media and Digital Security Lab Ukraine, launches a public online hub compiling open-source data on disinformation trends, Telegram channel reach, and existing EU audits by utilising existing monitoring data from EUvsDisinfo, StopFake, and the EEAS Strategic Communications Division, and hosting the hub on an existing government website. Thus, a publicly accessible tracker that visualises disinformation incidents and platform behaviour is created to serve as a tangible artefact of transparency and early accountability.
- Within the first four months, the Ministry of Digital Transformation in cooperation with the EU Delegation to Ukraine, convene a consultative roundtable with Ukrainian NGOs, digital rights experts from the Digital Security Lab, journalists, and advisors from the EEAS East Stratcom Task Force to discuss the scope of the ‘wartime addendum’. The outcome will be a report summary and a platform-neutral regulation roadmap, demonstrating inclusive and participatory policymaking.

Strategic Vision 3:

- Within the first four months, the Ministry of Education and Science, together with IIEP-UNESCO and UNICEF, publishes five short, interactive micro-modules on topics such as ‘How Algorithms Shape What You See,’ ‘Spotting Manipulated Images’, and ‘Sourcing News on TikTok’, using existing materials from UNESCO’s media and information literacy curriculum⁴² and UNICEF’s digital safety packages⁴³. These modules are uploaded to Diia.Education’s youth section. The outcome is that students and teachers receive ready-to-use, plug-and-play digital lessons, requiring no new funding for platform development.

Strategic Vision 4:

- Within the first the months, the Ministry of Social Policy, in cooperation with Detector Media and IREX, compiles a Media Resilience Starter Pack for adults aged 55+, using already-available materials (fact-checking guides, scam alerts, basic digital safety instructions) from existing NGO resources. The ministry publishes it on its website and distributes it through libraries and community centres. The outcome is a nationally branded, low-cost resource that immediately signals government action on protecting older adults from disinformation.

⁴² UNESCO. (2021). *Media and information literacy curriculum: Think critically, click wisely*. <https://www.unesco.org/mil4teachers/en/curriculum>

⁴³ UNICEF. (2024). *Child safety online: Global challenges and strategies*. <https://www.unicef.org/documents/child-safety-online> UNICEF; UNICEF. (2024). *Child protection in digital education: Policy brief*. <https://www.unicef.org/media/134121/file/Child%20Protection%20in%20Digital%20Education%20Policy%20Brief.pdf>

SUPPORT FOR SMES AND TECH-DRIVEN ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Authors: Liudmyla Haliulko (Ukraine), Sirod Serbest Kalash (Sweden), Yuliia Pavlenko (Ukraine),
Maksym Karpluk (Ukraine), Loli Chibko (France)
Facilitator: Vasyl Babych (Ukraine)



Fast-track access of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to external markets through co-production: Ukraine, as a dual-use innovation hub, together with partners should launch a dedicated co-production and export gateway, secure joint intellectual property (IP), and benefit from early export guarantees to Euro-Atlantic markets.

Empower municipalities to drive SME growth: Ukraine should create a national framework enabling local tax incentives, one-stop digital business hubs, and closer cooperation with EU municipalities for capacity-building and a wider network of financing and procurement.

Digitise certification and licensing systems: Ukraine should further develop the digital infrastructure that integrates conformity and standardisation bodies to lower corruption and cut costs.

Context

- Dual-use items are goods, software, and technology that can be used for civilian and military applications.⁴⁴ Examples include artificial intelligence, biotechnology, satellite systems, and drones.
- 96% of drones used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine are domestically produced, showcasing rapid innovation amid war.⁴⁵
- The European Commission sees the development of dual-use technologies and infrastructure as a priority in its defence policy,⁴⁶ with Ukraine being a strategic ally in strengthening common European defence, as it already faces the greatest threat to the continent's security.
- SAFE is a €150 billion defence financing programme to boost EU member states' military readiness through joint procurement. Members of Ukraine's technology sector can take part on equal terms in procurement and export needed defence components to the EU under the programme.⁴⁷

Key Recommendations

- Ukraine has proposed a \$50 billion, five-year drone deal with the United States for the production of 10 million drones annually.⁴⁸ The United States could gain battlefield-tested Ukrainian drone technology in exchange for up to \$90 billion in US weapons.
- Brave1 has launched a grant programme for component manufacturers.⁴⁹ The goal is to accelerate the domestic development of technologies and increase their readiness.
- In 2025, the United States increased its contribution to support the reconstruction and economic development of Ukraine through the Joint US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund.⁵⁰



⁴⁴ European Parliament. (n.d.). Dual-use goods: what are they and why are new rules needed? <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20210319S-T000424/dual-use-goods-what-are-they-and-why-are-new-rules-needed>

⁴⁵ Tyshchenko, K. (2024, December 28). Ukrainian-made drones account for 96% of all UAVs for Ukraine's Defence Forces – Ukraine's Foreign Ministry. *Ukrainska Pravda*. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/12/28/7491157/>

⁴⁶ European Commission. (2025). *White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030*. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20-%20Readiness%202030.pdf

⁴⁷ Regulation - EU - 2025/1106 - EN - EUR-LEX. (n.d.). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32025R1106>

⁴⁸ Interfax-Ukraine. (2025, August 21). Ukraine offered the US the production of 10 million drones per year for 5 years - President Zelensky y. *Interfax-Ukraine*. <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1098004.html>

⁴⁹ Brave1 launched a grant program for the components manufacturers for Ukrainian weapons. (2025, December 4). *Militarnyy*. <https://militarnyy.com/uk/news/brave1-zapustyv-grantovu-programu-dlya-vyrobniv-kiv-komponentiv-dlya-ukrayinskoyi-zbroji/>

⁵⁰ Kitsoft. (n.d.). DFC is contributing USD 75 million to the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund. *Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine*. <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/dfc-vydiliaie-75-milijoniv-dolariv-do-amerykano-ukrainskoho-investytsiinoho-fondu-rekonstruktsii>

SECTION 1 – SYNOPSIS

- How can Ukrainian dual-use SMEs gain wider access to the European single market and expand technological cooperation with the United States?
- What measures can local governments in Ukraine take to create beneficial conditions for dual-use SMEs?
- How can dual-use SME certification and licensing systems be designed to reduce bureaucratic barriers to access the external markets?

EUROPE

- **European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW):** Responsible for EU policy on the internal market, industry, entrepreneurship, and SMEs.
- **European Commission Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST):** Responsible for overseeing EU support and financial instruments for Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction, and accession process, including the Ukraine Facility and its investment component, the Ukraine Investment Framework.
- **European Investment Bank:** The EU’s lending institution that finances projects to support smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth across Europe and beyond.
- **European Bank for Reconstruction and Development:** Promotes sustainable development and economic transformation by investing in private-sector growth, strengthening resilient markets, and supporting reforms.

UKRAINE

- **Ministry of Defence:** Directs, co-ordinates, and equips the Armed Forces of Ukraine, ensuring military readiness while fostering innovation, defence capability development, and integration with Euro-Atlantic security standards.
- **Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture:** Responsible for shaping economic policy, sustainable development, environmental protection, and agricultural modernisation to ensure balanced growth and integration into the single market.

Central Questions

Stakeholders

- **Ministry of Digital Transformation:** Responsible for driving the digital transformation and for developing digital infrastructure, public e-services, and innovation policies to build a modern digital state and economy.
- **State Service for Export Control (SSECU):** Ukraine’s export credit and guarantees agency that supports exporters by providing financial products, insurance, and risk mitigation to boost international trade.
- **Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry:** Supports enterprises by promoting trade, investment, and economic development.
- **Ukrainian Dual-Use Technology Cluster:** A network of organisations focused on developing and promoting technologies that have civilian and military applications.
- **Brave1:** A defence and dual-use tech co-ordination platform that accelerates the development and deployment of innovative military and dual-use technologies.
- **TechForce in UA:** National co-ordination platform that mobilises the tech community to rapidly deliver innovative digital, defence, and dual-use solutions, supporting front line needs while strengthening long-term technological resilience.
- **Entrepreneurship and Export Promotion Office:** national support platform that strengthens the business ecosystem by empowering entrepreneurs and expanding the global reach of Ukrainian companies through targeted export development tools and services.

UNITED STATES

Stakeholders

- **Office of the US Trade Representative:** Responsible for developing and coordinating US international trade, commodity, and direct investment policy, and overseeing negotiations with other countries.
- **US Department of Treasury:** Works to maintain a strong economy and create economic and job opportunities by promoting the conditions that enable economic growth and stability at home and abroad.
- **US Department of Commerce:** Works to drive economic competitiveness, strengthen domestic industry, and spur the growth of quality jobs.
- **US Department of War:** Coordinates and supervises all agencies and functions of the government relating directly to national security and the military.
- **American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine:** Business association that represents and advocates for US, international, and Ukrainian companies operating in Ukraine.
- **US-Ukraine Business Council:** Washington-based non-profit organisation that promotes US-Ukraine business relations and supports trade and investment between the two countries.



Strategic Vision 1:


The transformation of Ukraine’s dual-use technology sector is vital for economic recovery and long-term integration into transatlantic value chains. Cooperation between Ukrainian and US dual-use SMEs within NATO programmes and beyond will support the growth of the former as competitive innovators while creating shared intellectual property and licensing opportunities that also benefit US firms.

UKRAINIAN BREAKTHROUGH IN DUAL-USE INNOVATION AND EU MARKET INTEGRATION

Cooperation will also be strengthened with European partners, establishing joint ventures and supporting domestic production of high-tech components. This will enable Ukraine to become a more reliable, recognised exporter and contributor to a resilient and competitive industrial ecosystem.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✦ By 2038, Ukrainian and US SMEs will implement a DIANA-enabled (see following pages) co-production model for defence drones and dual-use tech, with Ukraine leading system integration and domestic production, enhancing supply-chain resilience and boosting export capacity by 30% compared to in 2025.
- ✦ By 2040, Ukraine becomes a leading exporter of dual-use technologies to the EU, capturing at least 1% of the single market in this regard.



MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1. Building the US-Ukraine Co-Production Capacity Through the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)⁵¹

By 2028, the US Department of War and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, in co-ordination with DIANA and supported by a joint grant from the US–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, will pilot 10–15 Ukrainian SMEs to design and produce dual-use technologies.

Action 2. Support for Domestic Component Production

By 2029, the Ministry of Defence, in co-ordination with SME clusters, will implement a national subsidy programme reimbursing SMEs for the difference between Chinese-equivalent prices and domestic production costs, funded from the Ukraine Investment Framework⁵² or windfall profits from frozen Russian assets.

By the end of 2026, the parliament will waive VAT on domestically produced high-tech components used for dual-use technologies, reducing production costs for SMEs and strengthening the local industrial ecosystem.

Action 3. Fostering Export Through Joint Ventures


By mid-2027, the Ministry of Defence, in co-ordination with Brave1 and the European Innovation Council, will launch a joint venture programme to support Ukrainian SMEs in developing new dual-use technologies with European partners. Each joint venture will be registered in Ukraine under foreign legal status, enabling SMEs to export, participate in research and development (R&D) and co-own intellectual property. Within three years, the programme expects at least 50 internationally compliant prototypes, establishing a legal pathway for high-tech dual-use exports.

Action 4. Early Export Guarantee for Dual-Use SMEs

By the end of 2028, the Ministry of Economy, in co-ordination with the European Investment Bank, will establish an Early Export Guarantee Fund supporting 20–30 SMEs annually. Eligible SMEs producing dual-use technologies will be selected based on export readiness, technical compliance, and scalability. The fund will cover up to 80% of first-time EU contracts and partial certification costs, enabling SMEs to enter the single market and generate verified trade data.

⁵¹ DIANA. About. (n.d.). <https://www.diana.nato.int/about-diana.html>

⁵² Ukraine Investment Framework. (n.d.). Ukraine Investment Framework - Delivering impact for Ukraine's future. <https://uif.eu/>



Strategic Vision 2:

The transformation of local governments into drivers of dual-use technological innovation is essential for reconstruction and EU integration. By making municipal technology parks the cornerstone of a broader innovation ecosystem—supported by entrepreneurial zones, EU funding, and Diia.Business Hubs—Ukraine can empower cities to nurture SMEs developing drone, AI, renewable energy, and cyber resilience solutions. These local innovation systems will connect universities, local authorities, and businesses, turning Ukraine’s regions into engines of technological sovereignty and sustainable growth.

EMPOWERING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS ENGINES OF DUAL-USE INNOVATION AND RESILIENT GROWTH

Benchmarks for Success (5-20 years)

- ✦ By 2030, at least ten technology parks are operational, maintain collaboration with and support from local universities and city councils, attract private capital, and integrate into national innovation clusters, focusing on dual-use technologies. 70% of eligible SMEs in the dual-use sector are aware of and have accessed at least one EU funding stream such as Horizon, Digital Europe, the European Innovation Council, and Interreg.
- ✦ By 2035, at least 30% of dual-use SMEs either export directly or supply components, technologies, or services to large EU enterprises within defence and civilian high-tech value chains.
- ✦ By 2040, Ukraine will become a regional leader in dual-use R&D, doubling the current employment level in dual-use SMEs, and 50% of SMEs export regularly to at least one EU member state due to alignment with single-market standards.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1. Brownfield Revitalisation and Tech Parks

By 2028, under the direction of the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, municipalities in at least five regions complete a brownfield site inventory and select ten pilot sites. Each selected site will be converted into a municipal technology park in partnership with a local university and national innovation agency.⁵³ These parks will offer at least one dual-use test lab, co-working space for dual-use tech SMEs, and a digital infrastructure bundle that includes high-speed connectivity and shared equipment by 2029.

