

# Resolution Booklet

**THE HAGUE 2025 - 101ST INTERNATIONAL SESSION  
OF THE EUROPEAN YOUTH PARLIAMENT**



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101<sup>st</sup> INTERNATIONAL SESSION

EUROPEAN YOUTH PARLIAMENT



Resolution Booklet of

The Hague 2025 – 101st International Session of the European Youth Parliament

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Published May 2025 (version 2)

Stichting Europees Jeugdparlement Nederland (SEJN)

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# ITRE

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

**Pipeline Roulette:** Three years on from the invasion of Ukraine, the EU has drastically reduced natural gas imports from Russia, but gas and energy prices remain far higher than prior to the invasion, harming the competitiveness of European industry and household finances. As the EU remains highly dependent on fossil fuel imports, what actions should the EU and Member States take to guarantee both energy supply security and affordability?

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**The European Youth Parliament aims** to achieve energy independence and increase the competitiveness of European energy-intensive industries (EIIs) in the global energy market. Furthermore, it strives to improve the citizens' welfare and energy affordability, ensuring the safety and standardisation of the energy and power grid systems, further improving Member States' connectivity and trust,

### because

Following the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and the cut of affordable Russian gas, the EU has found itself with a profound energy crisis<sup>1</sup>,

A considerable increase in the cost of living in the EU has led to a rise in energy poverty<sup>2</sup>, posing far-reaching challenges for European citizens in the future<sup>3</sup>,

Energy prices differ significantly across Member States, contributing to a fragmented EU energy market<sup>4</sup>,



Infrastructure disparity, limited cross-border interconnectivity, and lack of solidarity between Member States lower the effectiveness of cross-border energy exchange, deepen energy poverty<sup>5</sup>, and slow the integration of green energy<sup>6</sup>,

The EU's reliance on non-EU countries for the import of resources can potentially lead to significant problems, including:

- a decrease in competitiveness in the global market<sup>7</sup>,
- possible shortages of resources required for energy production, storage, and industrial or civilian transport<sup>8</sup>,

The EU's imbalance of investment in long-term renewable energy research limits its ability to lead in the energy sector and creates division among Member States<sup>9</sup>,

There is insufficient infrastructure and a lack of incentive to move away from fossil fuels towards locally generated renewable energy across Member States<sup>10</sup>,

Consumer habits are heavily contributing to unnecessary energy waste and increasing stress on the grid<sup>11</sup>,

Ells face increasing competition from countries with lower energy costs, increasing the risk of carbon leakage<sup>12 13</sup>,

There is public mistrust about energy production methods such as nuclear energy<sup>14</sup>,

Cyberattacks and higher energy demand could risk the stability of the European power grid<sup>15</sup>;

**by**

1. Calls upon the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER)<sup>16</sup> to introduce recommendations for EU-wide minimum energy access standards;
2. Requests Member States to adopt demand-side flexibility<sup>17</sup> in new power systems;
3. Asks the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN)<sup>18</sup> to implement educational programmes and interactive large-scale projects educating citizens about the benefits of renewable energy;
4. Calls upon the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)<sup>19</sup> to create long-term research funding frameworks;
5. Urges Member States to enhance the robustness of the critical resource supply chain and diversify global energy partnerships;
6. Invites the European Commission to update and implement the TEN-E policy<sup>20</sup>, in particular regarding interconnectivity and infrastructure disparities between countries;

7. Instructs the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD)<sup>21</sup> to further extend the coverage of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)<sup>22</sup> to more industrial sectors with significant emissions;
8. Urges Directorate-General for Energy (DG Energy)<sup>23</sup> to subsidise green and economically viable means of energy production;
9. Directs the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E)<sup>24</sup> to reinforce the reliability of power grids across Europe by:
  - a. increasing real-time surveillance and improving security forecasts,
  - b. improving outdated infrastructure;
10. Requests the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)<sup>25</sup> to implement additional cybersecurity measures in important points of connection on the European power grid to protect vital zones from energy blackout

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<sup>1</sup> [International Energy Agency “Russia's War on Ukraine”](#)

<sup>2</sup> **Energy poverty** occurs when a household must reduce its energy consumption, resulting in negative effects on health and overall well-being.

<sup>3</sup> [Chair of Energy System Economics at RWTH \(2023\) “Impact of the Energy Crisis on Private Households”](#)

<sup>4</sup> [ACER \(2025\) “Key developments in European electricity and gas markets”](#)

<sup>5</sup> [Bruegel \(2025\) “Upgrading Europe's electricity grid is about more than just money”](#)

<sup>6</sup> [ACER \(2024\) “Capacities for cross-zonal electricity trade and congestion management”](#)

<sup>7</sup> [ECB Economic Bulletin \(2024\) “Energy shocks, corporate investment and potential implications for future EU competitiveness”](#)

<sup>8</sup> [Ecological Economics \(2025\) “Circular economy for resource security in the European Union \(EU\): Case study, research framework, and future directions”](#)

<sup>9</sup> [EEA \(2024\) “Investment needs and gaps for the sustainability transition in Europe: Rethinking the European Green Deal as an EU industrial strategy”](#)

<sup>10</sup> [European Parliament Briefing \(2024\) “Energy transition”](#)

<sup>11</sup> [Earth.Org \(2023\) “How New Energy Habits Can Reduce Europe’s Energy Consumption”](#)

<sup>12</sup> **Carbon leakage** occurs when industrial production is relocated to nations with less stringent environmental standards and energy pricing regulations.

<sup>13</sup> [ERT \(2024\) “Competitiveness of European Energy-Intensive Industries”](#)

<sup>14</sup> [Journal of Environmental Psychology \(2022\) “Disgust sensitivity and public opinion on nuclear energy”](#)

<sup>15</sup> [ICFR Council \(2022\) “Why Europe’s energy industry is vulnerable to cyber-attacks”](#)



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<sup>16</sup> **Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER)** is an EU agency that facilitates the creation of a unified, efficient, and sustainable internal market for gas and electricity

<sup>17</sup> **Demand-side flexibility** is the ability to shift consumer energy demand to supply availability, especially during peak hours

<sup>18</sup> **European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN)** is an international nonprofit organisation aiming to preserve and the further development of expertise in the nuclear fields by higher education and training in Europe.

<sup>19</sup> **Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)** is an EU agency that fosters cooperation among the EU's energy National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs).

<sup>20</sup> **Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E)** is the EU policy that aims to achieve a cohesive energy network in the EU by facilitating investment in cross-border infrastructure.

<sup>21</sup> **Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD)** is the European Commission department that develops EU policies on taxation and customs.

<sup>22</sup> **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)** is the EU tool to establish a fair price of carbon intensive goods entering the EU, encouraging cleaner industrial production.

<sup>23</sup> **Directorate-General for Energy (DG Energy)** is the European Commission department that develops and supports the implementation of policies on energy, prioritising clean energy, affordability, security, and diversity of the supply.

<sup>24</sup> **European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E)** is the association representing the European energy transmission system operators.

<sup>25</sup> **European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)** is the EU agency dedicated to ensuring cybersecurity across Europe.

# SEDE II

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Security and Defence

**Hold the mustard:** More than a century after the first large-scale use of chemical weapons on European soil, the continent is once again faced with the prospect of a resurgence of their use by both state and non-state actors. What steps should European states take to uphold the Chemical Weapons Convention and non-proliferation practices, so as to effectively respond to new technological and geopolitical developments, and eliminate the possibility for the re-emergence of chemical weapons?

### Submitted by:

Tereza Bůžková (CZ), Benjamin Glover (UK), Alex Thomas Goff Tarigo (ES), Aidan Hamja (AL), Alberto Ingram (IT), Angelina Kalishchuk (UA), Jana Manojlović (RS), Vlad Misterian (RO), Aisha Ní hAnainn Ní Bhaoill (IE), Sotiris Navratzoglou (GR), Aleksa Pavićević (SI), Lenka Živanović (Chairperson, RS/AT)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to prevent the potential future use of chemical weapons, in and outside of the EU. We seek to prevent both state and non-state actors from using, stockpiling, and manufacturing chemical weapons to ensure long-lasting, positive peace<sup>1</sup>,

### because

A significant number of state parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)<sup>2</sup> have not adopted comprehensive legislation<sup>3</sup> that covers all key areas<sup>4</sup> for enforcement of the Convention,

Egypt, South Sudan, and North Korea have neither signed<sup>5</sup> nor ratified<sup>6</sup> the CWC, while Israel has signed but not ratified it,

The CWC lacks an autonomous enforcement authority, relying instead on collective decisions by the Conference of the States Parties to adopt and implement measures against non-compliant States Parties<sup>7</sup>,

The Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) relies on state cooperation for field access and investigations in cases of non-compliance by state actors<sup>8</sup>,



The OPCW has no jurisdiction over the actions of non-state actors, including terrorists and criminal organizations, who pose an escalating threat in acquiring and utilizing chemical weapons,

International tracking of equipment required for manufacturing and dispersing chemical weapons is a highly complicated process<sup>9</sup>,

The threat of the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) models,<sup>10</sup> and cloud labs<sup>11</sup> for synthesising precursors of chemical weapons<sup>12</sup> is becoming ever more present and available to non-state actors,

Large-scale agricultural drones<sup>13</sup> can be weaponized by non-state actors to more easily and effectively disperse chemical weapons,

Global consensus on the Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD)<sup>14</sup> remains low, limiting its ability to prevent the use of chemicals that cause serious environmental and indirect human harm,

Global supply chains remain vulnerable,<sup>15</sup> with risks of mislabelled goods and uneven border control capacities enabling the passage of items prohibited by the CWC;

**by**

- 1.** Suggests OPCW State Parties to further adjust their national legislation in regards to the provisions of the CWC Article XII<sup>16</sup>;
- 2.** Calls upon the European External Agency (EEAS)<sup>17</sup> to make diplomatic efforts towards the signing and ratification of South Sudan, North Korea, Egypt, and ratification of Israel to the CWC;
- 3.** Calls upon the Council of the EU to further implement sanctions and diplomatic consequences on states violating the CWC;
- 4.** Calls upon the European External Agency (EEAS)<sup>18</sup> to make diplomatic efforts towards the signing and ratification of South Sudan, North Korea, Egypt, and ratification of Israel to the CWC;
- 5.** Commends OPCW State Parties who have made efforts to track the manufacture and distribution of chemical weapons-related equipment;
- 6.** Calls upon the European Commission to prevent the unauthorized synthesis of chemical weapon precursors by establishing a licensing framework and robust identity verification mechanisms for all users of cloud laboratory platforms;
- 7.** Calls upon the European Commission to strengthen the AI Act by:
  - a.** requiring built-in deactivation mechanisms (“kill switches”) for models generating instructions related to illegal activities, specifically in terms of chemical weapons,
  - b.** considering controlled access measures (e.g., APIs<sup>19</sup>) for high-risk general-purpose AI systems;

8. Recommends Member States to adopt national legislation requiring AI developers and chemical producers to establish stronger incident reporting and inspection mechanisms;
9. Calls upon the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)<sup>20</sup> to further invest in developing drone tracing technologies;
10. Calls upon the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA)<sup>21</sup> to enhance Copernicus<sup>22</sup> and other aerospace control technologies to precisely surveil and monitor the usage of agricultural drones;
11. Invite Member States to sign, ratify, and abide by the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD);
12. Encourage CWC State Parties to join the multilateral export control agreement of the Australia Group<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Defined by [Galtung \(1969\)](#), “positive peace [is] the negation of structural violence.”

<sup>2</sup> [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. \(1993\). “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.”](#)

<sup>3</sup> [OPCW \(n.d.\). “Legislation Compendium.”](#)

<sup>4</sup> **The CWC** aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by States Parties. States Parties, in turn, must take the steps necessary to enforce that prohibition in respect of persons (natural or legal) within their jurisdiction.

<sup>5</sup> **Signature into a treaty** occurs when a state expresses the intention to comply with the treaty.

<sup>6</sup> **Ratification of a treaty** makes it officially binding on a state.

<sup>7</sup> [The Chemical Weapons Convention. Article XII.](#)

<sup>8</sup> [The Chemical Weapons Convention. Article IX.](#)

<sup>9</sup> [European Union Institute for Security Studies. \(2013, March\). “The future of the CWC in the post-destruction phase.”](#)

<sup>10</sup> [The United Nations \(2021\). “Algorithms and Terrorism: The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence for Terrorist Purposes.”](#)

<sup>11</sup> [The OPCW \(n.d.\). “The OPCW Artificial Intelligence Research Challenge.”](#)

<sup>12</sup> **A precursor** is any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical (CWC, Art. II(3)).

<sup>13</sup> [Department of Homeland Security. \(2022\). “Addressing risks from non-state actors’ use of commercially available technologies.”](#)

<sup>14</sup> [United Nations. \(1977\). “Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques \(ENMOD\).”](#)



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<sup>15</sup> [Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade. \(n.d.\). “Exposing supply chain vulnerabilities to illicit trade: A global report on dynamics, hotspots and responses across 10 sectors.”](#)

<sup>16</sup> **CWC Article XII** is the Conference of the States Parties can impose measures, including suspension of rights or UN referral, on States Parties that fail to comply with the Convention or pose serious threats to its objectives.

<sup>17</sup> **The European External Action Service (EEAS)** is the EU's diplomatic service.

<sup>18</sup> **The European External Action Service (EEAS):** the EU's diplomatic service.

<sup>19</sup> **Application Programming Interfaces (APIs):** mechanisms that enable two software components to communicate with each other using a set of definitions and protocols.

<sup>20</sup> **The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):** a specialized agency of the United Nations that coordinates the principles and techniques of international air navigation.

<sup>21</sup> **The European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA):** a space agency, managing the European Union Space Programme as one of the agencies of the EU.

<sup>22</sup> **Copernicus:** the Earth observation component of the European Union's Space Programme, providing free and open-access information services based on satellite and in-site data to support environmental monitoring, climate change adaptation, civil security, and policymaking.

<sup>23</sup> **The Australia Group** is a non-formal multilateral export control regime that helps countries prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons by coordinating national rules on exports of related chemicals, supporting CWC goals through stronger customs and border controls.

# DROI

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Human Rights

**Crimes of compassion:** Human smugglers are increasingly associated with violence and human rights violations, and criminal groups are known to adapt methods and routes to avoid new legislation and maximise profit. At the same time, Amnesty International has found that people across Europe are being prosecuted for helping refugees under the premise of ‘anti-smuggling’ laws. What steps should the EU take to help its residents display solidarity towards those in need, while combating criminal human smuggler groups?

