

**TURKU 2025**

**102<sup>nd</sup> INTERNATIONAL SESSION**



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# Resolution Booklet

**Turku 2025 - International Session of the EYP**

EUROPEAN **YOUTH** PARLIAMENT



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## 2 GA PROCEDURE

### DAY 1

6 ECON I

11 SEDE

15 AFET II

19 DROI

23 EMPL

27 LIBE

31 CULT

### DAY 2

35 ECON II

38 AFET I

42 ITRE

46 INTA

51 FEMM

55 ENVI

# GA PROCEDURE

1. The board announces the name of the proposing committee and reads out the topic (*60 seconds*)
2. The board gives the GA a moment to read through the resolution (*60 seconds*)
3. Defence speech from the podium (*3 min*) (*1 speaker*)
4. 2 position speeches from the podium (*2x 1.5 min*)
5. Response to the position speeches (*2 min*)
6. Debate round 1 (*3-4 points*)
7. Debate round 2 (*3-4 points*)
8. Debate round 3 (*3-4 points*)
9. Debate round 4 (*3-4 points*)
10. Summation speech (*3 min*) (*1-2 speakers*)
11. Voting (*4 min*)

# GENERAL RULES

1. The General Assembly (GA) needs to be an open space that allows and encourages delegates to openly voice their ideas and opinions, in a respectful and constructive manner. Boards should be aware that delegates feel under a great deal of pressure during GAs, and should use their position to support and encourage them. Their focus should be on providing participants with an educational experience, discussing together and exchanging ideas as to different ways to achieve an aim.
2. During the GA, participants discuss each motion for a resolution separately in strict accordance with this procedure.
3. There should be an adequate amount of time scheduled for each motion for a resolution to be discussed.
4. A break has to be provided after every two motions for a resolution have been discussed, with the exception that once every day, three motions for a resolution may be discussed in a row and without a break.
5. All participants are required to observe appropriate and respectful manners. This does not include an obligation for participants to wear formal clothes.
6. The board leads the Assembly and has the final authority on decisions within the boundaries of this GA procedure.
7. Any participant wishing to speak during the GA may only do so after having been recognised by the board.
8. The content of the points made by the participants must be related to the resolution under consideration.
9. Any points made by the participants are delivered from the floor unless stated otherwise.
10. Each committee is provided with a set of placards (abbreviation of the committee name, direct response, personal privilege, point of order).
  - a. The committee name placard is raised when a member of the committee would like to address the assembly.
  - b. The direct response placard is raised together with the committee name placard when the committee would like to exercise their right to use the direct response.
  - c. The personal privilege placard is raised to indicate that a member of the committee cannot hear or comprehend what is being said.
  - d. The point of order placard is raised together with the committee name placard when the board violates the procedure. Only chairpersons can raise the placard.

# PROCEDURE

1. At the beginning of each debate, a member of the board announces the name of the proposing committee and the topic of the motion for the resolution.
2. The board can give the Assembly a few moments to refresh their memory as to the resolution about to be debated.
3. On behalf of the proposing committee, one speaker delivers the defence speech from the podium. The speech may last no longer than three minutes.
4. The board has to grant the opportunity for the delivery of two position speeches. The board assigns one and a half minutes to each speaker to deliver a speech from the podium. Position speeches can either represent agreement or disagreement with the overall position/direction that the motion for the resolution proposes. The speakers should approach these speeches constructively, and, in the case of speeches in disagreement, explain their reasoning for the disagreement and suggest alternative options that would have been more suitable, and why. Ideally, there is one position speech in agreement and one in disagreement.
5. The proposing committee has the possibility to respond to these position speeches. One speaker may use three minutes to respond on behalf of the proposing committee.

# DEBATE

1. The board opens the discussion on the motion for the resolution to the entire Assembly. Any delegate can voice their opinion on the motion for the resolution.
2. Adequate time should be provided to the proposing committee so that they can react to the ongoing discussion.
3. Only one point at a time may be voiced.
4. The board moderates the discussion.
5. Delegates express their personal opinion on the motion under consideration.
6. Every committee has the right to appoint a direct response to a delegate up to two times per debate. The board will immediately recognise the appointed delegate as the next speaker. The speaker has to directly address the last point made by the preceding speaker.
7. The board reserves the right not to recognise every Direct Response raised. Whether a second or third Direct Response in one Debate is recognised, is up to the discretion of the board. This is to ensure that it is not used in a manner that disadvantages balanced interventions from all committees.
8. On behalf of the proposing committee, one or two speakers conclude the debate with a summation speech from the podium. The speech may last a maximum of three minutes.

# VOTING

1. The motion for a resolution is submitted to a vote by the Assembly.
2. Each delegate has one vote and votes in line with their personal opinion. No proxy voting is allowed.
3. A delegate can decide to vote either in favour, against or abstain from voting for the motion for a resolution. The board may not encourage a specific vote.
4. A majority is required for a motion to pass. The motion for a resolution is adopted when there are more votes in favour than votes against. In the event of a tie, the motion fails.





## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS (ECON I)

**Let me In!(vest):** *In March 2025, the European Commission launched the strategy for the Savings and Investments Union to promote greater investment in capital markets to achieve Europe's strategic priorities. Considering that investments made earlier in life can lead to greater returns over time, how can the EU promote the inclusion of young people in the Savings and Investments Union to both ensure their financial preparedness for the future and maximise their contribution to a more prosperous economy?*

**Submitted by:** Santiago Arauz (ES), Adam Boulif (BE), Maja Tho Hartvigsen (NO), Katalin Horvath (DE), Tommaso Mariani (IT), Pavle Mazalica (RS), Michael McCarthy (IE), Danny Nguyen (FI), Marta Pulajew (PL), Ana Rodríguez (ES), Selina Schmidt (AT), Isha Sundaram (SE), Júlia Mesquita (PT, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to promote the introduction of young European citizens into financial markets through the development of tailored financial literacy and the search for credibility and veracity of financial information sources. Moreover, we hope to make investing safer and more accessible by simplifying regulations, improving risk warnings, and strengthening protection against scams and misleading platforms. Additionally, we aim to promote an EU-wide investment strategy without negating Member States' national identity, while strongly encouraging young people to invest in efficient capital markets, and eventually strengthening the global competitiveness of the EU,**

***because***

- The current unstable and unpredictable geopolitical landscape surrounding the EU [makes](#) investors sceptical,
- Market volatility is often [related](#) to uncertainty in economic policies, which can affect young people's confidence to invest,
- There is a scarcity of trustworthy resources on investing, often [causing](#) distrust and judgment among the younger generations,
- There is a [lack of awareness](#) regarding the importance of teaching young people about financial literacy<sup>1</sup>,
- Financial illiteracy remains a significant barrier to investing, with young people scoring the [lowest](#) in understanding basic financial concepts,

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<sup>1</sup> **Financial literacy** is the possession of skills, knowledge, and behaviors that allow an individual to make informed decisions regarding money.





- Not all Member States have [developed](#) a financial literacy strategy, with its deployment remaining uneven with [inconsistent](#) monitoring mechanisms and [poorly allocated](#) resources,
- Disinformation in social media has [led](#) young people to expect immediate results from investments,
- A significant portion of young people [lacks awareness of the benefits](#) of long-term financial planning and investing, resulting in low participation rates in [pension schemes](#) and [investment products](#),
- There is a lack of understanding of the importance of [investing in one's future](#) and [long-term responsibility](#) among the youth,
- Bureaucratic burdens imposed by regulations further [complicate](#) the investing process and hinder retail participation in EU capital markets<sup>2</sup>,
- Increased digitalisation and ease of access to investment platforms have [heightened](#) exposure to high-risk products, fraud, and online scams, particularly among inexperienced investors,
- Gamified investing platforms<sup>3</sup> give a false sense of confidence to young people, which often [leads](#) to impulsive decisions,
- [42% of Europeans](#) whose financial rights and assets have been breached have not filed a complaint, mainly due to inaccessible redress channels,
- Several countries are [concerned](#) about losing regulatory and national authority in the field of investment, as their domestic priorities often diverge from those of the EU,

*by*

### **Financial Literacy**

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<sup>2</sup> **Capital markets** are the part of a financial system concerned with raising capital by dealing in shares, bonds, and other long-term investments.

<sup>3</sup> **Gamification of investment** refers to the practice of integrating game-like elements, such as rewards, competition, and interactive features, into investment platforms and applications to make the process more engaging.





1. Recommending the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to award a 'Fintech Trust Label' that certifies credibility of platforms that meet minimum criteria on transparency, investor education, and cybersecurity;
2. Calling upon the Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT) to appoint fact-checkers to verify the accuracy of claims made by all platforms providing financial market information;
3. Calling upon Member States' Ministries of Education to update their curricula on financial literacy by:
  - a. integrating basic financial concepts into the primary school curricula,
  - b. including education on investment concepts and the current EU financial policy for secondary school;
4. Urging DG FISMA to create a social media campaign promoting the importance of financial literacy through the EU's official social media accounts;
5. Urging DG FISMA to introduce a mandatory label certifying trustworthiness of content creators who wish to market investment products;
6. Inviting the Member States to support the development of age-appropriate learning methods by funding TV shows for teenagers that introduce economic concepts in simple and accessible ways;
7. Encouraging the Directorate General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) to foster curiosity and knowledge on currently relevant financial issues by logistically and financially supporting informal educational activities and events, such as the European Youth Parliament;
8. Recommending DG FISMA to take further steps to attract young investors into capital markets by disseminating materials emphasising the importance of lower-risk stocks, and the benefits of long-term investments for inexperienced investors;



9. Inviting Member States to facilitate the participation of minors in financial markets by:
  - a. allowing minors guaranteed under a legal guardian to invest;
  - b. developing warning systems that automatically flag high-risk options to young people;

### **Youth in the Workforce**

10. Further inviting Member States to challenge the preconceptions that investing requires high initial capital through promoting micro-investing via state-owned channels;
11. Encouraging the European Banking Authority to elaborate reports on the current state of Member States' financial literacy strategies, focusing on the efficiency of their resource allocation and their impact;
12. Recommending DG FISMA to introduce a 'Euro-Match' scheme where upon turning 18-years-old, prospective investors may apply for the EU to match long-term investments within the EU up to a certain amount;
13. Advising Member States to encourage long-term sustainable investing towards young people through degressive taxation policies<sup>4</sup>;

### **Online Investment Safety**

14. Recommending DG FISMA to improve young generations' comprehension of stocks' terms and conditions through offering a simplified form of disclosure<sup>5</sup> documents;
15. Calling upon the European Commission to raise awareness in the form of a media campaign about risks of scams and fraud that users encounter online and provide guidance on how users can protect themselves against them;

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<sup>4</sup> **Degressive taxation policies** in an investment context refers to tax systems where the tax burden on returns on investment becomes lighter the longer an investment is held.