Action 2. Creation of Entrepreneurial Zones


By 2030, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, in co-ordination with local councils and private developers, launches ten pilot Entrepreneurial Zones⁵⁴ offering simplified permits, pre-equipped facilities, and fiscal incentives such as local tax rebates, green investment grants, and digitalisation vouchers for SMEs investing in dual-use innovation.

Action 3. SMEs Growth and Networking

By 2031, each Entrepreneurial Zone will host an EU-Ukraine Innovation Gateway, facilitating cross-border partnerships through twin-cities initiatives, joint R&D projects, and foreign direct investment from European enterprises seeking reliable suppliers within defence and civilian high-tech supply chains. The networks of Entrepreneurial Zones will act as regional launch pads for export-ready SMEs, linking dual-use enterprises to Horizon Europe clusters, European Innovation Council funding, and neighbouring Interreg regions.

Action 4. SMEs Integration Into EU Markets

By 2028, the Ministry of Digital Transformation and Diia.Business Hubs establish EU Liaison Help Desks in all regions, offering SMEs training on EU procurement and sustainability reporting, mentoring on Horizon and European Innovation Council proposal writing, and digital self-assessment tools aligned with the EU's Digital Decade policy programme.⁵⁵




⁵³ WINWIN. (n.d.). *Ukraine's Global Innovation Strategy*. <https://winwin.gov.ua/en>

⁵⁴ *Entrepreneurial infrastructure - gov.hr*. (n.d.). e-Gradani. <https://gov.hr/en/entrepreneurial-infrastructure/1368>

⁵⁵ *Europe's Digital Decade*. (n.d.). *Shaping Europe's Digital Future*. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/europes-digital-decade>

Strategic Vision 3:

The alignment of Ukraine’s dual-use export control and certification systems with EU standards is a necessary step toward integration with the single market. By harmonising procedures and digitalising licensing, Ukraine will build a trusted, transparent, and compliant environment recognised by its European partners. This transformation will not only reduce administrative burdens for Ukrainian SMEs but also establish Ukraine as a reliable partner in the EU’s secure technology value chain. Through convergence with EU regulations, Ukraine’s export governance will become an example of efficiency, strengthening investor confidence and accelerating the country’s transition to a modern innovation economy.



⁵⁶ Lefter, S. (2025, February 15). Procurement of unmanned systems and electronic warfare systems: how new rules complicated the process - Army PRO. <https://www.army-pro.com/zakupivlya-bezpilotnyh-system-ta-reb-yak-novi-pravylya-uskladnyly-protses/>

MODERNISING CERTIFICATION AND LICENSING FOR EU-ALIGNED DUAL-USE EXPORTS



Benchmarks for Success (5-20 years)

- ✦ By 2030, 80% of all Ukrainian export and production certifications for dual-use technologies are up to date with swiftly evolving EU legislation.
- ✦ By 2030, 15% of all licensing and certification procedures for dual-use technologies are fully digitalised through integration with e-governance platforms, reducing the average processing time by 40% compared to 2025 levels and increasing transparency and predictability for Ukrainian innovators and exporters.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1. Trusted Export Control Convergence Programme

By 2029, the SSECU together with the Ukrainian Centre for Certification and Standardisation will align Ukrainian and EU standards on dual-use technologies, such as Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which will introduce EU-compatible control lists, risk-assessment procedures, internal compliance programme requirements, and information-exchange mechanisms, resulting in a trusted, and interoperable export-control ecosystem recognised by EU regulators. Internal compliance programme mechanisms might be updated, in line with European Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/1318.⁵⁷

Action 2. Digital Control Update Mechanism

By 2028, the SSECU and the Ministry of Economy will formalise and digitalise a permanent regulatory update mechanism, enabling Ukraine to update national dual-use control lists within 90 days of changes to the Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821,⁵⁸ and introduce new national control list entries under Article 9(4) of the same regulation, ensuring SMEs are aware of updates and can operate under current, fully harmonised standards.

Action 3. Digital Control List Application Programming Interface (API)

By 2028, the SSECU, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Centre for Certification and Standardisation, will make national dual-use control lists under Article 9(4) machine-readable (JSON/XML) and provide an API integrated with internal compliance software in Ukrainian SMEs, enabling more accurate product classification checks.



Action 4. eLicensing for Dual-Use Exporters

By 2028, the SSECU, together with the Ministry of Digital Transformation, will allow exporters of dual-use technologies to partially complete certification and licensing via digital platforms, with accredited private auditors verifying compliance and publishing results to ensure transparent and traceable oversight.

⁵⁷ Consolidated text: Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (recast)(Document 02021R0821-20241108). (n.d.). EUR-Lex. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TX/?uri=CELEX%3A02021R0821-20241108>

⁵⁸ EUR-LEX - 32019H1318 - EN - EUR-LEX. (n.d.). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ell/reco/2019/1318/bj/eng>

Strategic Vision 1:


- By the end of 2026, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine will issue a guideline on applying for national subsidy reimbursements, providing step-by-step instructions for SMEs to claim price-difference support.
- By mid-2026, the Entrepreneurship and Export Promotion Office will launch an online tool where SMEs can self-check if their products fall under dual-use control lists, reducing misclassification risks.
- By mid-2026, Diia.Business will create a simple Export Cost Calculator, allowing SMEs to estimate certification, logistics, and insurance costs before entering the EU, leading to more fund applications.

Strategic Vision 3:

- By late 2026, the SSECU and the Ministry of Economy will launch automated notifications via the e-licensing portal and email, alerting SMEs to changes in national dual-use control lists for faster compliance.
- By late 2026, key national dual-use control list entries will be published in machine-readable formats (JSON/XML), allowing SMEs to integrate updates directly into internal compliance software for accurate product checks.
- By late 2026, the SSECU, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Economy will synchronise their certification and licensing customs systems to ensure further swift integration with e-governance platforms.

Strategic Vision 2:

- By mid-2026, local governments cooperate with local universities to host joint R&D hackathons on AI, drone safety, and renewable tech with SME mentors and defence actors to promote dual-use innovation challenges. Winning projects get Diia.Business acceleration support.
- By late 2026, the National Agency for Civil Service and the European Institute of Innovation & Technology train 200 EU project officers within municipalities to specialise in SME project design, state aid, and procurement.
- By late 2026, the Association of Ukrainian Cities, in partnership with Interreg⁵⁹ NEXT programmes (Poland–Ukraine, Romania–Ukraine, Hungary–Slovakia–Ukraine) and the Enterprise Europe Network organises an annual Dual-Use Innovation Forum. This includes the European Defence Fund network, Baltic drone innovation hubs, and Central European tech parks to showcase regional projects to EU partners.



⁵⁹ Admin, N. (2025, October 10). Strona główna - Interreg NEXT PL-UA 2021-2027. Interreg NEXT PL-UA 2021-2027. <https://pl-ua.eu/pl/>



TOWARD A RESILIENT ENERGY SYSTEM

Authors: Anastasiia Svystula (Ukraine), Vasileios Mavros (Greece),
Nadiia Medvedieva (Ukraine), Max Heegewaldt (Germany)
Facilitator: Andrea Stagni (Italy)



SECTION 1 – SYNOPSIS

Redirect **long-term energy planning** away from costly, slow-to-deploy centralised generation projects, including new nuclear units, and toward a decentralised system built on small-scale renewable energy and storage, which can be installed faster, reduces security vulnerabilities, and strengthens resilience against targeted attacks on large infrastructure.

Establish clear, **market-based electricity pricing** and replace blanket subsidies with targeted support for vulnerable consumers to accelerate renewable-energy deployment, enable efficient imports, and stimulate investment in storage and flexible generation.

Create a **unified national digital platform** that consolidates all renewable-energy subsidies, grants, loans, legal requirements, and technical guidance into one accessible portal tailored to households, small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), energy communities and cooperatives, and municipalities.

Launch a nationwide **programme of autonomous solar-and-storage systems** for critical public infrastructure (schools, hospitals, administrative buildings) as scalable pilot projects that demonstrate resilience, reduce blackout impacts, and provide replicable models for communities.

Context

- Since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, up to 40% of electricity transmission infrastructure, 20% of distribution networks, and as much as 50% of generation capacity have been destroyed, occupied, or severely damaged by Russia, causing widespread disruptions in electricity, water, heating, and essential services.⁶⁰
- The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which accounted for 10.7% of total installed capacity (as of early 2022) and 44.3% of all nuclear power plant capacity remains under Russian control, highlighting the national security risks of centralised, high-value energy assets.
- Ukraine's renewable energy share is among the lowest in Europe.⁶¹ In 2024, only 8.3% of primary energy consumption and 23% of electricity production came from renewable sources, up from 14% in 2021. Hydro generated 14.5% of electricity, solar 6.5%, and wind 0.7%, while nuclear accounted for 60% of electricity production in 2021.

Key Recommendations

- Residential buildings account for around 40% of final energy consumption, primarily from fossil fuels, which highlights the urgent need for large-scale energy efficiency improvements in the building sector and the possible positive gains from successfully tackling this issue.
- Ukraine's power system was synchronised with the ENTSO-E European grid in April 2022, one year ahead of schedule, in a major structural shift in electricity market integration and energy security.
- There is a critical skills shortage in the energy sector. A 2024 survey of 171 energy-sector and local government representatives highlighted gaps in technical, project-management, and financial expertise, compounded by low wages and misalignment with educational programmes. This limits the capacity of municipalities and communities to plan, implement, and manage decentralised renewable-energy projects.⁶³
- Ukraine has exceptionally strong technical potential for solar and wind energy development arising from favourable climatic and geographic conditions. Average annual solar irradiation of 1,000–1,400 kWh/m² across much of the country provides a robust basis for distributed and utility-scale photovoltaic (PV) deployment, while the annual output of onshore wind resources is estimated to be sufficient to meet the current electricity demand of the EU six times over.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Ministry of Economy. (2024). *Ukraine Facility Plan 2024–2027*. <https://www.ukrainefacility.me.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/ukraine-facility-plan.pdf>

⁶¹ Ritchie, H., Roser, M., & Rosado, P. (2020). *Renewable Energy*. OurWorldInData. <https://ourworldindata.org/renewable-energy>

⁶² Suspiine Media. (2024, 7 August). *Suspiine News*. (2024, August 7). *Ukrainian nuclear power plants currently provide 60% of electricity generation — Halushchenko*. <https://suspiine.media/808587-ukrain-ski-aes-narazi-zabezpecut-60-generacii-elektroenergii-galushenko/>

⁶³ Deloitte Ukraine. (2025). *Виклики щодо людського капіталу в енергетичному секторі – погляд представників бізнесу та місцевого самоврядування в Україні [Human-capital challenges in the energy sector: Perspectives of business and local governments in Ukraine]*. <https://www.deloitte.com/ua/uk/about/press-room/human-capital-challenges-energy-sector.html>

⁶⁴ Greenpeace. (2024, April 11). *Ukraine: Mapping the Energy Opportunities – Solar and Wind Energy Assessment*. <https://www.greenpeace.de/publikationen/20240411-green-peace-report-ukraine-mapping-energy-opportunities.pdf>


SECTION 1 – SYNOPSIS

- How can Ukraine accelerate the shift toward decentralised renewable-energy systems at a time when its large power plants and transmission infrastructure are highly vulnerable to attacks and expensive to rebuild?
- What support mechanisms are needed to overcome the shortage of qualified specialists and the lack of clear, accessible information on financing, subsidies, and technical assistance for households, SMEs, and communities that want to develop renewable projects?
- What steps across energy-market reform, pricing modernisation, and the deployment of pilot autonomous systems for critical public infrastructure are required to enable a long-term, scalable rollout of resilient, locally driven renewable-energy solutions?

DECISION-MAKERS

- **National Executive Bodies** (Cabinet of Ministers; Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Digital Transformation; Ministry of Infrastructure; Ministry of Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development; Ministry of Education and Science): Set strategic energy policy, allocate budgets, lead regulatory reforms, develop digital tools, manage reconstruction grants, co-ordinate regional administrations, and implement pilot programmes.
- **Supranational/International Executive Bodies** (European Commission Directorates General for Energy and for Environment): Establish binding EU energy and climate standards, define regulatory requirements for EU accession, and determine the conditions under which technical assistance and funding are provided, directly shaping Ukraine’s renewable energy policies and electricity-market reforms.
- **Regulatory and Oversight Bodies** (National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission–NEURC, State Agency for Energy Efficiency): Establish electricity pricing rules, approve feed-in tariffs and other compensation methods for renewable-energy producers, develop technical standards, promote renewable energy and efficiency programmes.
- **Legislative Bodies** (Parliamentary Committees on Energy, Budget, and Local Governance): Enact legislation, approve budgets, and provide legal frameworks for renewable-energy deployment.
- **Regional and Local Government Authorities** (Regional State Administrations, Raion Councils): Act as the connection point between communities and national authorities.