### Submitted by:

Noemi Agharese (CH), Nikoletta Christophorou (CY), Eszter Géczi (HU), Artild Hatellari (AL), Eva Hovhannisyan (AM), Caroline Kristiansen (NL), Nikola Loukanov (BG), Naïa Marchand (FR), Sandra Muukkonen (FI), Alba Tenesa Navarro (UK), Massimo Viswanath-Roberts (DE), Sara Zanzucchi (IT), Marius Bommier (Chairperson, CH)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to extend adequate protection of human rights to all migrants, regular or irregular. It seeks to address the needs of migrants, facilitate legal migration, and improve processing procedures. Furthermore, the European Youth Parliament strives to ensure the robust enforcement of borders and minimise the irregular entry of migrants through human smuggling. Finally, it intends to support the work of NGOs and Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) in rescuing and protecting migrants,

### because

The lack of safe and legal pathways poses a routine threat to life and safety with 29,126 people dying on routes to and within Europe from 2014 to 2022<sup>1</sup>,

Irregular migrants are often the victims of crimes such as abuse, extortion, kidnapping, sexual and gender based violence, and exploitation when entering a country through human smuggling<sup>2</sup>,

European legislation predominantly focuses on internal safety, resulting in counter-smuggling policies such as Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of

unauthorised entry, transit and residence<sup>3</sup> which further the criminalisation of migrants, HRDs and NGOs<sup>4</sup>,

Increasingly restrictive and selective immigration policies make it more difficult for migrants to enter the EU legally<sup>5</sup>, leading migrants to increasingly rely on human smuggling, and exacerbate risks associated with migration<sup>6</sup>,

Despite the protection of migrants being a necessity under international law, it is not viewed as a political priority by the EU and many of its Member States<sup>7</sup>,

There is a lack of awareness about the likelihood of success in seeking asylum, with nearly half of the 678,000 applications in Member States denied in 2023<sup>8</sup>,

Border control procedures that lack transparency<sup>9</sup> result in mistrust towards bureaucracy and cases of misconduct going uninvestigated,

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is only subject to internal oversight by its Fundamental Rights Officer,

HRDs and NGOs suffer from threats, defamation, harassment and are systematically prosecuted for providing aid to migrants in need<sup>10</sup>,

Human smuggling and human trafficking are often conflated to justify harsher immigration laws<sup>11</sup>, leading to increased human smuggling,

NGOs and HRDs struggle with limited resources<sup>12</sup>, making it difficult for them to ensure the protection and the human rights and lives of migrants irregularly crossing the Mediterranean Sea;

**by**

- 1.** Urges the European Commission to distinguish facilitation<sup>13</sup> and humanitarian efforts in the Facilitation Directive by:
  - a.** adding the condition of material or financial gain to the definition of facilitation,
  - b.** establishing a certification system for NGOs and HRDs to safeguard their protection from persecution;
- 2.** Recommends Member States to improve legal pathways to immigration by establishing a unified approach including:
  - a.** implementation of humanitarian visas in all Member States,
  - b.** initiating work and settlement programmes,
  - c.** expanding the EU Blue Card<sup>14</sup> criteria to a broader demographic;
- 3.** Further urges the EU Court of Justice to impose sanctions on Member States who are systematically violating migrant human rights at Europe's external borders;



4. Calls upon Member States to harmonise their immigration laws with international human rights norms;
5. Suggests that Frontex prevent abuse and ensure accountability by:
  - a. introducing the mandatory equipment of security body cameras for its officers,
  - b. introducing a mandatory training programme on dealing with humanitarian actors;
6. Further calls upon the European Commission to guarantee independent checks on the practices of Frontex by implementing a Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) following the example of the JPSG on Europol;
7. Further recommends the European Commission ensure the compliance of Frontex missions with international law and human rights standards by expanding existing information-sharing and cooperation programmes with NGOs and HRDs;
8. Asks the European Commission to streamline border controls by providing relevant artificial intelligence (AI) technology and equipment to Member States;
9. Further calls upon Member States to eliminate the de facto refugee hierarchy<sup>15</sup> and guarantee equal treatment to refugees regardless of countries of origin;
10. Further urges the European Commission to work with countries of origin to inform prospective migrants of conditions that must be fulfilled in order to meet asylum requirements;
11. Invites the European Commission to establish a program to audit and certify NGOs and HRDs and exempt them Facilitation Directive-related court cases;
12. Further asks the European Commission to provide NGOs and HRDs with the human and material resources they need to fulfill their humanitarian missions on the Mediterranean, including surplus and obsolete Frontex materials;
13. Further invites the European Commission to consider refugee voices in policy-making by working with NGOs, HRDs, and Europol;
14. Further recommends the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)<sup>16</sup> raise awareness on the urgency of migrant smuggling through multilingual campaigns.

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<sup>1</sup> The [FRA](#) is the EU's independent rights agency. It aims to promote and protect human rights across Europe and engages with stakeholders from local to international level.

<sup>2</sup> [United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner et al. \(2017\), "Human rights perspectives on the smuggling of migrants"](#)

<sup>3</sup> The [Facilitation Directive](#) obliges the EU Member States to criminally prosecute anyone who helps a migrant to unlawfully enter or remain in a country. The directive's definitions of smuggling and facilitation

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have been criticised for leaving plenty of room for interpretation. This has led to many human rights defenders and NGOs facing [legal difficulties](#).

<sup>4</sup> [Platform for Undocumented Migrants \(2024\), “Cases of criminalisation of migration and solidarity in the EU in 2023”](#)

<sup>5</sup> [European Parliamentary Research Service \(2021\), “Understanding EU action against migrant smuggling”](#)

<sup>6</sup> [Global Commission on International Migration \(2005\), “International migration and human rights”](#)

<sup>7</sup> [Irish Times \(2015\), “Migrant lives should not be the priority, EU border chief says”](#)

<sup>8</sup> [Lorenzo Macchi, Statista \(2025\), “Number of asylum-seekers granted applying for asylum, being accepted for asylum, and being rejected for asylum in selected European countries in 2023”](#)

<sup>9</sup> [European Union Agency For Fundamental Rights \(2024\), "Guidance on investigating alleged ill-treatment at borders"](#)

<sup>10</sup> [Amnesty International \(2020\), “Free to Help”](#)

<sup>11</sup> [Peter Tinti, Tuesday Reitano \(2017\), “Good and evil: the role of smugglers in the migrant crisis \[excerpt\]”](#)

<sup>12</sup> [Research Social Platform on Asylum and Migration \(2019\), “Crackdown on NGOs and volunteers helping refugees and migrants”](#)

<sup>13</sup> Facilitation is the legal term used for migrant smuggling. It refers to facilitating irregular entry of migrants into the EU.

<sup>14</sup> The [EU Blue Card](#) is a work- and residence permit for non-EU nationals. It grants socio-economic rights, and is a step towards permanent residence.

<sup>15</sup> [Refugee hierarchy](#) refers to differential refugee treatment based on their origin.

<sup>16</sup> The [FRA](#) is the EU’s independent rights agency. It aims to promote and protect human rights across Europe and engages with stakeholders from local to international level.

# CULT

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Culture and Education

Irish-language rap group Kneecap recently won their lawsuit against the UK government withdrawing their arts grant funding due to their anti-governmental lyrics. The lawsuit has highlighted the issue of freedom of expression and the power of art as a tool to stimulate critical reflection. Balancing the need for governmental support of the arts, and art as a form of soft power and cultural diplomacy, what could the EU do to further stimulate critical artistic expression whilst governments are the main funder of cultural expression in most Member States?

### Submitted by:

Ülvi Gitaliyev (AZ), Georg Kvantaliani (BY), Stella Kiralj (HR), Sophia Vasiliou (CY), Elia Ceccarini (FR), Stratos Ileris (GR), Adél Imre (HU), Julia Detken (IT), Hania Domaradzka (PL), Helena Fonseca (PT), Pavle Stanković (RS), Nehir Tuna (TR), Monika Zinková (CZ), Sofie de Jong (NL, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to advocate for artistic freedom as a human right across Europe, promote art as activism and support artists' protection and welfare. It aims to create a safe, inclusive environment for art, ensure free access to art as well as provide funding, legal frameworks, and educational resources. It sets out to foster a sense of community among artists and supports artists at risk. It seeks to balance freedom of expression with concerns around hate speech while ensuring transparency in all actions,

### because

Free creative expression, as well as engagement and access to art, is a human right in accordance to article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,<sup>1</sup>

There is a lack of existing European-focused legislation defining cultural and artistic rights, leading to inconsistent application across Member States,

Governments seeking to maintain social stability and deplore art as a soft power can utilise legislative loopholes to withdraw funding, censor critical voices, and promote politically aligned narratives, often in the name of anti-terrorism laws,

The Freemuse's 2022 report,<sup>2</sup> which documented more than 1.200 recorded attacks against artists, found 74% of attacks were directly because of their critical work, with artists and cultural workers facing harassment, imprisonment, or forced exile,

Artworks and cultural artifacts are increasingly being targeted, censored, and destroyed<sup>3</sup> by governments and the public,

Artists are increasingly self-censoring their work when addressing political or critical themes in fear of funding withdrawal, legal prosecution, or professional blacklisting<sup>4</sup>, also known as the "chilling effect",

There are large-scale cuts<sup>5</sup> as well as the withdrawal of long-term funding structures to cultural budgets across Member States, as art is increasingly seen as a luxury rather than a potential tool for social change and soft power,

The rapid disappearance of authentic, physical spaces to practice and engage with artistic expression<sup>6</sup> due to the increasing prioritising of financial gain over artistic integrity, further sidelining marginalised and critical voices,

Cultural institutions as one of the few platforms that offer financial compensation to artists, repeatedly impose excessively high fees for artists and enforce strict content policies, limiting the accessibility and approachability for new to the industry, marginalised or have otherwise dissenting voices artists,

NGOs, especially in European countries with strong artistic restrictions, that offer independent platforms for artists, face increasing discrimination through limited funding,<sup>7</sup> restrictive laws, and lack of long-term state support,

Art education is seen as an expendable in school curricula, often being the first to be cut or moved only to extracurriculars when there are budgetary pressures,

Art distributed through digital platforms often encounter automated content moderation algorithms that excessively restrict or remove art deemed controversial<sup>8</sup>;

**by**

- 1.** Calls upon the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)<sup>9</sup> to introduce a definition of freedom of artistic expression, created and understood by all Member States, guaranteeing:
  - a.** the right to create without censorship or intimidation,
  - b.** the right to have artistic work supported, distributed and remunerated,
  - c.** the right to the protection of social and economic rights,
  - d.** the right to participate in cultural life;

2. Urges Member States to strengthen and further reinforce existing laws regarding the punishment for threatening artistic institutions and artists who are promoting critical narratives;
3. Urges the European Commission to ensure algorithmic transparency and accountability of tech companies by amending the Digital Services Act (DSA)<sup>10</sup> to:
  - a. require platforms to disclose how their algorithms rank, promote, or suppress artistic content,
  - b. mandate periodic transparency reports from tech companies on the visibility of artistic content, including data on algorithmic bias against niche, minority, or controversial art forms,
  - c. promote algorithmic diversity by incentivising platforms to showcase a wider range of artistic styles, voices, and cultural perspectives;
4. Calls upon the European Commission to find a common sanction for governments who censor artistic expression such as cuts of budgets and EU funding for Member and Candidate states;
5. Urges Member States to enhance interdisciplinary education by embedding artistic approaches within existing curricula, or by creating dedicated art programs that support the teaching of science, history, and literacy through creative mediums;
6. Calls upon Artists at Risk Connection (ARC)<sup>11</sup> to establish a European Network to support artistic freedom that:
  - a. connects artists facing censorship with legal resources and funding opportunities,
  - b. provides artists with opportunities to hold seminars online, discuss creativity and provide a safe space to discuss possible problems,
  - c. share best practices for protecting artistic expression across Member States,
  - d. provide a platform for cross-border artistic collaboration on politically sensitive topics;
7. Advises Creative Europe programme<sup>12</sup> to follow the example of already existing partnerships between arts and other sectors and fields on the job market,
8. Calls upon Member States to:
  - a. follow the examples of the French<sup>13</sup> and German<sup>14</sup> governments in providing the youth with dedicated funding through culture passes to ensure accessibility to various cultural experiences,
  - b. specifically promote venues and events featuring critical and politically engaged art,
  - c. collect anonymised data on cultural participation to inform future policy;



9. Further calls upon the European Commission, in collaboration with the FRA, to propose the expansion of the eligibility criteria for humanitarian visas within the EU visa framework by explicitly including artists and cultural workers facing persecution, censorship, or threats due to their artistic expression in their home countries;
10. Calls upon the Council of Europe to adapt its existing Quality Label for Youth Centres<sup>15</sup> framework to create a similar certification for cultural spaces, ensuring that art centres and cultural hubs across Europe meet standards of safety, accessibility, inclusivity, and creative freedom;
11. Calls upon the Council of the European Union, to follow the example of the UN in introducing a new Charter on Freedom of Artistic Expression and Cultural Participation<sup>16</sup>;
12. Calls upon the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC)<sup>17</sup> in collaboration with Europeana<sup>18</sup> to ensure the safety of artworks by expanding the scope and infrastructure to include endangered artworks, digital archives, and censored artistic content from across Member States and other countries on the European continent;
13. Calls upon the European Commission's Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC) to foster cultural dialogue and specifically support underrepresented activist artists by creating a large-scale, annually recurring European art conference, similar in scope to the Venice Biennale<sup>19</sup>;
14. Further calls upon DG EAC to dedicate a share of EU cultural funding towards projects that are at risk due to national censorship or budget cuts;
15. Further calls upon DG EAC to expand Erasmus+ programmes to include specialised artistic exchange opportunities by:
  - a. creating dedicated mobility schemes for young artists to study artistic expression and regulatory frameworks across Member States, fostering cross-border education and mutual understanding of diverse art policies,
  - b. developing an art policy toolkit for harmonising artistic expression standards, including guidelines for reconciling national public-order exemptions under Article 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)<sup>20</sup> with artistic freedom under Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights<sup>21</sup>,
  - c. facilitating virtual exchanges between art students in Member States with restrictive artistic environments, ensuring equitable access to cross-cultural learning and creative dialogue,
  - d. promoting and supporting Erasmus+ art programs through partnerships with EU cultural institutions and art academies, emphasising their role in bridging regulatory gaps and strengthening pan-European artistic collaboration;

**16.** Calls upon the European Commission to prioritise funding for Creative Europe<sup>22</sup> and other cultural institutions in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)<sup>23</sup> by:

- a.** sharing selection criteria determining which projects are funded or not funded,
- b.** furthering its cultural and cross-sectoral mandates by specialising in programmes and administrations for artists from marginalised communities so they have a voice and funding in their country,
- c.** incentivising the expansion of cooperation between Creative Europe with Member States in cultural events and national competitions to ensure a wide array of voices and perspectives are represented,
- d.** creating a centralised press toolkit<sup>24</sup> highlighting the achievement of cultural activities of the EU to ensure that the positive impact of EU cultural funding is properly highlighted for the public of Member States and beyond.

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<sup>1</sup> **Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights** states that everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. It also states that everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

<sup>2</sup> [Freemuse \(2022\). “The State of Artistic Freedom 2022”.](#)

<sup>3</sup> [Pen Belarus \(2023\). “The cultural sector in Belarus in 2022 – 2023. Repressions. Trends”.](#)

<sup>4</sup> [Freemuse \(2024\). “The State of Artistic Freedom 2024”.](#)

<sup>5</sup> [Euronews \(2024\) “Berlin moves ahead with €130 million cut to culture budget amid protests”.](#)

<sup>6</sup> [Culture Action Europe \(??\) “State of Europe”.](#)

<sup>7</sup> [European Alliance of Academies \(2024\) “Expression of Solidarity with Artists and Cultural professionals in Slovakia”](#)

<sup>8</sup> [Transatlantic Working Group \(??\) “Artificial Intelligence, Content Moderation, and Freedom of Expression”.](#)

<sup>9</sup> The [FRA](#) is the EU’s independent rights agency. It aims to promote and protect human rights across Europe and engages with stakeholders from local to international level.

<sup>10</sup> The **Digital Services Act (DSA)** regulates online platforms such as social networks, content-sharing platforms. Its main goal is to prevent illegal and harmful activities online and the spread of disinformation. The Commission enforces the DSA together with national authorities, who will supervise the compliance of the platforms established in their territory.

<sup>11</sup> The **Artists at Risk Connection (ARC)** is an independent international organization whose mission is to defend and advance the right to artistic freedom, providing practical resources and support for artists and cultural workers at risk worldwide.

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<sup>12</sup> The Europe Union cofinances 37 pan-European Networks of culture and creative organisations, under the **Creative Europe programme** (2021-2027). These networks support cultural organisations and professionals who contribute to strengthening the competitiveness and diversity of the European cultural and creative sectors. Creative Europe Networks are organisations of different sizes representing thousands of members from individuals to national and regional organisations working in the cultural and creative sectors. The European Commission consults with these networks concerning the design and implementation of the EU's culture policy.

<sup>13</sup> [Pass Culture \(2025\) "Pass Culture"](#).

<sup>14</sup> [Kulturpass \(2025\) "Kulturpass"](#).

<sup>15</sup> [Council of Europe \(2010\). "Quality Label for Youth Centres"](#).

<sup>16</sup> [European Parliament \(2000\). "Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union"](#).

<sup>17</sup> The **European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC)** is a network of European national institutes of culture and national bodies engaged in cultural and related activities beyond their national borders. EUNIC brings together organizations from all 27 EU member states and works through its global network of clusters.

<sup>18</sup> **The Europeana Foundation** is an independent, non-profit organisation that curates the common European data space for cultural heritage. They develop expertise, tools and policies to embrace digital change and encourage partnerships fostering innovation in the pan-european cultural scene.

<sup>19</sup> The **Venice Biennale** is an international cultural exhibition hosted annually in Venice, Italy. It spans over 7,000 square meters, and artists from over 75 countries are represented in the collective exhibition spaces as well as in the national pavilions.

<sup>20</sup> [EUR-Lex \(2007\) Article 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union](#)

<sup>21</sup> [European Parliament \(2000\). "Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union"](#).

<sup>22</sup> **Creative Europe** supports projects to foster cultural diversity, promote artistic expression, and boost the economic potential of the creative industries.

<sup>23</sup> **The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)** is the EU's long-term budget plan, established for at least five years to ensure stable and predictable spending aligned with its resources, with the 2021–2027 cycle shaped by post-COVID recovery needs and significant institutional negotiations.

<sup>24</sup> A **press tool kit** contains graphs, images and statistics that is then used by reporters and journalists to more accurately cover stories.

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on International Trade

**Pier Pressure:** Seaports are not only conduits for European trade, but also hubs for research, and the development of industrial and environmental innovations. However, European ports face a regulatory environment fragmented between the European and national levels and infiltration by drug trafficking networks, hindering investment needed to keep pace with growing worldwide competition and decarbonization commitments. With this in mind, what can the EU do to ensure European ports fulfill their economic and societal potential?

### Submitted by:

Duarte Cambey (PT), Dalia Haka (AT), Arsen Martirosyan (AM), Moïra Mesnil (FR), Matěj Novotný (CZ), Anastasiia Panko (UA), Elias Schmauch (DE), Annabel Smith (NL), Tordar Soløy (NO), Maša Tasić (RS), Enrique Tena (ES), Shaina Vadher (UK), Nadia Schnider (Chairperson, CH)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to improve seaport efficiency and decrease bottlenecks in maritime logistics. Furthermore, it seeks to reduce the harm inflicted by organised crime in European harbours and strives towards the harmonisation of European maritime legislation. Finally, it aspires to reduce the negative impact of seaports on the environment,

### because

Out of over a thousand European seaports, the three largest account for 20% of all goods arriving in Europe in part due to large differences in performance and efficiency, leading to bottlenecks and congestion,<sup>1</sup>

Many ports are surrounded by residential areas or geographical barriers that impede further growth and lead to a bigger logistical strain<sup>2</sup> for hinterlands<sup>3</sup>,

Since the biggest ports in the EU have stricter security to fight drug trafficking, secondary ports<sup>4</sup> are in danger of becoming a target of organised crime due to less strict regulations,<sup>5</sup>

Criminal activity in ports and gang rivalries often lead to violence spreading into nearby cities, where organised crime groups fight over distribution areas,<sup>6</sup>

There is little cooperation between public and private actors in combating organised crime and drug trafficking,<sup>7</sup>

PIN code fraud<sup>8</sup> is the main method for drug traffickers to enter EU ports,<sup>9</sup>

Existing EU directives tackling maritime security are implemented differently in Member States, leading to differing security frameworks and risks in different Member States,<sup>10</sup>

Maritime shipping industry emissions significantly impact the environment,<sup>11</sup>

Many port cities exceed the 2030 air quality targets set by the Ambient Air Quality Directive,<sup>12</sup>

Only a few port cities have implemented sampling points to track the air quality,<sup>13</sup>

Noise pollution in ports harms marine ecosystems, fisheries, and nearby environments,<sup>14</sup>

Ports hold a significant unexploited potential to become renewable energy hubs;<sup>15</sup>

**by**

1. Requests the European Commission to include secondary ports in the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)<sup>16</sup>;
2. Calls upon Member States to create a plan for port infrastructure development focused on expanding hinterland access to secondary ports, studying their future expansion potential;
3. Directs the Directorate General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) to invest in software designed to forecast the trade volume of ports and optimise their internal logistics;
4. Calls upon Europol to facilitate greater cooperation between bigger and smaller ports to promote collaborative efforts to tackle organised crime;
5. Urges Europol to strengthen public-private cooperation in port security by setting up a permanent task force involving customs officers, law enforcement, and sea terminal operators;
6. Requests Europol to prevent infiltration by organized crime in Member States by:
  - a. expanding mandatory training programs for port workers across Member States,
  - b. improving partnerships with ports in non-member states to enhance international cooperation,
  - c. reinforcing background check procedures for private employers that operate in ports of Member States;
7. Calls upon the European Commission to invest in innovative projects within EU ports through Horizon Europe, specifically cosmic ray tomography<sup>17</sup> and underwater drone technologies;
8. Encourages the European Sea Port Organisation (ESPO) and the Federation of European Private Port Companies and Terminals (FEPORT) to invest in more secure authentication methods at port;

9. Calls upon the Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE) to adopt a unified implementation of the ISPS across Member States;
10. Urges the European Investment Bank (EIB) to support Research and Development into green maritime technologies with subsidies to encourage competition by:
  - a. widely establishing onshore power<sup>18</sup> in European seaports,
  - b. implementing water monitoring and cleaning drones,
  - c. introducing nets to prevent runoffs and spills from the port industrial areas to the the sea,
  - d. implementing noise-dampening technologies in port terminals and port industrial areas;
11. Urges the Directorate-General for Environment (DG ENV) to create mandatory sampling points to monitor air, water, and noise pollution in all main EU ports<sup>19</sup>;
12. Calls upon the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to revise the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV)<sup>20</sup> regulation to include ships over 500 gross tonnage<sup>21</sup>;
13. Encourages the ESPO and the FEPORT to cooperate with the EuropeWave initiative<sup>22</sup> and Ocean Energy Europe<sup>23</sup> to conduct research on and establish wave energy facilities.

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<sup>1</sup> [European Commission \(2013\), “Europe's Seaports 2030: Challenges Ahead”](#)

<sup>2</sup> [European Central Bank \(2021\), “What is driving the recent surge in shipping costs?”](#)

<sup>3</sup> **Hinterlands** are inland regions that are far from seaports, which are nonetheless reliant on resources and services from the ports.

<sup>4</sup> **Secondary Ports** are small or medium-sized ports, which service smaller regions or work in an assisting function for main ports.

<sup>5</sup> [Euclid \(2023\), “Criminal Infiltration of EU Ports”](#)

<sup>6</sup> [Splash \(2023\), “Europol details how criminal networks have infiltrated leading European ports”](#)

<sup>7</sup> [Europol \(2024\), “Leveraging legitimacy: How the EU’s most threatening criminal networks abuse legal business structures”](#)

<sup>8</sup> **PIN code fraud** in cargo shipping occurs when criminals steal or misuse unique reference codes assigned to shipping containers. These codes, which are used for tracking and pickup authorisation, allow them to illegally access and remove cargo from ports without detection.

<sup>9</sup> [Europol \(2022\), “New Modus Operandi: How organised crime infiltrates the ports of Europe”](#)

<sup>10</sup> [Risk Intelligence \(2024\), “The ISPS Code and port obligations”](#)

<sup>11</sup> [European Parliament \(2017\), “EU port cities and port area regeneration”](#)

<sup>12</sup> [European Union \(2024\), “Directive \(EU\) 2024/2881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe”](#)



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<sup>13</sup> [European Environment Information and Observation Network \(2024\), “ETC HE Report 2024/12: Air quality around ports”](#)

<sup>14</sup> [European Parliament \(2017\), “EU port cities and port area regeneration”](#)

<sup>15</sup> [Wind Europe \(2023\), “Offshore Wind Ports Platform”](#)

<sup>16</sup> [European Commission \(2025\), “Trans-European Transport Network \(TEN-T\)”](#)

<sup>17</sup> **Cosmic ray tomography** is a promising technology for cargo screening. With this technology, it is possible to identify materials hidden inside shielding that are too thick or deep for other imaging methods.

<sup>18</sup> **Onshore power** is a technology rapidly gaining popularity, which allows ships to turn off their engines while in the seaport, as they are supplied by an in-harbour energy supply compatible with green energy sources.

<sup>19</sup> **Main ports** are ports handling more than 1 mln tonnes of goods or 200,000 passengers annually.

<sup>20</sup> **Monitoring, Reporting and Verification** (MRV) requirements are a set of controls all cargo ships entering the European Economic Area carrying more than 5,000 gross tonnage or more must undergo, pursuant to the EU MRV Maritime Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/757).

<sup>21</sup> **Gross tonnage** (GT) describes the internal volume of cargo ships. Ships larger than 500 GT include large passenger boats and the vast majority of cargo ships.

<sup>22</sup> [EuropeWave \(2025\), “Welcome to EuropeWave”](#)

<sup>23</sup> [Ocean Energy Europe \(2025\), “OEE: the largest global network of ocean energy professionals”](#)

# FEMM I

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality I

**Protect Us, Don't Arrest Us:** Sex workers across Europe face different forms of labour exploitation such as job insecurity, lack of benefits and bad working conditions. Belgium recently introduced labour rights such as maternity and sick leave, which provides sex workers with more labour protection than ever before. With European countries all having different approaches towards sex work, how should the EU combat the exploitation of sex workers and increase their access to social and labour protections all across Europe?

### Submitted by:

Toivo Aartolahti (FI), Afonso Bernardo (PT), Febe Bille (BE), Ana Drugău (RO), Oluwapelumi Eluyemi (LU), Tora Gaupseth (NO), Marie Goupil (FR), Lara Kovcin (RS), Olivier Kucharski (PL), Trisha Madan, (NL), Erin Nic Gríogair (IE), Amber Smith (UK), Sofia Starace (IT), Cameron Dunn Merelle (FI, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to protect sex workers from the denials of their human rights which are especially legitimated by ideological opposition from Member States or due to a lack of common understanding of the profession. It aspires to reduce social stigma surrounding sex work, that forces sex workers to live and work in precarious and unsafe conditions. We aim not to glamorise the profession or condemn its nature, simply to protect those who are in the profession. By advocating for the implementation of unanimous legislation and ensuring better access to social protection and public services, it believes that sex workers should have the same opportunities and protection as those in any other profession within the EU,

### because

Sex work is not seen as equal<sup>1</sup> to other occupations, introducing themes of isolation, shaming, mental health issues, physical violence, social exclusion, and dehumanisation, whilst also increasing the violence against sex workers<sup>2</sup>,

Much current legislation, such as the Nordic Model<sup>3</sup>, is proving ineffective and harmful to sex workers, with studies showing an increase of 92% in reports of violence<sup>4</sup>,

The regulation of sex work legislation is inconsistent across Member States, allowing for manipulation and legal loopholes<sup>5</sup> which allow for further exploitation,

Access to basic needs for sex workers<sup>6</sup>, are restricted due to discrimination on the basis of profession,

Existing prejudices around sex work both exacerbates current issues<sup>7</sup> and creates new issues further harming current sex workers as well as inhibiting people to entering the industry,

Sex workers' stigmatised status in society<sup>8</sup> influences their attitude towards the police, often making them reluctant or completely refraining from reporting<sup>9</sup> violent encounters,

Data deficits<sup>10</sup> in the reporting of violence against sex workers lead to uninformed policies<sup>11</sup> that do not meet the needs of sex workers and further create opportunity for harm,

Sex workers present a higher risk of Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs)<sup>12</sup>, due to a lack of access to contraception and tests<sup>13</sup> and hygiene being precarious<sup>14</sup> in most sex worker's environments,

Sex workers often lack access to specialised healthcare and face a shortage of comprehensive medical services<sup>15</sup> in addition to STI treatment and mental health support,

Mental health support services are often not available in the areas frequented by sex workers<sup>16</sup>, thereby limiting their access to available public services,

Sex workers and victims of human trafficking<sup>17</sup> often have a difficult time transitioning out of the industry due to drug dependencies<sup>18</sup> and continuous oppressive control from third parties<sup>19</sup>,

Sex workers, both documented and undocumented, are exempt from welfare benefits<sup>20</sup> due to the lack of legal contracts;

**by**

1. Recommends Member States to decriminalise consensual adult sex work by updating their national legislature in line with the relevant research findings;
2. Calls upon the European Commission to provide funding for increased research on all aspects of sex work through creating a specialised research fund for this area;
3. Invites the European Statistical System (ESS) to launch a policy review campaign through expert panels and public consultation across Member States;
4. Requests NGOs to provide more information on services for sex workers by setting up both universal and European helplines;
5. Asks Member States to ensure better training and education for police officers, updating training programs regarding sex work, human rights, and supporting vulnerable individuals;

6. Seeks NGOs to provide sex workers with a safe place to report violence by setting up shelters for sex workers seeking protection from harassment;
7. Recommends Member States to introduce a common European STI strategy, by:
  - a. introducing tests for venereal diseases for sex workers,
  - b. establishing free STIs testing points,
  - c. providing free contraception to sex workers;
8. Requests Directorate-General for Citizens' Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs (DG IUST) to ensure that sex workers have are offered guidance on navigating the job market to leave the profession;
9. Encourages Member States to use Belgium as a blueprint for legislation regarding sex worker labour laws<sup>21</sup>;
10. Asks Member States to increase police presence and visibility within local sex work districts, discouraging deviant behaviour, and ensuring that sex workers feel protected;
11. Further asking Member States to introduce client checks before their encounters with sex workers to ensure further protection by:
  - a. introducing a flagging system,
  - b. implementing contracts prior to the service, holding them accountable for any possible misconduct;
12. Endorses the Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport, and Culture (DG EAC) to organise educational campaigns regarding the realities of sex work as a career and sex workers;
13. Urges the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) to further extend international cooperation through the sharing of unanimous data regarding violence against sex workers;
14. Encourages Member States to aid sex workers' transition to employment in other fields by introducing specialised drug rehabilitation programmes.

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<sup>1</sup> [Johansson, Hansen \(2024\). "Predicting Attitudes Towards the Exchange of Sexual Services for Payment: Variance in Gender Gaps Across the Nordic Countries".](#)

<sup>2</sup> [Lynzi Armstrong \(2018\). "Stigma, decriminalisation, and violence against street-based sex workers: Changing the narrative".](#)

<sup>3</sup> **The Nordic Model** criminalises the purchase of sex work in an attempt to reduce its demand.

<sup>4</sup> [Erin Kilbride \(2023\). "Spain Debates Dangerous Sex Work Law".](#)

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- <sup>5</sup> [Andrea Di Nicola \(2021\). “The differing EU Member States’ regulations on prostitution and their cross-border implications on women’s rights”.](#)
- <sup>6</sup> [Faissner, Beckmann, Freistein, Jungilligens, Braun \(2024\). “Healthcare for sex workers—access, barriers, and needs”.](#)
- <sup>7</sup> [Dina Siegel \(2015\). “Ethnicity, Crime and Sex Work: A Triple Taboo”.](#)
- <sup>8</sup> [Eva Klambauer \(2017\). “Policing roulette: Sex workers’ perception of encounters with police officers in the indoor and outdoor sector in England”.](#)
- <sup>9</sup> [Pia Struyf \(2022\). “To Report or Not to Report? A Systematic Review of Sex Workers’ Willingness to Report Violence and Victimization to Police”.](#)
- <sup>10</sup> [Phil Hubbard \(2008\). “Regulating sex work in the EU: prostitute women and the new spaces of exclusion”.](#)
- <sup>11</sup> [Alexandra Oliveira \(2020\). “Less equal than others: The laws affecting sex work, and advocacy in the European Union”.](#)
- <sup>12</sup> [ECDC \(2022\). “HIV and sex workers”.](#)
- <sup>13</sup> [Tokar, Osborne, Hengeveld, Lazarus, Broerse \(2020\). “‘I don’t want anyone to know’: Experiences of obtaining access to HIV testing by Eastern European, non-European Union sex workers in Amsterdam, the Netherlands”.](#)
- <sup>14</sup> [Ross, Crisp, Månsson, Hawkes \(2012\). “Occupational health and safety among commercial sex workers”.](#)
- <sup>15</sup> [Rudolf Mak \(2004\). “Specific health services for sex workers: from theory to practice”.](#)
- <sup>16</sup> [Lotysh, Tezcan-Güntekin, Kalinowski, Kaya, Kroehn-Liedtke, Mihaylova, Schouler-Ocak, Rössler \(2025\). “An explorative qualitative study of barriers to the use of health and mental health services among migrant female sex workers in Germany and needs for action”.](#)
- <sup>17</sup> [EuroStat \(2025\). “Trafficking in human beings statistics”.](#)
- <sup>18</sup> [Lucy Dixon \(2014\). “Prostitution and drug misuse: breaking the vicious circle”.](#)
- <sup>19</sup> **In this case** third parties refers to those who manage the clientele of sex workers in organised brothels.
- <sup>20</sup> [ICRSE \(2018\). “Diverse, Resilient, Powerful: Intersectional Activism Toolkit for Sex Workers and Allies”.](#)
- <sup>21</sup> **Sex worker legislation in Belgium** grants sex workers the same employment rights as in other professions, including but not limited to: work contracts and work benefits.

## SEDE III

# Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Security and Defence III

**War on words:** The period since October 2023 has been dubbed ‘the most deadly period for journalists since records began’ in 1992. Alongside this, the International and European Federation of Journalists has spoken out against increasing restrictions of press freedom across Europe, such as the unlawful deployment of spyware against journalists, and the use of lawsuits (SLAPPs) to hamper investigative work. What safeguards should the EU implement to protect press freedom and safeguard journalists in conflict zones?

### Submitted by:

Tilda Carmichael (UK), Isabel Connolly (IE), Daniel Doubrava (CZ), Prisha Dubey (SE), Dakota Dzene (LV), Leo Heß (DE), Marianna Karageorgi (GR), Maria Mille (IT), Klara Mujačić (HR), Iva Pantelić (RS), Perrine Pène (FR), Susan van der Weele (NL), Jelle Zegers (Chairperson, NL)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to ensure the protection and rights of journalists while promoting press freedom through unified and robust EU-wide and global legislation. The aims are to prevent violence, harassment, and censorship against journalists, provide comprehensive support for those reporting in conflict zones, and finally raise awareness about the dangers they face. Additionally, it strives to hold accountable entities that threaten press freedom, as well as advocate against the misuse of spyware, combat Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs)<sup>1</sup>, and overall foster a safer environment for journalists,

### because

The violence and harassment that journalists face is a direct violation of their human rights<sup>2</sup>,

There is a lack of consistent and timely aid and resources provided to journalists in conflict zones<sup>3</sup>,

The lack of enforcement of the Geneva Conventions leads to war crimes going unpunished<sup>4</sup>,

The improper implementation of the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity<sup>5</sup> has left sanctions unenforced and accountability weakened<sup>6</sup>,



Threats against journalists by politicians and other powerful actors lead to a decrease in reporting in conflict zones<sup>7</sup>,

Governments, politicians and companies threatening and harassing journalists do not face appropriate consequences<sup>8</sup>,

Journalists receive insufficient financial, jurisdictional, and mental health support in court against legal action taken against them<sup>9</sup>,

There is an absence of advocacy for reporters due to a lack of education and general awareness regarding the conditions journalists in conflict zones face<sup>10</sup>,

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)<sup>11</sup> leaves room for the use of spyware, and as a result is not fully effective in safeguarding press freedom,

The current European legislation combating SLAPPs does not sufficiently protect journalists from domestic or non-EU lawsuits<sup>12</sup>,

The geopolitical situation in the world has changed dramatically since the Safety Guide for Journalist in Conflict was last updated in 2015<sup>13</sup>;

**by**

1. Encourages The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to increase the safety of journalists in conflict zones by providing journalists with first-aid training, mental health support, and other necessary supplies;
2. Invites the UN General Assembly to further sanction nations not complying with the Geneva Convention;
3. Invites the UN to commit to and implement the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity<sup>14</sup> as put forth by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
4. Asks Member States to implement more robust national laws and regulations deterring entities from employing fear tactics on journalists;
5. Calls upon the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL) to establish an independent task force in collaboration with Member States, aimed at investigating harassment claims of journalists;
6. Suggests Member States to expand support mechanisms for journalists facing judicial harassment, including legal assistance through lawyers specialised in SLAPPs;
7. Asks Member States to introduce media campaigns and educational programmes to increase media literacy, raise awareness on the importance of media in conflicts and the obstacles and dangers that journalists face;

8. Urges the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to propose sanctions on spyware companies;
9. Further calls upon the European Commission to reform the EMFA to ensure that the use of spyware on journalists is illegal;
10. Encourages European States to adopt the Recommendation on countering the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs)<sup>15</sup> and its annex as a global foundational framework;
11. Calls upon Reporters Without Borders (RSF) to update the Safety Guide for Journalists in Conflict Zones.

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<sup>1</sup> **Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation** are unfounded and abusive legal actions that aim to silence those working in the public interest on matters such as fundamental rights, the environment, and public access to information.

<sup>2</sup> [Reporters Without Borders \(2024\), “2024 Round-up: Journalists killed, detained, held hostage and missing”](#)

<sup>3</sup> [Free Press Unlimited \(2021\), “Accessing conflict zones”](#)

<sup>4</sup> [Priagun Arif Budi Wibawa, Modern Diplomacy \(2024\), “Enforcing Humanity: The Struggle to Uphold International Law in Conflict”](#)

<sup>5</sup> [United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner \(2022\), “UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity”](#)

<sup>6</sup> [Amal Clooney, Human Rights Institute \(2020\), “IBAHRI Enforcement Report: Report on the Use of Targeted Sanctions to Protect Journalists”](#)

<sup>7</sup> [Marte Høiby, Rune Ottosen \(2017\), “Journalism under pressure in conflict zones: A study of journalists and editors in seven countries”](#)

<sup>8</sup> [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization \(2021\), “UNESCO calls for ending impunity for crimes against journalists”](#)

<sup>9</sup> [European Parliamentary Research Service \(2022\), “Strategic lawsuits against public participation \(SLAPPs\)”](#)

<sup>10</sup> [Ethel Bonet, The Equal Times \(2025\), “War journalism: precarious work, threats and disregard for mental health”](#)

<sup>11</sup> The **European Media Freedom Act** addresses the fragmented national regulatory approaches related to media freedom, pluralism, and editorial independence.

<sup>12</sup> [Birgit van Houtert, Maastricht University Law Blog \(2025\), “The Anti-SLAPP Directive as a Roadmap for SLAPP Targets and the Obstacles Along the Way”](#)

<sup>13</sup> [Reporters Without Borders \(2015\), “Safety Guide For Journalists”](#)

<sup>14</sup> [United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner \(2022\), “OHCHR and the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity”](#)

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<sup>15</sup> [Council of Europe \(2024\). “Recommendation CM/Rec\(2024\)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on countering the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation \(SLAPPs\)”](#)

# FEMM II

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality II

**Stamp it out:** In a research by Eurostat it showed that in 2023 alone, there were 1.3 million reports of child sexual abuse, and the EU continues to rank highest in the world for hosting images and videos of child sexual abuse. With technological advances enabling the monetisation of child abuse and increasing the difficulty/decreasing the chance of prosecution/discovery, how can the EU respond to end child sexual abuse and protect children affected?

### Submitted by:

Anahit Alaverdyan (AM), Tara Borojević (SI), Georgia Bousiaki (GR), Tatul Ghazaryan (AM), Ella Gottschling (DE), Marta Mateu (ES), Maggie Mattson (FI), Enzo Mazat (FR), Kai Nacheva (BG), Petra Nevistić (HR), Michał Ogiela (PL), Lisa Pinheiro (PT), Miriam Smeralda Todaro (IT), Bilge Çilingir (TR, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to ensure the safety and well-being of children by spreading awareness, seeks to improve existing systems, and prevent and minimise child sexual abuse cases while guaranteeing comprehensive long-term support for children. We seek to provide proper education on child sexual abuse (CSA) while empowering the people affected. Furthermore, we strive to enhance international compliance and cooperation and utilise artificial intelligence (AI) based detection systems to curb online child sexual abuse and material and its distribution,

### because

Relations with the offender, social stigma, and lack of support, protection, and prosecution may leave most cases unreported and victims traumatised, untreated, and without justice,<sup>1</sup>

The lack of recognition, sharing, and availability of resources due to insufficient education about consent, grooming, and safety hinders the disclosure and reporting of cases,<sup>2</sup>

Perpetrators may sexually extort and manipulate their victims and the people close to them through different means,<sup>3</sup>

Across Member States, policies to combat child sexual abuse material (CSAM) are not aligned,<sup>4</sup>

There is a lack of clarity on how reported CSAM is detected, reviewed, removed, and followed up by authorities,<sup>5</sup>

Offenders often exploit legal loopholes, technological innovation,<sup>6</sup> and the susceptibility of children to gifts or financial incentives, financial instability of victims,<sup>7</sup>

End-to-end encryption<sup>8</sup> and underdeveloped filtering algorithms may enable anonymity, complicating the detection process,<sup>9</sup>

AI tools and algorithms for detecting CSAM lack accuracy and consistency as CSAM gets modified under technology, hindering law enforcement and risking privacy violations,<sup>10</sup>

AI technologies are used to create deepfake<sup>11</sup> pornography,<sup>12</sup>

The increase of self-generated sexual content<sup>13</sup> among minors has significantly increased the risk of exploitation and abuse,<sup>14</sup>

Predators often use grooming as a method to subsequently manipulate and exploit children<sup>15</sup>;

**by**

- 1.** Calls upon Member States to train school educators, social workers, and psychologists to be the first responders<sup>16</sup> in cases of CSA;
- 2.** Encourages Member States to provide efforts for rehabilitation and care through:
  - a.** providing free long-term trauma psychotherapy for victims of CSA of all ages,
  - b.** funding rehabilitation and therapy centres for victims and their close circle;
- 3.** Requests Member States to develop and adopt a set of unified legal guidelines on CSA;
- 4.** Calls upon the European Commission to assess and monitor the enforcement of existing child protection laws across all Member States, in line with Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union<sup>17</sup>;
- 5.** Urges the European Commission to create a multilingual hotline and website through funding of the European Social Fund +;
- 6.** Calls upon the European Commission to convert temporary legislation currently in place that requires tech companies to have optional online detection mechanisms designed for children under 18 that can be set in place by their caretakers into permanent legislation;

7. Urges the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT) to require tech companies in the EU to use AI tools to detect, and flag suspected CSAM before uploading or downloading;
8. Recommends Member States to create:
  - a. courses for children covering different categories of sexual abuse, addressing the signs, root causes, and consequences of grooming, extortion, and coercion,
  - b. seminars for parents and educators on identifying situations where children may be at risk of being exposed to inappropriate interactions;
9. Affirms Europol in enabling the prevention and investigation of CSA-related cases through a framework strengthening cooperation between Member States.

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<sup>1</sup> [ECPAT International \(2017\) Barriers to Compensation for Child Victims of Sexual Exploitation](#)

<sup>2</sup> [Mar Negreiro \(2024\) Combating Child Sexual Abuse Online](#)

<sup>3</sup> [Europol \(2022\) “Child Sexual Exploitation”](#)

<sup>4</sup> [International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children \(2023\) Child Sexual Abuse Material: Model Legislation & Global Review](#)

<sup>5</sup> [Katie McQue \(2024\) Revealed: US Police Prevented from Viewing Many Online Child Sexual Abuse Reports, Lawyers Say](#)

<sup>6</sup> [Missing Kids \(2024\) The Growing Concerns of Generative AI and Child Sexual Exploitation](#)

<sup>7</sup> [Catch 22 \(2024\), “Child financial exploitation: a guide for parents, carers and professionals”](#)

<sup>8</sup> **End-to-end encryption** is a secure communication process that prevents third parties from accessing data transferred from one endpoint to another.

<sup>9</sup> [European Commission \(Accessed on 2025\) Encryption](#)

<sup>10</sup> [Rami Al Naib \(Accessed on 2025\) The Complex World of AI Failures / When Artificial Intelligence Goes Terribly Wrong](#)

<sup>11</sup> **Deepfake** is a video or sound recording that replaces someone's face or voice with that of someone else, in a way that appears real.

<sup>12</sup> [Simone Obadia \(2024\) Survivor Safety: Deepfakes and the Negative Impacts of AI Technology](#)

<sup>13</sup> **Self-generated sexual content** is sexually explicit content created by and featuring children below the age of eighteen. These images can be taken and shared intentionally by minors, but are in many cases a result of online grooming or sexual extortion.

<sup>14</sup> [Dan Milmo \(2022\) Huge Rise in Self-generated Child Sexual Abuse Content Online, Report Finds](#)

<sup>15</sup> [Bravehearts \(Accessed in 2025\) What is Grooming?](#)



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<sup>16</sup> **First responders** in the context of child protection are those who can provide immediate care to victims, assessing and documenting their needs, and collaborating with child protective services.

<sup>17</sup> **Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union** establishes the objective for the EU to promote the protection of the rights of the child. This is reinforced by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which guarantees the protection of the rights of the child by the EU institutions and by EU countries.

# EMPL

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

**In for a penny, in for a pound:** Recent reforms of pension systems towards defined contribution systems have made early adulthood an increasingly important age for accruing future pension outcome due to the impact of compounding interest. However, with young people often engaging in non-standard work and career breaks, alongside experiencing increased financial pressure, how can young people, their employers, pension providers, competent authorities and European states work together to ensure adequate pension funding for old age and, at the same time, financially sustainable pension solutions?

### Submitted by:

Atanas Filipov (BG), Ella Eberg Fimreite (NO), Jan Havel (CZ), Leander Immanuel Klinger (AT), Timo Leupin (CH), Milica Milošević (RS), Ruzanna Nazaryan (AM), Ceren Özalp (TR), Krystian Pikul (PL), Kyriaki Sofi (GR), Dan Victor (RO), Riccardo Rastello (IT, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to advance a financially sustainable, inclusive, efficient and fair pension environment that guarantees a decent and dignified living standard for all citizens in old age. This resolution intends to promote intergenerational fairness in European pension systems, fostering the inclusion of non-standard forms of work<sup>1</sup> in social security, strengthening the role of supplementary pension schemes<sup>2</sup> and raising the level of financial literacy<sup>3</sup> among the European population, as well as reducing the gender pension gap. It aspires to address such issues intensifying European harmonisation of pension systems' legal frameworks, thus strengthening the EU's capacity to innovate in this sector and achieving greater prosperity for the European population,

## because

The fragmentation among Member States' tax and pension systems:

- significantly hinders the development of a harmonised approach towards pension-related issues,
- results in transnational workers<sup>4</sup> facing increased administrative costs for their occupational and personal pension funds<sup>5</sup>,

Sustained increases in life expectancy among Member States populations and a drop in birth rates<sup>6</sup> lead to statutory pension schemes being financially unsustainable,

An increasing share of Member States' budgets is being used to finance the expenses of a growing population of pensioners<sup>7</sup>,

The pay-as-you-go<sup>8</sup> structure of European pension systems results in current workers risking higher contribution rates to provide for an increasing number of pensioners and a decrease in pension levels after retirement<sup>9</sup>,

The transfer of financial resources between different occupational pension funds is not always possible, which is associated with outcomes of:

- lower pension returns stemming from higher administrative costs, less aggregated interest<sup>10</sup>, and the dispersion of their financial resources across different occupational funds,
- the risk that, in case an early cashing-in of the occupational pension fund is allowed, workers use those resources for other purposes than saving for pension<sup>11</sup>,

Occupational pension systems are:

- underfunded<sup>12</sup>,
- affected by decreasing employers' contribution shares<sup>13</sup>
- potentially influenced by falling rates of collective agreement<sup>14</sup> coverage in the EU<sup>15</sup>,

Socio-economic conditions and a lack of financial literacy and trust in financial institutions, potentially caused by documented bias<sup>16</sup>, leads 39% of the European population to not invest for retirement<sup>17</sup>,

Following the failure of the launch of the Pan-European pension product (PEPP), there is no effective and unified legal regime for personal pension products,

The absence of a unified legal regime for personal pension funds limits the ability of such funds to scale-up in terms of financial capital,

Non-standard employment relationships are often excluded from access to statutory and occupational pension schemes<sup>18</sup>,

When included in statutory or occupational pension schemes, the frequent career breaks that characterise workers in non-standard employment relationships generate gaps in their old-age revenue accrual,

The pursuit of further education by young people leads to less accrual of pension contributions later in life<sup>19</sup>,

Young people are more likely to be engaged in non-standard employment relationships<sup>20</sup>,

Women are faced with a lesser capacity to accumulate statutory, occupational, and personal old-age pension contributions as a result of the unbalanced distribution of unpaid care work, related career breaks<sup>21</sup>, and the gender pay gap<sup>22</sup>;

**by**

- 1.** Calls upon the European Commission, in cooperation with Member States' authorities, to draft a programme for a progressive adoption of a harmonised pension system in the EU to be proposed to Member States;
- 2.** Encourages Member States to further diversify multi-pillar pension systems<sup>23</sup>, composed by:
  - a.** statutory pension schemes providing the minimum income necessary to ensure dignified retirement,
  - b.** occupational and pension schemes, funded by contributions by both employers and workers;
- 3.** Encourages Member States to link and dynamically adapt retirement age to changes in life expectancy;
- 4.** Invites Member States to introduce progressive retirement schemes, in which workers' working hours start decreasing when workers reaches a given age, while receiving increasing pension benefits;
- 5.** Urges the European Commission to develop a financial grant to be invested by young people who open a financial portfolio, calculated on the basis of a formula specific to each Member State's financial situation, not able to be withdrawn for two years;
- 6.** Urges the European Commission to promote financial literacy on occupational and personal pension funds by:
  - a.** carrying out online media campaigns promoting investment in such schemes,
  - b.** promoting awareness on occupational and personal pension funds in the framework of professional training and re-skilling programs, through classes delivered by experts focusing on the functioning of such arrangements;

7. Invites Member States to include classes on financial literacy and investment in high school curricula;
8. Calls upon the European Commission to introduce legislation granting workers the right to freely choose their preferred occupational pension fund, regardless of their employer or country of work;
9. Encourages Member States to encourage long-term investment into occupational and personal pension schemes by establishing legislation reducing the taxation of pension contributions into occupational and personal pension schemes;
10. Further encourages Member States to coordinate such legislation, in order to establish a harmonised threshold under which financial resources allocated to occupational and personal pension funds would not be taxed;
11. Invites Member States to discourage short-term cash-outs by establishing legislation locking contributions into occupational pension funds until retirement age;
12. Urges the European Commission to propose legislation strengthening the powers of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)<sup>24</sup> in supervising the management of occupational and personal pension funds;
13. Urges the European Commission to propose legislation further advancing fair competition between asset management companies that set up occupational or personal pension funds by:
  - a. facilitating access to and comparability of offers from asset managers to consumers,
  - b. promoting the development of rules granting the transferability of funds among different occupational or personal pension funds;
14. Encourages Member States to adopt legislation that ensures non-standard workers are included in statutory and occupational pension schemes by linking the access to such systems with work-related income rather than the presence of a standard employment contract;
15. Invites Member States to promote an early accrual of minimal pension contributions among young people in prolonged education by providing tax incentives to employers for hiring young people in higher education student jobs;
16. Encourages Member States to adopt legislation granting pension credits<sup>25</sup> for child-care related career breaks of up to three years;
17. Urges the Member States to advance the fight against the gender pay gap by swiftly transposing the Pay Transparency Directive<sup>26</sup> into national law.

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<sup>1</sup> **Non-standard forms of work** are employment relationships that do not meet all the conditions of (1) being open-ended (permanent employment contracts), (2) being full-time, and (3) granting a direct relationship

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between employer and employee. Examples are temporary work, part-time work or traineeship work. Source: [International Labour Organisation \(2017\). “The rising tide of non-standard employment”](#)

<sup>2</sup> **Supplementary pension schemes** can take either the form of occupational pension funds or personal pension funds. **Occupational pension funds** (also called second-pillar pension schemes) are collective schemes established by employers or employers’ associations, usually together with trade unions on the basis of a collective agreement, at company or industry sector level. They are usually financed jointly by employer and employee with contributions. **Personal pension funds** (also called third-pillar pension schemes) are individual schemes through which a person can accumulate capital during their working life, that is then used to integrate their old-age funding. Supplementary pension schemes complement **statutory pension schemes** (also called first-pillar pension schemes), which are pension schemes set up and managed by the State and can be financed by contributions into the social security State budget as well as by taxes paid into the general government budget.

<sup>3</sup> **Financial literacy** can be defined as a set of awareness, knowledge, skills, attitudes, and behaviours that enable individuals to make informed and smart financial decisions. Source: [OECD. “Financial education”](#)

<sup>4</sup> In the context of this resolution, the term **transnational workers** indicates workers who entertain or have entertained employment relationships with employers in different Member States.

<sup>5</sup> [High-level Group of Experts on Pensions \(2019\). “Final Report of the High-level Group of Experts on Pensions”](#)

<sup>6</sup> [European Commission \(2023\). “The Impact of Demographic Change in a changing environment”](#)

<sup>7</sup> [High-Level Group on the future of social protection and of the welfare state in the EU \(2023\). “The future of social protection and of the welfare state in the EU”](#)

<sup>8</sup> **Pay-as-you-go** schemes are characterised by the fact that current working people’s contributions are used to pay current pensioners’ pension benefits. Source: [Marketa Pape \(2023\). “Understanding EU action on pensions”](#)

<sup>9</sup> [Economic Policy Committee and Social Protection Committee \(2020\). “Joint Paper on Pensions 2019”](#)

<sup>10</sup> [High-level Group of Experts on Pensions \(2019\). “Final Report of the High-level Group of Experts on Pensions”](#)

<sup>11</sup> [High-level Group of Experts on Pensions \(2019\). “Final Report of the High-level Group of Experts on Pensions”](#)

<sup>12</sup> [European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority \(2019\). “Occupational pensions stress test 2019”](#)

<sup>13</sup> [High-level Group of Experts on Pensions \(2019\). “Final Report of the High-level Group of Experts on Pensions”](#)

<sup>14</sup> **Collective agreements** regulate certain aspects of employment relationships and are the result of collective bargaining, which is the negotiation between social partners, the two actors of the employment relationship at collective level: the employer (or an employers’ association) and one or more trade unions representing workers. Occupational pension funds are usually established by collective agreements.

<sup>15</sup> [High-level Group of Experts on Pensions \(2019\). “Final Report of the High-level Group of Experts on Pensions”](#)

<sup>16</sup> [High-level Group of Experts on Pensions \(2019\). “Final Report of the High-level Group of Experts on Pensions”](#)

<sup>17</sup> [Insurance Europe \(2023\). “2023 Pan-European Pension Survey: Key findings”](#)

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<sup>18</sup> [High-Level Group on the future of social protection and of the welfare state in the EU \(2023\). “The future of social protection and of the welfare state in the EU”](#)

<sup>19</sup> [Alina Pelikh, Francisco Rowe \(2024\). “Increasing diversity, precarity and prolonged periods of education in the transition from school to work in Britain”](#)

<sup>20</sup> [Arthur Corazza \(2019\). “Of Carts and Horses: Youth in non-standard Employment”](#)

<sup>21</sup> [European Institute for Gender Equality \(2023\). “A Better Work–Life Balance: Bridging the gender care gap](#)

<sup>22</sup> [European Commission \(2022\). “The gender pay gap situation in the EU”](#)

<sup>23</sup> **Multi-pillar pension systems** are pension systems characterised by the fact that a person’s old-age revenue comes from a mix of statutory pension systems, occupational pension funds and personal pension funds.

<sup>24</sup> [Occupational Pensions Authority \(EIOPA\)](#)

<sup>25</sup> **Pension credits** are mechanisms designed to compensate for breaks in employment due to a career break, so that the accrual of pension entitlements does not suffer from significant gaps. Source: [European Commission \(2024\). “Study supporting the monitoring of care credits in occupational pension schemes”](#)

<sup>26</sup> [Directive \(EU\) 2023/970 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023](#)



# LIBE I

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs I

**Europe's largest ethnic minority:** The Roma are the largest ethnic minority in Europe, and face discrimination and exclusion in educational and healthcare across Europe. As a champion of equality and human rights, how can the EU guarantee equal access to health care and education for this marginalised group?

### Submitted by:

Karine Abrahamyan (AM), Sofiia Bolshakova (UA), Charlotte Brunt (ES), Warsame Bulale (SE), Antonie Copkatá (CZ), Ella Fitzgerald (IE), Filip Gmurkowski (PL), Kornél Németh (HU), Jelena Obradović (RS), Michalis Psomas (CY), Mayline Rizvi (DE), Kosmas Spyropoulos (GR), Rhydian Waters (UK), Defne Deniz Yılmaz (TR), Pol Sanmartí Vigo (ES, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to ensure equal and affordable access to education and healthcare for the Roma community. Above all, it aims to eliminate stigma and discrimination against the group, offering equitable opportunities in the job market and educational institutions through fair competition and unprejudiced evaluation criteria. It also strives to enhance and improve the living conditions of all Romani in Europe,

### because

Some Roma housing settlements lack legal and administrative recognition, hampering access to education and healthcare,<sup>1</sup>

The lack of reliable statistical data on the European Romani population exacerbates health inequalities and marginalisation within the EU,<sup>2</sup>

Roma communities with lower populations receive more funds per capita from their municipalities than communities with larger populations,<sup>3</sup>

Romani political representation is absent on a local and international scale,<sup>4</sup> with the European Parliament lacking Romani MEPs in its current term, despite the fact Roma people make up 1.3% of the European population,<sup>5</sup>

Roma people face discrimination in medical care,<sup>6</sup> including humiliation, alienation, and breaches of doctor-patient confidentiality, violating Article 35 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,<sup>7</sup>

Healthcare institutions fail to meet the needs of Roma communities<sup>8</sup> due to a lack of general practitioners,<sup>9</sup> limited community health care services,<sup>10</sup> and a lack of understanding of the factors influencing mental health in Roma people,<sup>11</sup>

Romani women encounter systemic discrimination<sup>12</sup> and barriers when accessing maternity and gynaecological care,<sup>13</sup>

Life expectancy within the Romani community is around 5 to 20 years below the EU average due to systemic discrimination and social exclusion in the healthcare sector;<sup>14</sup>

63% of young Roma are not in education, employment, or training, while the EU average is at 12%,<sup>15</sup>

Early school dropout rates are alarmingly high, with 71% of Roma aged 18 to 24 leaving school before reaching upper secondary education<sup>16</sup> and not attending further education or training,<sup>17</sup>

Roma girls are 32% less likely to be enrolled in primary school compared to their non-Roma peers in similar socioeconomic conditions,<sup>18</sup>

Only 44% of Roma children attend early childhood education and care,<sup>19</sup> falling short of the EU Roma Framework's 70% target by 2030,<sup>20</sup>

Mobility, language, cultural and legal obstacles result in lower Roma participation in higher education,<sup>21</sup>

60% of Romani children under the age of three do not have access to early childhood education and care services near their homes, negatively affecting mental and intellectual outcomes;<sup>22</sup>

**by**

1. Suggests European States to formally recognise Roma settlements by developing legal frameworks and municipal guidelines that guarantee access to education, public services, and civil documentation, following Sweden's example;<sup>23</sup>
2. Calls upon the European Commission to produce a comprehensive, updated report on the situation of Roma in education, healthcare, and employment to address the critical data gap since the last major healthcare report in 2014;

3. Calls upon the European Parliamentary Research Service to raise public awareness by:
  - a. conducting a survey to estimate the population of Roma in all Member States,
  - b. reporting its findings to the European Council, European Commission, and Eurostat;
4. Calls upon the European Commission to conduct thorough assessments on the equitable and proportional distribution of EU funds designated to Roma community development by Member State municipalities,
5. Urges the European Commission to ensure equal and non-discriminatory access to healthcare for Roma communities by:
  - a. recommending Member States to inspect healthcare institutions regularly,
  - b. mandating cooperation between the Directorate-General on Health and Food Safety (DG SANT) and Roma-led organisations,
  - c. enforcing anti-discrimination through binding directives and cross-border healthcare rights,
  - d. providing interim support through NGO-led services and cultural training for medical staff;
6. Encourages Member States to establish community-based health mediation programmes,<sup>24</sup> replicating the ROMED1 Programme,<sup>25</sup> by training and deploying Roma health mediators to bridge communication gaps between healthcare providers and Roma patients;
7. Demands the European Commission to promote equal access to healthcare for the Romani people through:
  - a. adopting a harder stance and implementing stricter laws regarding discrimination against the Romani community,
  - b. ensuring that legal consequences are implemented against any healthcare professional violating Article 35 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights;
8. Asks Member States to guarantee accessibility of medical care in areas densely inhabited by Roma communities by implementing wider access to mobile healthcare units,<sup>26</sup>
9. Urges Member States to expand and adapt mental health services to ensure accessibility, inclusiveness, and cultural appropriateness for Romani communities, drawing on the recommendations of the Roma Support Group's 2024 report on mental health;<sup>27</sup>
10. Recommends Member States to adopt heritage language models, following Sweden's 1977 Home Language Reform;<sup>28</sup>
11. Urges the Association for Teacher Education in Europe to work with the Roma Education Fund in training teachers on Romani culture and history to reduce prejudice in schools;

- 12.** Asks the Roma Education Fund and the European Roma Grassroots Organisations Network to implement and expand mentoring and tutoring programmes tailored to Roma youth at risk of early school leaving<sup>29</sup> following the Final Report of the Thematic Working Group on Early School Leaving's recommendations;<sup>30</sup>
- 13.** Calls upon the European Commission to guarantee access to quality preschool education by increasing targeted education funding for Roma-led NGOs;
- 14.** Asking the Roma Education Fund to establish community workshops and mentorship networks providing free professional assistance on bureaucratic procedures and legal literacy;
- 15.** Suggests the Directorate-General on Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC) collaborates with the International Roma Youth Network through consistent dialogue on tackling the marginalisation of the Roma community and promoting active youth political engagement on the European level;
- 16.** Calls upon the European Commission to allocate additional funding to the Justice Programme to strengthen collaboration with NGOs like the European Roma Rights Centre to ensure effective access to justice for Romani people across Europe;
- 17.** Calls upon the European Commission to guarantee accessible, effective, and equal education for Romani people by:
  - a.** prioritising funding under the European Social Fund+ and Erasmus+ for projects that support the participation of Roma girls in education, including mentorship schemes, after-school programmes, and access to digital learning resources,
  - b.** developing targeted campaigns encouraging Roma girls' enrolment and retention in schools;

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<sup>1</sup> [INSCHOOL3 \(2024\) "School segregation of Roma communities: trends and pathways towards educational inclusion"](#)

<sup>2</sup> [UNDP \(2024\) "Data can make the difference for Roma inclusion"](#)

<sup>3</sup> [Open Society Foundations "Main risks of misusing EU funding in the field of Roma inclusion"](#)

<sup>4</sup> [Roma Foundation for Europe \(2024\) "The Empty Chair in the European Parliament"](#)

<sup>5</sup> [European Parliament \(2025\) "Romani people in the EU"](#)

<sup>6</sup> [Rodica Gramma et al., Lumen Research Center in Social and Humanistic Sciences \(2013\) "Stigma and Discrimination against Roma Patients in the Romanian Healthcare System"](#)

<sup>7</sup> [European Union \(2010\) "Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union"](#)

<sup>8</sup> [Vishal S. Arora et al., European Journal of Public Health \(2016\) "An examination of unmet health needs as perceived by Roma in Central and Eastern Europe"](#)

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- <sup>9</sup> [ERGO Network \(2022\) “Roma access to adequate healthcare and long-term care”](#)
- <sup>10</sup> [ERGO Network \(2022\) “Roma access to adequate healthcare and long-term care”](#)
- <sup>11</sup> [Roma Support Group \(2024\) “Tackling Mental Health Inequalities for Gypsy, Roma and Traveller People”](#)
- <sup>12</sup> [Brandon Muncan, Journal of Global Health Reports \(2018\) “Eastern European Roma: ethnic discrimination in the public healthcare system”](#)
- <sup>13</sup> [European Roma Rights Centre \(2024\) “Policy Brief: Segregated Maternity Wards, Reproductive Rights Abuses, and Obstetric Violence Against Romani Women”](#)
- <sup>14</sup> [European Public Health Alliance \(2018\) “Closing the life expectancy gap of Roma in Europe”](#)
- <sup>15</sup> [European Parliament \(2022\) “Roma: what discrimination do they face and what does EU do?”](#)
- <sup>16</sup> **Upper secondary education programmes** are typically designed to complete secondary education in preparation for tertiary education or provide skills relevant to employment, or both.
- <sup>17</sup> [European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights \(2023\) “Roma in 10 European countries - Main results”](#)
- <sup>18</sup> [UNICEF \(2011\) “The right of Roma children to education”](#)
- <sup>19</sup> [European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights \(2023\) “Roma in 10 European countries - Main results”](#)
- <sup>20</sup> [European Commission \(2020\) “Commission launches new 10-year plan to support Roma in the EU”](#)
- <sup>21</sup> [Alexandre Rutigliano, OECD \(2020\) “Inclusion of Roma Students in Europe: A literature review and examples of policy initiatives”](#)
- <sup>22</sup> [Romani Early Years Network \(2023\) “Breaking the cycle of discrimination of Roma children through early childhood education”](#)
- <sup>23</sup> [European Commission \(2022\) “Civil society monitoring report on the quality of the national strategic framework for Roma equality, inclusion, and participation in Sweden”](#)
- <sup>24</sup> [European Commission \(2009\) “Cultural mediators in health care”](#)
- <sup>25</sup> **ROMED1 Programme** is a programme, initiated in 2011, aims to train intercultural mediators around Europe to reduce the gap between Roma communities and public institutions.
- <sup>26</sup> **Mobile healthcare units** are small mobile hospitals that can be deployed in 20 minutes on any site with flat ground of 30 meters. They have water, electricity, and oxygen reserves, and allow treating patients in separate spaces.
- <sup>27</sup> [Roma Support Group \(2024\) “Tackling Mental Health Inequalities for Gypsy, Roma and Traveller People”](#)
- <sup>28</sup> **Sweden Home Language Reform (1977):** In Sweden’s national education system, heritage language education, also called “Mother Tongue Instruction” or “MTI”, is protected by law.
- <sup>29</sup> **Early school leaving** refers to students who leave education and training with only lower secondary education or less, and who are no longer in education and training.
- <sup>30</sup> **Final Report of the Thematic Working Group on Early School Leaving** draws on the work of the Thematic Working Group on 'Early School Leaving' of the European Commission, comprising experts nominated by 31 European countries, and stakeholder organisations.

# ENVI

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety

**Glass half-full:** By 2050, the global demand for water could increase by up to 55%, and 40% of the world's population will face water shortages. Given the essential nature of water, and the current challenges in this area facing Europe and the world, how can the EU respond to water-related challenges to protect ecosystems and ensure wash, sanitation, and hygiene services are accessible, affordable, and sustainable for all?

### Submitted by:

Sarah Bernard (IR), George Charalambides (CY), Miruna Dospinescu (RO), Boris Ganzevoort (NL), Alvin Gelner (CZ), Elman Hasanli (AZ), Elizabeth Frøya Klaveness (NO), Mihajlo Majstorović (RS), Yael Marzocchi (IT), Sinnu Nio (FI), Eftychia Panousi (GR), Elsa Peyrouny (FR), and Enian Xhixha (AL), Polyna Antoniou (CY, Chairperson)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to address water scarcity and its consequences by tackling interconnected challenges, such as water pollution and wastage. Furthermore, it strives to strengthen cooperation and shared responsibility among Member States by promoting data collection, transparency, and improved collective water reserve management. Additionally, it aims to encourage investment in preventative measures and restoration projects, while ensuring universal access to clean water through sustainable and inclusive water management practices,

### because

Water scarcity and poor water quality result in 10 million Europeans<sup>1</sup> lacking access to basic sanitation services, exacerbating challenges to food security and threatening people's livelihoods,

Water scarcity impacted 34%<sup>2</sup> of the EU's territory for at least one season in 2022, affecting 30%<sup>3</sup> of its population annually,

Since the 1990s the EU has averaged annual water losses of 25% of total distributed supply, with some Member States facing losses as high as 40–60% due to ageing infrastructure<sup>4</sup>,

From 2001 to 2018, around 74% of natural disasters were water-related, including unprecedented droughts and floods<sup>5</sup>, with droughts in Europe causing annual economic losses of EUR 9 billion<sup>6</sup>,

Between 2015-2021, only 37%<sup>7</sup> of Europe's surface water bodies met 'good' or 'high' ecological status requirements of the Water Framework Directive (WFD), while just 29%<sup>8</sup> achieved 'good' chemical status,

Emerging technologies such as liquid cooling systems used in Artificial Intelligence (AI) data centres consume a significant amount of clean water<sup>9</sup>,

Countries such as Serbia face are planning unsustainable lithium extraction projects, which can severely harm<sup>10</sup> local ecosystems and populations,

In several Western Balkan Countries<sup>11</sup>, the water sector faces common challenges, including limited water coverage,

Poor waste management<sup>12</sup> and outdated infrastructure have resulted in significant clean water pollution, with prolonged exposure to contaminated water causing organ damage and increasing the risk of gastrointestinal diseases,<sup>13</sup>

Several Member States are failing<sup>14</sup> to uphold transboundary water cooperation agreements, posing a major obstacle to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)<sup>15</sup> set by the United Nations (UN),

Water pollution, such as agricultural runoff and wastewater, offsets ecological balance in Member States' ecosystems<sup>16</sup>,

Despite EU requirements for all Member States, Iceland, and Norway, to report aquifer data, only 16 have provided complete and publicly accessible information<sup>17</sup>;

**by**

1. Urges Member States to create and implement tailored national action plans that will help achieve the SDGs and the WFD by 2030 and 2027, respectively;
2. Encourages Member States to raise awareness on water consumption by adding water bottle labels featuring alarming statistics on the impact of water scarcity in upcoming years;
3. Designates the European Environmental Agency (EEA) to make sure that water infrastructure, are up-to-date, with mandatory annual efficiency and water safety checks;
4. Insists that the European Commission compliance with the WFD by withholding a percentage of total funding received from the EU for countries not meeting the 2027 deadline for water source quality;

5. Calls upon the Directorate-General for Environment (DG ENV)<sup>18</sup> to invest through the Horizon Europe fund into programmes, research, and initiatives, such as the “WaterWiseEU,”<sup>19</sup> to raise awareness on consumers’ behaviour;
6. Urges the European Commission to reduce ecosystem and water source degradation in non-EU countries by introducing legislation that requires companies operating in economic sectors with high water consumption practices to comply with EU environmental standards as a condition for trading within the Single Market;
7. Suggests Member States to:
  - a. subsidise a wider use of water-saving shower heads and sensor taps;
  - b. implement a water efficiency scale system similar to the Energy Label<sup>20</sup>,
8. Calls upon the European Commission to mitigate water resource exploitation due to the increasing demand for data centres’ liquid cooling by:
  - a. amending the EU AI Act<sup>21</sup> to regulate the use of potable water for data center cooling by recommending the use of alternative water sources, i.e. recycled water and rainwater,
  - b. compelling all major AI chatbot providers to provide in-app live updates on the water consumption that the users’ queries evoke;
9. Calls upon the EEA to establish a clear institutional mandate by:
  - a. implementing transparent operating principles for aquifer management<sup>22</sup> and national water usage reports,
  - b. introducing public consultation and appeal processes that provide for citizen participation and input with tools such as citizen report cards on water consumption, hotlines, and feedback mechanisms,
  - c. including monitoring of the water quality at each stage of the water cycle,
  - d. establishing an open, unified, and shared groundwater data platform;
10. Invites Member States to improve irrigation and farming techniques through:
  - a. using smart water meters and Internet of Things (IoT) irrigation sensors<sup>23</sup>,
  - b. reusing treated water from local sources,
  - c. suggesting the introduction of practices like crop rotation paired with a selection of water-efficient crops whilst being mindful of the location and soil needs,
  - d. integrating agro-ecological methods such as agroforestry<sup>24</sup> and permanent pastures that allow the maintenance of water in the soil through underground root systems;



- 11.** Calls upon the European Commission to implement funding for infrastructure in a two-step plan by:
- a.** firstly executing an immediate 5-year pipeline coverage development plan for infrastructurally underdeveloped regions,
  - b.** secondly continuously investing in sustainable renovation of water infrastructure, such as the repairs and replacement of current insufficient systems;
- 12.** Invites the European Commission to set up a separate branch under the European Solidarity Fund (EUSF)<sup>25</sup> to address water-related natural disasters by:
- a.** expanding the usage of nature-based flood management solutions,
  - b.** implementing early warning systems by integrating real-time data,
  - c.** offering emergency relief through the provision of a clean water supply for matters of sanitation and health care in the case of emergencies,
  - d.** increasing preparedness for possible drought scenarios by investing in the development of extraction systems through Managed Aquifer Recharge (MAR)<sup>26</sup> and Aquifer storage and recovery (ASR)<sup>27</sup> technologies;
- 13.** Asks the European Commission to increase investments in wastewater treatment by:
- a.** utilising methods such as Membrane Separation Tech (MST)<sup>28</sup> and Biosand Water Filtration<sup>29</sup> for smaller households;
  - b.** gradually shifting to renewable energy sources for clean-water production, such as electrical systems or nature-based solutions,
- 14.** Calling on the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW)<sup>30</sup> to:
- a.** reduce reliance on extracted lithium by promoting sustainable sourcing methods, such as urban mining and recycling;
  - b.** mandate that at least 75% of battery weight consists of recycled lithium by 2030,
- 15.** Suggests that the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI)<sup>31</sup>:
- a.** stimulates invest in vertical farming, organic pest control methods, such as biopesticides, and the reduction of water consumption, through the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD);
  - b.** deincentivises the use of traditional chemical pesticides in agricultural systems by limiting access to the aforementioned funds.

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<sup>1</sup> [European Commission. 'Urban wastewater'.](#)

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- <sup>2</sup> [European Environment Agency \(2025\). 'Water scarcity conditions in Europe'.](#)
- <sup>3</sup> [EEA Report \(2024\). 'Europe's state of water 2024: the need for improved water resilience'.](#)
- <sup>4</sup> [World Economic Forum \(2025\). 'Water security: How to ensure access to water in a changing world'.](#)
- <sup>5</sup> [European Commission \(2023\). 'Statement by President von der Leyen at the UN Water Conference, via video message'.](#)
- <sup>6</sup> [JRC Technical Report \(2020\). 'Global warming and drought impacts in the EU'.](#)
- <sup>7</sup> [European Environmental Agency. 'Pollution, over-use and climate change threaten water resilience in Europe'.](#)
- <sup>8</sup> [European Environmental Agency. 'Pollution, over-use and climate change threaten water resilience in Europe'.](#)
- <sup>9</sup> [White & Case \(2024\). 'Data centers and water: From scrutiny to opportunity'.](#)
- <sup>10</sup> [Scientific Reports \(2024\). 'The influence of exploration activities of a potential lithium mine to the environment in Western Serbia'.](#)
- <sup>11</sup> [WAREG \(2020\). 'Water Sector Challenges in the Western Balkans – Editorial'.](#)
- <sup>12</sup> [World Health Organisation \(2023\). 'Drinking water'.](#)
- <sup>13</sup> [World Health Organisation. 'Water and sanitation'.](#)
- <sup>14</sup> [World Health Organisation \(2024\). 'Progress on Transboundary Water Cooperation'.](#)
- <sup>15</sup> **SDG 6** aims to ensure the availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. Through entities like UN-Water, the organisation coordinates efforts to monitor water resources, promote access to clean water, and support international cooperation on transboundary water management.
- <sup>16</sup> [European Environmental Agency \(2024\). 'Biodiversity: state of habitats and species'.](#)
- <sup>17</sup> [European Waters \(2024\). 'Under the Surface'.](#)
- <sup>18</sup> **Directorate-General for Environment (DG ENV):** European Commission's department for development and delivery of environmental policy that protects, preserves and improves the environment for present and future generations while promoting sustainable development.
- <sup>19</sup> **“WaterWiseEU”** is a campaign by the European Commission, bringing Europeans together to See Water Differently.
- <sup>20</sup> The **energy label** has been a key driver for helping consumers choose more energy efficient products.
- <sup>21</sup> The **EU AI Act** sets out a clear set of risk-based rules for AI developers and deployers regarding specific uses of AI.
- <sup>22</sup> **Aquifer management** is the process of planning, implementing, and monitoring activities to sustainably manage and protect groundwater resources contained in aquifers.
- <sup>23</sup> **Internet of Things irrigation sensors** test water quality and alert farmers to issues, ensuring that irrigation water is suitable for crops.

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<sup>24</sup> **Agroforestry** is the intentional integration of trees and shrubs into crop and animal farming systems to create environmental, economic, and social benefits.

<sup>25</sup> The **European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF)**: It supports Member States and accession countries by offering financial support after severe natural disasters and, since 2020, major health emergencies.

<sup>26</sup> **Managed Aquifer Recharge** enhances and sustains natural groundwater recharge.

<sup>27</sup> **Aquifer storage and recovery** is the practice of storing water in a suitable aquifer through a well when water is available and recovering the water from the same aquifer when it is needed.

<sup>28</sup> The **Membrane Process Technology** group focuses on the design, development and optimization of membrane-based separation processes.

<sup>29</sup> The **biosand Filter** is a proven technology, which removes pathogens such as bacteria, protozoa and helminth.

<sup>30</sup> **Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW)**: European Commission's department that works to support an open, seamless and resilient Single Market, with open borders and free flow of goods and services.

<sup>31</sup> **Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI)**: European Commission's department responsible for EU policy on agriculture and rural development and deals with all aspects of the common agricultural policy (CAP).

# LIBE II

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs II

**Topic title:** Free and Fair? Election interference is a growing concern for the health of European democracies, with elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania having recently seen credible allegations of meddling by foreign actors, especially Russia, and even accusations towards the platform TikTok. What steps should the EU take to ensure European electorates are not manipulated by external influence, and that democratic exercises are free of foreign interference?

**Submitted by:** Cristina Alcover (UK), Carolina Dias (PT), Jimena García del Poyo Santos (ES), Alex Georgiev (BG), Sylvia Houdek (SE), Rosa Karlsen (NO), Jasna Kojić (RS), Nikolaos Lagios (GR), Seány Mac Suibhne (IE), Suvanto Oula (FI), Nuša Strašek (HR), Peteris Vitolis (LV), submitted by Oisín McGinley, Chairperson (IE)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to ensure that European elections are fair, democratic and free of external interference. It seeks to counter foreign interference, media manipulation, and cyber threats, while promoting media literacy, critical thinking, and access to accurate, diverse information. Through supporting Member States and enhancing cooperation with external actors, the EYP is committed to ensuring fair, democratic electoral processes protecting citizens from disinformation<sup>1</sup> and undue influence,

### because

It is vital for the health of European democracy that voters have access to accurate information placed in its full context<sup>2</sup>,

There is greater public susceptibility to bias due to the homogeneity of the current media landscape and ownership<sup>3</sup>,

There has been an increase in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) leading to public distrust in these institutions,

Threats posed to the European institutional cybersecurity systems have increased by 33% in 2021<sup>4</sup> alone, jeopardising European citizens' trusts in electoral processes,

Russia has increasingly attempted to target European Elections<sup>5</sup>, with Moldovan Security Services estimating that Russia has spent approximately €100,000,000<sup>6</sup> in an effort to undermine its recent legislative elections in October 2024,

Citizens' lack of media literacy<sup>7</sup> and critical thinking skills hinders their ability to understand and engage with social and political issues, reducing civic participation and makes people more vulnerable and susceptible to disinformation,

Fabricated and exaggerated stories attract more attention<sup>8</sup> and engagement on social media than real stories, providing profit-motivated social media companies with little incentive to act upon misinformation<sup>9</sup>,

81% of European citizens<sup>10</sup> believe the rapidly growing misrepresentation of reality in news outlets and social media is a significant threat to democracy,

Propaganda and misinformation spread by media outlets [contributes to](#)<sup>11</sup> citizens losing trust in democracy and electoral systems,

Tech companies can shape electoral direction and potentially arbitrate electoral integrity<sup>12</sup> due to the rapid spread of information on their respective platforms,

Foreign states utilise troll farms<sup>13</sup> to deliberately exploit political division and polarise European countries for their own strategic and political gain, often facing little to no consequences,

Despite the prevalence of AI deep fakes<sup>14</sup>, there is a lack of regulations<sup>15</sup> on AI-generated content in social media;

**by**

1. Encourages national EU offices to include information about ongoing foreign interference campaigns in their current EU-focused outreach projects;
2. Calls upon the Directorate-General for Communication ([DG COMM](#)) to organise official EU media literacy and information campaigns through various platforms;
3. Urges the European Commission to allocate more resources to the special committee concerning election interference ([ING 2](#));
4. Designates the European External Action Service ([EEAS](#)) to incentivise knowledge-sharing between private and public entities with regards to foreign threat-related cybersecurity matters;
5. Calls upon the European Commission to revise the Directive on Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity Across the Union (NIS2 Directive) and the Digital Services Act to include specific AI-related measures;

6. Urges the European Commission to revise the mandate of European Union Agency for Cybersecurity ([ENISA](#)) to strengthen its role in unifying cybersecurity and cyberattack laws across Member States;
7. Encourages Member States to organise and conduct seminars ran in third spaces<sup>16</sup> for the community, aimed at equipping participants with the skills to critically evaluate and verify information sources;
8. Appreciates the efforts of the Ambassador Schools Programme ([EPAS](#))<sup>17</sup> to incorporate comprehensive instructions on citizens' rights and the electoral process into the education curricula of Member States;
9. Urges the Directorate-General for Digital Services ([DIGIT](#)) to support Member States in creating voting advice applications and other digital service tools to help voters compare their policy preferences on major issues with the positions of political parties and candidates;
10. Authorises upon the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training ([CEDEFOP](#)) to develop an accredited course for politicians and political institution staff focused on cybersecurity and protection against digital threats;
11. Calls upon the European Commission to increase funding and grants to independent media organizations under the three existing funding opportunities outlined in the [CulturEU](#) funding guide;
12. Endorses European Digital Media Observatory to further its capacity to protect the digital information environment by:
  - a. collating labeling systems which assess the extent of the trustworthiness of articles based on how well-sourced they are,
  - b. fostering search engine optimisation which promotes well sourced news sites<sup>18</sup>;
13. Encourages the European Fact-Checking Standards Network ([EFCSN](#)) to create a universal crowdsourcing and fact-checking tool for social media platforms and traditional news outlets;
14. Calls upon the EEAS to enforce legal sanctions for countries that have credibly been found culpable of external interference in EU politics.

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<sup>1</sup> **Disinformation:** Disinformation is false or misleading content that is spread with an intention to deceive or secure economic or political gain, and which may cause public harm.

<sup>2</sup> [European Parliament Research Service, \(2024,1,12\), "Information integrity online and the European democracy shield"](#)

<sup>3</sup> [Horizon 2020, \(2021,1,9\), "The Political Economy of Media Bias"](#)

<sup>4</sup> [IBM, \(2022.1.12.\) "IBM Security X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2022 Full Report"](#)

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<sup>5</sup> [European Parliament, \(2024.25.4\), “New allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union”](#)

<sup>6</sup> [European Parliament, \(2024.9.10\), “Parliament condemns Russia’s interference in Moldova”](#)

<sup>7</sup> [Networking European Civic Education, \(2024.1.4\), “European voices: Survey on future trends in civic education”](#)

<sup>8</sup> [Massachusetts Institute of Technology, \(2018.3.8\), “Study: On Twitter, false news travels faster than true stories”](#)

<sup>9</sup> **Misinformation:** Misinformation is false or misleading content shared without harmful intent though the effects can be still harmful.

<sup>10</sup> [Zbigniew Gniatkowski, \(2023.14.11\), “Challenges in times of disinformation. The EU's measures to tackle it”](#)

<sup>11</sup> [European Economic Social Committee, \(2023.24.11\), “Disinformation and lack of interest are the main reasons for poor voter turnout in European elections”](#)

<sup>12</sup> [European Parliament, \(2021.1.4\), “The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world”](#)

<sup>13</sup> **Troll Farms:** A troll factory is an entity conducting disinformation propaganda activities on the Internet.

<sup>14</sup> **Deep fakes:** Deep fake means AI-generated or manipulated image, audio or video content that resembles existing persons, objects, places, entities or events and would falsely appear to a person to be authentic or truthful.

<sup>15</sup> [European Council on Foreign Relations, \(2025.17.02\), “Regulate or stagnate: Why the EU must lead on AI”](#)

<sup>16</sup> **Third spaces:** A space for informal, free social interaction, essential to democracy.

<sup>17</sup> **The Ambassador Schools Programme:** Aims at increasing students’ awareness of European parliamentary democracy and the role of the European Parliament and European values.

<sup>18</sup> **Search Engine Optimisation:** Search engine optimisation (SEO) is the art and science of ensuring that search engines such as Google, Yahoo and Bing, recommend a website to users as the best solution to their problem.

# SEDE I

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Security and Defense I

**Cutting the Cord:** Recent incidents in the Baltic Sea in 2023 and 2024 have seen undersea telecommunication cables, which carry over 95% of the world's data traffic, as well as the crucial Balticconnector gas pipeline be damaged by passing transport ships, sparking accusations of intentional sabotage and hybrid warfare efforts by China or Russia. What action should the EU take to ensure the integrity of its infrastructure, and limit the impact of hostile actions on its economy and security?

### Submitted by:

Aidan Abaspahić (BH), Fedor Artiushenko (DE), Paola Cosentino (IT), Pedro Costa (PT), Salem Frost-Rendon (ES), Nick Louroutziatis (CY), Alexander Nielsen (SE), Tommy Nygren (FI), Ulkar Suleymanli (AZ), Maja Tho Hartvigsen (NO), Arda Yenigün (TR), Kateryna Zynych (UA), Ella Hagberg (Chairperson, SE)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to protect the integrity of European submarine energy and telecommunication infrastructure in the Baltic region. It aims to diminish the impact that any potential sabotage or disruption would have upon these systems and establish contingencies for situations where the infrastructure currently in place fails. Finally, it intends to increase cooperation between Member States to improve energy resilience and security,

### because

Recent geopolitical tensions<sup>1</sup> amplify the need for the EU to act and protect the territorial integrity of its Member States and their current and future investments<sup>2</sup>,

There is an exceptional rise in accidents and suspicion of sabotage<sup>3</sup>, sending which sends a signal to external partners that the EU lacks the initiative mobility to protect its critical infrastructure,

Different national policies and the absence of a unified regulatory regime between Member States lead to uncoordinated responses to undersea infrastructure threats,<sup>4</sup>

The economic disparities between Member States make it challenging<sup>5</sup> to achieve consensus on policies for undersea infrastructure protection,



Recent incidents have damaged vital maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, with the private sector being reluctant to cooperate<sup>6</sup> with the EU on repairs,

Advanced monitoring and repair methods for maritime infrastructure demand significant and sustained capital investment,<sup>7</sup>

Some Member States are reliant on the power and gas<sup>8</sup> flowing through undersea pipes and cables,

The damage to undersea infrastructure caused by recent intentional and accidental incidents has increased energy prices<sup>9</sup> in Nordic-Baltic Eight Plus countries<sup>10</sup> affecting their economic stability,

Undersea cable failures can lead have led to sustained and widespread total collapse of internet connectivity, leading to outages of various critical infrastructures for an average of over 2 weeks<sup>11 12</sup>;

by

1. Asks the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to revise Article 113<sup>13</sup> of The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to include clear offence definitions, standardised penalties, and enforcement protocols in both territorial and international waters for damage to undersea infrastructure;
2. Encourages the Nordic-Baltic Eight Plus countries to share information regarding surveillance of vessels in areas of repeat offenses and willful suspicious activities;
3. Invites Member States to flag potential security threats by deploying Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DASs)<sup>14</sup> systems along Baltic regions;
4. Suggests the Swedish Government set up a base of operations in Gotland<sup>15</sup>, hosting a repair fleet for rapid responses in case of incidents damaging gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea;
5. Commends the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for ensuring the ability to respond to destabilising acts by maintaining a military presence in the Baltic Sea over the Baltic Sentry mission<sup>16</sup>;
6. Encourages the Directorate-General for Budget (DG BUDG) to partially allocate the Horizon Europe fund to research and development in acoustic sonar technology and underwater vehicles;
7. Requests the European Defense Agency (EDA) to increase the monitoring of critical energy and telecommunications infrastructure by obtaining high-resolution imagery from defence satellite constellations;
8. Requests the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to:
  - a. monitor and track vessel speeds over undersea cables and pipelines,
  - b. provide data relevant for investigations by using SafeSeaNet<sup>17</sup> and The Copernicus Maritime Surveillance;<sup>18</sup>

9. Asks the Nordic-Eight Plus countries to develop contingency plans to ensure the deterrence of future anomalous behaviour;
10. Urges the DG BUDG to allocate the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)<sup>19</sup> to the protection of infrastructure technology;
11. Calls upon the Directorate-General for Energy to assist in the creation of redundancies<sup>20</sup>:
  - a. within strategic communication networks via satellites in cooperation with the Space Traffic Management (STM),
  - b. by developing additional pipeline and cable infrastructure.

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<sup>1</sup> [Tim Zadorozhnyy \(2025\) "US considering withdrawing 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe, NBC News reports"](#)

<sup>2</sup> [European Parliament \(2025\) "Defence: how the EU is boosting its security"](#)

<sup>3</sup> [Elisabeth Braw \(2024\) "Stakes Rise in Baltic 'Sabotage'" Standoff](#)

<sup>4</sup> [Sophia Besch, Erik Brown \(2024\) "Securing Europe's Subsea Data Cables"](#)

<sup>5</sup> [Christian Bueger, Tobias Liebtrau, Jonas Franken \(2022\) "Security threats to undersea communications](#)

<sup>6</sup> Christian Bueger, Tobias Liebtrau, Jonas Franken (2022) "Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU"

<sup>7</sup> [Directorate-General for Energy \(2023\) "The Commission provides emergency funding to Finland in relation to the damage of the Balticconnector pipeline"](#)

<sup>8</sup> [European Council \(2025\) "Where does the EU's gas come from?"](#)

<sup>9</sup> [Baltic Wind \(2025\) "Damage to EstLink 2 cable raises energy prices in Baltic countries"](#)

<sup>10</sup> **The Nordic-Baltic Eight Plus Countries:** Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Poland, Finland, and Sweden.

<sup>11</sup> Christian Bueger, Tobias Liebtrau, Jonas Franken (2022) "Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU"

<sup>12</sup> **Economic stability:** minimal sudden changes in financial conditions.

<sup>13</sup> **Article 113 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea:** Prohibits breaking or injury of a submarine cable or pipeline.

<sup>14</sup> **Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DASs):** Technique that allows continuous measurements of the strain along a fiber-optic cable produced, among other possible phenomena, by the seismic wave field.

<sup>15</sup> **Gotland:** Swedish island in the Baltic Sea with strategic military importance.

<sup>16</sup> **The Baltic Sentry mission:** NATO initiative enhancing NATO's military presence in the Baltic Sea.

<sup>17</sup> **SafeSeaNet:** Vessel traffic monitoring and information system.

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<sup>18</sup> **The Copernicus Maritime Surveillance:** provides satellite images and value adding products to monitor activities at sea.

<sup>19</sup> **European Regional Development Fund (EDRF):** EU fund providing funding through national or regional programmes, to public and private bodies in all EU regions.

<sup>20</sup> **Redundancy:** Create duplicates of critical systems or IT systems to ensure alternative sources are always available.

# ECON

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

**Head in the Clouds:** As cloud computing becomes an increasingly indispensable tool of government and business, the cloud infrastructure market is currently dominated by US providers such as Amazon and Microsoft, sparking provider dependency, data protection, and national security concerns. How can the EU and its Member States act to ensure strategic autonomy for European cloud infrastructure, limit external dependencies, and ensure data sovereignty that ensures high-performing cloud computing capabilities for its governments and businesses?

### Submitted by:

Alexander Aldershoff (BE), Mario Escudero Almagro (ES), Petar Kamenov (BG), Julia Makrynioti (DE), Srushti Mehra (SE), Hrach Mnatsakanyan (AM), Ben Moloney (IE), Anastasia Schoonderwoerd (NL), Milan Stojković (RS), Rudrakshi Wangoo (FI), Elena Stunda (Chairperson, NL)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to reduce over-dependency on non-EU-based cloud computing companies, whilst promoting the competitiveness of European cloud computing companies in the global market and creating a more unified and deregulated framework within the EU, improving interoperability and cooperation across Member States. It aims to encourage greater public-private partnerships and foster public investment in critical digital infrastructure to stimulate innovation and development. It seeks to enhance cybersecurity resilience and ensure that data remains under EU jurisdiction by strengthening data sovereignty and protecting privacy,

### because

The fragmentation<sup>1</sup> of the European cloud computing market leads to<sup>2</sup> a lack of interoperability and stagnates progress,

Divergence in rulings<sup>3</sup> amongst Member States is creating a lack of mutual ground<sup>4</sup> for efficient implementation of digital regulation in Europe,

US-based services dominate 72%<sup>5</sup> of the cloud market, hindering the possibility<sup>6</sup> of fair competition for the EU,

The US CLOUD Act<sup>7</sup> allows American authorities to access personal data<sup>8</sup> stored abroad by US companies,

The US is responsible for 65% of investments<sup>9</sup> in cloud computing, further exacerbating fair competition and hindering the timely creation of sufficient EU competitors,

The EU does not invest sufficiently<sup>10</sup> in local European cloud alternatives, further permitting a US-centralised market,

The fragmentation<sup>11</sup> of legal frameworks concerning the GDPR<sup>12</sup> and European Data Act<sup>13</sup> is hindering its ability to establish secure and competitive cloud solutions, The EU's dependence<sup>14</sup> on US providers increases its vulnerability leaving the EU without a clear alternative,

Issues<sup>15</sup> such as high costs, security and compliance concerns, and prolonged migration time, lead to IT decision-makers not opting for public clouds,

European cloud providers lack compelling incentives<sup>16</sup> to attract businesses away from dominant US platforms;

**by**

- 1.** Calls upon the European Commission to continue the EU Cloud Rulebook initiative<sup>17</sup> in order to:
  - a.** standardise digital regulations,
  - b.** align Member States' cloud policies and technical interoperability protocols,
  - c.** develop comprehensive legislation on data security,
  - d.** reduce inefficiency regarding divergent rulings;
- 2.** Instructs the European Commission to enhance public-private partnerships, such as Gaia-X,<sup>18</sup> with EU-based companies to build domestic alternatives and autonomous digital infrastructure, by:
  - a.** increasing investment in EU-led cloud infrastructure to boost innovation, scale, and digital sovereignty,
  - b.** encouraging the adoption of EU cloud services in public operations and key sectors to drive demand and lasting impact;
- 3.** Calls upon the European Investment Bank to increase investments in the local European cloud infrastructure initiatives through IPSEI-CIS;<sup>19</sup>

4. Urges the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) to develop a marketing strategy, raising awareness on the meaning and importance of ENISA certification;<sup>20</sup>
5. Calls upon the the European Commission to sponsor an annual European summit on cloud computing in order to:
  - a. foster cooperation between Member States and businesses,
  - b. enable cooperative innovation,
  - c. create accessible education for the public;
6. Urges the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT) to further increase funding for cloud computing initiatives such as GAIA-X;
7. Further urges DG CONNECT to continue research and expand on the EU's Digital Single Market<sup>21</sup> strategy, ensuring more innovation and efficient cooperation between Member States;
8. Calls upon DG CONNECT to enhance the efficiency and use of existing EU-based cloud providers by making access to these providers easier.

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<sup>1</sup> [Mark Scott and Francesco Bonfiglio \(2024\). "Why Europe's Cloud Ambitions Have Failed"](#).

<sup>2</sup> [Sluijs, Larouche, Sauter \(2012\). "Cloud Computing in the EU Policy Sphere"](#).

<sup>3</sup> [Sebastião Barros Vale \(2022\). "Diverging Fining Policies of European DPAs: Is There Room for Coherent Enforcement of the GDPR?"](#).

<sup>4</sup> [Alexander Lee \(2023\). "What the divergent EU and U.K. rulings say about the future of the Microsoft-Activision Blizzard merger"](#).

<sup>5</sup> [Consultancy.eu \(2024\). European IaaS and PaaS cloud market to double by 2028.](#)

<sup>6</sup> [ZEW \(2021\). "Lack of Digital Sovereignty Threatens Competitiveness of German Companies"](#).

<sup>7</sup> **The US Cloud Act** allows US law enforcement agencies to compel technology companies to provide data stored on their servers, regardless of whether the data is located within the US or abroad. It also enables the US to establish bilateral agreements with foreign governments, facilitating reciprocal access to electronic information for law enforcement purposes.

<sup>8</sup> [Michael Goldner \(2024\). How the CLOUD Act Challenges GDPR Compliance for EU Businesses.](#)

<sup>9</sup> [Mary Zhang. Top 10 Cloud Service Providers Globally in 2024.](#)

<sup>10</sup> [Bauer, Erixon, Pandya \(2024\). "The EU's Trillion Dollar Gap in ICT and Cloud Computing Capacities: The Case for a New Approach to Cloud Policy"](#).

<sup>11</sup> [CEE Digital Coalition \(2023\). "Fragmentation of the regulations and insufficient competences among the potential users, remain the main obstacles to deploying cloud solutions"](#).

<sup>12</sup> **The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)** is a comprehensive EU law that governs the processing of personal data, aiming to enhance individuals' control over their personal information. It imposes strict

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obligations on organisations worldwide that handle data of EU residents, with non-compliance resulting in significant fines.

<sup>13</sup> **The Data Act** aims to enhance data accessibility and establish clear rules on who can access and use data across all economic sectors within the EU. It clarifies data usage rights, promotes equitable data sharing, and facilitates public sector access to private sector data for public interest purposes.

<sup>14</sup> [The European Commission \(2024\). The future of European competitiveness \(Page 72\).](#)

<sup>15</sup> [Ella Hutchinson \(2024\). “Over 67% of IT decision-makers now blend public cloud with on-premise solutions”.](#)

<sup>16</sup> [Andrew Wooden \(2022\). “European cloud players face declining market share as US hyperscalers clean up”.](#)

<sup>17</sup> **The EU Cloud Rulebook** aims to establish a unified framework of binding and non-binding rules for cloud service users and providers in Europe, enhancing legal certainty and promoting cloud adoption. It includes guidelines for public procurement of data processing services, offering recommendations and essential criteria for public sector bodies during tendering processes. This initiative supports the development of secure, sustainable, and interoperable cloud infrastructures

<sup>18</sup> **Gaia-X** is an initiative to develop a federated, secure data infrastructure for Europe, promoting data sharing while ensuring users retain control over their data. It aims to foster innovation and competitiveness among European companies by reducing dependence on non-European cloud providers and aligning with European values of transparency, openness, data protection, and security.

<sup>19</sup> **The Important Project of Common European Interest on Cloud Infrastructure and Services (IPCEI-CIS)** is a European initiative aimed at developing a next-generation cloud and edge computing ecosystem to enhance Europe's digital sovereignty. IPCEI-CIS focuses on creating an interoperable and openly accessible European data processing ecosystem, known as the cloud-edge continuum.

<sup>20</sup> **ENISA certifications** are cybersecurity certification schemes developed by ENISA to ensure that ICT products, services, and processes meet EU security standards. They are important because they foster trust, reduce fragmentation across the EU, and provide a clear and consistent framework for ensuring the security of digital technologies.

<sup>21</sup> **The Digital Single Market strategy** aims to ensure that the EU's economy, industry, and society fully benefit from the digital age by creating a free and secure digital environment for consumers and businesses across the EU. Key achievements include ending roaming charges, modernising data protection, enabling cross-border portability of online content, and removing unjustified geo-blocking to enhance e-commerce.

## Motion for a Resolution by the Committee on Legal Affairs

**Parents without borders:** It is estimated that around two million children in the EU may face a situation where their parents are not legally recognised as their guardians when traveling within all EU Member States, thus going against the EU children's rights. With countries having different ideas and laws on the recognition of parenthood, what should European states do to ensure the rights and safety of rainbow families across Europe?

**Submitted by:** Vyacheslav Bakanov (CY), Kylo Bhandari (LU), Guilherme Catela (PT), Rosanagh de Mestre (UK), Roko Guberović (HR), Yasmin Mahmmod (NL), Constance Matteï (FR), Mariela Rangelova (BG), Tina Reksce (LV), Iida Särkkä (FI), Deniz Yatağanbaba (TR), Anna Maëlle Zbinden (CH), George Vagias (Chairperson, GR)

**The European Youth Parliament aims** to safeguard the safety and security of rainbow families<sup>1</sup> when crossing EU borders by harmonising EU legislation, whilst also respecting national sovereignty over Family Law<sup>2</sup>. It strives to reaffirm their right to freedom of movement, as well as eliminate discrimination and prejudice against members of the LGBTQIA+<sup>3</sup> community. Furthermore, it takes steps towards establishing a common definition of parenthood and guardianship, in order to safeguard the rights of children. Lastly, it strives to overcome barriers to family creation, by increasing access to Artificial Reproductive Technologies (ARTs)<sup>4</sup> and step-<sup>5</sup> or joint- adoption<sup>6</sup> for all LGBTQIA+ individuals,

### because

There is a lack of consistent LGBTQIA+ parenthood recognition across the EU<sup>7</sup>,

Currently an estimated two million children<sup>8</sup> are at risk of long-term familial separation when travelling from one Member State to another,

Even though discrimination against LGBTQIA+ individuals is prohibited under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 53% of LGBTQIA+ individual report experiences of harassment or violence<sup>9</sup> due to their sexual orientation and/or gender identity,



The absence of a uniform recognition of parental status for LGBTQIA+ couples across the EU puts their children at risk of statelessness<sup>10</sup> and/or family separation when relocating within the Union, thus undermining their fundamental rights as inscribed in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)<sup>11</sup>,

Although an estimated 30,000 transgender individuals live in the EU, only five Member States legally recognize transgender parenthood<sup>12</sup>,

LGBTQIA+ marriage is neither legally recognized nor protected in 9 Member States<sup>13</sup>,

Rainbow families face limited recognition and a lack of documentation<sup>14</sup> when travelling across Member States, preventing them from exercising their right to freedom of movement<sup>15</sup>, right to residence<sup>16</sup>, and restricting their career opportunities;

Numerous Member States have not introduced sufficient regulations to ensure the automatic recognition of parenthood for same-sex couples<sup>17</sup> in marriage or a civil union, regarding cases in which only one of the partners is the biological parent of the child,

A potential separation of rainbow families during cross-border relocation can lead to significant emotional distress<sup>18</sup> and potentially even result in long-term psychological harm,

The development of mutually-accepted definitions of marriage, parenthood, and partnerships is hindered<sup>19</sup> by divergent social, cultural, and religious norms or outlooks on members of the LGBTQIA+ community across the EU,

The implementation of Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU<sup>20</sup>), remains inconsistent<sup>21</sup> across EU Member States,

As family law remains under the jurisdiction of each Member State, the implementation of relevant decisions<sup>22</sup> by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the recognition of birth, marriage, and civil partnership certificates across the EU has been either delayed or limited<sup>23</sup> in several Member States,

LGBTQIA+ couples encounter substantial legal obstacles, as well as a limited amount of options, regarding family formation within the EU since:

- access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) is not guaranteed across all Member States<sup>24</sup>,
- surrogacy is prohibited in most European countries<sup>25</sup>, on the basis of national legislation aimed at preventing the commercialization of the human body;

In many Member States LGBTQIA+ parents and their children have restricted access to essential social services<sup>26</sup>,

Member States where public education on LGBTQIA+ issues remains limited often exhibit greater resistance to LGBTQIA+ inclusion, which is reflected in conservative legislation and higher reported levels of discrimination<sup>27</sup>,

by

1. Encourages the Directorate General on Justice and Consumers (DG-JUST) to create an EU-wide legal framework regarding the recognition of parenthood that:
  - a. provides principles in the definition of parenthood,
  - b. incorporates relevant CJEU decisions<sup>28</sup>;
2. Suggests the European Commission to revise its non-adopted 2022 proposal<sup>29</sup> on the introduction of a European Certificate of Parenthood by drafting an EU Certificate of Guardianship affirming the role of a guardian and serving as a form of legal recognition across all Member States;
3. Invites Member States to collaborate with the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe) in launching educational campaigns in countries where societal attitudes toward LGBTQIA+ individuals are predominantly negative;
4. Urges Member States to allow for transgender individuals to change their registered gender on both their own and their child's documentation by establishing regulations similar to those of Denmark<sup>30</sup>;
5. Asks the European Commission to draft a proposal for a directive ensuring the automatic recognition of parenthood or guardianship for the non-biological parent in a same-sex union, regardless of the manner of the child's conception;
6. Requests the European Council to propose an amendment to the Directive on Free Movement that encompasses the right to freedom of movement for rainbow families;
7. Invites the European Commission to assist the Network of European LGBTIQ Families Associations (NELFA) in supporting rainbow families facing potential separation due to their relocation within the EU through:
  - a. providing adequate and easily accessible legal advice for rainbow families that are considering travelling or migrating across different EU states,
  - b. introducing psychological support groups, facilitated by mental health professionals, across the EU for victims of familial separation;
8. Asking DG-JUST to incorporate an inclusive definition of parenthood within its recommendations, outlining the necessary caretaking and obligations of a parent towards a child regardless of gender or biological links;
9. Strongly urges Member States to fully recognise and acknowledge LGBTQIA+ couples wishing to engage in a marriage or civil union by legalising same-sex civil partnerships or marriages;

10. Calls upon the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) to collaborate with ILGA-Europe in introducing a support strategy aimed at monitoring and aiding the complete implementation of the Council's directives combating discrimination within Member States;
11. Directs the European Commission to encourage the compliance of Member States towards their obligation of incorporating CJEU rulings into national legislature by pursuing legal action and introducing financial sanctions in cases of non-compliance;
12. Invites Member States to gradually harmonise their national frameworks on step- and joint-adoption by LGBTQIA+ individuals including the recognition of adoption certificates established in other countries;
13. Encourages the Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety (DG-SANTE) to support access to ARTs for all families by:
  - a. financially aiding couples considering their use to create a family,
  - b. introducing regulations pertaining to the legal obligations and ties between surrogates, guardians, and the child;
14. Recommends Member States to introduce inclusive legislation ensuring that personal information regarding one's sexuality and gender identity is neither mandatory nor a basis to bar individuals from accessing ARTs;
15. Invites Member States to implement the guidance set out in Directive (EU) 2019/1158<sup>31</sup> regarding the establishment of a non-gender specific system of parental leave;
16. Urges the European Commission to renew its dedication to safeguarding the right to freedom of movement for rainbow families within the EU in its updated LGBTIQ Equality Strategy post-2025<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> **Rainbow families**, as defined by the EU, are family units in which one or more of a child's parents are members of the LGBTQ+ community, including same-sex parents (among others).

<sup>2</sup> **Family Law** (also called matrimonial law or the law of domestic relations) is an area of the law that deals with family matters and domestic relations, including marriage, divorce, and the treatment of children, among others.

<sup>3</sup> The **LGBTQIA+ acronym** stands for 'lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex, and asexual, with the (+) sign representing anyone whose identity may not be included'.

<sup>4</sup> **Assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs)** include medical procedures used primarily to deal with infertility, but can also be used by same-sex couples in order to create a family.

<sup>5</sup> **Step adoption** describes the process in which a step-parent adopts the child of their current spouse. In LGBTQIA+ couples, one of the partners adopts the child at first (Single Adoption) with the other one becoming its step-parent legally later on.

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<sup>6</sup> **Joint adoption** allows both partners to become the legal guardians of a child and equally share the responsibility of its upbringing. In some Member States, LGBTQIA+ couples are required to be married in order to jointly adopt a child.

<sup>7</sup> [Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs \(2021\). 'Obstacles to the Free Movement of Rainbow Families in the EU'.](#)

<sup>8</sup> [The European Parliament \(2020\). 'Recognition of parenthood in the EU: no discrimination against children's rights'.](#)

<sup>9</sup> [European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights \(2020\). 'A long way to go for LGBTI equality'.](#)

<sup>10</sup> [United Nations. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons](#)

<sup>11</sup> [United Nations. Convention on the Rights of the Child.](#)

<sup>12</sup> [Ilga-Europe \(2024\). 'Family - Rainbow Map'](#)

<sup>13</sup> [Your Europe \(2025\). 'Registered partnerships'](#)

<sup>14</sup> [Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs \(2021\). 'Obstacles to the Free Movement of Rainbow Families in the EU'.](#)

<sup>15</sup> [EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 45 - Freedom of movement and of residence.](#)

<sup>16</sup> [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Part Two - Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union - Article 21 \(ex Article 18 TEC\).](#)

<sup>17</sup> [Ilga-Europe \(2024\). 'Family - Rainbow Map'.](#)

<sup>18</sup> [Valeria Coscini \(2024\). 'Parenting Discrimination and Children's Rights in lgbtqia+ Families: A Review of International Human Rights Decisions'](#)

<sup>19</sup> [ILGA-Europe \(2024\). 'Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in Europe and Central Asia'.](#)

<sup>20</sup> **Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union** grants the Council the authority to take action against discrimination based on factors such as sexual orientation or gender identity

<sup>21</sup> [The European Commission \(2021\). '2021 Annual Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights'.](#)

<sup>22</sup> [Court of Justice of the EU \(2021\). 'Press Release No 221/21'.](#)

<sup>23</sup> [Court of Justice of the EU \(2025\). 'Press Release No 43/25'.](#)

<sup>24</sup> [Leibetseder, Doris \(2018\). Queer and trans access to assisted reproductive technologies: A comparison of three EU-States, Poland, Spain and Sweden.](#)

<sup>25</sup> [Brandão Pedro & Garrido Nicolas \(2022\). 'Commercial Surrogacy: An Overview'](#)

<sup>26</sup> [European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights \(2020\). 'A long way to go for LGBTI equality'.](#)

<sup>27</sup> [European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights \(2020\). 'A long way to go for LGBTI equality'.](#)

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<sup>28</sup> [Alina Tryfonidou \(2021\). ‘The Cross-Border Recognition of the Parent-Child Relationship in Rainbow Families under EU Law: A Critical View of the ECJ’s V.M.A. ruling’.](#)

<sup>29</sup> [The European Commission \(2022\). ‘Recognition of parenthood between Member States’.](#)

<sup>30</sup> [LGBT komiteen \(2022\). ‘Improved family law on home insemination and trans parents’.](#)

<sup>31</sup> [Directive \(EU\) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU.](#)

<sup>32</sup> [Ursula von der Leyen \(2024\). ‘Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029’](#)





# THE HAGUE 2025

101<sup>st</sup> INTERNATIONAL SESSION

EUROPEAN YOUTH PARLIAMENT


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The Schwarzkopf Foundation is the international umbrella organisation of the European Youth Parliament (EYP), EYP the Netherlands is a National Committee in the EYP Network.