<sup>5</sup> **Disclosure documents** in relation to **retail investment** are formal papers provided to investors that explain important information about an investment product, service, or financial offering.



16. Proposing that DG FISMA directs investment platforms to implement a standard for a clear and prominent risk warning system that alerts users, upon entry, to potential risks associated with online investment activities;
17. Urging Member States' relevant authorities to reinforce direct support channels of communication for citizens who are victims of scams;

**European Cohesion and Global Competitiveness**

18. Calls upon DG FISMA to strengthen ESMA's authority to improve supervision of financial applications in Member States, by:
  - a. gradually granting it oversight in priority areas, such as cross-border activities, through a scope-based approach,
  - b. strongly advocating for their interests and priorities regarding their economic and political situation.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE (SEDE)

**Don't shoot the messenger:** *With war breaking out in Europe in 2022 and the weapons lobby increasing spending by 40 percent from 2022 to 2023, their efforts have the potential to increasingly influence EU defence strategy. Noting this, how can the EU ensure that decisions on defence spending are made with Europe's best interests in mind?*

**Submitted by:** Isabel Curello (DE), Louka Demange (CY), Frederic Dietze (IE), Fani Fuštar (BE), Ena Galijašević (BH), Vicky Garnier (FR), Sam Jacobs (UK), Ralfs Kalniņš (LV), Olli Kauppi (FI), Abel Meta (AL), Valia Sassalou (GR), Charlotte Verdonck (NL), Zofia Wawrzyniak (PL), Yihang Xiong (CH), Arturo Luciani (IT, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to increase EU defence preparedness as a response to new and ever-changing security threats in the context of an unpredictable and unstable global order. Pushing for a united EU in the areas of industry, finance, defence policy, and diplomacy, our objective is to reduce reliance on external powers, enhancing collaboration between Member States while being mindful of their individual economic circumstances and lobbying influences. Our focus is on upholding EU values during policy-making while ensuring the EU's strategic autonomy,**

**because**

- The close relationship between EU policy-makers and defence companies increases the chances of [conflicts of interest emerging](#),
- Interests of dominant and influential industry giants, such as Airbus, Saab and Rheinmetall, are overrepresented in comparison to the interests of [small and medium-sized enterprises](#) (SMEs), [critical NGOs, and researchers](#),
- Disagreements between Member States on whether the EU should take out loans or use existing funds for [rearmament](#), as well as economic barriers, have hindered progress on joint initiatives and [spending targets](#),
- Cooperation between Member States when it comes to the standardisation of military equipment is [insufficient to meet Europe's defensive needs](#), making both logistics and aid provision more difficult,
- Limited public funding and private investment in emerging areas of the defence sector, such as [cybersecurity](#), have created gaps in the EU's military capacity,
- [Leading EU industrial powers' failure to comply](#) with NATO's '30 days' worth of ammunition supply' demonstrates the EU's unpreparedness for conflict,



- [Structural weaknesses](#), higher energy and labour cost, and divisions on internal rearmament partnerships, have led to [78% of purchased military equipment](#) originating from outside of the EU,
- Defence policy decisions in the European Council [require unanimity](#), which can be difficult to attain due to the cautious positions of Member States like [Spain](#) and [Hungary](#) regarding the extent of European defence integration,
- Some Member States are [reluctant to engage](#) in a more cooperative EU defence strategy, with countries such as Germany and France dominating the industry,
- The military and political influence of the U.S. and its recent shifts in foreign policy, hinder progress towards EU [strategic autonomy](#) as well as weaken its [diplomatic credibility](#),
- There is a [lack of clarity](#) around the [Mutual Defence Clause](#) (Art.42(7) TEU)<sup>6</sup> to create an effective EU framework for defence;

*by*

### **Lobbying**

1. Urging the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), in accordance with GDPR regulations, to create guidelines on the reduction of conflicts of interest between policy-makers and lobbyists by:
  - a. performing biannual security checks for EU institution employees,
  - b. making pre-hiring checks for EU institution workers more thorough;
2. Calling upon the Directorate-General of Communication (DG COMM) to support the NGO LobbyControl and the Corporate Europe Observatory campaign group in the further implementation of a hotline for reporting lobbying-related misconduct;

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<sup>6</sup> **Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union** provides that if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States have an obligation to aid and assist it by all the means in their power.



3. Calling upon the European Parliament Bureau to extend former Members of the Parliaments' 'cooling-off period'<sup>7</sup> to five years;
4. Suggesting the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Committee of Regions to involve NGOs and SMEs in the decision-making process on national military funding and initiatives;

### **Financing and Production**

5. Encouraging the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Directorate-General for Defence, Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) to introduce independent defence experts within the [Collaborative Procurement of Ammunition Project](#)<sup>8</sup> framework, assisting Member States in setting and furthering standardisation;
6. Calling upon the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) to utilise InvestEU to provide subsidies for companies conducting R&D in critical technologies such as cybersecurity;
7. Calling upon the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) to subsidise SMEs through the STEP-Regulation<sup>9</sup>;
8. Imploring Member States to reach a minimum defence spending target of 3.5% of their GDP, excluding [Austria](#), Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta due to their military spending neutrality;
9. Asking the Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC) to restart and maintain educational programs for defence workers, such as the Alliance for Strategic Skills addressing Emerging Technologies in Defence ([ASSETs+](#))<sup>10</sup>;

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<sup>7</sup> The **cooling-off period** refers to the six months after the end of a mandate in which former Members of Parliament shall not engage in lobbying or representational activities with the European Parliament.

<sup>8</sup> The '**Collaborative Procurement of Ammunition**' project aims to collectively procure ammunition and aggregate, coordinate, and agree on contracts with EU defence industry at a faster pace, sending a clear message to the industry.

<sup>9</sup> The **Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP)** supports critical and emerging strategic technologies and their respective value chains in relevant sectors. It provides a more structural solution to industries' needs as well as help mobilize private capital to support the competitiveness of EU businesses.

<sup>10</sup> **ASSETs+** was a project running between 2020 and 2024 built on close collaboration between the Defence Industry, sectoral organizations, Higher Education Institutions, Vocational Education and Training providers and research centres.



10. Calling upon DG DEFIS to encourage production of arms in Eastern Europe, reducing logistical and production costs;

### **Sovereignty and Cooperation**

11. Urging the European Commission to consider the [use of tariffs](#) on the primary non-EU military equipment providers;
12. Urging DG DEFIS to increase the percentage of military equipment developed within the EU through the expansion of the [Economic Development Incentive Program \(EDIP\)](#)<sup>11</sup>;
13. Urging the European Commission and national Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) regulators<sup>12</sup> to redefine ethical investment criteria for arms industries to facilitate the inclusion of SMEs in the defence market by:
  - a. differentiating between manufacturing controversial weapons (e.g. cluster munitions or nuclear arms) and conventional defence products (e.g. protective equipment, cybersecurity, and logistics),
  - b. differentiating between high-risk export of arms and intra-EU supply,
  - c. recognising ethical defence contribution in accordance with peacekeeping,

### **U.S. and NATO**

14. Encouraging the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) to make a statement recognising the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to European security;
15. Urging the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) to draft a detailed plan to support Member States in upholding Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union;
16. Calling upon the HR to foster amicable relations with the U.S. and build strategic and diversified partnerships with third countries through the European External Action Service (EEAS).

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<sup>11</sup>**EDIP** is a Regulation proposed by the European Commission to provide financial support to the EU defence industry, ensure the availability and supply of defence products, and more.

<sup>12</sup>**Environmental, social and governance ratings** provide an opinion of a company's or a financial instrument's sustainability profile, by assessing its impact on society and the environment and its exposure to risks associated with sustainability issues.





## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS II (AFET II)

**Stronger Together:** *Celebrating 30 years since Finland became the 15th Member State of the European Union, the EU faces renewed pressure to expand its influence and promote stability in its neighbourhood. How should the EU reform its enlargement process to provide a credible path for candidate countries while upholding democratic values and the rule of law within the Union?*

**Submitted by:** Felix Åkesson (SE), Raphy Craigie (ES), Nela Dämpfer (DE), Mihnea Haiduc (RO), Tom Haydon (UK), Luis Kränzlein (CH), Arkela Kryemadhi (AL), Anna Panayiotou (CY), Lisa Sipola (FI), Azra Vuruşkaner (TR), Cormac Wygers (IE), Rita Araújo (NL/PT, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to make the EU accession process more efficient. We aspire to streamline the process by making it more accessible for (pre-) candidate countries, whilst simultaneously safeguarding the future of the EU, promoting sustainable enlargement, with a focus on protecting the principles of the rule of law and democratic values. Furthermore, we strive to uphold the Copenhagen Criteria<sup>13</sup>, in order to secure the quality of the process of candidate selection, while providing more support for (pre-) candidates and maintaining the democratic and political integrity of the EU. Through reforming the process, we attempt to make the path to membership more appealing for pre-accession countries,**

***because***

- The lengthy process associated with seeking EU membership is a source of [frustration](#) for both candidate countries and the EU,
- Member States' [right to veto](#) EU candidacy applications often results in existing bilateral conflicts [paralysing the accession process](#),
- When countries with economies performing below-average join the EU, the [financial burden](#) on current Member States with stronger economic systems is increased, leading to [pushback](#) against EU enlargement amongst the latter,
- The EU's accession benchmarks, particularly within the Stabilisation and Association Agreements<sup>14</sup>, are often [disproportionately rigid](#) in comparison to other legal frameworks regulating European integration, resulting in accession progress in the Western Balkans remaining significantly delayed,

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<sup>13</sup> The **Copenhagen Criteria** is the main universal set of criteria that European countries must meet in order to join the EU.