Central Questions



Stakeholders



Stakeholders

SUPPORTING ACTORS

- **International Programmes and Multilateral Initiatives** (EU4Energy, Ukraine Facility, Innovate Ukraine, other multi-actor collaboration platforms): Provide technical assistance, analytical support, and funding mechanisms.
- **International Donor Organisations, Foundations, and Humanitarian Actors** (Biohaus Stiftung, arche noVa, similar organisations): Contribute to financing, capacity-building, and community-level project support, particularly in vulnerable or front line regions. Help launch pilot projects and connect local authorities and NGOs with international expertise.
- **Ukrainian NGOs and Energy-Focused Civil Society Organisations** (Greenpeace Ukraine, Ukrainian Association of Renewable Energy, Ecoaction, Ecoclub, Dixi Group, Energy Act for Ukraine, RePower Ukraine, Women in Tech Ukraine, others): Advocate green transition policies, promote community energy initiatives, and help tackle the shortage of specialists by delivering training and educational programmes. Many also act as connectors between municipalities, donors, and expert communities.
- **Municipal Utilities, State and Energy Enterprises** (Ukrenergo, Oblenergo, DTEK, Guaranteed Buyer, others): Operate electricity generation, distribution, and transmission infrastructure; provide essential technical data; and support grid integration and maintenance of decentralised assets. Guaranteed Buyer ensures stable revenue streams for renewable-energy producers.
- **International Financial Institutions** (European Investment Bank, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development): Provide financing, grants, technical expertise, and advisory services.
- **Universities, Technical Institutes, and Research Centres** (Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute, Odesa National Polytechnic University, Institute of Renewable Energy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, others): Provide research, training programmes, and skilled specialists; collaborate in pilot projects; support innovation and technology transfer at the regional and national level.

IMPACTED POPULATION

- **Residents of regions experiencing attacks or energy infrastructure damage:** Face immediate blackouts and property damage.
- **Hospitals and healthcare facilities:** Interrupted power supply threatens patient care, surgeries, and emergency services.
- **Schools, educational institutions, and their students:** Lose heating, lighting, and digital/online learning capabilities during power outages.
- **Local businesses, manufacturers, and SMEs:** Sudden power loss halts operations, causes material or financial losses, and requires significant additional investment.
- **On-site energy-sector workers** (grid operators, plant personnel): Face safety risks due to repeated attacks, operational hazards, and emergency workloads during outages.
- **Vulnerable population** (elderly, people with disabilities, low-income households): Suffer disproportionately from service interruptions, heating/cooling failures, and overall increased costs.
- **Municipalities and regional administrations:** Must balance ongoing long-term energy planning and short-term restorations of damaged infrastructure, conduct community outreach, and find financing opportunities.
- **Energy cooperatives and energy community groups:** Dependent on policy clarity, cooperation with distribution system operators, and technical support to scale projects.
- **Educational and research institutions:** Disrupted projects, training programmes, and workforce development due to lack of specialists, students, and funding.

Directly Impacted

Indirectly Impacted

Strategic Vision 1:

A LIBERALISED ELECTRICITY MARKET WITH TARGETED CONSUMER PROTECTION

Ukraine transitions from administrative price caps to market-based pricing supported by technical limits that reflect real grid conditions. This shift improves investment incentives, enables dynamic pricing and cross-border trade, and expands renewable energy while protecting households and small businesses through targeted subsidies.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✦ By 2032, Ukraine operates a fully harmonised, EU-aligned electricity market without administrative price caps, independent of martial law.
- ✦ During the transition, comprehensive subsidies and support mechanisms protect vulnerable households and small businesses from price shocks. After the transition, stable, long-term targeted assistance remains for those who need it, maintaining affordability while supporting renewable and flexible generation investments. Coverage of households and SMEs is tracked, and subsidy mechanisms are predictable and sustainable.
- ✦ Transparent, market-based price signals encourage investment in renewable-energy sources and energy storage, improve market balancing and system flexibility through promoting net-billing mechanisms, and therefore strengthen the electricity network against supply fluctuations and peak demand. Installed renewable energy sources (RES) capacity, storage capacity, reduction in blackout hours, and deployment of flexible services track progress.
- ✦ Companies fully import and export electricity at market prices, without administrative caps, ensuring reliable supply during potential blackouts, accommodating higher prices during peak hours, and supporting efficient cross-border trade for domestic stability and regional integration. Progress is reflected in import/export volumes and the frequency and duration of blackout events.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

Starting in Q4 2026, the Ministry of Energy, the NEURC, utilities, and media partners will conduct a clear communication campaign explaining the benefits of market liberalisation, net-billing advantages, targeted consumer protections, and renewable-energy investment. A dedicated feedback platform will be created, allowing households, SMEs, and investors to raise questions and clarify concerns before the plan is fully implemented, ensuring that the rollout addresses real needs and builds public trust.

Action 2.

By Q2 2027, the Ministry of Energy, the NEURC, Ukrenergo, with Ukrainian NGOs and in dialogue with the European Commission (particularly the Directorates-General for Energy and for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood), will develop and adopt a phased plan to replace administrative price caps with technical limits, define timelines for market segments, and set rules for temporary consumer protection.

Action 3.

From Q2 2027 to Q4 2028, the NEURC will gradually remove artificially set consumer electricity tariffs and start replacing administrative caps with technical limits based on real-time demand, grid constraints, and reserve requirements, ensuring transparency through publicly available market dashboards.

Action 4.

From Q2 2027, funds from the Mechanism for Imposing Special Obligations⁶⁵ will provide carefully targeted support to households and small businesses that qualify through a simple application process, with the total amount gradually decreasing as market liberalisation reduces reliance on administrative support.



⁶⁵

Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2019, June 5). Про затвердження Положення про покладення спеціальних обов'язків на учасників ринку електричної енергії для забезпечення загальносуспільних інтересів у процесі функціонування ринку електричної енергії (Постанова №483) Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2019, June 5). On approval of the Regulation on imposing special obligations on electricity market participants to ensure general public interests in the process of electricity market functioning (Resolution No. 483). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/483-2019-%D0%BF?lang=en#Text>

Strategic Vision 2:

The energy transition in Ukraine will require a significant, qualified workforce with expertise in implementing and managing renewable energy communities, smart and traditional grids, and distributed energy resources. The strategy concentrates on enhancing technical education, collaboration between business and education, and providing structured apprenticeship routes for staff. This will help to develop the critical mass necessary for delivering growth in renewable-energy communities and grid modernisation.

BUILDING A SKILLED WORKFORCE FOR THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSITION

Benchmarks for Success (5-20 years)

By 2040, Ukraine has a self-sustained, European-quality staff to run a large, decentralised, and renewables-fuelled energy sector.

- ✦ At least 35,000 qualified electricians, grid technicians, and installation specialists for renewable energies trained to EU standards.
- ✦ At least 400 functional Energy Apprenticeship Hubs within vocational colleges in all oblasts.
- ✦ 80% of renewable-energy communities have trained local managers and monitoring operators.
- ✦ There are mobility exchanges between the EU and Ukraine for 2,000 placements in the fields of technical, engineering, policy, and community energy.
- ✦ Shortages in key sectors (electricians, installers of heat pumps, grid technicians) declined by 60%.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By 2028, the Ministry of Education and Science, with €35 million from Erasmus+ Capacity Building for Higher Education, revises vocational and higher-education curricula to prioritise electrical engineering, grid maintenance, heat-pump installation, solar PV installation, battery systems, and digital grid surveillance, reducing emphasis on over-produced auditing profiles.

Action 2.

By 2029, the Energy Apprenticeship Hubs are co-developed by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Energy, and local administrations in all oblast capitals. Each of the hubs signs 3–5 binding agreements with Ukrenergo, the sector’s regional electricity distribution companies, solar farms (e.g., KNESS, UDP Renewables), and municipal utilities. This would enable the offering paid apprenticeships of 6–12 months, not only for energy engineering students, but also for students in IT (digital grid monitoring, cybersecurity), environmental science and urban planning (community energy planning), economics and public administration (renewable-energy communities management, energy-cooperation finance). Last, the government will provide 50% funding for apprenticeships, encouraging companies to provide training and jobs for youth, thereby reducing unemployment.

Strategic Vision 3:

NATIONAL DIGITAL PLATFORM FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FUNDING AND GUIDANCE

An official national digital platform centralises all information on country-wide renewable-energy support (subsidies, loans, grants, technical assistance, legal requirements, renewable compensation policies, and responsible authorities) into a single, transparent system. It provides up-to-date guidance organised into dedicated sections for private households, energy communities, energy cooperatives, social infrastructure, SMEs and large enterprises, ensuring each

stakeholder accesses only the information relevant to current programmes and procedures. By replacing fragmented and unclear information, the platform accelerates application processes, expands participation, reduces bureaucracy, and strengthens trust in the transition to a decentralised and resilient energy system.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✿ At least 85% of platform users report that the information is clear, the platform is easy to use, and the guidance is accessible, as measured through in-platform feedback and periodic online surveys, with feedback used to improve the platform.
- ✿ Not less than 90% of all available nationally funded subsidies, loans, and technical assistance programmes are listed and up to date on the platform.
- ✿ The number of renewable-energy projects supported through the platform (measured by the use of subsidies, loans, and other programmes) grew by at least 100% over the first three years of the platform's existence.
- ✿ Starting in 2035, in addition to providing comprehensive information, the platform integrates relevant stakeholders (banks, municipalities, and other authorities), enabling the entire application process to be completed online through a single, unified system.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By the end of 2026, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, and the NEURC collaborate to define clear roles, responsibilities, and deadlines for all stakeholders involved in the platform’s development and maintenance, ensuring accountability and timely integration of data and processes.

Action 2.

Between Q1 and Q2 2027, the Ministry of Digital Transformation develops a first draft of the modular digital platform, with separate sections for households, SMEs, large enterprises, energy communities, and cooperatives, including basic educational modules and step-by-step guidance for users of all technical levels.

Action 3.

From mid-2027, a small-scale pilot of the platform will be launched, integrating platform access and feedback into the Diia app. User surveys and in-app feedback are collected to identify usability issues and data gaps, with insights used to refine the platform before full deployment.

Action 4.

Starting in 2027, regional administrations, NGOs, national television, and platform partners conduct outreach through media, social networks, workshops, and webinars to raise awareness, demonstrate platform usage, and highlight available programmes for different stakeholder types.

Action 5.

From 2027 to 2028, short online courses, webinars, and guides are delivered to households, SMEs, and energy communities to ensure that users with varying technical knowledge can understand available programmes and navigate the platform successfully.



Strategic Vision 4:

A national Energy Islands pilot programme enables public institutions and infrastructure (schools, hospitals, kindergartens, water-pumping stations, libraries, etc.) to install decentralised renewable-energy generation and storage capacity for autonomous operation through a simple, needs-based open-call application process at the oblast level, ensuring transparency and equitable regional coverage. By integrating solar panels, battery storage, and minimally used backup generators with auto-

AUTONOMOUS RENEWABLE-ENERGY SUPPLY FOR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

mated controls, these systems allow schools, hospitals, and administrative buildings to continue operating during grid outages. Expert teams provide municipalities with support throughout the application, project management, permitting, and installation processes, guaranteeing reliable deployment, building local capacity, and creating a scalable model for nationwide replication of resilient energy infrastructure.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✿ By 2035, at least 50 pilot Energy Islands for public infrastructure, financed by the EU's Ukraine Facility, are fully operational, demonstrating measurable-energy autonomy and reduced dependence on the grid.
- ✿ At least 70% of newly created autonomous energy supply facilities report use by local communities during power outages and serve as recognised local Points of Invincibility, providing reliable-energy access while demonstrating the benefits of decentralised renewable energy.
- ✿ By 2035, a replication toolkit (including standard designs, permitting templates, procurement rules, and installer requirements) is adopted by regions, reducing project preparation time for new implementations by at least 30%.
- ✿ By 2040, at least 100 additional projects are realised independently by communities without state financial support, leveraging the knowledge, technical packages, and best practices demonstrated by the pilot projects.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

Starting in Q4 2026, the Ministry of Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development, in collaboration with the State Agency on Energy Efficiency, conducts an open call for European and Ukrainian partner communities and NGOs to participate. They organise workshops and panel discussions for knowledge-exchange sessions to share best practices, Ukrainian experiences, and technical perspectives, facilitating an understanding of how to implement Energy Island projects effectively.

Action 2.


By Q2 2027, an informational campaign with media outreach is conducted to inform municipalities, NGOs, and communities about the opportunity to participate in pilot Energy Island projects, providing application details, brief guidance, and encouragement to replicate the model widely.

Action 3.

By mid-2028, at least five Energy Island projects for social infrastructure are selected, fully planned, and under implementation, demonstrating autonomous operation and providing a practical model for subsequent replication.

Action 4.

Starting in 2028, involved actors (including pilot project teams, regional administrations, and technical experts) analyse the results of the first Energy Island pilots and develop regional and online dissemination activities to share best practices, lessons learned, and technical knowledge, enabling municipalities, regional authorities, and communities to access practical guidance, accelerate replication, and build public trust in decentralised energy solutions.



Strategic Vision 5:

LOCAL ENERGY INFORMATION AND ADVISORY OFFICES

Raion Energy Management Offices (REMOs) are established within each raion council (district council, Ukrainian: rayrada) to serve as the first point of contact for citizens, communities, and businesses seeking information and guidance on renewable energy and energy efficiency. Operating under the Department of Housing, Communal Services, and Infrastructure, these offices act as local information and advisory centres rather than direct project implementers, providing clear, accessible information on available

subsidies, technical options, and legal requirements, helping residents and municipalities understand how to apply for support, and connecting them with certified specialists or programmes. Staffed by an energy manager, an economist, and an engineer, the REMOs ensure that every district has trusted local experts who bridge the information gap between citizens, regional administrations, and national institutions, fostering informed participation in the energy transition.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✦ By 2030, all successfully created REMOs are connected to the national digital renewable-energy platform, enabling real-time tracking of applications and funding, the accumulation of data, and the implementation of renewable-energy projects across raions.
- ✦ At least 70% of candidates who complete the accredited training and certification programme for local energy ambassadors report regularly applying their newly gained skills, whether by establishing their own advisory units, volunteering, or working with local authorities, NGOs, or private companies in the renewable-energy sector.
- ✦ By 2032, at least 40% of raions have adapted or replicated successful advisory practices through the establishment of Regional Renewable-Energy Hubs, which organise at least two events annually, and at least 50% of raions annually conduct accredited training for local energy ambassadors based on models developed by pilot raions.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1-3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By mid-2027, there are fully operational REMOs in 50% of raions (that are within the territory under the jurisdiction of Ukraine), integrated into the Department of Housing, Communal Services, and Infrastructure, and staffed with professionals responsible for communication, financial and grant co-ordination, and technical oversight. Positions may be filled from existing staff or hired externally following official public recruitment procedures.

Action 2.

Between mid-2027 and the end of 2027, the REMOs develop raion-specific Helpdesks addressing frequently asked questions tailored to local conditions, programmes, and available renewable-energy support measures. These provide citizens, SMEs, and community groups with clear, accessible guidance on common procedures and resources, ensuring locally relevant and easily understandable information is consistently available.

Action 3.

Between late 2027 and early 2028, at least three REMOs, together with regional universities and local NGOs, establish pilot Regional Renewable-Energy Hubs. These organise quarterly workshops, training sessions, and advisory days in each region, allowing citizens, SMEs, and municipalities to receive hands-on support and practical expertise on renewable technologies and project preparation.

Action 4.

Starting in early 2028, the Ministry of Education and Science, in cooperation with the State Agency on Energy Efficiency and incorporating local feedback from the REMOs, introduces the Certified Local Energy Ambassadors programme. The REMOs identify and nominate local engineers, economists, and technicians to participate in accredited training. Once certified, these ambassadors provide part-time advisory services to households and community groups, expanding local expertise and ensuring consistent access to professional renewable-energy guidance across all raions.



Launch a National Feedback Platform on Electricity Market Liberalisation

By the end of 2026, the Ministry of Energy and the NEURC will launch an online feedback form and hotline, using existing IT systems, to allow households, SMEs, and investors to submit questions, provide input, and clarify concerns caused by the announcement of the future market transition.

Visible outcome: A functioning channel that improves transparency, reduces misinformation, and enables regulators to prevent misunderstandings early.

Publish Real-Time Electricity Price Information

By the end of 2026, the Ministry of Energy and the NEURC will begin publishing real-time wholesale, import, and regional price data using current monitoring tools and communication platforms.

Visible outcome: Citizens gain immediate access to transparent pricing, improving public understanding of the scale of the universal subsidy mechanism and the financial pressure it places on the system during restoration after attacks.

Energy Workforce Training Programme

By Q1 2027, the Ministry of Education and Science, together with EU4Skills and selected EU Centres of Vocational Excellence, launches a three-month online micro-training programme for electricians, technicians, and vocational instructors. Training focuses on solar PV installation, basic grid maintenance, safe operation of decentralised systems, and digital monitoring tools.

Visible outcome: Citizens will be certified in solar PV installation, basic grid maintenance, and digital energy monitoring, immediately boosting local energy workforce capacity.

Conduct a National Survey to Shape the Renewable-Energy Support Platform

By Q4 2026, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, in cooperation with the Ministry of Energy and the NEURC, will release a short stakeholder survey through the Diia app, requiring no new infrastructure. Respondents will identify gaps and uncertainties regarding renewable-energy support mechanisms and highlight difficulties in understanding application procedures for grants, loans, and other assistance programmes.

Visible outcome: A clear understanding of informational gaps, user needs, and priority features to refine the design of the upcoming national RES support platform.

Launch an Awareness Campaign for the Energy Islands Pilot Programme

By Q4 2026, the Ministry of Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development, with regional administrations, will run a short social-media and press campaign using existing communication budgets to inform municipalities and NGOs about the Energy Islands pilot and its upcoming application process.

Visible outcome: Municipalities are aware, prepared, and motivated to apply once the pilot opens.

Deliver One-Day Introductory RES Trainings for Raion Councils

Within six months, three pilot raion councils will host one-day workshops delivered by a specialised external partner, using low-cost training contracts and existing municipal facilities.

Visible outcome: Councils understand basic RES mechanisms and can evaluate whether internal capacity exists for future REMO staffing or whether external hiring will be needed.

SOCIAL COHESION, INCLUSION, AND YOUTH EMPOWERMENT



Authors: Taisiia Taran (Ukraine), Sofiia Lysenko (Ukraine), Viktoriia Barylovska (Ukraine),
Rafael Gardoş (Romania), Valentina Stîncanu (United Kingdom/Romania)
Facilitator: Andrea Stagni (Italy)



EUROPEAN **YOUTH** PARLIAMENT



SECTION 1 – SYNOPSIS

Establish inclusive educational campuses by enforcing EU accessibility standards across all school and university reconstruction projects.

Modernise rehabilitation and disability assessment systems by transitioning to a needs-based social model aligned with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Implement a nationwide Barrier-Free Community Initiative using an annual Accessibility and Youth Inclusion Index to benchmark and incentivise municipal progress.

Accelerate deinstitutionalisation by expanding family-strengthening services, recruiting foster/patronage families, and deploying multidisciplinary transition teams in all oblasts.

Launch Safe Transition pathways (Social Apartments, mentorship networks, life-skills curriculum) for youth with disabilities leaving institutional care.

Establish a disability-inclusive Youth Guarantee ensuring tailored employment, education, or training offers within four months for Not in Education, Employment, or Training (NEET) youth aged 18–25.

Mandate accessibility compliance in all national and municipal reconstruction tenders, grants, and procurement processes.

Key Recommendations

Scale public participation by granting young people with disabilities formal decision-making authority in reconstruction boards and accessibility oversight mechanisms.

Expand quick-impact accessibility upgrades (in transport, shelters, campuses, public buildings) using low-cost, rapid implementation models.

Introduce a nationwide Caregiver Social Protection Index to measure financial assistance, access to home-based services, and caregiver labour-market reintegration.

Expand and standardise home-based social support services, ensuring regular visits from trained social workers and mobile rehabilitation teams for all eligible families.

- **Scale of Need and Demographics:** Ukraine has a large, diverse population of young people with disabilities (YPwD) requiring sustained, systemic support. Over 3 million persons under 18 live with disabilities.⁶⁶ Households with YPwD face disproportionate food insecurity and safety risks. Youth veterans with new war-related disabilities require specialised support.
- **Collapse of Disability-Related Support System:** The war has severely disrupted essential disability services. Access to disability-related support services fell from 80% to 47% in the ten months from the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Interruption of rehabilitation services disproportionately affects youth with mobility, sensory, or complex needs. Carers face declining psycho-social and material support.
- **Infrastructure Damage and Inaccessible Environments:** Outdated standards and wartime destruction significantly undermine independent mobility. Mobility routes, transport stops, and sidewalks do not meet accessibility standards. Many public facilities remain non-compliant with basic accessibility norms. Rehabilitation centres are insufficient in number and outdated in design.
- **Institutionalisation and Rights Violations:** Institution-based care continues to exclude youth and to violate basic rights. Around 30,000 children and young people remain in institutional care. Over 100,000 documented legal cases in the last decade highlight systemic abuse and neglect.⁶⁷ Youth leaving institutions struggle to reintegrate into society or to access services.
- **Social Understanding and Awareness Gaps:** Public knowledge about accessibility does not match public support. 87% of Ukrainians say accessibility is a societal value, but 26% say that they do not understand its meaning.⁶⁸ Misconceptions slow the implementation of inclusive standards and local advocacy efforts.
- **Governance Fragmentation:** Policies supporting YPwD are dispersed across ministries, with weak co-ordination. Overlapping mandates across ministries and local authorities fragment service delivery. Limited data and inconsistent monitoring slow reforms and EU alignment. Local implementation varies widely by oblast and municipality.

Context

- **Economic and Social Vulnerability:** YPwD and their families face compounded socio-economic challenges. High unemployment among YPwD is paralleled by low access to vocational training. Many households experience shelter inaccessibility or rely on informal caregiving arrangements. Emergency preparedness systems are often not disability-inclusive.
- **Limited Participation in Decision-Making:** YPwD are largely excluded from the formal governance structures shaping reconstruction. Few municipalities include them in councils or participatory mechanisms. Reconstruction boards rarely include disability representation. Organisations of persons with disabilities (OPDs) lack formal co-decision-making power in recovery processes.



⁶⁶ UNICEF. (2025, March). *State Social Support for Persons and Children with Disabilities in Ukraine*. <https://www.unicef.org/ukraine/en/documents/state-social-support-for-persons-and-children-with-disabilities#:~:text=In%20Ukraine%20today%2C%20more%20than,children%20with%20disabilities%20is%20ineffective>

⁶⁷ Disability Rights International. (2023, October), *Executive Summary - Ukraine* https://www.driadvocacy.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/Executive-summary_UKR.pdf

⁶⁸ The Presidential Office of Ukraine. (2024, June 19), *83% of Ukrainians Consider Accessibility a New Value for Society – Survey Results* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/83-opitanih-ukrayin-civ-vvazhayut-bezbaryernist-novoyu-cinnis-91649>

- How can Ukraine enhance accessibility within society for persons under the age of 18⁶⁹ with disabilities and remove existing barriers to mobility?
- How can the rights of young people with severe disabilities and their carers be protected while ensuring access to need-based support?
- How to guarantee that the voices of YPwD are actively involved in planning, funding decisions, and monitoring reconstruction projects, ensuring they are not just consulted but have real power?

GOVERNMENT AND STATE ENTITIES

- **Ministry of Social Policy, Family, and Unity (MoSP)** collaborates with organisations like the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Pension Fund of Ukraine to assist. It is also working on strategic partnerships to implement the European Child Guarantee in Ukraine and preparing legislative changes to address the shortage of social workers.
- **The Ministry of Health** estimates that more than 250,000 people each year will require rehabilitation services, and it is responsible for formal disability recognition.
- **The Office of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights** (Ombudsman) has formalised cooperation with UNHCR.
- **The Olena Zelenska Foundation partners with UNHCR** to support internally displaced children and large foster families.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS AND UN AGENCIES

- **The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)** delivers critical assistance (including cash and shelter repairs) to war-affected people with specific vulnerabilities, such as older people and people with disabilities (PWDs). UNHCR works closely with the government and is involved in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (MEDEVAC programme).

Central Questions

Stakeholders

- **The Inter-Agency Standing Committee** has issued Guidelines for Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Activities.
- **The UN Partnership on the Right of Persons with Disabilities** provides resources to participating UN organisations to jointly implement programmes in partnership with OPDs, governments, and broader civil society.

INTERNATIONAL NGOS

- **Project HOPE** implements the Rehab4U project, a five-year initiative focused on strengthening the rehabilitation sector and combating stigma against PWDs.
- **Save the Children** engages with the MoSP on strategic partnerships regarding the European Child Guarantee and Better Care Reform.
- **War Child** has produced reports detailing the challenges faced by children with disabilities, such as the Invisible at the Frontline report.

⁶⁹ The terms: 'persons under the age of 18,' 'children,' 'young people' and 'youth' are used synonymously throughout.

DISABILITY RIGHTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

- **Organisations of People with Disabilities (OPDs)** are important for humanitarian responders to identify and reach people experiencing barriers to aid access. OPDs in Ukraine (such as those that have partnered with the European Disability Forum) advocate for reconstruction that guarantees accessibility.
- **The League of Strong** is a Ukrainian public association that advocates disability rights, promotes inclusion, and provides expertise to support barrier-free communities and accessible development through its Centre of Inclusion Expertise.

INTERNATIONAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY GROUPS

- **The European Disability Forum advocates accessibility** in reconstruction and works with UNHCR to ensure protection for PWDs fleeing Ukraine.

INDIVIDUALS AND AFFECTED POPULATIONS

- **People with Disabilities (PWDs):** Including older people, those with new war-induced disabilities, and those with complex self-care needs.
- **Youth/Veterans with Disabilities:** Individuals like Ruslan, a 22-year-old veteran and peer supporter, and Tamara, who works to help sight-loss veterans.
- **Advocates and Cultural Figures:** Individuals like Yana, who advocates sign-language accessibility, and Olena Osadcha, who advises on disability rights.
- **Carers and Families:** Households with PWDs, including older parents who often provide unpaid care.

Stakeholders

HEALTHCARE AND REHABILITATION PROFESSIONALS

- **Multidisciplinary Teams:** These include physical medicine and rehabilitation physicians, nurses, physical therapists, occupational therapists, psychologists, social workers, and team co-ordinators involved in rehabilitation.
- **Multilingual Staff:** Crucial for bridging communication and cultural gaps by acting as conversation partners and cultural mediators in international rehabilitation settings.
- **Professional Medical Interpreters:** Essential for accurate communication between PWDs and health professionals.



Strategic Vision 1:

ESTABLISHMENT OF INCLUSIVE CAMPUSES AT THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED FOR YOUTH WITH DISABILITIES

With over 3 million young people facing different forms of disabilities, like immobility and blindness, the reinforcement of educational institutions is significant for their integration into society, ensuring their rights for accessible education are met. Creating a barrier-free environment requires alignment with the MoSP and the Ministry of Education and Science to boost inclusive education for more than 160,000 YPwD.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✦ By 2035, educational institutions will provide accessible routes from transportation stops, parking spaces and sidewalks to the accessible entrances of buildings. With the implementation of European Standard EN 17210:2021 for accessibility and usability of the built environment,⁷⁰ the technical requirements for the design, construction, and maintenance of accessible buildings and outdoor areas will have a continuous clear width of at least 90 centimetres for routes and doorways. Additional reinforcements will include a full 360 degrees turn around obstructions for wheelchair turning space and a minimum width of 2 metres for footways to allow two wheelchairs to pass each other safely.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By 2028, the European Network for Health Technology Assessment will establish an effective and sustainable structure for the health assessment of accessible educational spaces for youth with reduced mobility, ultimately improving the quality of the inclusive environment.

Action 2.

By 2027, the Ministry of Education and Science will pursue the goal of supporting the participation of blind and visually impaired youth in society by lending audio and braille literature with the production of teaching and learning aids.

Action 3.

By 2027, the MoSP will revise the loading zones of educational institutions to be located on the shortest accessible route to the accessible entrance of buildings. Additionally, these spaces will provide an access aisle that is at least 152.4 centimetres wide and extends the full length of the vehicle pull-up space, allowing sufficient space for wheelchair lifts or ramps to be deployed and for passengers to move around safely.

⁷⁰ European Commission, (8 September 2021) EN 17210:2021. Accessibility and usability of the built environment - Functional requirements. https://accessible-eu-centre.ec.europa.eu/content-corner/digital-library/en-172102021-accessibility-and-usability-built-environment-functional-requirements_en

Strategic Vision 2:

Disability assessment remains dominated by outdated medical approaches administered by the Medical and Social Expert Commissions,⁷¹ leading to inherent inequities in service distribution and limiting access to the tailored rehabilitation and community assistance necessary for independent living. Reform advocates emphasise that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) requires the swift introduction of needs-based assessment tools to build personalised support systems.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By 2027, the EU Health Policy Platform will launch cooperation between health interest groups and the European Commission, aiming to make health policy dialogue transparent and to build knowledge on health issues while addressing insufficient enforcement of regulations.

REINFORCEMENT OF REHABILITATION FACILITIES CREATED DUE TO OUTDATED MEDICAL STANDARDS

Benchmarks for Success (5-20 years)

- By 2030, Ukraine will transition from status-based support, such as for individuals with acquired disabilities within the war context, to a social model centred on a person's actual functional needs or limitations. This will eliminate the gap in legal patterns and inconsistent implementation of the Act on the Framework for Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Ukraine, removing the access barriers to transportation and information.



Action 2.

By 2029, the European Commission Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety will establish new regulations for outdated medical devices, working on reinforcement of rehabilitation facilities to provide accessible treatment to individuals with disabilities based on functional needs.

⁷¹ The MSEC was introduced in Ukraine in 1992 as a replacement for the Soviet-era disability assessment framework.

Strategic Vision 3:

A BARRIER-FREE COMMUNITY INITIATIVE BASED ON UNICEF'S THE CHILD FRIENDLY CITIES INITIATIVE MODEL FOR VILLAGES AND CITIES⁷²

The MoSP develops a nationwide Barrier-Free Community Initiative aimed at empowering municipalities to create inclusive, accessible, and participatory environments for YPwDs. The core of the initiative is the Accessibility and Youth with Disabilities Inclusion Index, aligned to the EU Accessibility Act and the UNCRPD, applied annually to all oblasts⁷³ and voluntary hromadas.⁷⁴ The index assesses infrastructural accessibility,

equal access to public services, inclusive governance, and the meaningful participation of YPwD. Municipalities demonstrating progress receive positive reinforcement benefits such as targeted grants, public recognition through a national ranking system, and priority access to government co-financing.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✿ By 2030, the Accessibility and Youth with Disabilities Inclusion Index is launched, tracking municipal performance and increasing transparency for residents, civil society, and international partners and donors. All major cities as well as at least 25 hromadas with the highest YPwD population voluntarily join the program and reach 85–100% compliance with core Barrier-Free Community criteria.
- ✿ By 2035, 100% of municipal leadership (i.e., mayors, deputy mayors, and directors of local social services, education, health, and infrastructure departments) will have completed the mandatory government training on disability inclusion and accessible governance, developed with EU expertise and UN agencies.
- ✿ By 2040, at least 75% of hromadas will achieve Green Level based on the index tracking, and accessibility compliance will become a condition for all major municipal infrastructure tenders, reducing long-term retrofitting costs and ensuring sustainable design across public spaces.

⁷² The Child Friendly Cities Initiative promotes the realisation of child rights at the local level through a network of municipal governments, civil society organisations, the private sector, academia, media and children themselves in more than 40 countries. It provides relevant resources and guidelines for stakeholders related to local governance.

⁷³ An oblast is an administrative division or region in Ukraine.

⁷⁴ A hromada (територіальна громада) is the basic unit of local self-government in Ukraine.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By 2027, the MoSP will introduce a national Accessibility and Youth with Disabilities Inclusion Index, establishing measurable standards for step-free access, sign-language services, digital accessibility, emergency protocols, accessible transport, and youth participation in governance.

Action 2.

By 2027, the ministry will formalise cooperation with hromada and oblast administrations through the Barrier-Free Community Initiative, requiring all participating municipalities to complete baseline accessibility assessments within six months of joining.

Action 3.

By 2028, the MoSP will implement the Barrier-Free Spaces Grant Scheme, enabling municipalities to secure funding contingent on demonstrable improvements on the Inclusion Index, supporting upgrades to public infrastructure, development of inclusive youth centres, and accessibility adjustments. Concurrently, the ministry will co-ordinate structured partnerships between municipalities and local businesses to expand paid internships, educational opportunities, and accessible services for YPWD, with participating businesses receiving tax incentives, national recognition rankings, and preferential status in municipal procurement.

Action 4.

By 2029, municipalities will institutionalise the role of disability-focused NGOs in monitoring accessibility reforms through formalised participation in the co-designing of local action plans. At least 5% of youth-related municipal budgets will be allocated through participatory budgeting toward initiatives led or co-designed by YPWD, while newly established Youth Inclusion Advisory Boards, offering paid stipends to members with disabilities, will review local policies related to social services, including in accessibility, mobility and safety.

Action 5.

By 2029, the MoSP, in collaboration with UNICEF Ukraine's communications team, will run the nationwide campaign Barrier-Free Community: Youth First, using fully accessible digital formats including sign-language interpretation, captions, clear plain-language visuals, and audio descriptions. The campaign will highlight municipal progress, ranking updates, and personal YPWD stories, with compensated youth co-creators shaping the content. Monthly engagement reports will inform Inclusion Index scoring, and an annual National Inclusion Week will mobilise mayors and communities through livestreams, commitments, and interactive civic challenges.

Strategic Vision 4:

BOOSTING THE DEINSTITUTIONALISATION OF YPWDS

Building on the Strategy for Ensuring the Right of Every Child to Grow Up in a Family Environment (2024-2028) and on the Better Care reform agenda developed by UNICEF and Maestral International,⁷⁵ the MoSP, with support from EU partners and international donors, launches a reinforcement initiative that focuses on strengthening families, keeping them together through targeted social services, and expanding family-based alternative care (foster care, guardianship, domestic adoption) for children with disabilities.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✿ By 2030, around 5,000 new foster families are recruited, trained, and certified, prioritising placements for children with disabilities and an 80% reduction in children and young people with disabilities living in institutional care, with priority on those ageing out of the system. Most social services supporting biological families are scaled, reducing separation due to preventable social or economic challenges and evidence-based community services (respite care, day centres, inclusive extracurricular programs, mobile social work teams) are operational nationwide.
- ✿ By 2035, all children and youth in institutions have individual transition plans linking them to family-based care, community services, education, and employment opportunities, and multidisciplinary deinstitutionalisation groups of social workers, psychologists, and disability specialists with EU training/expertise are fully operational in each oblast, managing transitions and monitoring placements.
- ✿ By 2040, 100% of YPwD in institutionalised care will be placed in family-based or community-based settings with no transfers from child institutions to adult institutions as institutions operate primarily as community service hubs or social centres.

⁷⁵ UNICEF, Maestral International. (2025, August 12). *Technical Guidance for Oblast-level Better Care Start-up*

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1-3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By 2027, the MoSP, in partnership with UNICEF, local social services, and NGOs, will expand comprehensive family support programmes to prevent separation. These will include counselling, disability-specific parenting support, home-based care visits, and targeted financial assistance for families at risk of separation due to disability-related care challenges. Moreover, social workers will receive specialised training on early intervention, family preservation, and disability inclusion.

Action 2.

By 2028, the MoSP, working with foster care agencies, relevant NGOs, and EU experts, will recruit, train, and certify at least 2,000 new foster and patronage families annually, with a focus on YPWD. Strengthened guardianship and domestic adoption systems will be implemented for children without parental care, complemented by ongoing support through financial subsidies, psychological counselling, and mentorship networks for foster and adoptive families.

Action 3.

By 2029, multidisciplinary deinstitutionalisation teams will design and implement individualised transition plans prioritising family or community placement for institutionalised youth. These teams will provide education, skills-building, and employment support linked to Youth Guarantee programmes, while ensuring continuous monitoring and rapid-response interventions to address reintegration challenges.

Action 4.

By 2029, the MoSP, in collaboration with NGOs, YPWD, and communications partners, will launch national campaigns to promote family-based care, showcase successful reintegration stories, and recruit foster and patronage families. These campaigns will raise public awareness about the importance of preserving biological families and expanding family-based alternative care for YPWD.



Strategic Vision 5:**A SAFE TRANSITION INITIATIVE FOR SUPPORT OF GRADUATES WITH DISABILITY AGED 18–25 TO MOVE FROM INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR FURTHER INTEGRATION INTO SOCIETY**

The initiative includes the establishment of a support system for institutionalised YPwD to successfully transition to independent, skills-oriented ability to integrate into society. The programme includes launching Social Apartments, free housing for 6–12 months with mentorship, peer-to-peer support, and skills-development training (household, financial literacy, digital devices, public services, political engagement, rights and law), and career orientation opportunities. Simultaneously, the MoSP will launch a nationwide initiative of mentorship for youth with disability based on inclusive peer-to-peer interactions with certified volunteers who have completed a three-day Youth Mentor training, based on the model of the Youth Worker programme of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and have weekly meetings with their mentees to be a stable source of support, guidance, motivation, and learning for YPwD.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✨ By 2035, a nationwide network of at least 15,000 certified Youth Mentors trained in disability inclusion is established, providing weekly support to mentees and over 80% of YPwD involved report improved confidence, autonomy, and community participation in annual surveys by 2040.
- ✨ By 2040, 95% of YPwD ageing out of institutions will transition into community-based living rather than adult institutions, and at least 200 Social Apartments will operate nationwide, offering temporary housing and structured support.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)**Action 1.**

By 2027, the MoSP, in collaboration with oblast social services, international technical partners, and NGOs with deinstitutionalisation expertise, with European Commission and European Investment Bank funding, will establish 30 pilot Social Apartments providing 6–12 months of supported housing for institutionalised YPwD.