<sup>14</sup> **Stabilisation and Association Agreements** are the frameworks of relations established between the EU and (potential) candidate Western Balkan countries for the implementation of the former's policy towards the latter's accession.



- Civil society in candidate countries sometimes [faces legal repression](#) from their national governments, interfering with the government's ability to [adhere](#) to the stable democratic institutions requirement associated with the [Copenhagen Criteria](#),
- Candidate countries feel as though their traditional values and way of life are at [risk of degradation upon accession](#), thereby generating euroscepticism amongst their population and decreasing the political will to attain EU membership,
- Potential candidate and current candidate countries often [struggle to enforce](#) the rule of law due to [political and judicial corruption](#), which undermines their ability to [adhere to Chapters 23 and 24](#) of the [acquis communautaire](#)<sup>15</sup>,
- Expansion of the EU's external border resulting from the admission of new Member States might lead to [challenges](#) regarding border security,
- The EU has in the past coupled candidate countries' accession paths in unfavourable ways, forcing candidates' accession to be stagnated by vetoes targeted at other prospective countries and directly contradicting the [EU's supposed meritocratic approach](#),

*by*

### **Governance**

1. Calling upon the European Commission to agree upon stricter individual accession timelines for candidate countries;
2. Urging the European Council to discuss the revision of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), possibly replacing the system of unanimous voting for accession with qualified majority voting;
3. Requesting the European Commission to agree upon a tiered funding system for new Member States, limiting, and then gradually increasing the amount of funding these are eligible for upon accession;

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<sup>15</sup> The **Acquis Communautaire** is the collection of common rights and obligations that constitute the body of EU law, which must be incorporated into the legal systems of Member States.



4. Asking the European Commission to establish a mechanism that provides guidance to incoming Member States on how to efficiently manage EU funding;
5. Calling upon the Directorate General of Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST) to reform the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Framework (IPA)<sup>16</sup> to a tailored response for each candidate country, instead of thematic priorities;

### **Civil Society**

6. Encouraging youth organisations to create educational and information campaigns in candidate countries aimed at fostering youth engagement, intercultural dialogue, and promoting active participation in democratic life;
7. Urging DG ENEST to establish funding and legal support for civil society organisations in candidate countries, building upon commitments made in the defunct Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR)'s Guidelines for EU Support to Civil Society in Enlargement Countries;
8. Calling upon the European External Action Service (EEAS) to promote dialogues with the civil society sector in candidate countries on democracy, transparency, and public accountability;
9. Asking DG ENEST to establish independent anti-corruption agencies in candidate countries in collaboration with civil society;

### **Foreign Relations**

10. Calling upon DG ENEST to collaborate with the European Judicial Training Network in providing relevant anti-corruption training to magistrates and law enforcement within candidate states;
11. Urging the European Council and DG ENEST to implement an individual merit-based progress monitoring framework for each candidate country, including clearly defined individual reform benchmarks;

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<sup>16</sup> The **Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Framework (IPA)** is the mechanism through which the EU provides technical and financial assistance to support reforms within its enlargement region, benefiting countries in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.



12. Encouraging the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) to facilitate training of relevant border control actors within candidate countries during the negotiation process;



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS (DROI)

**Back in the closet:** *With the UK restricting the legal definition of 'woman' to fit just people assigned female at birth, Europe faces accelerating backsliding when it comes to the legal protection of transgender people. What should the EU do to legally protect all transgender people, considering increasing rates of harassment and violence against the transgender community?*

**Submitted by:** João Albuquerque (PT), Kyriakos Katsiaris (CY), Sadie Lim (UK), Alexandra Malisova (GR), Alessandro Marchesan (IT), Ruben Moens (BE), Sofi Remes (FI), Alexa Eleonora Szilagyi (RO), Macha Rouy-Maksic (RS), Sterre van Wijk (NL), David Varela (ES), Caoilan Walsh (IE), Vera Rieck (SE, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to protect the rights of transgender people in all Member States by combating hate speech and harassment, harmonising legislation within the European Union, and overcoming social exclusion. We strive to support the transgender community by expanding access to psychological and physical healthcare, and developing efficient education on gender identity,**

***because***

- The [presence](#) of violence, harassment, and discrimination towards transgender people threatens their fundamental rights, safety, and wellbeing,
- The [lack of legislation prohibiting hate speech against LGBTQIA+](#) individuals in certain Member States, such as [Italy](#) and [Hungary](#), threatens the rights of transgender individuals,
- Existing European legislation prohibiting discrimination, such as the [Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union](#), [do not explicitly mention gender identity](#), leaving transgender individuals without sufficient legal protection,
- The presentation of transgender individuals in political contexts is [often shifted to suit political agendas](#), manifesting as scapegoating or tokenism,
- The [lack of comprehensive education](#) regarding gender non-conforming individuals across Member States leads to ignorance, at [varying levels between different age groups](#),
- Transgender individuals are [underrepresented](#) in politics and media, limiting their influence and ability to defend their own rights,



- Approximately [30%](#) of transgender people in the EU reported facing discrimination at work,
- Only two Member States scored above 80% in [ILGA-Europe's mapping of LGBTQIA+ rights and wellbeing](#), reflecting a great disparity of trans rights across the EU,
- [Inconsistent](#) national legislation concerning transgender rights contributes to the discrimination faced by this group,
- Transgender individuals are systematically being [excluded](#) from gendered spaces, such as bathrooms,
- The [lack of healthcare resources](#), both mental and physical, causes harm to transgender individuals;

*by*

### **Representation**

1. Asking the Directorate-General for Communication (DG COMM) to fund public awareness campaigns and media programmes in support of LGBTQIA+ individuals;
2. Requesting that the European Commission creates a consistent definition for hate speech, which includes LGBTQIA+, to be applied in Member States;
3. Strongly urging the European Commission to include transgender individuals and binary non-conforming gender identities in terms concerning gender and sex in all future legislation;
4. Inviting the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) to support further fact-checking on public information about the transgender community, both in political contexts and on social media within Member States;
5. Directing the European Board of Media Services (The Media Board) to exercise closer surveillance of discrimination against transgender individuals in media;



6. Asking the DG EAC to design comprehensive LGBTQIA+ education curriculum templates increasing the education on transgender issues;

### **Law and Order**

7. Appealing to the Member States to enforce relevant national law by prosecuting individuals who commit violence, harassment, and/or discrimination against transgender individuals;
8. Tasking the European Commission, in collaboration with ILGA-Europe, with deciding on a target for the protection of transgender rights to be reached by Member States within a given timeframe;
9. Reminding Member States of the legal obligation to transpose EU Directives, such as the Equal Treatment Directive<sup>17</sup>, into national laws, as well as that failure to do so can result in infringement proceedings against the Member State in question;
10. Recommending the European Commission to amend the Equal Treatment Directive's definition of gender identity, broadening the term of transgender to include binary non-conforming individuals;
11. Encouraging Member States to follow positive national examples of legislation protecting transgender individuals, such as Malta's Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act and constitutional protection;

### **Welfare Infrastructure**

12. Inviting Transgender Europe (TGEU) to create a free manual available both physically and digitally for individuals searching for legal guidance in cases of discrimination against them;

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<sup>17</sup> **The Equal Treatment Directive**, Directive 2006/54/EC, concerns the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, and defines sex to include those who have undergone, or plan to undergo, gender reassignment.





13. Calling upon Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) in collaboration with the Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC) to encourage gender inclusivity in bathrooms through:
  - a. relabelling existing facilities as gender neutral;
  - b. offering funding through the EIB for new bathrooms to be built as single stalled cubicles;
  - c. introducing Erasmus+ internships on design of gender neutral spaces, such as bathrooms;
  - d. Urging the Directorate-General on Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) to instate an EU-wide LGBTQIA+ mental health support hotline;
14. Urging Member States to provide the option of carrying out voluntary service supporting transgender individuals for those convicted of transphobic offences who have demonstrated genuine disposition towards rehabilitation;
15. Requesting the EIB to invest in Member States' healthcare infrastructure to improve gender-affirming care, including social, medical, and psychological aspects.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (EMPL)

**Diploma-cy Issues:** *In a time of displacement due to wars, climate change, and authoritarian regimes, millions of people seek asylum in Europe, often facing long waits for legal recognition and major barriers to continuing their education and careers. How can the EU ensure that asylum seekers are granted a clear legal status and recognition of their qualifications to support long-term integration?*

**Submitted by:** Raven Armstrong (IE), Isaiah Ben (CH), Daisy Doan (FI), Apolonia Dudek (PL), Giovanni Paolo Di Gabrielle (IT), Ema Karpata (AL), Ege Kocakaya (TR), Anamarija Kožica (HR), Tom Schmoll (UK), Dorothea Sergeeva (BG), Laura Silva (PT), Alexandra Tzika (GR), Rostyslav Lisovskyi (PL, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to support long-term integration and overall well-being of asylum seekers within the EU by alleviating the challenges they face to ensure their inclusion into society. We will achieve this through fostering meaningful collaboration between Member States to improve recognition of prior learning, efficiency within legal status applications, access to the labour market, and further developing the education of child asylum seekers. This resolution ultimately seeks to improve the quality of life for the refugees in their new country of residence,**

***because***

- Asylum seekers face [prolonged and uncertain waiting periods](#) to get legal recognition, often due to the high volume of applications and underfunded asylum facilities,
- The local population's [limited understanding](#) of the challenges faced by asylum seekers often fosters [social resentment](#), contributing to their isolation and marginalisation,
- Refugees come from [diverse cultural backgrounds](#), often facing challenges integrating into host communities and finding a purpose, resulting in discrimination and [feelings of isolation](#),
- Member States, such as [Germany and Spain](#), receive a disproportionate number of asylum applications relative to their populations, [resulting](#) in their resources being drained and worsening the quality of life for both asylum seekers and citizens,
- [Language courses](#) are often inaccessible due to their high cost, location, and accessibility,



- The process of recognising the [previous qualifications](#) of asylum seekers presents a lack of uniformity and consistency among Member States, leading to refugees being unable to prove their former credentials,
- Due to difficulties proving their qualifications, asylum seekers are unable to enter the employment market, unable to work to their previous level of qualification, and might turn to the [black market](#) and unofficial work to make ends meet,
- Asylum seekers and refugees often face [substantial language barriers](#) and inefficient support in acquiring the host country's language and cultural norms,
- Refugees have around [1.6 more years of schooling](#) on average than people of the same age at their current residency, resulting in refugees spending more time in primary education and less in the workforce or in higher education,
- Children, who represent [more than 25% of asylum seekers](#), [struggle](#) to receive adequate integration or education;

*by*

### **Legal Affairs**

1. Inviting Member States to create a digital network where they can share their number of asylum seekers and notify overflows;
2. Encouraging Member States to create employment programs for asylum seekers for entry-level, public sector jobs;
3. Urging the European Commission to implement quotas requiring Member States to process a fair number of asylum seekers' applications annually, proportional to each Member State's ability to accommodate those asylum seekers;



4. Demanding the European Commission to amend the Reception Conditions Directive<sup>18</sup> to allow asylum seekers to have access to the labour market immediately after their asylum application has been filed;

### **Recognition of Prior Learning**

5. Suggesting Member States to allow entry-level prior learning exams that test the level of school qualification in asylum seekers' languages most often spoken by refugees, either online or in test centres;
6. Requesting the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA) to establish a digitalised database, that is shared among Member States on request, consisting of information on:
  - a. asylum seekers, and specifically their qualifications,
  - b. data on integration programmes, education, and asylum procedures;
7. Instructing the European Commission to make mandatory in all Member States the European Qualification Passport for Refugees (EQPR)<sup>19</sup>, which is now a voluntary instrument;

### **Integration**

8. Requesting the national Ministries of Education to include objective and relevant information on legal, social and economic aspects of asylum in national curricula;
9. Calling upon Member States to establish accelerated study programs for child asylum seekers that provide them with parallel tutoring in their native language and language of the country of residence;
10. Requesting the Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sports and Culture (DG EAC) to fully subsidise language learning courses in the native language of the host country;

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<sup>18</sup> The **Reception Conditions Directive** is a framework of the EU that sets a minimum standard for the reception of asylum seekers, including housing, healthcare, work permits, etc.

<sup>19</sup> The **European Qualification Passport for Refugees (EQPR)** is a document that explains the qualifications a refugee is likely to have, based on available evidence.



11. Wishing for Member States to establish a host family programme allowing vetted families to host refugees based on selected criteria, for a duration of their choice, supporting integration and care, with subsidies for board and food.
12. Affirming the European Committee on Regions (CoR) to partner with the United Nations High Representative for Refugees (UNHCR) to create mentoring and cultural hubs, in places with a concentration of asylum seekers, through:
  - a. receiving mentoring from previous asylum seekers about legal affairs and integration,
  - b. engaging with locals and other refugees to learn more about the cultural norms of the country.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE, AND HOME AFFAIRS (LIBE)

**Speaking of Autocracies:** *Since the 1970s, Europe has had a steady democratic development. Levels of democracy have been declining in several countries recently, making the current level of democracy in Europe the same as in 1978. With these trends breaching freedom of expression and civil liberties, how can the EU promote democratic development in Europe in order to protect its Member States from further democratic backsliding?*

**Submitted by:** Sofia Angelaki Mertzemeki (GR), Arnau Aliaga (ES), David Alves (PT), Maj Arhippainen (FI), Frane Bijuković (HR), Céline Boll (CH), Hans Čivrný (CZ), Ben Daschner (AT), Luna Drecker (NO), Neko Hickey (IE), Federico Paracchi (IT), Katarina Rakić (RS), Theodora Timini (CY), Sine Virkelyst (SE), Simon Gartner (AT, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to counteract democratic backsliding both by combating anti-democratic forces and by promoting democratic values. We are convinced that populism, disinformation, and political distrust are driving forces of this phenomenon and aim to tackle them through elaborate educational campaigns and by supporting civil society organisations. We stand strongly with the fundamental rights of European citizens and aim to expand the EU's capacities to safeguard them,**

*because*

- [Democratic backsliding](#) or [autocratisation](#) means a regression of democratic development, through practices such as unfair elections, attacks on the rule of law, restriction of free speech, or a decline in civic engagement,
- Almost every single Member State is [experiencing democratic backsliding](#),
- The rise of right-wing populism [commonly coincides](#) with democratic backsliding, as they often undermine democratic principles and civil rights,
- The [erosion of democratic principles](#) across the EU has weakened civil society, leading to a rise of nationalism and an anti-EU sentiment,
- Populist forces [frequently undermine judicial independence](#) when they are in power, as evidenced by the example of [Poland](#),
- A deficient European response to democratic backsliding [risks the internal undermining](#) of the EU, while excessive intervention could threaten its unity,
- [Research](#) shows that, globally, countries with a high level of socio-economic inequality are at an increased risk of democratic backsliding,



- Social media algorithms [favour right-wing populists in terms of outreach](#) and create [filter bubbles](#)<sup>20</sup>, facilitating the distribution of misinformation that is [commonly spread](#) by certain political groups,
- The activation of the mechanism Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (Article 7)<sup>21</sup> [requires unanimity amongst all other Member States](#), de facto [giving other countries with autocratic tendencies veto power](#),
- The [fundamental right of protest](#) is being infringed upon in some Member States such as [Poland](#) and [Hungary](#), where protests, like the Pride Parade, have been banned in the past,
- Media freedom is threatened in some Member States, such as [Greece](#), significantly [contributing to democratic backsliding](#) by complicating informed voting decisions,
- In some Member States, such as [Poland](#) and [Hungary](#), there have been changes in election law to favour the ruling party, resulting in unfair [elections](#),
- There is a [lack of civic engagement](#), especially amongst young people, exacerbating [distrust in democracy](#) and a feeling of disconnection from policy-making,
- Populist forces often [contribute to the further exclusion](#) of marginalised communities, such as immigrants,
- Deepfakes<sup>22</sup> created by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other AI tools can be used [as a form of political disinformation](#), posing novel challenges due to their comparatively high plausibility;

*by*

### **Judicial and Institutional Processes**

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<sup>20</sup> **A filter bubble** is an online environment where algorithms limit exposure to differing viewpoints, reinforcing a user's existing beliefs.

<sup>21</sup> **Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union** is a legal mechanism allowing the sanctioning of Member States that breach core EU values such as democracy and the rule of law.

<sup>22</sup> **Deepfakes** are artificially generated or altered videos and audio recordings that realistically mimic real people, often using AI.





1. Suggesting the European Commission ensures that governments undermining civil rights are held accountable at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by more frequently initiating infringement procedures<sup>23</sup>;
2. Recommending Member States to preserve trust in the rule of law by increasing legal punishments for corruption and increasing the funding allocated to national anti-corruption bodies;
3. Strongly recommending the European Council to increase its capacity to counteract democratic backsliding by abolishing the requirement for unanimity in regard to Article 7, replacing it with a 90% threshold;
4. Urging Member States to safeguard judicial independence by minimising government involvement in the nomination of high-ranking judges and maintaining reasonable age and neutrality requirements;

### **Civic Engagement**

5. Designates the European Commission to promote democracy and civic engagement across Member States by further allocating funding from Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme (CERV)<sup>24</sup> to organisations working within different countries, such as national youth councils and Amnesty International;
6. Inviting the European Youth Forum to increase youth involvement in political processes by promoting more programs such as Erasmus+ and the European Youth Parliament (EYP);

### **Education**

7. Recommending National Ministries of Education to further integrate content about the democratic process, minorities, populism, and objective voting into national curricula;

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<sup>23</sup> An infringement procedure is a legal action the European Commission can initiate against a Member State for failing to comply with EU law.

<sup>24</sup> The Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme is an EU funding programme that promotes democracy, fundamental rights, and equality.



8. Asking the Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC) to combat socio-economic inequality by allocating funding from the European Regional Development Fund to public education;
9. Encouraging European Digital Rights to develop educational campaigns and curricula about the use of AI and deepfakes as well as their influence on democracy;

### **Media**

10. Calling upon the European Commission to counteract the detrimental effects of social media algorithms by establishing its own digital platform for political discourse;
11. Encouraging the European Centre for Press & Media Freedom (ECPMF) to highlight political biases and support neutrality by frequently publishing an independent evaluation of media outlets across the EU;
12. Strongly encouraging Member States to allow the option to copyright one's own face, where an individual's online identity is being protected, following the example set by Denmark;
13. Suggesting Member States to improve media transparency by mandating media outlets to provide concrete sources for their claims;
14. Requests the Directorate-General for the Information Society and Media (DG INFSO) to establish an independent organisation working to protect journalists, for example by supporting them to exit dangerous areas or facilitating the anonymous publishing of critical articles.
15. Proposing that the Committee of Experts on the Integrity of Online Information of the Council of Europe provide an accessible research alternative to social media by establishing and disseminating a databank with reliable sources.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION (CULT)

**Putting the Art in Artificial:** *Despite the EU's efforts to combat the harmful uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI), concerns grow over the preservation of artistic integrity and intellectual property in the age of generative AI. With growing doubts about the AI Act's effectiveness in protecting creative industries, how can the EU strike a balance between supporting innovation and protecting creators' rights in the cultural sector?*

**Submitted by:** Adriana Atanasova (BG), Ella Fimreite (NO), Lucka Gomolová (CZ), Anja Jočić (RS), Angelina Kalishchuk (UA), Melike Nur Makar (TR), Thuy Tam Nhu Nguyen (FI), Rachel Nic Lochlainn (IE), Nuha Niyas (SE), Peter Parker (DE), Vasiliki Poulimenou (GR), Denisa Sava (RO), Eléa Schott-Barta (FR), Tončica Šunjić (HR), Robin Pleslová (CZ/CH, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to regulate the use of AI to protect intellectual property while also fostering innovation by reinforcing current measures. We seek to review and modify current legislation to make it more accessible for Member States to comply with. In addition, we suggest better education on the ethical use of AI and the risks associated. Furthermore, we seek to create a safe environment for artists to share their art without the threat of AI using their work for training without consent,**

**because**

- Generative AI<sup>25</sup> is spreading into all [forms of artistic fields](#), including digital art, graphic design and [music](#),
- International economic competitiveness and [geopolitical pressure](#) push for rushed development and prioritise profit over creators and artists,
- The general public lacks awareness and understanding on the inner workings and risks of AI,
- [AI trains<sup>26</sup> on all art in the public domain](#), causing artists to refrain from posting their art on free online spaces, reducing accessible human-made art,
- Existing legislation takes an unclear stance on AI and [data mining<sup>27</sup>](#) for training,

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<sup>25</sup> **Generative AI** (GenAI) are AI models that aim to generate content, i.e., text, images, video, or all of these things simultaneously.

<sup>26</sup> **AI training** functions through learning algorithms that analyse data to extract knowledge, insights and patterns.

<sup>27</sup> **Data mining** is the process of searching and analyzing a large quantity of raw data to identify patterns and extract useful information.



- The unpredictable and fast-paced evolution of AI leads to [difficulties in efficient law-making](#), particularly in data mining and copyright,
- Profit-driven decisions lead to [loss of jobs in the artistic field](#), therefore overpowering human work,
- AI progress can be a positive development, [amplifying creative production](#) and increasing accessibility,
- Artists [do not get credited, nor financially](#) compensated for the work used to train AI models,
- Only three EU Member States have fully designated all [supervisory authorities](#) stated in the AI Act despite the approaching [2 August 2025 deadline](#),
- The uncertainty of AI development and its spread raises [fears among artists for their future and their livelihood](#) might be at stake of being replaced by work done by AI,
- AI is [widely accessible](#), contributing to an oversaturated art market that devalues the nuances of human artists' touch as well as cultural heritage and history;

*by*

### **Legislation**

1. Strongly urging all Member States to comply with the AI Act's requirement to appoint specific supervisory authority with no further delay;
2. Reminding the European Commission to closely monitor AI development to ensure that legislation stays relevant through updates if needed;



3. Calling upon the European Commission to update and redefine the EU Copyright Directive with help from the EU Data Protection Board and the EU Intellectual Property Office to:
  - a. limit generative AI's data mining;
  - b. ensure artists can opt out of their work being used for AI training;
4. Urging the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT) to mandate media platforms operating within the EU to flag monetised content that is AI-generated;
5. Encouraging DG CONNECT to implement a minimum age restriction of 13+ on usage of AI platforms;
6. Calling upon DG CONNECT to establish a common protocol such as C2PA<sup>28</sup> across digital platforms, including but not restricted to: Google, Tiktok, Instagram.
7. Calling upon Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) to invite companies to resort to artists instead of AI tools to carry out creative work;
8. Encouraging the Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) to separate AI art from human art in public spaces such as galleries and advertisements with descriptive signs;
9. Calling upon the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) to promote human-made art by:
  - a. developing an algorithm that favours it,
  - b. strongly inviting media platforms to use this new algorithm instead of their pre-existing one;

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<sup>28</sup> **The Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity** (C2PA) is an organisation that develops technical standards for verifying the origin and history of digital media to combat misinformation and increase transparency.



### **Education and Awareness**

10. Encouraging National Arts Councils to fund and support initiatives promoting human-made art, such as art exhibitions, festivals, competitions etc.;
11. Endorsing NGOs, such as Meedan, by tying sustainable partnerships, to create initiatives to improve digital literacy connected to AI;
12. Suggesting Member States include mandatory AI literacy courses in their school curricula;
13. Calling upon the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) to introduce specialised services in HR, workshops, and media campaigns in order to increase understanding and awareness on potential downsides of potential downsides of generative AI in the workspace.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS (ECON II)

**Schengen for sale:** *The monetisation of citizenship policies through so-called Residence and Citizenship by Investment (RBI/CBI) programmes have greatly affected the promise of equal free movement throughout the European continent. How can Member States harmonise their citizenship policies, while keeping in mind possible fiscal benefits and other investment opportunities of such programmes?*

**Submitted by:** Juliane Altenbach (CH), Mira Bachvarova (BG), Anis Bendjaballah (UK), Henrihs Briģis (LV), Alych Dvorničenko (CZ), Agata Kopiszka (PL), Gustavs Malzubris (BE), Daria Mocan (RO), Bernardo Monicelli (IT), Florentine Smit (NL), Murad Suleymanli (AZ), Johannes Wilde (DE), Kateryna Zynych (UA), Nikita Zolotarevskyi (UA), Francisco Moura (PT, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to reform European Residence by Investment (RBI) schemes, protecting economic benefits, and the security of the Schengen Area. We strive to incentivise proportional and equitable investment across different regions. Furthermore, our goal is to prevent market speculation, avoiding unreasonable price shocks which can intensify housing market pressure. We pursue the harmonisation of both investment contribution requirements and enforceable screening regulations in golden visa<sup>29</sup> policies across the whole EU,**

***because***

- RBI scheme investments tend to focus on [high-density, urban, and developed areas](#), ignoring underdeveloped areas and thus widening regional inequality,
- RBI regulations are not standardised across Member States, which [may compromise the integrity of the Schengen Area](#) and the EU [principle of sincere cooperation](#),
- Some golden visa beneficiaries do not undergo sufficient screening, enabling the [approval of criminal applicants](#) and [money laundering](#),
- Common forms of investment in RBI programs, like real estate, [tend not to be the most economically beneficial form of investment](#),
- Most RBI schemes [do not require long-term social and economic commitment to the country](#) on the part of the beneficiary,

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<sup>29</sup> **Golden visa** is the commonly used term for RBI programmes, which are policy schemes that offer resident status in exchange for a financial contribution.





- The housing market is [severely influenced by golden visa investors](#), resulting in a lack of long-term rental availability, and overall unaffordable prices for the local population,
- Golden visa schemes are a way for Member States to easily [incentivise foreign investments](#),
- In the case of [Malta v European Commission in April 2025](#), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in favour of the Commission, outlawing overly simplistic and generous Citizenship by Investment (CBI) programmes,
- In a few Member States, RBI investments comprise a significant share of the host country's GDP (e.g. [4.5% in Cyprus in 2018](#)), making them more vulnerable to fluctuations in these investments;

*by*

### **Promoting Productive Investments**

1. Incentivising Member States to direct RBI funding towards underdeveloped areas along with public infrastructure projects, offering applicants priority processing and reduced minimum contribution requirements;
2. Soliciting Member States to create longer-term investment requirements for RBI applicants, shifting one-time investments to continuous contribution plans;
3. Urging Member States to deny short-term rental permits for existing real estate properties purchased by RBI beneficiaries;
4. Asking Member States to limit the share of applications stemming from real estate investment mitigating the impact of golden visa investments on the housing market;

### **Standardisation of Policies**

5. Inviting Member States to quickly follow the verdict of the ECJ and discontinue any remaining CBI programmes;
6. Proposing the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD) in consultation with the Global Anti-Corruption Consortium (GACC) to outline a



best-practices package regarding security screening requirements for RBI applications in the EU;

7. Instructing the DG TAXUD to regularly audit the RBI application screening processes of Member States and third parties commissioned by them;
8. Requesting the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services, and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA) to conduct relevant research and recommend a desirable proportional country-specific (e.g. based on GDP) minimum level of investment contributions for RBI programmes in the EU;
9. Pleading the Council of the EU to implement a common application waiting period as well as a minimum stay requirement for RBI (re-)applicants, further harmonising RBI policies in the Schengen Area;
10. Calling upon the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) to adapt the new Entry/Exit System (EES)<sup>30</sup> that makes use of automated border control systems (e.g. such as [EasyPASS](#)) to preserve in-person border control for RBI beneficiaries, when entering the Schengen zone;
11. Counselling Member States to act in consultation with the European Economic and Social Council (EESC) to monitor the risk associated with overreliance on RBI schemes as a form of foreign investment;
12. Advising the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) to adapt country-specific recommendations of the European Semester to levy a higher property tax for real estate purchased under RBI schemes;
13. Appealing to Member States to implement requirements of a language certification (e.g. A2 by the Common European Language Framework) in at least one of the official languages of the host country for RBI applicants.

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<sup>30</sup> **Entry/Exit Service (EES)** is an automated IT system that will come into effect in October 2025 for registering non-EU nationals travelling for a short stay, each time they cross the external borders of Member States.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (AFET I)

**Khoda hafez?:** *The U.S. has been urging the EU to impose stricter sanctions on Iran, especially following the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In light of this, how should the EU navigate its relationship with Iran, while balancing its economic, security, and diplomatic interests?*

**Submitted by:** Kaavya Chakraborty (FI), Carla Courtois (BE), Chrysa Corona (GR), Maria Gomes (PT), Antonis Hadjipanayis (CY), Baptiste Heim (FR), Rosa Karlsen (NO), Sigge Lilliehöök (SE), Dilsuz Novruzov (AZ), Clara Remy (FR), Christina Seibert (CH), Gioia Sellitri (IT), Hayk Mantashian (AM, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to reaffirm the EU's role as an independent global actor in negotiations with Iran, reducing reliance on U.S.-driven decision-making. We seek to restore the climate of dialogue and peaceful negotiations between all parties, contribute to regional stability, safeguard the wellbeing of civilians of the region, and protect the EU's economic interests,**

***because***

- Since the withdrawal of the United States (U.S.) from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)<sup>31</sup>, the agreement has failed to remain [effectively operational](#),
- The snapback mechanism<sup>32</sup> is [expiring](#) in October 2025,
- U.S. officials have consistently [voiced](#) their unwillingness to make concessions on the deal, [maintaining](#) a firm stance that strongly [condemns](#) Iran's actions,
- The U.S. is the [EU's largest export market](#) for goods and its [second largest source](#) of imports,
- The EU is [constrained](#) by its close partnership with the U.S. from pursuing more autonomous foreign and security policy, especially when it comes to international trade and [weapons supply](#),

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<sup>31</sup> The **JCPOA** is an agreement reached in 2015 between Iran and the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and Germany, along with the EU. It aimed to limit the advancement of Iran's nuclear program and ensure its civilian use in exchange for lifting UN economic sanctions. Under JCPOA, Iran agreed to 'not seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons' and have its nuclear activities monitored by investigators.

<sup>32</sup> **Snapback mechanism** is a provision in JCPOA that allows any of the remaining JCPOA signatories to unilaterally reimpose UN sanctions until 18 October 2025 due to Iran's non-compliance. This mechanism is the last leverage other JCPOA signatories hold over Iran.



- Historical background, political ideology and national interests, such as [Germany's sense of moral duty towards Israel](#), have led to a [strong sense of opposition](#) in the E3<sup>33</sup> talks with Iran,
- The ongoing tensions between Iran and Israel, combined with recent [military escalation](#) involving the U.S., have significantly increased the risk of a broader regional conflict,
- Recent military escalations between Israel, the U.S., and Iran, including strikes on strategic and civilian targets, are causing ordinary [civilians to suffer first](#) in this conflict,
- Pivotal international waterways and crossings, such as the [Strait of Hormuz](#), are subject to [Iranian retaliation](#), [possibly disrupting](#) the global economy,
- Iran faces strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)<sup>34</sup>, whereas Israel, which never joined the treaty, [avoids inspections](#) and blocks IAEA access to its territory,
- Iran has [access](#) to nuclear enrichment facilities to develop nuclear weapons,
- Iran's enrichment level<sup>35</sup> of uranium has reached [60%](#), far above the minimum necessary level for nuclear energy generation,
- The rial has lost [90%](#) of its value since U.S. sanctions were reimposed in 2018,
- The United Nations (UN) and IAEA are unable to determine whether Iran's intentions concerning its use of nuclear material [comply](#) with prior agreements;

*by*

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<sup>33</sup> **E3**, or EU-3, refers to France, Germany and the UK as the three major European countries involved in negotiating with Iran.

<sup>34</sup> **The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)** is an international treaty, finalised in 1968, that aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world, whilst promoting cooperation amongst the parties to ensure peaceful use of the existing nuclear energy.

<sup>35</sup> **Enrichment level** shows how much uranium is made up of the isotope U-235, which can cause a nuclear chain reaction. Natural uranium has only about 0.7% U-235, so to enrich it other isotopes need to be removed. Civilian nuclear fuel is usually enriched up to 5%, while nuclear weapons need about 90%.



### **Diplomatic Engagement and Conflict Resolution**

1. Calling on the U.S. to resume nuclear negotiations with Iran with renewed commitment;
2. Strongly recommending the U.S. to reinstate its diplomatic presence in Iran;
3. Calling upon the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (EU HR) to initiate mediation talks with the EU acting as a mediator in the nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran;
4. Asking the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and EEAS to reaffirm the EU's commitment to diplomatic engagement as the primary means of addressing JCPOA-related disputes, avoiding reliance on coercive measures such as the snapback mechanism;

### **Sanctions, Trade and Economic Measures**

5. Suggesting the Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE) to invite Iran into a new trade cooperation agreement, conditional upon Iran's compliance with peaceful negotiations and non-proliferation commitments;
6. Urging Iran to fully comply with its obligations under existing international agreements, including the NPT;
7. Encouraging DG TRADE to impose sanctions related to trade and commercial connections on states that do not allow for and comply with IAEA inspections;
8. Kindly urging the U.S. government to withdraw secondary sanctions targeting non-U.S. companies engaged in legitimate trade with Iran;

### **Security, Military and Regional Stability**

9. Requesting the European Council and the EU HR to issue a united public statement advocating for peace and opposing further military action in the Middle East;



10. Requesting Member States that have not yet participated to join the relaunch of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH) and mission AGENOR<sup>36</sup>;
11. Encouraging the European Defence Agency (EDA) to further research the development and standardisation of defence technologies and weapons systems;
12. Calling upon the Council of the EU to expand the existing EU arms export control regulations by introducing an arms embargo on states involved in internationally condemned armed conflicts;
13. Urging DG INTPA, along with the Council of the EU, to negotiate an updated nuclear deal building on the JCPOA including a clause establishing restrictions and repercussions for treaty signatories that withdraw or breach the agreement;
14. Calling upon the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) to coordinate the delivery of impartial and ongoing humanitarian aid, including food and medical supplies, to Iran.

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<sup>36</sup> **EMASoH** is a European-led mission launched in 2020 to ensure safe navigation and de-escalation in the Strait of Hormuz through diplomatic efforts and a military operation called **AGENOR**.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND ENERGY (ITRE)

**Reduce, reuse, recycle:** *The shift to a circular economy (CE) is central to the EU goal of a climate-neutral continent by 2050. Technological advancement in areas such as waste management, recycling and alternative raw materials are required to move towards this, yet Member States are making greatly different rates of progress due to differences in local infrastructure and public opinion as well as the lack of suitable market conditions. How can the EU foster better framework conditions and greater collaboration between politics, business and society to best uniquely contribute to solving the climate crisis?*

**Submitted by:** Stavriani Avramidou (GR), Giacinto Luca Balsamo (IT), Neville Bhinday (SE), Maria Kristine Bratus Larsen (NO), Pauline Jugi (FR), Aadi Khandelwal (CH), Maja Koziestańska (PL), Orkhan Mammadov (AZ), Veeti Pajala (FI), Hanna Robbens (NL), Tereza Šavlová (CZ), Angela Schwartz (BE), Caroline Soppitt (UK), Osman Cem Ünver (TR), Céline Taeymans (BE, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to smoothly transition towards a sustainable and inclusive CE, achieving equitable pace towards climate neutrality among Member States. We aim to achieve this by promoting the research and development of innovative technologies and waste management techniques, while implementing coherent legal frameworks and constructing sustainable infrastructure. Additionally, we seek to incentivise businesses of all sizes in this transition to adopt circular practices, and strive to raise public understanding. We seek to achieve the above while making the sustainable change beneficial for the majority of the stakeholders,**

**because**

- Recycling processes are currently time-consuming and expensive due to the advanced technologies and [significant investments](#) they require,
- [A significant amount](#) of waste is mishandled, for example by being incinerated, dumped in landfills, or [exported](#) to other countries,
- Waste contamination, [chemically](#) as well as [composition-wise](#), hinders the recycling process and further compromises the circularity of resources,
- Downcycling<sup>37</sup> entails that full circularity is not possible or always profitable due to [physical and thermodynamic constraints, causing recycled goods to lose utility](#) and efficiency over time, limiting the potential of continuous recycling,
- Current European economic systems allow businesses to prioritise economic growth over sustainability, leading to [backlash against CE](#) from private industries,

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<sup>37</sup> **Downcycling** is the process by which products are recycled into lesser quality items as their value and material quality decrease and degrade over time.



- Transitioning to a CE involves [high initial and compliance costs](#), making eco-design and circular product development less appealing for industries due to the high [risk of financial loss](#),
- The implementation of the [current legal framework](#) for transitioning to a CE [varies significantly](#) across Member States, and consequently, creates discrepancies in the pace required to achieve climate neutrality,
- [High bureaucratic hurdles](#) slow down the progress towards CE transition, further limiting access to funding and the implementation of beneficial policies,
- A lack of focus from the EU on the quickly evolving industry of waste management causes [misallocation of resources](#),
- The general public indulges in overconsumerism, generating [great amounts of waste](#),
- A [lack of knowledge and understanding](#) among the public, combined with hesitation among businesses and policy-makers, remain regarding the CE,
- [Stigma among consumers](#) exists in some European regions regarding recycled and second-hand goods, causing scepticism towards CE;

**by**

### **Legal Framework**

1. Appealing to the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) to develop individualised CE action plans tailored to Member States, detailing specific sustainability targets and identifying sectors of improvement while rewarding Member States' compliance;
2. Calling for the Directorate-General for Environment (DG ENV) to establish a business-to-business (B2B) platform to foster knowledge sharing about the optimisation of supply chains and sustainable material processing techniques;





3. Encouraging DG GROW to foster collaboration and guidelines sharing amongst Member States by expanding and aligning deposit-return schemes (DRS)<sup>38</sup> for recycling household waste management following the example of Germany;
4. Requesting the European Environmental Agency (EEA) to establish a measuring system for pollution and solid waste generation in companies to support the pay-as-you-throw policy (PAYT)<sup>39</sup>;
5. Calling upon the Member States to encourage more cities to adopt the Circular Cities and Regions Initiative (CCRI)<sup>40</sup>;

### **Incentives and Funding**

6. Encouraging the DG GROW to support companies, including SMEs<sup>41</sup>, in adopting cleaner production methods and implementing circular supply chains by providing financial support;
7. Calling upon national environmental ministries, in collaboration with the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO), to increase governmental spending in order to augment the availability of waste management facilities and infrastructures for consumers and businesses;
8. Requesting the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) to create a circularity metric assessment programme for European businesses, to serve as the basis for the implementation of corresponding tax incentives;
9. Suggesting the European Commission to use the Innovation Fund to provide aid to EU countries with less developed CE systems to improve their recycling infrastructures, efficiency, and recycling capability;

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<sup>38</sup> **Deposit Return Schemes (DRS)** are systems which encourage consumers to recycle products, such as plastic bottles, by charging a small deposit upon purchasing which is then refunded when the item is returned to a deposit point.

<sup>39</sup> **Pay-as-you-throw (PAYT)** is a scheme in which waste fees paid by users are modulated according to the amount of mixed waste delivered to the waste management system.

<sup>40</sup> **Circular Cities and Regions Initiative (CCRI)** is an initiative of the European Commission aimed at achieving the EU Green Deal's objectives.

<sup>41</sup> **Small and Medium- sized Enterprises (SMEs)** are defined as businesses whose headcount and/or turnover fall below a certain threshold.



10. Calling upon the DG GROW and the European Innovation Council to collaborate with LIFE programme and “Circular Economy & Quality of Life” sub-programme to provide subsidies to businesses and start-ups transitioning towards circularity;
11. Encouraging the DG ENV to allocate funding to European Circular Innovation Valley (ECIV)<sup>42</sup> for research and development projects aimed at finding sustainable alternatives to hazardous and harmful chemicals such as PFAS<sup>43</sup>;

### **Awareness and Education**

12. Suggesting the Directorate-General for Communication (DG COMM) to create informative campaigns aimed at educating the general public about CE through social media platforms;
13. Strongly urging Member States to incorporate projects such as “All around...Circular Economy”<sup>44</sup> and informative workshops in their national educational curricula.

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<sup>42</sup> **European Circular Innovation Valley (ECIV)** is a collaborative initiative uniting regions across Europe to accelerate the shift towards a CE.

<sup>43</sup> **PFAS**, also known as “forever chemicals” are a group of synthetic chemicals commonly found in everyday items. They can pose environmental and health risks due to their strong chemical bonds which resist degradation.

<sup>44</sup> **“All around...Circular Economy”** is a competition with the aim of formulating CE plans that could be implemented at a school level.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (INTA)

**Greener on the other side:** *The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and other carbon markets have faced criticism as a method of reaching EU climate goals in spite of other countries, while disproportionately burdening the Global South. What steps can the EU take to prevent eco-colonialism and ensure that climate action is global, truly just, and inclusive?*

**Submitted by:** Lana Braunović (RS), Marta Di Natali (IT), Kasia Gircus (PL), Iris Keene (IE), Daniella Khaibullina (ES), Cara Lee (UK), Cléo Lesas (FR), Nadir Luijten (NL), João Monteiro Dias (PT), Jason Nahhas (SE), Alexandros Potolios (GR), Željko Rudolfi (HR), Keith Străjan (DE), Niki Zehnder (CH), Alžběta Vítková (CZ, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to dismantle colonial power structures between the Global North and Global South and eco-colonial patterns within environmental policies. We strive to promote collective action as well as shared accountability while upholding just global policies, prioritising wellness and quality of life over financial profit. We commit to systemic reform, ensuring fair, democratic, and sustainable trade,**

***because***

- The majority of the Global South, despite contributing [significantly less](#) to historical emissions, face the most severe climate [consequences](#), such as increased instances of extreme weather, floods, and wildfires,
- The Global South suffers from [unequal global distribution](#) of financial and technological resources as well as [exploitative labour conditions](#), which continues to [limit](#) its capacity to implement effective climate action on terms set predominantly by the Global North,
- Current European climate policies, such as the European Green Deal, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)<sup>45</sup> or Critical Raw Materials Act (CRM Act)<sup>46</sup> often [lack](#) input from affected communities, reinforcing colonial patterns and [historical inequity](#), thus allowing privileged actors to [evade](#) accountability,

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<sup>45</sup> The **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)** is a carbon tax put on carbon-heavy products imported into the EU aiming to ensure that production outside the EU is not unfairly advantaged due to potentially looser climate policies.

<sup>46</sup> The **Critical Raw Materials Act (CRM Act)** is a policy aiming to ensure a secure, local and sustainable supply of critical raw materials such as lithium or cobalt, required for the EU to meet its climate goals.



- The approach of environmental exploitation resembling eco-colonial patterns is present within the Global North, such as in the case of lower-income EU citizens disproportionately [affected](#) by European climate policy,
- The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), while [effective](#) in reducing emissions domestically, [overlooks](#) global climate justice and may serve to wealthier actors as a tool to purchase a [right to pollution](#),
- CBAM is set to bring profit to EU industries, and simultaneously possibly creates [trade barriers](#) and disproportionately [harms](#) economies in the Global South,
- The implementation of the ‘Polluter pays’ Principle ([PPP](#)) is [ineffective](#) and lacks transparency and consistency between Member States,
- Global North-led green energy, conservation, and mineral extraction projects in the Global South frequently [displace](#) communities, violate land rights, and exclude local voices,
- International climate financing directed to the Global South [lacks](#) consistent, transparent, and accessible reporting, resulting in difficulties in assessing its effectiveness,
- The Global North’s shift from eco-colonial and exploitative practices in the Global South could result in [increased short-term costs](#) on Global North citizens and a general loss of global economic competitiveness;

*by*

### **Deconstructing Colonial Patterns**

1. Urging the European Commission to [reopen](#) the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus;<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> **Global Climate Change Alliance Plus** was an EU initiative set to build an alliance on climate change between the EU and developing countries most affected by climate change. The programme is now officially concluded.



2. Suggesting the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and the European Environment Agency (EEA) to create a concrete action plan on the self-sufficiency of the Global South by:
  - a. actively promoting non-exploitative climate policy and programmes, collaborating with international unions in the Global South, such as the UNASUR and the African Union,
  - b. creating and supporting indigenous-led land restoration projects in the Global South through the Great Green Wall Initiative;

### **Knowledge sharing**

3. Inviting DG INTPA to facilitate joint educational projects between the Global North and South by:
  - a. facilitating shared research and innovation focused on the development of renewable energy initiatives,
  - b. promote exchange programmes between educational institutions;
4. Supporting local initiatives both in the Global North and Global South, such as Global Call To Action Against Poverty, to globally raise awareness of eco-colonialism and promote public consciousness in affected countries;

### **Due diligence and Monitoring**

5. Calling upon the European Commission to allocate a fixed percentage of additional taxes within EU ETS to the allowances' auction price to reinforce the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP);<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> The **Polluter Pays Principle (PPP)** is a core principle of the EU environmental law, trying to ensure that the costs of environmental damage are paid by those responsible for it.



6. Invites the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) to add a new requirement to the EU ETS annual compliance cycle to detail all outsourced materials, including those that have been outsourced from outside the EU;
7. Calling upon DG CLIMA to create tax bands based on the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)<sup>49</sup> for least developed countries<sup>50</sup> and Small Island Developing States (SIDS)<sup>51</sup>, whereby goods from these countries are either fully exempt from CBAM taxes or provided with gradual tax phasing-in, dependent on the country's development;
8. Urging the Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) to enforce ethical raw material sourcing from non-EU countries by:
  - a. mandating conduct of environmental and social impact assessments prior to materials extraction,
  - b. obtaining Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)<sup>52</sup> from local communities and Indigenous people,
  - c. act in compliance with International Labour Standards and local environmental laws;
9. Calling upon DG TRADE to monitor implementation of the principles of transparency and fairness within the frameworks of the CBAM and CRM Act through conducting on-site inspections, and applying appropriate sanctions when failed to comply with said regulations;

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<sup>49</sup> **Human Development Index (HDI)** is a summary measure of development based on health, education and income. IHDI adjusts the HDI to account for large differences across the population.

<sup>50</sup> According to the UN, there are currently 44 economies designated as the least developed countries.

<sup>51</sup> **Small Island Developing States** are a group of island states facing unique social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities.

<sup>52</sup> **Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC)** is the principle which refers to the right of Indigenous peoples to approve or reject any actions that may impact their lands, territories, or rights.



10. Proposes that the European Commission establishes a Global South Green Sovereignty Fund funded through revenues from the EU ETS and CBAM, as well as a set annual reporting system;
11. Hoping DG CLIMA broadens the Social Climate Fund by increasing its budget and enhancing support for Member States in its implementation.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY (FEMM)

**End the silence:** *In 2023, 85,000 women and girls were killed intentionally, with over 60% murdered by a partner or relative. Considering the lack of a shared legal definition and data gathering of femicide across the EU, how can we ensure that all women are granted the right to life?*

**Submitted by:** Emin Ahmadov (AZ), Lara Almeida (PT), Oliver Cajska (CZ), Laia Calvo (ES), Liene Dhont (BE), Evaggelia Economou (CY), Antonio García-Cervigón Moreno (ES), Marilyn Laurino (IT), Lucy Mullins (IE), Evelina Psarri (EL), Marija Račić (HR), Ariana Rošić (HR), Isabella Rybski (FI), Natalia Hristina Stanković (RS, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to create a safe and equal Europe where women are guaranteed their right to life. We strive to break the cycle of fear, aggression and silence that oppresses women all around the world. Furthermore, we seek to provide financial, social and emotional support to every victim of gender-based violence. Our intention is to eradicate the root causes of femicide through institutional cooperation and awareness,**

***because***

- According to a United Nations (UN) report, one woman is intentionally killed [every 10 minutes](#) worldwide,
- The most prevalent perpetrators of femicide are [intimate partners and family members](#),
- Member States [lack a consistent and uniform](#) legal definition of the term 'femicide',
- Despite all Member States signing the Istanbul Convention<sup>53</sup> on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, [not all have fully ratified it](#),
- Due to [cultural norms](#), aggressors' actions are often socially justified, even if they are found guilty,
- Women are [often financially dependent](#) on their aggressor, hindering their capability to escape domestic abuse,
- The normalisation of public harassment has contributed to [at least 37%](#) of women having experienced street intimidation,

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<sup>53</sup>**The Istanbul Convention** is a Council of Europe treaty aimed at preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. It sets legally binding standards to protect victims, prosecute offenders, and promote gender equality.





- The culture of silence, the lack of trust in the system, and the psychologically damaging process of pressing charges have contributed to [only one in eight women](#) having reported gender-based violence to the police, severely hindering efforts to tackle femicide,
- The lack of education regarding recognising abusive partners for youth [can be linked to gender-based violence](#) and sexual abuse later in life,
- [Failure of legal and justice systems](#), due to the inherent negligence and lack of sensitivity, leads to dismissals or acquittals of cases relating to gender-based violence and femicide,
- In exceptional circumstances, such as times of [war](#) or [lockdown](#), gender-based violence intensifies, [as observed](#) in the COVID-19 pandemic;

*by*

### **Legislation**

1. Strongly encouraging Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention;
2. Urging Member States to accept an EU-wide definition created by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)<sup>54</sup> of femicide in their criminal code and declare it as an independent murder category;
3. Advising Member States to implement specific courts for gender-based violence based on the example of Spain, including well-trained judges in the safety, privacy and well-being of the victims;

### **Providing Security**

4. Suggesting the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) creates guidelines to instruct social workers to do regular check-ups on the victim through house visits and appointments after filed reports;

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<sup>54</sup> **Femicide** is broadly defined as the killing of a woman or girl because of her gender, and can take different forms, such as the murder of women as a result of intimate partner violence, the torture and misogynist slaying of women, or killing of women and girls in the name of “honour”.



5. Inviting the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST) to develop a recovery programme aimed at supporting victims of gender-based violence with educational and financial support;
6. Hoping Member States to subsidise shelters and safer housing options, where the victims are not forced to press charges;
7. Encouraging Member States to develop safe spaces in cities where women can receive medical, emotional, and social assistance, following the example of Spain's 'Puntos Violeta';<sup>55</sup>
8. Advising DG JUST to fund support groups and providing affordable specialised therapy for victims through the Daphne Strand of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) Programme<sup>56</sup>;

### **Raising Awareness**

9. Encouraging the Directorate-General for Communication (DG COMM) to collaborate with the European Women's Lobby (EWL)<sup>57</sup> in a publicity campaign about sensitivity towards gender-based violence, the bystander effect, and increasing motivation for victims to report their aggressors;
10. Inviting Member States' Ministries of Education to integrate comprehensive lessons on identifying and preventing abusive patterns into school curricula;

### **Prevention of Femicide**

11. Encouraging DG COMM to advertise the EU-wide helpline through campaigns, posters and online portals, especially in conflictuous contexts and emergency situations;

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<sup>55</sup>**Puntos Violeta** are designated safe spaces for women, set up by organisations, local authorities, or event organisers, where women can seek help if they feel harassed, threatened, or have experienced any form of aggression. These spaces also provide support for reporting incidents and addressing any concerns or questions.

<sup>56</sup>**The Daphne Strand** of the CERV programme provides funding to help prevent and tackle all forms of gender-based violence, particularly against women, girls, children, young people, and other at-risk groups at all levels. It also aims to support and protect both direct and indirect victims of such violence.

<sup>57</sup>**The European Women's Lobby** is the largest network of women's organisations in the EU, dedicated to advancing women's rights and achieving gender equality.



12. Recommending Member States to monitor the progress of combating femicide by providing an annual report including statistics to Eurostat and the European Observatory on Femicide (EOF)<sup>58</sup> based on internally collected primary data sources.

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<sup>58</sup>**The European Observatory on Femicide** concentrates on gathering and analysing data on femicide across Europe to support prevention initiatives.



## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE AND FOOD SAFETY (ENVI)

**On thin ice:** *As mining activities, driven by the green transition, continue to expand in the Arctic, they are increasingly destroying traditional reindeer grazing areas, while frequent freeze-thaw cycles are exacerbating grazing challenges. How can the EU and Arctic states balance the urgent demand for renewable energy resources with the need to preserve reindeer habitats, safeguard the rights of Sami people, and protect the integrity of the Arctic ecosystem?*

**Submitted by:** Mark Byrne (IE), Iman Čaušević (BH), Yiğit Çobanoğlu (TR), Tora Gaupseth (NO), Běla Horáková (CZ), Jerry Koli (FI), Elizabeth Klaveness (NO), Lam Le (FI), Nina MacDonald (GB), Daniella Metaxa (CY), Simone Lo Monaco (IT), Liliana Mozler (PL), Hannah Schmid (CH), Strahinja Trivković (RS), Malte Ohrås (SE, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims to address green colonialism and obtain balance between the demand for a green transition and the preservation of Arctic ecosystems and Sámi livelihoods, rights, and culture. We seek to ensure that mining expansion in European Arctic States does not come at the cost of traditional reindeer grazing areas, biodiversity, or Indigenous rights by enforcing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC)<sup>59</sup>, promoting responsible resource extraction, strengthening environmental safeguards, and further including Sámi people in decision-making processes,**

**because**

- The Arctic is warming [nearly 4 times faster](#) than the globe on average, [negatively impacting](#) the Sámi's food security, [impacting](#) migration routes, endangering indigenous traditions, language, and herding practices, and [causing](#) mental health issues for Sámi,
- Sápmi<sup>60</sup> [tends to be exploited](#) in the urgent push for green energy, resulting in green colonialism<sup>61</sup> that displaces traditional livelihoods and cultural heritage,
- The Sámi are facing a [double burden](#) of both being disproportionately impacted by climate change and, whilst also suffering from the negative consequences of green transition projects, threatening Sámi livelihoods and *árbediehtu*<sup>62</sup>,

<sup>59</sup> **FPIC** is the principle which refers to the right of Indigenous peoples to approve or reject any actions that may impact their lands, territories, or rights.

<sup>60</sup> **Sápmi** is the Sámi name for the people's traditional territory in Northern Fennoscandia.

<sup>61</sup> **Green colonialism** refers to the exploitation of Indigenous lands and communities through environmental initiatives such as renewable energy projects or resource extraction. Additionally, it involves imposing green agendas without local consent, often resulting in displacement, loss of livelihoods, and the reinforcement of traditional colonial power structures.

<sup>62</sup> **Árbediehtu** is the Sámi word for traditional knowledge passed down through generations. It encompasses values, practices, and a holistic understanding of the interconnection between people and nature.



- Inadequate knowledge of Sámi culture, livelihoods, and history [impedes](#) the implementation of Sámi people's rights in policy;
- The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ([UNDRIP](#)) provides strong moral recognition of Indigenous rights, but [holds no legally binding status](#), limiting its enforceability in national and international law,
- The International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 ([ILO C169](#))<sup>63</sup> is only ratified by Norway among the European Arctic States, significantly undermining the Sámi people's capacity to influence policies that affect their land, resources, and future,
- Sámi parliaments [lack](#) decision-making power in both national and EU policies,
- The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRM ACT)<sup>64</sup> [fails to uphold](#) the principle of FPIC,
- Current EU law [hinders](#) reindeer herders from selling their own processed meat, [diminishing](#) their possible revenue from their main source of income compared to their Norwegian counterparts,
- Increased temperature volatility in Arctic regions [causes](#) frequent freeze-thaw cycles, forming layers of ice that block reindeer's access to feeding ground lichen, adding a financial burden on herders to provide them with additional feed,
- Species native to the Arctic, such as the arctic fox, [are experiencing habitat loss and competition](#) from species migrating further north due to the warming climate, causing decreasing populations and even potential extinction,
- Large corporations are building and continuing to [operate energy plants illegally](#) on Sámi land without significant repercussions,
- Both on- and offshore wind turbines [cause](#) noise and sight pollution, which impacts both migration patterns of reindeer and threatens biodiversity of marine life,
- Frequent changes in water temperature [force](#) marine animals to migrate to stay alive, affecting Sámi livelihoods;

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<sup>63</sup> **C169** is the major binding international convention concerning indigenous and tribal peoples, aiming to ensure that indigenous peoples can exercise control over their institutions, ways of life and economic development, as well as to maintain and develop their identities, languages, and religions.

<sup>64</sup> **The CRM Act** is a legislative framework established in 2024, which aims to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials. It strives to do so by limiting the dependence on non-EU parties, building up production within the bloc, diversifying the supply chain, and encouraging recycling of such materials.



by

### **Indigenous Rights**

1. Encouraging European Arctic States to establish quotas for Sámi electives in national parliaments;
2. Further encouraging European Arctic States to ratify the ILO C169;
3. Directing the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST) to implement a transparent and effective framework into UNDRIP by:
  - a. sending expert commissions to Arctic Member States yearly to investigate and report on their progress,
  - b. implementing an incentive program based on the reports' findings where countries following UNDRIP receive additional funds from Horizon Europe;
4. Calling upon the Directorate-General for Environment (DG ENV) to integrate the preservation of Sápmi into Natural Restoration Law of the European Green Deal<sup>65</sup>;
5. Welcoming European Ministries of Education to add educational programs on the Sámi people, other Arctic ethnic minorities, and the double burden to the pre-existing curriculum;
6. Further directing DG JUST to require CRM ACT to follow the principles set by FPIC;
7. Further encouraging the European Arctic States to provide better mental health treatment facilities by:
  - a. spreading awareness of existing mental health and outreach programmes,
  - b. improve Sámi people's trust in local authorities;

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<sup>65</sup> **The Natural Restoration Law** sets an overarching goal for long-term ecological recovery in EU land and sea areas, with binding targets to restore at least 20% by 2030 and all degraded ecosystems by 2050.



8. Further encouraging European Arctic States in collaboration with Sámi parliaments to categorise Sápmi land into strictly protected and potentially usable areas;
9. Urging the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) to liberate existing EU food security legislation on processed reindeer products coming from traditional reindeer herding practice;
10. Inviting Member States to make UNDRIP legally binding in national law, followed by:
  - a. recognising UNDRIP in court cases;
  - b. issuing fines upon violation of UNDRIP;

### **Climate Change**

11. Urging European Arctic States to fund traditional knowledge initiatives such as Climate Impacts on Terrestrial Environment (CITE) and Climate Sick Reindeer;
12. Instructing the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) to integrate *árbediehtu* into climate action planning by establishing advisory councils of Sámi representatives;
13. Encouraging the EU to create a transparent action plan as part of the Natural Restoration Law by:
  - a. creating a live tracker where the amount of progress made on natural restoration will correspond to additional funding,
  - b. adding an incentive program based on the reports,
  - c. requiring Member States to submit an annual National Restoration Plan;
14. Further encouraging European Arctic States to adjust existing hunting policies aligned with the migration patterns of invasive species;



15. Instructing the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) to invest in fish tracking technology to follow changing migration patterns through funds from Horizon Europe;

### **Renewable Energy**

16. Calls upon the Directorate-General Research and Innovation (DG RTD) to minimise the negative impact of wind turbine farms on both people and non-human animals by:
  - a. sponsoring innovation in wind turbine infrastructure, emitting minimal noise pollution,
  - b. utilising topography to hide wind turbine farms;
17. Further inviting Member States to create concrete construction and infrastructure plans regarding areas with minimal impact on reindeer migration routes and habitats by:
  - a. implementing a mandatory system of cooperation and consultation between Sámi parliaments and companies seeking to operate mining or renewable energy production on Sámi land,
  - b. standardising the principle of FPIC.





# TURKU 2025

102<sup>nd</sup> INTERNATIONAL SESSION


EUROPEAN YOUTH PARLIAMENT

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