These apartments will serve as scalable models for safe housing infrastructure, drawing on EU-funded deinstitutionalisation reforms in Croatia and Bulgaria.⁷⁶ Pilot sites will be renovated according to EU accessibility standards, staffed with multidisciplinary groups, including case managers, psychologists, and independent-living coaches, and implement the National Transition Curriculum covering household management, financial literacy, digital skills, civic participation, and legal rights. Each young resident will be paired with a certified Youth Mentor, with further transition plans linked directly to local employment centres.

Action 2.

By 2028, the MoSP, in partnership with the Diia application,⁷⁷ local social service centres, NGOs, and communications partners, will integrate the Safe Transition program into the Diia app. YPwD leaving institutions will be able to register for Social Apartments and mentorship programmes online, access digital life-skills curricula, track progress, communicate with mentors, and schedule appointments with local social services. Institutional, in-person support points will be provided at local social service centres for youth unable to access Diia. Social workers and other staff will be trained to assist youth in navigating the platform, and a national awareness campaign with QR codes in institutions, vocational schools, and community centres will link directly to programme registration.

⁷⁶ Thomas, A. (2024, November). *The state of play of independent living and deinstitutionalisation for persons with disabilities in the EU: Progress, challenges, and way forward in supporting community-based living*
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/291558/QA-01-24-084-EN-N.pdf>

⁷⁷ *The Diia (Дія) is an e-government app launched in 2020, which allows Ukrainian citizens to use digital documents on their smartphones instead of physical ones for identification and sharing purposes, as well as over 130 government services.*

Strategic Vision 6:

YOUTH GUARANTEE: EMPOWERING YOUTH WITH DISABILITY, A GOVERNMENT-LED PROGRAMME OF CAREER PREPARATION AND EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT FOR NEET YOUTH WITH DISABILITY AGED 18–25 BASED ON BEST EU PRACTICES

Under the programme, every eligible young person receives a tailored offer of an internship, career guidance, education, skills-oriented training, or supported employment within four months. Delivery will rely on a co-ordinated network of local authorities, private-sector partners, and international experts, drawing on EU best practices and funding sources (e.g., alternatives to European Social Fund Plus—ESF+, the Youth Employment Initiative). All participating partners will be required to undergo an accessibility and anti-discrimination evaluation based on standards set by the MoSP, in cooperation with UNICEF Ukraine. These mechanisms will ensure that young people with non-severe disabilities transition into adulthood with equitable opportunities, safe environments, and sustained pathways into the labour market.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✿ By 2030, a permanent National Youth Guarantee Co-ordination Office is established under the MoSP for ensuring implementation regardless of political cycles, and has launched national inclusivity and anti-discrimination standards for employers aligned with the EU Accessibility Act.
- ✿ By 2035, at least 75% of eligible YPwD are pursuing a career or barrier-free higher education after receiving tailored support within four months of registration, matching the EU Youth Guarantee trajectory, and 100% of partner employers, training centres, and municipalities meet national accessibility and anti-discrimination standards aligned with the EU Accessibility Act.
- ✿ By 2040, 100% coverage of the Youth Guarantee mechanism across all oblasts and 30% increase in the number of inclusive employers registered in the national employment database, and secured sustainable annual co-funding from instruments equivalent to ESF+ and international organisations, covering at least 40% of programme investment needs.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By 2027, the MoSP, with support from EU partners, will establish a National Youth Guarantee Co-ordination Office responsible for planning, monitoring, and strategic partnership management. The office will introduce a comprehensive digital case-management system modelled on Finland's Ohjaamo one-stop guidance centres and a national network of regional co-ordinators to track each young participant from registration to placement. A standardized three-month service obligation will be standardized in alignment with EU Youth Guarantee requirements.

Action 2.

By 2028, the MoSP, in cooperation with local authorities, disability-inclusion NGOs, and private-sector partners, will launch pilot Inclusive Career Hubs within the Youth Guarantee framework in at least five oblasts. These hubs will provide counselling, vocational assessments, digital skills training, and accessible job-matching services, each aiming to serve 300–500 young people within two years to build evidence for nationwide scaling. The hubs will be situated within employment centres and staffed by disability co-ordinators trained in EU profiling methodologies, applying tools such as profiling grids, individual action plans, and standardized case-management protocols. Partnerships with employers will be supported through wage subsidies, internship funding, and accessibility requirements, while assistive technologies and workplace inclusion coaches will be integrated, modelled, for instance, after Sweden's Special Introduction and Follow-Up Support employment programme. Municipal social workers will conduct outreach and home visits for NEET youth with disabilities, particularly in rural areas, and all participating employers and training centres will undergo mandatory accessibility and anti-discrimination audits.

Action 3.

By 2028, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the MoSP, UNICEF, and disability-rights advocates will jointly run a national outreach and awareness campaign to increase registration in the Youth Guarantee by 40% in targeted regions and to reduce stigma around hiring YPWD. The campaign will feature youth-oriented digital content and ambassadors with lived experience, establish referral pathways through schools, youth centres, NGOs, and vocational institutions for those from age 16, and will distribute accessible materials across formats including easy-to-read text, braille, audio, and Ukrainian Sign Language.

Action 4.

By 2029, the Ministry of Economy, together with the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and disability-rights NGOs, will recruit and certify employers to provide safe, inclusive internships and jobs. At least 300 employers will achieve graded accessibility certification (Bronze/Silver/Gold), based on models such as Ireland's Disability Confidence Project, creating placements for YPWD. Employers will receive subsidies of up to 30% of salary for six months and annual micro-grants for necessary workplace adaptations, including accessibility equipment and inclusive software.



Strategic Vision 7:

PROTECTION OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF CAREGIVERS: BUILDING SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR FAMILIES RAISING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THAT ARE RESILIENT, INCLUSIVE, AND EMPOWERING

According to a 2024 UNICEF report, the poverty rate in Ukraine among families with children rose from 39% in 2021 to 84.7% in 2024.⁷⁸ The trend affects disproportionately families with children with disabilities, leaving them significantly exposed to heightened poverty. This can be explained by the absence of home-based social services, which forces people (primarily women) into full-time, lifelong caregiving, significantly limiting their ability to participate in the labour market, and leading to a 70% reduction in earning capacity; and by the insufficient level of state financial assistance, which at highest reaches UAH 3,028,⁷⁹ far below the real cost of disability-related care.

Although UNICEF has introduced temporary support measures, such as the UNICEF–EU Winter Assistance Programme (2024/2025) that provided cash assistance and essential household items to vulnerable caregiver families, including guardians, these are seasonal and cannot substitute for a permanent, state-funded support system. There is a clear need to strengthen the protection of caregivers' social and economic rights, as children with disabilities in low-income households often experience worse care conditions, leading to serious impact in various areas of life.⁸⁰

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✿ By 2030, the Caregiver Social Protection Index will be fully operational nationwide, with all regions publicly reporting annual data on caregiver support, home-based services, and labour-market integration. At least 60–70% of participating municipalities will have improved their score by 35–40% or more, demonstrating measurable expansion of home-visiting services, increased disability-related financial assistance, and improved co-ordination with NGOs and partners such as the Ukrainian Red Cross.
- ✿ By 2035, a minimum of 70% of communities will meet national standards for home-based social support, ensuring regular visits from trained social workers and mobile rehabilitation teams. At least 35–40% of major national employers will have adopted caregiver-friendly workplace standards under the National Labour Market Integration Initiative, resulting in significant increases in caregiver employment. Respite services will be available in all oblasts, with documented reductions in caregiver burden reflected in annual index data.
- ✿ By 2040, all oblasts will reach Green Level performance on the Caregiver Social Protection Index, indicating sustained and high-quality provision of home-based services, robust financial support schemes, and stable pathways for caregiver workforce reintegration, reaching 70–80% of caregivers being employed. Disability-inclusive social protection will be embedded into national and municipal budgeting rules, and compliance with caregiver-support standards will be a prerequisite for major social-sector funding. The Caregiver Dignity and Support campaign will have grown into a permanent national programme, ensuring continuous public awareness, improved data transparency, and long-term accountability.

⁷⁸ UNICEF Ukraine Country Office. (2024). *Situation Analysis of Children in Ukraine 2024* https://www.unicef.org/ukraine/en/media/49206/file/UNICEF_SitAn_2024_ENG.pdf

⁷⁹ Subsistence minimum for able-bodied persons in Ukraine as of January 1st, 2024. The figure is used as a basis to calculate disability benefits, which are dispensed as a fraction of said basis.

⁸⁰ UNICEF (2021, February). *Seen, Counted, Included: Using data to shed light on the well-being of children with disabilities* <https://data.unicef.org/resources/children-with-disabilities-report-2021/>

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

By 2027, the MoSP will introduce the Caregiver Social Protection Index, establishing measurable standards for disability-related financial assistance, access to home-based services, caregiver labour-market reintegration, and provide clear data on social protection situations in different regions.

Action 2.

By 2028, the MoSP will launch the Caregiver Support Grant Scheme, enabling a decentralised approach through municipalities to secure targeted funding for expanding respite care, home-visit programmes, and mobile rehabilitation services. Grants will be awarded based on demonstrated improvements in Index scores.

Action 3.

By 2028, the MoSP will launch a National Labour Market Integration Initiative for Caregivers, expanding flexible employment pathways (including remote, part-time, and supported work options) and providing tailored vocational re-skilling for parents of children with disabilities. In cooperation with major employers and local employment centres, the initiative will introduce caregiver-friendly workplace standards, offer job-matching services, and establish community-based respite support to enable participation in training and work. Employers meeting these standards will receive tax incentives, national recognition, the possibility to apply for governmental subsidies (structurally similar to subsidies for the employment of disabled individuals) and preferential status in public procurement, strengthening long-term economic inclusion for caregivers.

Action 4.

By 2028, the MoSP will expand and standardise home-based social support services for families caring for children with disabilities, building on existing state and NGO programmes, such as home-visit social workers and Red Cross patronage services. The ministry will establish minimum service standards that guarantee regular home visits for medical, rehabilitative, and daily-living assistance, with priority given to households experiencing high caregiver burden or financial vulnerability. Municipalities will be required to ensure that each eligible family has access to trained social workers, while a dedicated funding line will support the recruitment, training, and retention of home-care staff.

Action 5.

By 2029, the MoSP, in cooperation with UNICEF Ukraine, will implement a national communication campaign titled Caregiver Dignity and Support, using accessible communication formats and highlighting local progress, caregiver stories, and annual index updates, enabling cooperation of local NGOs. Annual feedback reports will inform index scoring, highlighting the issue and bringing it to public attention.



SECTION 3 - QUICK WINS

By mid-2026, the Ministry for Strategic Industries, local authorities, and the State Emergency Service will ensure bomb shelters are accessible and barrier-free for people with disabilities, providing essential survival supplies, in compliance with Article 11 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, resulting in safe, usable shelters for individuals with physical impairments during emergencies.

By December 2026, the MoSP will establish the National Youth with Disabilities Advisory Council as a permanent body with at least three youth with disabilities as equal decision-makers, in alignment with the UNCRPD, ensuring that all initiatives related to rehabilitation, reconstruction, transport infrastructure, and public services follow the 'Nothing for us without us' principle.

The Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories, in partnership with OPDs, will select and appoint 10 to 15 Youth Disabilities Representatives to national and regional reconstruction boards within two months, with their names and photos publicised.

Within three months, the Ministry of Restoration and the Agency for Reconstruction will issue a ministerial order establishing a co-signature mechanism, giving the Youth Disabilities Representatives authority to approve or halt accessibility and inclusion plans for pilot reconstruction projects, using existing standard operating procedures and online approval forms.

By spring 2026, the Ministry of Education and Science will host a one-day national inspection event in which student councils and youth with disabilities walk campus routes and document barriers using a simple mobile forum.

By April 2026, the Ministry of Education and Science will require all universities to complete a ten-item accessibility route checklist and submit photographic documentation of key access routes, using existing campus staff.

By July 2026, local authorities in partnership with municipal maintenance services will implement a One-Day Barrier Fix on at least one public building or surrounding street, using current staff and materials available, to quickly repair ramps, signage, pathways, and handrails.

By August 2026, the National Employment Service will designate and publicly list First Step Employment Mentors for YPwD, drawing from existing trained staff, who will provide early guidance on CV preparation, benefits access, and reasonable accommodation requests as part of the Youth Guarantee framework.

By October 2026, the MoSP, in partnership with UNICEF and local media, will implement a nationwide awareness campaign featuring YPwD sharing personal stories. These will be accessible in video, audio and text formats, using existing communication budgets and platforms.

By September 2026, the Ministry of Infrastructure, in collaboration with local transport authorities, will retrofit at least 20 public buses and key metro stations in major cities with wheelchair ramps, tactile floor markings, audible announcements, using existing maintenance teams and budget.

By December 2026, the Ministry of Education and Science, the MoSP and local NGOs will launch a nationwide school programme delivering workshops and interactive sessions on the rights, needs and inclusion of YPwD, using NGO facilitators and teaching staff, to ensure students, teachers, and administrators gain practical knowledge to support inclusive education and prepare them for successful transition into adulthood.



REFRAMING UKRAINE'S NARRATIVE IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Authors: Viktoriia Palahniuk (Lithuania/Ukraine), Lucie Fayoux (France),
Ioannis Zervos (Greece/Norway)
Facilitator: Anastasiia Ianovytska (Ukraine)

The Cabinet of Ministers adopts a Nation Brand Strategy for Ukraine, created through an inclusive, bottom-up, and evidence-based consultation process co-ordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in partnership with the Ministry of Culture, and engaging a variety of public stakeholders, including civil society, cultural actors, youth, diaspora, and government institutions.

Institutionalise a Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office by establishing a permanent inter-ministerial unit under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, holding final responsibility, and the Ministry of Culture, supporting the implementation, to align reforms, messaging, and international partnerships.

Align Ukraine's strategic communication with its reform delivery by implementing the Ukraine 2030 Reputation Roadmap and Proof, Not Promises campaigns to link visible reform progress with stronger international recognition and trust.

Key Recommendations

Empower youth as cultural diplomats by establishing a transnational Youth for Ukraine Brand Network across Ukraine and EU countries to activate 150,000+ young people as co-creators, cultural diplomats, and trusted messengers for the country, led by the Ukrainian Institute and the NGO Brand Ukraine Solutions in partnership with EU youth organisations (such as the European Youth Forum and Erasmus+ networks).



Context

- russia's full-scale invasion has severely disrupted Ukraine's global narrative environment, overwhelming international media agendas, amplifying disinformation operations, and causing Ukraine's image to be increasingly defined by war, destruction, and humanitarian crisis rather than by its reforms, resilience, and democratic progress.⁸¹
- Ukraine's soft power is declining: Ukraine fell from the 44th to 46th place in the 2024 Global Soft Power Index, falling 19 places in the Reputation indicator and 17 places in the Governance one.⁸²
- Brand perception deteriorated: Ukraine's ranking in the Anholt Nation Brands Index fell from the 47th place in 2022 to 57th in 2023.⁸³
- Governance misperceptions persist: Ukraine continues to be perceived as highly corrupt, despite significant reform progress.⁸⁴
- The digital landscape is huge but noisy: Ukraine has about 24 million social media users (about 65% of its population), yet narrative spaces are dominated by disinformation and fragmented messaging.⁸⁵

⁸¹ OECD. (2022). *Disinformation and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: Threats and governance responses*. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/11/disinformation-and-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine_8b596425/37186bde-en.pdf

⁸² Brand Finance. (2025, February 20). *Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2025: China overtakes UK for the first time, US remains top-ranked nation brand*. <https://brandfinance.com/press-releases/brand-finance-global-soft-power-index-2025-china-overtakes-uk-for-the-first-time-us-remains-top-ranked-nation-brand>

⁸³ Place Brand Observer. (2024, May 6). *Ukraine - Country Performance, Brand Strength and Reputation*. <https://placebrandobserver.com/ukraine-country-performance-brand-strength-reputation/>

⁸⁴ Transparency International. (2025, February 11). *2024 Corruption Perceptions Index - Explore Ukraine's results*. <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/ukr>

⁸⁵ Anholt-Ipsos. (2023). *Nation Brands Index 2023: Press release and supplemental deck*. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2023-10/NBI_2023_Press_Release_Supplemental_Deck_WEB.pdf

- How can Ukraine develop a Nation Brand Strategy to achieve its strategic goals?
- How can youth from Ukraine and the EU promote Ukrainian strategic narratives effectively through cultural diplomacy, storytelling, and digital platforms?

TARGET AUDIENCES FOR ADVOCACY

- **Office of the President:** Supervises the overall communication tone and provides strategic direction for the Nation Brand Strategy. Its endorsement ensures coherence across ministries and continuity beyond political cycles, while its co-ordination role is essential for aligning domestic and international messaging under a unified national vision.
- **Ministry of Foreign Affairs:** The lead actor in external communications. Through its Departments of Public Diplomacy and Economic Diplomacy, as well as the Ukrainian Institute, it will take the lead on, as well as co-ordinate, the international implementation of the Nation Brand Strategy across embassies, missions, and multilateral fora, ensuring that communication priorities remain consistent with foreign policy objectives.
- **Ministry of Culture:** Defines the creative and cultural direction of the national narrative, notably through its Centre for Information Security and Strategic Communications. It co-leads the Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office, managing narrative framing, counter-disinformation efforts, and the integration of cultural diplomacy into broader strategic communications.
- **National Information Agency (Ukrinform):** Operates as a bridge between public institutions and the media, distributing verified government content domestically and internationally. It will co-produce explainers such as Ukraine Governance in Numbers and co-ordinate their dissemination across partner media outlets and international networks.

Central Questions

Stakeholders

- **Eventual Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office:** Functions as a specialised co-ordination body rather than an independent implementing body. It provides technical expertise in audience research, narrative design, and campaign planning, supporting the ministries and state institutions responsible for execution.
- **Civil society organisations:** Play a complementary advocacy role. Networks such as PR Army, Ukraïner, and Stratcom Ukraine amplify authentic citizen voices and deliver agile, story-driven communication to international audiences. Other organisations (including Internews Ukraine, Detector Media, and Human Rights Centre ZMINA) contribute to media literacy, digital rights advocacy, and narrative research that strengthen the public communication ecosystem.



WHO IS IMPACTED BY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

- **Citizens:** Gain visibility and recognition as their daily experiences, resilience, and achievements are communicated abroad, not just the narrative of war.
- **Youth and diaspora:** Young people and Ukrainians living abroad get better tools and narratives to act as authentic ambassadors, shaping how others understand modern Ukraine and forming the core membership and volunteer base of the Youth for Ukraine Brand Network.

Key Decision-Makers

Strategic Oversight and Political Mandate

- **Office of the President:** Has final political responsibility for the strategy. It ensures all brand narratives align with national security and foreign policy goals, providing the high-level mandate necessary to compel cooperation across ministries and to ensure continuity beyond political cycles.

Lead Co-ordinating Institution (International)

- **Ministry of Foreign Affairs:** Designated as the primary owner of Ukraine’s international brand presence. It approves foreign-facing strategic campaigns, co-ordinates implementation across the embassy network, and serves as the single point of accountability for the strategy’s global performance.

Narrative Development and Creative Lead

- **Ministry of Culture:** Focuses on the substance of the brand. It defines narrative pillars, manages the ‘creative engine’ (arts, heritage, creative industries), and oversees domestic strategic communications to ensure the home front supports the global message.

Specialised Sectoral Mandates

- **Ministry of Digital Transformation:** Leads on the digital brand and is responsible for the State in a Smartphone narrative and the technical infrastructure (e.g., DIIA) required for public consultation and metrics collection.

Stakeholders

- **Government institutions:** Government institutions benefit from clearer, more consistent communication that strengthens their credibility, supports diplomacy, and improves responses to disinformation.
- **International audiences:** Foreign publics, media, and partners access clearer, more trustworthy stories about Ukraine’s identity, culture, and progress, reducing reliance on distorted or outdated narratives.

- **Ministry of Economy:** Leads on the economic brand, integrating the Invest in Ukraine and Made in Ukraine initiatives to reinforce the country’s reputation as a resilient, modern partner.
- **Government Office for Strategic Communications:** Ensures crisis alignment and co-ordinates counter-disinformation efforts to protect the brand’s integrity.

Operational and Implementation Support

- **Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office:** Serves as the technical secretariat. It does not hold political authority but provides the service layer: conducting audience research, producing creative assets, and monitoring key performance indicators.
- **Ukrainian Institute:** Acts as the primary implementation agency for cultural diplomacy, executing programmes like academic exchanges and artistic events.



Strategic Vision 1:

REBUILDING UKRAINE’S REPUTATION THROUGH EVIDENCE-BASED COMMUNICATION AND CIVIC LITERACY

In order to maximise the impact of limited diplomatic and communication resources, the strategy must move beyond a broad pan-European approach to a prioritisation framework. This framework aligns narrative efforts with Ukraine’s immediate political and defence objectives.

The Three-Tier Engagement Model is based on a strategic priority vs public sentiment matrix:

Tier 1:

Strategic Sustainment (e.g., Germany, France, United Kingdom, Poland, Nordic countries). Objective: Combat ‘Ukraine fatigue’ and maintain high-level military/ financial aid. Action: High- frequency, values-based messaging that frames Ukraine as the security shield of Europe.

Tier 2:

Narrative Contestation (e.g., Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, wider Central and Eastern Europe). Objective: Counter hostile information operations and neutralise scepticism in regions with fluctuating support. Action: Pragmatic, interest-based messaging. Instead of engaging in myth-busting (which often amplifies the myth), this tier focuses on the proactive distribution of fact-based information regarding economic stability, energy security, and border safety.

Tier 3:

Future Partners and Soft Power (e.g., wider EU states, non-EU allies). Objective: Build long-term cultural affinity and prepare ground for post-war investment. Action: Culture-first approach led by the Ukrainian Institute, emphasizing art, heritage, and human capital.

APPLYING CONTEXTUALIZING STRATEGIES RELEVANT FOR EACH REGION

The goal is to rebuild and elevate Ukraine’s global reputation as a resilient, innovative, and democratic nation, measured by its inclusion among the top 30 countries in the Anholt Nation Brands Index by 2040 and by 75% of EU citizens recognizing Ukraine as an inclusive, reform-driven liberal democracy with low corruption levels. Ukraine’s global image remains heavily shaped by war-focused narratives, leading to public fatigue, declining soft power, and distorted perceptions. To secure long-term European political support, Ukraine must shift from reactive crisis communication to structured, evidence-based storytelling that highlights reform delivery, democratic resilience, and innovation. Improving Ukraine’s reputation in the EU as well as strengthening its nation brand is essential for EU accession, foreign investment, and societal morale.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✦ By 2040, Ukraine has improved its scores in the Governance and People indicators of the Anholt Nation Brand Index by at least ten points compared to the 2023 baseline and converged with or exceeded the average scores of current EU candidate countries, while maintaining or improving its performance in the other dimensions (Exports, Culture, Tourism, Immigration, and Investment).
- ✦ 75% of EU citizens hold a positive view of Ukraine as a democratic and inclusive state, according to Eurobarometer polling.
- ✦ At least ten EU countries integrate a Modern Ukraine education module.
- ✦ Over 100,000 youth are engaged in narrative and exchange programmes (up from 8,000–10,000 as of 2025).

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

The Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office, supported by the Cabinet of Ministers, Reputation Lab, and research institutions, will develop and adopt an evidence-based Ukraine 2030 Reputation Roadmap linking priority reforms and EU accession commitments to measurable reputation indicators. Ministries will align their external communication with these metrics, using cross-ministry workshops, messaging toolkits, and a monitoring dashboard that tracks international perceptions. Validated with input from civil society, the diaspora, and international partners, the roadmap will guide coherent strategic messaging, showcase Ukraine's reform progress, and strengthen credibility with sceptical global audiences, with full adoption across ministries by 2028.

Action 2.

The Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, will implement a Proof, Not Promises communication model, shifting from crisis-driven messaging to consistently showcasing verifiable success stories in areas such as anti-corruption, decentralisation, digital transformation, and defence innovation. Using data-validated content presented in accessible multimedia formats and released monthly in multiple languages, ministries will co-ordinate messaging through centralised toolkits and dashboards. Civil society, diaspora networks, and international partners will provide

feedback and amplification, ensuring credibility and reach, with full implementation across government channels by 2027.

Action 3.

The Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture, will highlight Ukraine as a global problem-solver through annual reports and campaigns on food security, humanitarian innovation, digital governance, reconstruction, and demining. Co-ordinated messaging and amplification via diaspora and civil society networks will reframe Ukraine as a provider of solutions, with the first report and campaign launched by 2028.

Action 4.

The Ukrainian Institute, in collaboration with EU education ministries and digital learning platforms, will integrate civic and cultural literacy modules on modern Ukraine into school curricula, teacher trainings, and open-access platforms such as Coursera and Moodle. Building on existing modules created by the Ukrainian Institute, this initiative will ensure that future generations of Europeans understand Ukraine as an integral part of Europe rather than a distant conflict zone, with full implementation by 2029.

Strategic Vision 2:

STRENGTHENING COORDINATION AND COHERENCE IN UKRAINE’S NATION BRAND STRATEGY

Despite substantial communication efforts, Ukraine’s messaging remains fragmented across state institutions, civil society actors, NGOs, and international partners. Without a unified and coherent narrative and institutional architecture, Ukraine risks inconsistency, duplication, and missed opportunities to influence foreign publics. A co-ordinated Nation Brand Strategy can harmonise messaging, increase credibility, and ensure the

country speaks with one voice while still embracing pluralism. Thus, by 2040, a comprehensive Ukraine Nation Brand strategy will be created through a co-ordinated and inclusive approach involving civil society representing citizen groups, state institutions, the private sector, and the media. This strategy will be applied and mainstreamed by various stakeholders in all public-facing communication efforts.

Benchmarks for Success (5-20 years)

- ✦ A comprehensive Ukraine Nation Brand Strategy is adopted by 2028.
- ✦ A permanent Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office is fully operational by 2027.
- ✦ 80% of public institutions apply a unified narrative toolkit by 2027.
- ✦ Annual international reach of 100+ million citizens with coherent brand-aligned messaging through digital media campaigns and youth exchanges by 2028.
- ✦ In addition to long-term reputation benchmarks, the Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office will implement continuous monitoring systems to track narrative alignment, resonance, and impact. These will include:
 - A quarterly brand perception dashboard, based on media sentiment, search trends, and audience segmentation (developed in partnership with Reputation Lab).
 - A biannual narrative alignment audit, ensuring government and embassy outputs reflect brand pillars.
 - Regular stakeholder feedback loops, with public reports integrating input from civil society, journalists, and diaspora networks.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1-3 YEARS)

Action 1.

Between 2026 and 2027, Ukraine will design and adopt a unified Nation Brand Strategy that defines how the country presents itself to the world. The process will be grounded in broad public participation and institutional co-ordination to ensure that the resulting vision reflects citizens' voices and the country's long-term reform trajectory. The initiative will be supervised by the Office of the President, which will ensure political legitimacy, coherence across ministries, and alignment with national strategic priorities.

A temporary Inter-Agency Task Force on Nation Branding, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Ministry of Culture as the deputy lead for creative content, will oversee day-to-day implementation.

This structure ensures a clear chain of command for international activities while maintaining a strong creative core. The consultation process will combine digital participation and in-person engagement. A national public platform hosted on DIIA will invite Ukrainians at home and abroad to share stories, values, symbols, and ideas expressing what they believe their country stands for and how it should be represented internationally.

These online submissions will be complemented by regional hearings across Ukraine and pilot focus groups held in Kyiv and two EU capitals to include the diaspora. The NGO Brand Ukraine Solutions and other civil society partners will co-ordinate outreach, moderation, and reporting, while the Office of the President will maintain oversight of progress and review major milestones.

Throughout 2026, the platform will collect and analyse citizen input, while expert and thematic focus groups test emerging ideas and narrative options. In 2027, the public consultation will expand nationwide and abroad, introducing feedback loops to refine and validate the strategy. Draft narrative frameworks will be shared publicly for comment, followed by structured dialogues at the municipal level and a DIIA-based digital poll

to finalise priorities. The process will culminate in the Cabinet of Ministers' adoption of the Nation Brand Strategy in 2030.

The strategy will articulate Ukraine's vision, values, and narrative pillars, along with a clear implementation roadmap for use by government institutions, embassies, and international partners. It will be accompanied by a public report summarising citizen inputs and consultation outcomes, and an open database of stories, symbols, and narratives that informed its creation. The result will be a coherent and legitimate Nation Brand Strategy supervised by the country's highest political authority, built through an inclusive, participatory process that reinforces domestic trust and international credibility.

Action 2.

A permanent Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office will be established by the Cabinet of Ministers, assisted by Brand Ukraine Solutions, to co-ordinate nation-branding activities. It will provide a shared calendar, narrative guide, and communication framework, enabling ministries, civil society, diaspora networks, and cultural institutions to align messaging, reduce fragmentation, and increase consistency across all channels, with the office operational by 2029. The office will consist of 40% government, 30% civil society, 20% private sector, and 10% media representatives, selected and governed according to formalised procedures ensuring legitimacy, accountability, and continuity.

Action 3.

To ensure legitimacy, transparency, and institutional continuity, the hybrid governance structure of the Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office should be regulated by a formal statute adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers. Representatives from government institutions will be appointed ex officio, while civil society, private sector, and media representatives will be selected through open, competitive calls based on predefined eligibility criteria, including demonstrated expertise, ethical compliance, and prior engagement in public-interest

communication. Fixed-term mandates of three years, renewable once, should be introduced to prevent over-personalisation and ensure regular renewal of perspectives.

Action 4.

Decision-making authority within the Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office should follow a tiered model. Strategic decisions related to national security, foreign policy alignment, and official state positioning will remain with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the President. The office will exercise consultative and technical authority over narrative design, campaign planning, and monitoring, operating through qualified majority voting rules codified in its statute. Conflict-of-interest safeguards—including mandatory asset declarations, disclosure of affiliations, and recusal procedures—should be applied to all non-state members, in line with OECD integrity standards. These procedures align the proposed model with international best practices in collaborative public governance, reducing co-ordination risks while preserving inclusiveness and innovation.

Action 5.

The effective implementation of the Nation Brand Strategy requires a clearly articulated financial architecture. Core operational funding for the Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office and associated strategic communication activities should be embedded as a protected multi-year budget line within the state budget, co-ordinated through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture. Embedding funding in the national budget is essential to ensure continuity beyond electoral cycles and to safeguard the strategy from ad hoc or politically contingent financing.

Action 6.


Complementary external resources—including international donor support, EU programmes, private-sector partnerships, and philanthropic contributions—should be managed through a ring-fenced trust or programme-based financing mechanism subject to public reporting. All external funds should adhere to unified financial management rules, including independent audits, annual efficiency assessments, and impact-based reporting aligned with the strategy's performance indicators.

Action 7.

Indicative medium-term costs should be transparently communicated in the strategy, including staffing, research, content production, youth programmes, and monitoring tools. International experience suggests that nation-branding systems typically require annual investments equivalent to 0.01–0.05% of national public expenditure, depending on scope and ambition. Explicit cost ranges will enhance credibility vis-à-vis policy-makers, donors, and implementation partners.

Action 8.

The Ministry of Culture, with the assistance of Brand Ukraine Solutions will develop and distribute a multilingual Brand Ukraine Toolkit on governmental websites as well as a dedicated web page, containing narrative pillars, visuals, tone guidelines, and verified messaging. Annual updates to the toolkit will ensure accuracy, maintain narrative coherence, and allow all stakeholders to consistently communicate Ukraine's identity and achievements, with the first version released by 2028.



Strategic Vision 3:

EMPOWERING A TRANSNATIONAL YOUTH NETWORK FOR DELIVERING UKRAINE'S STRATEGIC NARRATIVES

Young people are the most active participants in digital spaces where perceptions about Ukraine are formed and contested. They are also the most trusted messengers among their peers. However, their involvement in official strategic communication is minimal. Empowering youth throughout Ukraine and Europe as co-creators of cultural diplomacy and narrative work can significantly expand Ukraine's reach, authenticity, and emotional resonance across generations.

Benchmarks for Success (5–20 years)

- ✨ The Ukrainian Institute, in partnership with EU youth organisations and diaspora networks, will establish a global youth network of 150,000+ active members engaged in storytelling and cultural diplomacy, with full network mobilisation by 2035.
- ✨ By 2032, 30% of Ukrainian youth councils will be connected to EU youth institutions, enabling cross-border collaboration and knowledge exchange, and empowering young Ukrainians as cultural and diplomatic ambassadors to strengthen Ukraine's European ties.
- ✨ Youth-led campaigns and content on social media reach 20+ million people annually.
- ✨ The Ukrainian Institute, together with Brand Ukraine Solutions and EU youth networks, will establish an Annual Youth Ukraine Brand Summit as a permanent platform to engage young people in storytelling, cultural diplomacy, and collaborative branding, ensuring the brand continues to expand and thrive by 2030.

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (1–3 YEARS)

Action 1.

Brand Ukraine Solutions, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ukrainian Institute, Erasmus+ agencies, and EU youth organisations, will create the Youth for Ukraine Brand Network across 20+ EU countries and Ukraine, delivering trainings, creative labs, and digital diplomacy opportunities for thousands of youth each year, thus providing pathways to shape Ukraine's European narrative, to be fully operational by 2030.

Action 2.

Hromadske, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Sciences Po in collaboration with European media schools will co-produce a youth-generated cross-border multi-media series (Our Ukraine) showcasing innovation, resilience, cultural diversity, and reform success

stories. This will humanise Ukraine for foreign audiences and combat 'Ukraine fatigue'. The first season is planned for release by 2032, with ongoing annual productions.

Action 3.

Municipalities in Ukraine, together with the Brand Ukraine Co-ordination Office and partner twin cities in the EU, will establish local Civic Labs where youth co-design projects on culture, climate, and inclusion that align with Ukraine's values-based brand. This bottom-up diplomacy fosters lasting cross-border relationships, empowers youth to drive change locally, and reinforces Ukraine's sense of belonging in Europe. The goal is to have the initial labs operational by 2035.

SECTION 3 – QUICK WINS

By mid-2026, the Ministry of Culture will launch a pilot campaign titled Proof, Not Promises, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It will highlight three verified reform achievements and repackage them for broad international audiences. Short, visually appealing explainers and micro-stories will be released across Ukraine’s official channels and major social-media platforms in English, French, Spanish, and German to maximise accessibility. Using existing communication resources and a budget of €15,000–€20,000, the initiative aims to show, through clear evidence and relatable storytelling, that Ukraine delivers on reforms and belongs firmly within Europe’s democratic landscape.

All pilot initiatives will be accompanied by brief financial and impact summaries, published online, to establish early standards of transparency and value-for-money assessment.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate-General for Public Diplomacy will publish a concise multilingual digest titled Ukraine Governance in Numbers. Drawing on open government data, the publication will translate complex reform statistics into clear visuals and short commentaries understandable to journalists, diplomats, and citizens across Europe. Distributed through government and embassy websites, international mailing lists, and EU partner channels, it will provide a reliable reference point for those seeking quick, trustworthy information about Ukraine’s progress.

By mid-2027, the Ministry of Culture, with the support of Brand Ukraine Solutions, will design and release the first Brand Ukraine Toolkit. This open-access package will provide unified visual, linguistic, and narrative guidelines for all institutions, embassies, and civil society partners communicating about Ukraine abroad. The toolkit will include adaptable templates, examples of effective messaging, and clear instructions on tone and imagery, ensuring coherence and professionalism across campaigns. By offering free, easy-to-use materials in English, French, German, and Spanish, the toolkit will help align Ukraine’s voice across platforms and audiences, strengthening recognition and trust in the country’s democratic and cultural identity.


By early 2027, the Ministry of Culture will open an online public consultation portal, hosted on the DIIA platform, to collect citizens’ contributions to the emerging Nation Brand Strategy. The initiative will invite Ukrainians at home and abroad to share stories, values, and symbols that represent how they see their country’s identity and future in Europe. The Office of the President will supervise the process to ensure institutional legitimacy and coherence, while Brand Ukraine Solutions and civil society partners will assist in outreach and moderation. This public consultation will form the participatory backbone of the Nation Brand Strategy, anchoring Ukraine’s international image in the lived experiences of its people and demonstrating a democratic, bottom-up approach to nation-branding. The initiative aims to gather at least 10,000 citizen contributions and to publish a public summary report shaping the Nation Brand Strategy.

By 2027, the Ukrainian Institute, working with twin cities in the EU, will curate three small-scale multimedia exhibitions titled Ukraine in My City. Hosted in municipal gallery spaces and implemented with European local cultural centres, each exhibition will use a €10,000–€15,000 budget to showcase Ukraine’s creative energy, civic initiatives, and reform stories. These events will bridge Ukrainian and local communities, reinforcing city-level cooperation and making Ukraine’s transformation tangible to European visitors.





ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



REBUILD UKRAINE AMBASSADORS

Deppy Alafoyanni	Vasilis Mavros
Viktoriia Barylovska	Nadiia Medvedieva
Isabella Buhrow	Ron Mehana
Loli Chibko	Aybars Önder
Mikołaj Czerwiński	Viktoriia Palahniuk
Lucie Fayoux	Yuliia Pavlenko
Rafael-Petruț Gardoș	Daria Perevertailo
Liudmyla Haliulko	Nazarii Pomohaibo
Max Heegewaldt	Marijn (M.J.L.) Rijk
Mariia Hryhurko	D. E. Valentina Stincanu
Sirod Serbest Kalash	Anastasiia Svystula
Maksym Karpliuk	Taisiia Taran
Illia Kuksenko	Anna Vietrova
Sofiia Lysenko	John Zervos

FACILITATORS

Anastasiia Ianovytska

Vasyl Babych

Andrea Stagni

EXPERTS

Marine Abramian	Polina Kolodyazhna
Simon Anholt	Maksym Kostetskyi
Anton Antonenko	Zhanna Panchenko
Tetiana Avdieieva	Liudmyla Redutova
Marina Dadinova	Viktoriia Romaniuk
David Franz	Yulia Sachuk
Olena Halushka	Denys Sviatokum
Jakub Kalenský	Valeriia Voshchevska
Tanya (Tetyana) Lokot	

ILLUSTRATIONS & LAYOUT

Kateryna Velcheva

IMPRINT

Publisher:

Schwarzkopf Foundation Young Europe in 2026
European Youth Parliament
c/o Schwarzkopf Foundation Young Europe
Sophienstr. 28/29
10178 Berlin
Germany

info@eyp.org | eyp.org | @eyp_network

*The Schwarzkopf Foundation Young Europe is the international umbrella organisation
of the European Youth Parliament.*

Person responsible under German press law (V.i.S.d.P.):

Anya Suprunenko

Initiated by:

EUROPEAN **YOUTH** PARLIAMENT



Schwarzkopf 
Foundation
YOUNG EUROPE 

Supported by:

