



Resolution Booklet



EUROPEAN YOUTH PARLIAMENT

DUBLIN BELFAST
2016

81st International Session of the European Youth Parliament



Programme of the General Assembly

Friday 11th March

09:00 – 09:30	Opening of General Assembly
09:30 – 10:20	The Committee on Legal Affairs
10:20 – 11:10	The Committee on Culture and Education
11:10 – 11:30	Coffee Break
11:30 – 12:20	The Committee on Economic & Monetary Affairs I
12:20 – 13:10	The Committee on Constitutional Affairs I
13:10 – 14:00	Lunch
14:00 – 14:50	The Committee on Foreign Affairs II
14:50 – 15:40	The Committee on the Environment, Public Health & Food Safety
15:40 – 16:00	Coffee Break
16:00 – 16:50	The Committee on Transport and Tourism
16:50 – 17:40	The Committee on Foreign Affairs I

Saturday 12th March

09:00 – 09:50	The Committee on Security and Defence
09:50 – 10:40	The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs II
10:40 – 11:00	Coffee Break
11:00 – 11:50	The Committee on Development
11:50 – 12:40	The Committee on Human Rights
12:40 – 13:30	Lunch
13:30 – 14:20	The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs II
14:20 – 15:10	The Committee on Constitutional Affairs II
15:10 – 15:30	Coffee Break
15:30 – 16:20	The Committee on Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs I
16:30 – 17:30	Closing Ceremony

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GA Procedure

- an overview



Beginning of debate

The Board announces the name and topic of the Proposing Committee.

Friendly Amendments

The Board reads out any amendments by the proposing committee.

Reading of OC Clauses

A member of the proposing committee reads the operative clauses.



Response to Attack Speeches (1.5 minutes)

A member of the proposing committee responds to attack speeches.

Attack Speeches (2 minutes each)

Members of other committees deliver attack speeches.

Defence Speech (3 minutes)

A member of the proposing committee delivers the defence speech.



Open Debate

The assembly debates the resolution. The proposing committee typically gets three turns of 1-1.5 minutes each to respond to points. Each committee gets one direct response per debate.

Summation Speech

After the last round of points during the open debate, one or two members of the proposing committee deliver a summation speech.

Voting Procedure

The assembly votes on the motion for a resolution. A delegate can vote in favour, against or abstain from voting.

THE END



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS (JURI)

Towards a Digital Single Market: Taking into account the growth opportunities associated with digital technologies, what legislative and regulatory steps should the EU take to adapt the single market to the digital age?

Submitted by:

Erik Ananyan (AM), Tomas Andriuškevičius (LT), Francesco Stefano Carzaniga (IT), Onur Çaycı (TU), Mahaut Estier (CH), Gonçalo Gameiro (PT), Silvia Grothe (ES), Max Lange (DE), Vikash Panjiyar (CY), Mond Parissis (UK), Maria Pokkinen (FI), Luka Potskhishvili (GE), Gard Søderholm (NO), Sterre van Campen (NL), Jean Zacharis (BE), Ilir Kola, Chairperson (AL)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Supports the initiative of the European Commission to achieve a fully functioning Digital Single Market¹ in order to:
 - i. achieve economic growth through businesses and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs),
 - ii. improve consumer and business access to digital goods and services across Europe,
 - iii. boost EU gross domestic product by up to EUR 145 billion²,
- B. Alarmed by restrictions in access to digital content based on the consumer's location within the EU due to practices such as geo-blocking³,
- C. Concerned that the cross-border nature of disputes arising from digital transactions complicate subsequent proceedings due to jurisdictional issues,
- D. Deeply concerned that differing Value Added Tax (VAT) rates in Member States result in:
 - i. unfair competition,
 - ii. higher costs carried by consumers,
 - iii. obstacles to SMEs in offering their services in other Member States,

¹ The **Digital Single Market** is an initiative by the European Commission to ensure the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. The aim is for citizens and businesses to seamlessly and fairly access online goods and services regardless of their nationality and place of residence.

² European Parliament Research Service, *Mapping the cost of Non-Europe, 2014-19, 2015*

³ **Geo-blocking** is the practice of restricting access to Internet content based upon the user's geographical location.



- E. Concerned that excessive bureaucratic processes resulting from Member States' differing VAT regulations cause inefficient use of resources,
 - F. Recognising the lack of interoperability⁴ among parcel delivery operators with regards to cross-border sales,
 - G. Noting with regret the significant difference between cross-border and domestic delivery costs,
 - H. Expressing its appreciation of the EU Data Protection Reform⁵ which includes provisions on issues of importance such as:
 - i. the right to be forgotten⁶,
 - ii. the right to know when one's data has been hacked⁷,
 - iii. the "one continent, one law"⁸ principle,
 - I. Welcoming the application of the regulations under the EU Data Protection Reform to international companies carrying out operations within the EU,
 - J. Noting with dissatisfaction the inability of users to access and use lawfully purchased online content services when traveling to a different Member State,
 - K. Emphasising the importance of the Proposal for a Regulation on ensuring the cross-border portability of online content services⁹,
 - L. Noting with deep concern that differences in Member State procedures for copyright enforcement prevent copyright owners from enjoying their rights to the full extent;
1. Believes that the establishment of a Digital Single Market can be achieved through further harmonisation of legislation among Member States;

E-Commerce

- 2. Asks the European Commission to identify clear enforcement authorities for Article 20 of the Service Directive¹⁰;
- 3. Recommends the use of the Online Dispute Resolution¹¹ platform as an alternative method when dealing with cross-border online sales disputes;

⁴ **Interoperability** is the ability of systems to provide services to and accept services from other systems, as well as use the exchanged services to ensure their effective joint operation.

⁵ **EU Data Protection Reform** (IP/12/46) is a regulation launched by the Commission in 2012 to enable people to better control their personal data. At the same time, modernised rules will allow businesses to make the most of the opportunities offered by the Digital Single Market. The Reform was agreed upon by both the European Parliament and the Council of the EU on December 2015 and now it is going through the implementation stage which is set to be finalised by 2017.

⁶ **The right to be forgotten** is the right of an individual that no longer wants his/her data to be processed to request the data to be deleted, provided that there are no legitimate grounds for retention.

⁷ **The right to know when one's data has been hacked** is the right to be notified as soon as possible in case of data breaches which put individuals at risk.

⁸ **"One continent one law"** implies a single, pan-EU law for data protection, replacing the current inconsistent patchwork of national legislation.

⁹ The **Proposal Regulation on ensuring the cross-border portability of online content services** COM (2015) 627 was published by the European Commission in December 2015. It aims to ensure that subscribers to online content services in the EU can access and use these services in any Member State.

¹⁰ **Article 20 of the Service Directive** from the European Commission is a regulation aiming to avoid companies treating customers differently based on their location. This, however, is currently not efficient enough since there is no clarification on the enforcement authorities.

¹¹ **Online Dispute Resolution** is an alternative dispute resolution procedure conducted entirely online which enables consumers that have a complaint on a good or service purchased by them to resort to this method instead of going to court.



4. Invites the European Commission to make the VAT Mini One-Stop Shop scheme¹² mandatory in cases of cross-border sales;
5. Invites the European Commission to take the necessary steps as outlined in the Communication on data-driven economy¹³ through:
 - a. supporting initiatives such as the European free flow of data¹⁴,
 - b. investing in new technologies which reduce delivery costs;
6. Strongly recommends further collaboration among parcel delivery operators through sharing of best practices and agreements concerning cross-border deliveries;

Data Protection

7. Affirms the importance of the correct and efficient implementation of the EU Data Protection Reform;
8. Calls upon the European Data Protection Supervisor¹⁵ to evaluate and, if needed, review the EU Data Protection Regulation every three years;

Intellectual Property Protection

9. Expresses its conviction that adoption of regulatory proposals ensuring cross-border portability of online content services within the internal market is of utmost importance;
10. Requests the European Commission to initiate legislation to further harmonise copyright regulations, especially on areas such as:
 - a. reproductions made for private and non-commercial use,
 - b. incidental inclusion of another work,
 - c. press reviews and news reporting.

¹² The **VAT Mini One Stop Shop** scheme stipulates that the place of taxation will be determined based on the location of the consumer. It affects the sale of digital services (broadcasting, telecommunications and e-services) by a business to a consumer (private individuals and non-business entities e.g. public authorities or charitable bodies).

¹³ The **Communication on data-driven economy** COM (2014) 442 describes the features of the data-driven economy of the future and sets out operational conclusions to support and accelerate the transition towards it. It also sets out current and future activities in the field of cloud computing.

¹⁴ The **European free flow of data** is an initiative proposed by the EU to allow sharing of public and private datasets.

¹⁵ The job of the **European Data Protection supervisor** is to supervise data protection activities and systems to ensure their compliance with best practices.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION (CULT)

Youth, Peace and Security: In light of the lack of synergy between policies on peace building and youth development, how can the EU develop approaches that will offer meaningful avenues for young people to become a part of efforts to prevent conflict, counter violent extremism and build peace?

Submitted by:

Madina Bakhshaliyeva (AZ), Alexandra Dediu (RO), Helder Faria (PT), Eleonora Di Franco (IT), Sara Huseby (NO), Ketevan Kapanadze (GE), Oğul Mesut Kölçe (TU), Marie Kwon (BE), Panayiotis Leonidou (CY), Ainhoa Rocabert (ES), Renata Rouvinen (FI), Mandelina Sandström (SE), Iren Stepanyan (AM), Mirna Vrdoljak (NL), Juliane Wiedersberg (DE), Niall Murphy, Chairperson (IE).

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Recognises that this generation of young people is the largest the world has ever seen¹,
- B. Alarmed by the fact that youth are disproportionately affected by the consequences of conflict²,
- C. Noting the correlation between youth bulges³ and the risk of conflict and political violence,
- D. Bearing in mind the existence of conflict and post-conflict societies within Europe such as in Northern Ireland and Cyprus,
- E. Aware that since youth can be both vulnerable to radicalisation and open to peace and reconciliation they play a key role in building peaceful societies,
- F. Regretting that the EU lacks a comprehensive strategy on the role of youth in peacebuilding processes,
- G. Deeply alarmed that the existence of segregated communities often encourages vulnerable minority youths to partake in violent extremism,
- H. Noting with regret the lack of cross-community youth projects in many Member States which fosters a sense of a lack of belonging and makes extremist activities more appealing to young people,
- I. Alarmed that policy makers, governments, and civil society do not include or consult young people in the creation of peacebuilding programmes,
- J. Convinced that peacebuilding projects are more effective when youths are directly involved and play a leading role in their implementation,

¹ Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security Final Report, Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security, 2015.

² Civil Society Dialogue Network Policy Meeting Youth in Conflicts, Agents for peace or recruits for armed groups. 2014.

³ **Youth bulges** are areas where the percentage of youth per head of population is very high.



- K. Deeply regretting the barriers within youth structures that are excluding a significant part of the young population from the peacebuilding process including:
 - i. lower socio-economic means,
 - ii. gender related bias,
 - iii. disabilities,
- L. Concerned that youth peacebuilding programs currently suffer from a lack of:
 - i. knowledge sharing between youths already involved in peacebuilding programs,
 - ii. expertise in the field of peacebuilding,
 - iii. funding,
- M. Realising that young people are too often seen as being either perpetrators or victims of violent extremism;

Recognising young people's potential

- 1. Expresses its hope that Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and governments will recognise and utilise the full potential of young people in peacebuilding;
- 2. Recommends the drafting of a comprehensive EU strategy seeking to promote and elevate the role of young people in peacebuilding;

Education and support

- 3. Calls upon the Directorate General Culture and Education (DG EAC) to develop guidelines on peacebuilding in education in cooperation with the Consortium of Institutions for Development and Research in Education⁴ (CIDREE) that is focused on:
 - a. unbiased presentation of material,
 - b. communication and conflict resolution skills,
 - c. the spreading of knowledge about cultural diversity;
- 4. Encourages European governments to employ psychologists, social workers, and family consultants to give direct support to young people in high risk areas, conflict, and post-conflict zones;

Youth participation in peacebuilding

- 5. Invites the European Commission and Member States to support the creation and development of local, national, and European youth forums and representative assemblies that represent the voices of young people from all backgrounds;
- 6. Further encourages NGOs working in the area of peacebuilding and European governments to take into consideration the aforementioned assemblies when drafting youth development and peacebuilding policies;
- 7. Urges NGOs and European government agencies who are involved in youth development and peacebuilding to have youth observers from all sections of society play an assisting role in the development of youth peacebuilding policies;

⁴ **CIDREE** is a self-managing network of educational bodies that play a recognised national role in the field of curriculum development and/or educational research.



8. Calls upon Member States to facilitate the creation of common spaces where young people can come together in an atmosphere of friendship and solidarity in conflict and post-conflict zones;
9. Endorses European governments and NGOs to increase their levels of cooperation and information sharing in the area of peacebuilding and youth development;
10. Supports the continuous evaluation of the functioning of different types of peacebuilding projects by DG EAC and DG International Development and Cooperation (DEVCO);

Youth leadership of peacebuilding

11. Approves the development of a peacebuilding volunteer network that would enable and facilitate young people's involvement in and running of peacebuilding projects;
12. Encourages Member States to provide support for young people leading or starting peacebuilding projects and organisations through means such as:
 - a. small financial grants,
 - b. easy access to bank accounts and other essential financial instruments,
 - c. project planning and implementation procedures guidelines,
 - d. free access to state owned facilities;
13. Calls for Member States to ensure that young people from disadvantaged backgrounds and minorities have equal access to youth organisations and peacebuilding projects through measures such as the provision of financial aid;
14. Recommends that DG Communication (DG COMM) and the Member States use local, national, and European media to showcase young people who have made significant contributions to peacebuilding.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS I (ECON I)

Revisiting the EMU Reform: In the aftermath of the Greek debt crisis and in light of the deepening fault lines between Member States' positions on the future of the Eurozone, what should be the future of the Economic and Monetary Union?

Submitted by:

Elliot Barker (UK), Eva Glynn (IE), Gregor Heilborn (DE), Osmo Järvi (FI), Johan Martin E. Johnsen (NO), Clement Joujon (FR), Haris Karavassalis (GR), Ieva Karvelytė (LT), Guilherme Lameirinhas (PT), Erik Michalowski (CH), Naneh Mouradian (AM), María Pintos (ES), Hajar Rian (BE), Aleksandra Selimaj (AL), Michal Sklenář (CZ), Faruk Emre Yazıcı (TR), Patrick Lavelle, Chairperson (IE)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Keeping in mind that macroeconomic imbalances in a common currency area can lead to asymmetric shocks,
- B. Deeply conscious that monetary and fiscal policy fall under different competencies of the EU, leading to a lack of coherence in policy making,
- C. Taking into account the limited effectiveness of monetary policy when there are asymmetric shocks in a common currency zone,
- D. Alarmed by Member States' limited ability to deviate from the maximum budget deficit target of 3% of GDP in the Stability and Growth Pact in times of crisis,
- E. Fully aware of the Member States' desire to retain sovereignty over fiscal policy-making,
- F. Recognising the destabilising effect that a Member State's excessive debt levels can have on the single currency and the euro area as a whole,
- G. Noting with approval the reforms for the improved functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since the emergence of the euro area crisis including:
 - i. the introduction of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure,
 - ii. reform of the Stability and Growth Pact,
 - iii. the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance,
- H. Observing that there is no formal exit option for Member States that wish to leave the euro area,
- I. Realising the significant role played by the Eurogroup in response to the euro area crisis,

- J. Deeply concerned by the potential risk of moral hazard in financial rescue packages (“bailouts”) of euro area Member States,
- K. Bearing in mind that the euro area is considered not to fulfil all the criteria of an optimal currency area;

Macroeconomic Measures

1. Urges the European Commission to strengthen the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure as proposed in “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union” by:
 - a. encouraging structural reform through the European Semester,
 - b. using the Corrective Arm more forcefully,
 - c. measuring imbalances for the Eurozone as a whole and not just the imbalances of each individual Member State;
2. Instructs the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) to assist regions affected by asymmetric shocks through the creation of a Eurozone budget which will:
 - a. be partly allocated to the creation of a euro area unemployment insurance scheme,
 - b. assist euro area Member States with macroeconomic imbalances in their adjustment efforts;
3. Proposes that the aforementioned budget be funded by Eurozone Member States with each Member State’s contribution based on the size of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
4. Requests that the European Commission grant Member States dealing with exceptional economic situations flexibility in achieving the 3% Stability and Growth Pact deficit target if deemed necessary;

Governance & Institutional Structures

5. Endorses each Member State’s right to conduct their own fiscal policy whilst remaining within the confines of current EU rules coordinating fiscal policy;
6. Calls for the European Commission to initiate an amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to add an article providing a framework for Member States who wish to leave the euro area;
7. Further calls for the European Commission to initiate an amendment of Protocol No 14 of the Lisbon Treaty to give the Eurogroup formal institutional status;

Funding of Sovereigns

8. Welcomes the fact that financial assistance packages to Member States under the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) are conditional on the imposition of binding fiscal and structural policy measures;
9. Seeks the introduction of partial Eurobonds alongside national bonds on the condition that:
 - a. debt-to-GDP ratio between the lowest and highest indebted countries is within an acceptable range,
 - b. fiscal deficits of euro area Member States are deemed to be within the limits set by the Stability and Growth Pact.

FACT SHEET

THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS I

Asymmetric Shock

When an economic shock affects one economy or part of an economy more than another. Since there is a single monetary policy for the currency zone, the ability of monetary policy to address such shocks is limited.

Moral Hazard

A situation in which one party develops incentives to take undue risk because it expects to be protected from any costs that might arise, with other parties instead bearing the consequences i.e. expecting stronger economies to pay any fall-out costs from unsound fiscal policy.

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)

A set of rules designed to ensure Member States maintain sound public finances and coordinate their fiscal policies, most notably limits on government deficits of 3% of GDP and a maximum debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%. It was reinforced during the crisis with the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance.

The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP)

A surveillance mechanism under the European Commission composed of two arms – preventative and corrective. The preventative arm aims to help member States adopt sound policies that will avoid the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances. The corrective arm aims to identify and correct policy failures or address major macroeconomic risks.

The Eurogroup

The informal body where Eurozone finance ministers meet to discuss their shared responsibilities.

The European Semester

An annual cycle of policy coordination, guidance and surveillance at EU level. During the cycle the European Commission analyses each Member State's economic and fiscal policies, and addresses specific reform recommendations to each country.

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

Set up in 2012 as a permanent EU financial assistance fund, providing financial assistance to euro area Member States experiencing or threatened by financial difficulties

“Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union” (“The Five President’s Report”)

Report released in June 2015 by the Presidents of the European Commission, European Council, Eurogroup, European Central Bank and European Parliament detailing their vision for the future of the Economic and Monetary Union.

Eurobonds

Suggested government bonds issued in Euros jointly by the 19-euro area Member States.

Optimal Currency Area (OCA)

The theory describes a region in which it would maximise economic efficiency to share a single currency, describing the optimal characteristics for the merger of currencies or the creation of a new currency.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS I (AFCO I)

Improving Special Interest Representation: In light of the increasing numbers of special interest groups lobbying the EU institutions, what steps can be taken to ensure that the activities of these groups are transparently supported at all steps of the policy cycle?

Submitted by:

Rasmus Aarla (EE), Eric Axdorph (SE), Juliette Besnier-Rodier (FR), Giselle Chavannes (CH), Andreea-Sînziana Guță (RO), Cian Horgan (IE), Jakub Matyjaszczyk (PL), Asnāte Neimane (LV), Georgios-Angelos Papaioannou (GR), Jakub Roślewski (UA), Teresa Sihler (AT), Triin Kaup, Chairperson (EE)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Emphasises the importance of the right to access of information¹ and the principle of transparency² in order to enhance transparency in interest representation,
- B. Deeply concerned that the lack of consensus on an exact definition of “lobbying” leads to misinterpretations and legal loopholes thus reducing investigative bodies’ effectiveness in imposing legal sanctions, such as the Advisory Committee³,
- C. Having examined the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC⁴, which allows for data processing in cases of unambiguous consent by the data subject,
- D. Keeping in mind that voluntary registration in the Transparency Register⁵:
 - i. results in incomplete information regarding the actors present at official lobby meetings,
 - ii. does not provide any sanctions besides a suspension from the register in case of submission of false information,
 - iii. allows lobbyists to remove their records permanently by de-registering at any moment,

¹ **The Article 42 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU** states that any European citizen has the right of access to all documents of the European Parliament, Council and Commission.

² **The Article 11 of the Treaty on the EU** states that all institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society.

³ **The Advisory Committee** on the Conduct of Members is the body responsible for giving MEPs guidance on the interpretation and implementation of the Code of Conduct. At the request of the President, the Advisory Committee also assesses alleged breaches of the Code of Conduct and advises the President on possible actions to be taken.

⁴ **Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC** sets up a regulatory framework which seeks to strike a balance between a high level of protection for the privacy of individuals and the free movement of personal data within the EU.

⁵ **The Transparency Register** has been set up for lobbyists to answer core questions such as what interests are being pursued, by whom and with what budgets. The system is operated jointly by the European Parliament and the European Commission, on the basis of an agreement between the two institutions.



- E. Profoundly concerned that the Transparency Register includes lobbying activities conducted in the European Parliament and the European Commission, whilst excluding the Council of the EU,
- F. Pointing out that the legislative footprint⁶ is not mandatory,
- G. Bearing in mind that unrecorded lobbying is often impossible to identify and prevent due to unofficial meetings between lobbyists and EU officials,
- H. Firmly convinced that the absence of sanctions in case of the violation of the Code of Conduct (CoC) for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) leads to its perception as a guideline rather than a strict set of rules,
- I. Realising that the majority of provisions in the CoC for MEPs leave too much room for interpretation,
- J. Alarmed by the fact that the declaration of financial interest submitted by MEPs does not include travel expenses, accommodation, and subsistence expenses reimbursed by a private interest groups at an event organised by aforementioned groups,
- K. Considering that the civil society and private representation in the legislative process is disproportionate, with an estimated 75% of lobbyists representing private interests⁷,
- L. Taking into account that civil society representatives lack the necessary resources for effective lobbying, especially in comparison to representatives of private interests,
- M. Stressing that the cooling-off period⁸ is not always respected,
- N. Aware that movement of employees between private and public sector might cause an issue of using sensitive knowledge from their previous employment,
- O. Fully aware that the actions of public representatives holding parallel jobs or having a shared portfolio might be affected by conflicts of interest,

Transparency Register

- 1. Calls upon the European Commission to initiate the procedure to make the Transparency Register mandatory on the basis of Article 352 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)⁹;
- 2. Requests the Joint Transparency Register Secretariat (JTRS)¹⁰ to produce specific definitions of what constitutes lobbying activities;
- 3. Decides accordingly that every entity falling under the scope of the aforementioned definitions will register in the Transparency Register;
- 4. Resolves to extend the European Parliament's use of the Transparency Register as a prerequisite for the issuance of entrance permits to lobbyists to include all EU institutions involved in the legislative procedure;

⁶ **The legislative footprint** is a public record of lobbyists, who are having meetings with the decision-makers, which is either annexed to the legislative reports or published "real time" on official websites.

⁷ European Parliamentary Research Service. European Parliament.

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572803/EPRS_BRI\(2015\)572803_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572803/EPRS_BRI(2015)572803_EN.pdf)

⁸ **A cooling-off period** refers to an interval (18 months) after leaving office during which an MEP or a Commissioner should not accept job offers which in any way collide with their previous work and/or portfolio.

⁹ **Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU** reads "If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures."

¹⁰ **The Joint Transparency Register Secretariat** monitors the Transparency Register, verifies the correctness of data and publishes annual reports, which provide statistics and an overview of activities.



5. Authorises the JTRS to:
 - a. take punitive action for breaches of the Transparency Register Code of Conduct¹¹,
 - b. ensure the proportionality of sanctions imposed for entry of inaccurate information to the Transparency Register,
 - c. increase the number of random checks to verify the information on the Transparency Register,
 - d. remove the option of de-registering from the Transparency Register,
 - e. enable lobbyists to set their status to active or inactive,
 - f. impose a 'suspended' status on lobbyists in case of misconduct;
6. Seeks permanent preservation of all Transparency Register records with public access, subject to time limits imposed by mandatory EU provisions on data retention, unless they are shown to be inaccurate;

Code of Conduct

7. Directs the Advisory Committee to redraft the CoC for MEPs to incorporate stronger sanctions;
8. Calls upon the European Commission and the European Parliament to make the Code of Conduct of their officials¹² legally binding;
9. Designates the Bureau of the European Parliament as the regulatory body for payments made to MEPs for travel expenses in relation to third-party events;

Representation

10. Asks the JTRS to include the examination of the appropriate balance of special interest group representation by private and civil society lobbyists in its annual study;
11. Further asks the JTRS to take necessary actions in light of the results of this study;

Legal aspects

12. Invites all registrants of the Transparency Register to consent to the publication of general information on meetings with EU officials by signing a consent form concerning the legislative footprint for lobbyists;
13. Instructs the JTRS to incorporate the mandatory legislative footprint for lobbyists in their database, so as to collect and present information about special interest group representatives as well as the time, place and minutes of the interaction;

Revolving doors phenomenon

14. Urges the Council and the European Parliament to incorporate the relevant Commissioner's Code of Conduct¹³ rules concerning the revolving doors phenomenon in their employment contracts with EU officials', except for the ban on parallel employment.

¹¹ **The Transparency Register Code of Conduct** is signed once a lobby group registers in the Transparency Register and it binds all organisations and self-employed individuals to fully respect the ethical principles.

¹² **The Code of Conduct for EU officials** sets out the principles that guide administrative conduct: lawfulness, non-discrimination, proportionality (measures taken should be proportional to the aim pursued) and consistency. These principles are consistent with the principles laid down by the European Ombudsman in the 'Statement of public service principles for the EU civil service'.

¹³ **The Commissioner's Code of Conduct** states that when they leave office they must abide by an 18 month notification period, during which time they must seek Commission authorisation for any new job. The document is also banning Commissioners for 18 months from lobbying the Commission on matters for which the commissioner used to be responsible.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS II (AFET II)

A Balancing Act on the Border: In light of the findings of the European Commission's 2015 Annual Progress report on Turkey, how best should the EU address the ongoing violations of human rights and press freedom while maintaining the cooperation required to tackle the refugee crisis?

Submitted by:

Linus Ben Ax (DE), Catarina Bustorff (BE), Marios Charilaou (CY), Anna Chirniciuc (RO), Afonso Ferreira (PT), Stephanie Gevorgyan (AM), Gema Grau (ES), Shila Husein (SE), Natia Jokhadze (GE), Emre Cem Kaya (TR), Francesca Lacava (IT), Ismini-Anna Pnevmatikaki (LU), Yonatan Bisrat Taye (NO), Aava Vuojarvi (FI), Ruben de Vrieze (NL), Ioanna Yiallourides, Chairperson (CY)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Expresses its concern that 88% of cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2015 found at least one violation by Turkey¹,
- B. Concerned by the persistent violations of freedom of expression in Turkey, as showcased by its ranking at 149 out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index in 2015²,
- C. Alarmed by the Turkish judiciary's decreasing impartiality and independence due to an increase in the influence of the executive,
- D. Concerned by the systematic suppression of opposition from political parties within the Turkish Parliament,
- E. Deploring the repeated use of excessive force by the police in peaceful demonstrations, violating Article 11 of the ECHR³,
- F. Deeply concerned by the breakdown of the ceasefire between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan People's Party (PKK),
- G. Aware of Turkey's fluctuating stance towards becoming a Member of the EU,

¹ European Convention on Human Rights, European Commission, 2016 Retrieved from:
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf

² Reporters without borders for freedom of information, 2015 World Press Freedom Index, 2015 Retrieved from:
<https://index.rsfi.org/#/index-details/TUR>

³ European Convention on Human Rights, European Commission, 2016 Retrieved from:
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf



- H. Expressing its doubts concerning the use of accession talks as a suitable tool for cooperation between the two parties,
- I. Noting with regret the human rights violations caused by Turkey's long standing illegal occupation of the northern part of Cyprus and its impact on Turkey's accession process,
- J. Recognising the potential of Turkey's geopolitical position as a gateway to closer cooperation with the Middle East to alleviate the refugee crisis,
- K. Understanding Turkey's key role in managing the increasing migration from Syria,
- L. Bearing in mind that the influx of refugees from Syria to Turkey might potentially have a negative economic impact on the Turkish and European economies,
- M. Alarmed that 90% of the 2.9 million refugees in Turkey remain outside camp settings with limited access to basic services⁴,
- N. Believing the EU-Turkey Action Plan⁵ has not yet provided an adequate solution to the ongoing refugee crisis;
 - 1. Encourages the European Commission to strengthen its long-term working relationship with Turkey considering its strategic importance in tackling the refugee crisis;
 - 2. Condemns the EU's current disregard for recent and ongoing human rights violations in Turkey;

Human Rights

- 3. Urges the European Council, in cooperation with the Heads of State, to place further pressure on Turkish leaders regarding the safeguarding of human rights in upcoming EU-Turkey summits;
- 4. Further condemns the continuing violence by the Turkish government in the Kurdish region, as well as its treatment of other minorities;
- 5. Further encourages the Turkish government to reform domestic legislation on public demonstrations so as to prohibit the use of excessive police force during peaceful protests;
- 6. Invites the Directorate General for Education and Culture to increase the accessibility of intercultural projects such as Erasmus+⁶ and Da Vinci programmes⁷ within Turkey;
- 7. Suggests the ECtHR and the Council of the EU encourage Turkey to revise its relevant legislation on refugees to align with principles set forth by the UNHCR;
- 8. Approves Cyprus blocking 8 chapters⁸ of Turkey accession negotiations due to the unresolved Cyprus problem;

⁴ European Commission, Refugee Crisis Turkey Fact Sheet, 2016

⁵ The **EU-Turkey Action Plan** identifies a series of collaborative actions to be implemented as a matter of urgency by the EU and Turkey with the objective to supplement Turkey's efforts in managing the situation of massive influx of persons in need of temporary protection.

European Commission, EU-Turkey joint action plan, 2015 Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm

⁶ **Erasmus+** is a programme aiming to boost skills and employability, as well as modernising education, training, and youth work. It supports transnational partnerships among educational, training, and youth institutions and organisations to foster cooperation and tackle skills gaps in Europe.

European Commission, Erasmus+, 2016 Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/discover/index_en.htm

⁷ **Leonardo Da Vinci Programme** is a programme which funds practical projects in the field of vocational education and training. Its initiatives range from those providing work-related training to individuals to larger cooperation efforts.

European Commission, Life Long Learning Programme, 2016 Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/education/tools/llp_en.htm

⁸ Ministry of EU Affairs, Current Situation, 2015 Retrieved from: <http://www.ab.gov.tr/?p=65&l=2>



9. Recommends the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund to provide financial assistance to contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus dispute as soon as practicable;
10. Strongly encourages close cooperation between the ECtHR and Turkey's Constitutional Court to improve legal processes at the national level;
11. Calls upon the European Commission to create a platform in Turkey to facilitate coordination between international and local Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs);
12. Requests the European Commission establish a monitoring mechanism for EU funds provided to Turkey, which will:
 - a. include the release of an annual report on Turkey's utilisation of European funds and aid,
 - b. evaluate the impact of EU funds on the humanitarian situation of the refugees and the safeguarding of their human rights,
 - c. be based on the principle of conditionality,
 - d. utilise the delegation of the EU in Turkey to cooperate with international NGOs in its reporting;

EU-Turkey Relations

13. Further urges the European Council to conduct a Summit with Heads of State to reconsider the use of the accession process as a foreign policy tool within the EU-Turkey relationship;
14. Further recommends Member States increase economic cooperation with Turkey in the long-term, conditional upon Turkey improving its human rights record by:
 - a. increasing trade partnerships in energy, transport and infrastructure sectors,
 - b. increasing foreign direct investment;
15. Further calls upon the Directorate General for Enlargement and Neighbourhood to support NGOs based in Turkey specialising in democracy and governance, rule of law, fundamental rights and freedom of expression, through the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II)⁹;

Refugee Crisis

16. Supports the European Commission's efforts to revise the EU-Turkey Action Plan to include effective mechanisms for managing migration from Turkey to Greece;
17. Asks the European Commission to allocate further funding from the Refugee Facility Fund to NGOs active in the refugee crisis in Turkey;
18. Expresses its support of measures taken by Member States to reach a sustainable agreement regarding the resettlement of refugees within the EU by:
 - a. harmonising the EU's asylum system,
 - b. initiating negotiations with third party countries regarding the resettlement of refugees,
 - c. providing humanitarian aid in kind.

⁹ European Commission, Pre-Accession Instruments (IPA), 2016 Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/turkey/index_en.htm



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND FOOD SAFETY (ENVI)

Closing the Loop: How can the EU transition towards a circular economy, thereby ensuring better resource-efficiency, and benefits to both the environment and the economy?

Submitted by:

Elena De'Luca di Pietralata (IT), Eduard Gafton (RO), Jakob Horn (DE), Salma Ismaili (NL), Vladislava Kachurova (RU), Raphaël Kokkelmans (BE), Yuliia Matviichuk (UA), Edward Poghosyan (AM), Antonia Psalti (CY), Alicia Sjöberg (SE), Mikołaj Szpunar (PL), David Teixeira (PT), Elias Vaara (FI), Rebecca Smith, Chairperson (FR)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Alarmed by the EU's reliance on the linear economy model¹, which has harmful economic and environmental consequences,
- B. Observing that demographic and economic growth worldwide magnifies the negative effects of the linear economy,
- C. Further observing that the EU is dependent on imports of raw materials,
- D. Noting with appreciation the European Parliament's Resolution titled 'Resource efficiency: moving towards a circular economy'²,
- E. Further noting with appreciation the European Commission's Action Plan³ for a circular economy,
- F. Taking note that the European Parliament proposal presents more ambitious targets than the European Commission proposal, regarding for example municipal waste, landfill bans, and resource efficiency targets,
- G. Reaffirming the economic benefits of transitioning to a circular economy, such as:
 - i. protection against price volatility,
 - ii. decreased dependency on imports,
 - iii. projected net savings of EUR 600 billion⁴ for businesses across the EU,
- H. Keeping in mind that the transition to a circular economy will generate new jobs⁵,

¹ The **linear economy** is a common economic model where materials are extracted, transformed, consumed and disposed. It produces large quantities of waste while relying on finite resources, which it does not use efficiently.

² The European Parliament adopted a resolution on 9 July 2015 with proposals on how to transition to a circular economy model. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150702IPR73644/Circular-economy-MEPs-call-for-“systemic-change”-to-address-resource-scarcity>

³ The European Commission adopted on 2 December 2015 an Action Plan for the transition to the circular economy, including several legislative proposals. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/index_en.htm

⁴ Circular Economy Package: Questions & Answers, European Commission, 2nd December 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6204_en.html



- I. Recognising the importance of private sector involvement for the transition to the circular economy,
 - J. Further recognising the potential of the sharing economy⁶ to contribute to the transition to a circular economy,
 - K. Taking into consideration the differences between Member States in their environmental legislation and infrastructure,
 - L. Welcoming programmes incentivising recycling and waste reduction in Member States, such as deposits for glass bottles and fees for plastic bags,
 - M. Emphasising the need to properly manage food waste,
 - N. Declaring the importance of citizens' involvement in the transition to a circular economy, especially with regards to their impact on:
 - i. creating demand for products and services of a circular economy,
 - ii. resource use and waste reduction through recycling, reusing, repairing and sharing,
 - O. Affirming the need for citizens and governments to be informed about a circular economy model;
1. Encourages further dialogue between the European Commission and the European Parliament on their policy proposals for a circular economy;
 2. Requests that the European Commission organise a summit on the circular economy for heads of Member States and their respective ministers, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and representatives of major European companies;

Private Sector Measures

3. Calls upon the European Commission to propose legislation encouraging the development of the sharing economy while respecting existing EU principles;
4. Supports the European Parliament's resolution calling on the European Commission to develop measures against planned obsolescence⁷;
5. Further calls upon Member States to support companies transitioning to a circular economy by:
 - a. increasing their visibility,
 - b. offering trainings for employees,
 - c. providing administrative support;
6. Expresses its appreciation of the European Resource Efficiency Excellence Center⁸;
7. Invites the European Commission and Member States to create a European business-to-business platform for data on commercial and industrial waste, including information on location, type of waste, amount of waste, and input resources needed;

Investment and Research

⁵ 'Closing the loop: Commission adopts ambitious new Circular Economy Package to boost competitiveness, create jobs and generate sustainable growth', European Commission Press Release, 2 December 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6203_en.htm

⁶ The **sharing economy** is an economic model where individuals can borrow or rent products owned by someone else. Airbnb and bike sharing schemes are examples of the sharing economy.

⁷ **Planned obsolescence** is a policy of designing a product with an artificially limited useful life, so that it is no longer functional after a certain period of time.

⁸ The **European Resource Efficiency Excellence Centre** advises and assists SMEs seeking to improve their resource efficiency performance, directly and through a network of partners across European regions.



8. Urges the European Commission to continue and increase funding for programmes supporting circular economy research, in particular Horizon 2020⁹, LIFE¹⁰, and the European Structural and Investment Funds¹¹;
9. Further invites the European Commission to make the circular economy a priority research area in research programmes established after 2020;
10. Instructs the European Regional Development Fund¹² (ERDF) to prioritise the allocation of resources towards the creation of circular economy infrastructure, in particular in less developed and transition regions;
11. Recommends the European Commission to provide funds to universities involved in research and education on a circular economy and training for circular economy jobs;

Waste Management

12. Further supports the European Parliament's resolution calling on the European Commission to promote the creation in Member States of conventions proposing that the retail food sector distributes unsold products to charity associations¹³;
13. Further encourages Member States to adopt and expand recycling programmes, such as collection of deposits for bottles;
14. Further requests the European Commission to address the issues of commercial and industrial waste in its circular economy Action Plan;
15. Asks the European Commission to ban all landfilling of recyclable waste by 2030;
16. Suggests Member States to ensure that garbage disposal prices are measured per weight, with lower prices for recycled waste;

Information and Education

17. Directs the European Commission to include circular economy criteria in the EU Ecolabel¹⁴ criteria;
18. Further suggests the European Commission develop a new branding and marketing strategy for the EU Ecolabel;
19. Further invites the European Commission to produce information packages about a circular economy for different age groups;
20. Strongly encourages schools to implement a circular economy model, with measures including but not limited to:
 - a. composting all food waste produced in the school,
 - b. using recycled paper,
 - c. separating and recycling all waste,
 - d. taking part in water efficiency and energy efficiency schemes.

⁹ **Horizon 2020** is the biggest EU Research and Innovation programme with nearly EUR 80 billion of funding available from 2014 to 2020.

¹⁰ **LIFE** is the EU's financial instrument supporting environmental, nature conservation and climate action projects throughout the EU.

¹¹ With a budget of EUR 454 billion for 2014-2020, the **European structural and investment funds** are the EU's main investment policy tool.

¹² The **European Regional Development Fund** aims to strengthen economic and social cohesion in the European Union by correcting imbalances between its regions.

¹³ The proposal is included in the resolution on resource efficiency: moving towards a circular economy, adopted by the European Parliament on 09 July 2015. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1396678&t=d&l=en>

¹⁴ The **EU Ecolabel** helps identify products and services that have a reduced environmental impact throughout their life cycle, and is recognised throughout Europe.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM (TRAN)

Uber and Beyond: With Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) gaining popularity in Europe, how can the EU work towards harmonising the different regulatory environments of Member States, paying particular attention to decreasing legal loopholes to address concerns of passenger safety and quality of service?

Submitted by:

Aygun Ahmadli (AZ), Aïcha Bouchelaghem (CH), Riccardo Ciani (IT), Tjalling Fokkema (NL), Fernando García Alberó (ES), Gökçe Gürçavdı (TR), Jarna Heikkinen (FI), Paul Pawel Iwkin (DE), João Macedo (PT), Ben McConkey (UK), Rozi Mkrtchyan (AM), Liv Marie Rønnevold (NO), Nikita Salukvadze (GE), Whitney Schoefs (BE), Stefanos Stavrou (CY), Darya Savishchava, Chairperson (BY)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Recognising that lower prices and increased convenience of Transport Network Companies (TNCs) make them a preferable option for consumers over incumbent businesses¹,
- B. Noting with satisfaction that the reduced level of private car usage as a result of the spread of TNCs reaps environmental benefits,
- C. Taking into consideration the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which guarantees the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services²,
- D. Bearing in mind the White Paper on a Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area (2011)³ emphasising the:
 - i. importance of "smart mobility services",
 - ii. need to embrace new technologies and innovations in the transport sector,
- E. Stressing that an exact definition of TNCs is not contained in existing EU legislation,
- F. Noting with concern the absence of a common European regulatory framework for TNCs,
- G. Appreciating the launch of the study "Passenger transport by taxi, hire car and ridesharing in the EU" by the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE),
- H. Noting with appreciation the launch of the study "Consumer issues in the sharing economy" by the DG for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST),

¹ **Incumbent businesses** are businesses which already have a market position with an established market share.

² Article 49 and 56 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

³ **White Paper on a Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area** is a roadmap by the European Commission consisting of 40 concrete initiatives for the next decade to build a competitive transport system that will increase mobility, remove major barriers in key areas and fuel growth and employment.



- I. Aware that as drivers working for TNCs are being considered as self-employed, many drivers are deprived from social protection,
- J. Concerned by the TNCs' abuse of legal loopholes through means such as operation without commercial licenses or tax avoidance, resulting in a competitive advantage over incumbent businesses,
- K. Keeping in mind that the responsibility for the maintenance of vehicles are borne by the third party providers of TNCs, which often have a low EuroNCAP⁴ rating,
- L. Deeply concerned by the lack of monitoring mechanisms which can verify the suitability of potential TNC drivers,
- M. Alarmed by TNCs usage of a surge pricing mechanism⁵ resulting in unpredictably excessive pricing and lack of transparency in final price formation;

Legislative recognition

1. Urges the Court of Justice to establish an official definition of TNCs in EU case law in its upcoming decisions on pending cases;
2. Requests that the European Commission initiate a common regulatory framework on the basis of the upcoming studies by the DG MOVE and DG JUST to address concerns on consumer protection and safety, quality of service, and rights of third party providers;

Fair Competition

3. Recommends the Member States simplify the procedure for obtaining mandatory commercial driving licenses for all drivers who provide commercial services;
4. Invites the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) to conduct research on the TNCs' exploitation of legal loopholes in the area of corporate taxation;
5. Encourages companies based on traditional business models operating in the transportation sector to embrace digital technologies in their commercial activities;

Consumer Protection and Safety

6. Invites the DG MOVE to develop safety requirements for commercially used vehicles based on EuroNCAP ratings;
7. Requests that the European Commission compel third party providers to undertake regular vehicle maintenance;
8. Asks the European Commission to oblige TNCs to undergo background checks by third party providers that will require criminal record checks and annual medical reports including an assessment of physical and mental health;
9. Requires Member States to ensure transparency and fair pricing by prohibiting:
 - a. an increase in the surge pricing multiplier once the consumer books the ride,
 - b. application of the multiplier to the duration of the trip.

⁴ **The European New Car Assessment Programme** is a voluntary vehicle safety rating system supported by the European Union. Vehicle models are either being independently chosen by Euro NCAP or voluntarily tested by the manufacturers.

⁵ **The surge pricing algorithm** is used at times of high demand, when the number of drivers becomes limited. As a result, a simple "multiplier" that multiplies the standard fare is assigned to encourage more drivers to make themselves available.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS I (AFET I)

A New Intifada?: Faced with rising tension between Israel and Palestine, how can the EU ensure its commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict?

Submitted by:

Jan Adamski (PL), Dumitru Cretu (RO), Mariam Kakhniashvili (GE), Ilya Kursenko (RU), Jean-Baptiste Lasserre (FR), Emīlija Linda Mendelšone (LV), Kate O' Regan (IE), Sanna Persson (SE), Arne van Rooijen (NL), Eero Kristjan Sild (EE), Jana Soukupová (CZ), Valeria Yudina (UA), Sophie Zemann (AT), Dan Brown, Chairperson (UK)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Taking into consideration the different interests of all involved parties, namely:
 - i. surrounding Arab countries which display anti-Israeli sentiment,
 - ii. divided political groups in Palestine, such as Hamas¹, which are regarded as a terrorist organisation by the European Union (EU),
- B. Conscious that Palestine is not a full member of the United Nations (UN) and only has observer status compared to Israel which is a full member,
- C. Noting with regret the lack of dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) which has contributed to:
 - i. a new wave of political and religious radicalism,
 - ii. increased levels of violence across the region²,
 - iii. increased levels of terrorism,
- D. Recognising the growing disengagement of the USA from the conflict, underlining the importance of the EU's role in the peace process,
- E. Alarmed by the divide in the Member States' positions towards both Israel and Palestine and the significance this has on the EU's ability to coordinate a peaceful resolution,
- F. Noting with sincerity the historical magnitude and depth of the cultural, religious, political, and ethnic divides between the Israeli and Palestinian people,
- G. Fully aware of the significance of Jerusalem as the cultural and religious centre of both parties and its strategic importance to the peace process,
- H. Noting with deep concern that the Two-State solution³ is not evolving as intended despite the EU's efforts to promote this solution,

¹ **Hamas** is a Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist organisation which has been the governing authority of the Gaza Strip since 2007.

² Between October and November 2015, 94 Palestinians and 16 Israelis were killed in conflict ('Mapping the dead in the latest Israeli-Palestinian violence', Aljazeera, 24 November 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/10/mapping-dead-latest-israeli-palestinian-violence-151013142015577.html>).



- I. Concerned that Peace Agreements such as the UN Resolution 242⁴ and the Oslo Peace Accords⁵, are not being upheld,
- J. Stressing that it is in the best interest of both the PA and Israel to avoid an intifada and find a peaceful resolution,
- K. Regretting the prolonged and aggravated impact the political split between Hamas and Fatah⁶ has on the peace negotiations,
- L. Appreciates the willingness of the Arab League to normalise trade relationships with Israel conditional upon the peaceful resolution to the conflict,
- M. Deploring the impact of the arms trade from third-party countries in prolonging the conflict,
- N. Aware that the labelling system⁷ recently adopted by the European Commission is leading to anti-EU sentiment in Israel,
- O. Profoundly concerned by the human rights violations and poor living conditions in the Gaza Strip and Occupied Territories⁸ which are resulting in a humanitarian crisis;

EU Commitments

- 1. Encourages Member States that do not recognise Palestine as a state to reconsider their stance on the recognition of Palestine as an independent state⁹;
- 2. Endorses Member States' Permanent Representations to consider supporting the process of Palestine's acceptance to full UN membership;
- 3. Calls for the European Council to instruct the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase the EU delegation to the Occupied Palestinian Territories;
- 4. Urges the European Commission to demonstrate a renewed sense of urgency to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by incorporating it on the agenda of the next European Council meeting;
- 5. Reaffirms the European Commission's guidelines to label certain products made in Israeli settlements on Occupied Territories;
- 6. Further encourages Member States to work towards decreasing arms trade with Israel and Palestine;

Humanitarian Aid

- 7. Calls upon the European Commission to reinforce the EU's commitment to helping those affected by the crisis, such as internal refugees, by prioritising aid projects outlined in the framework set up by Article 214¹⁰;
- 8. Requests the European Commission to allocate a proportion of the EU general budget¹¹ to financially support projects that aim to enhance quality of life in the Occupied Territories such as those that:

³ The **Two-State solution** envisages an independent State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel.

⁴ The UN Resolution 242 called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories gained after the 1967 "Six Day War".

⁵ **The Oslo Accords** are a set of agreements between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation signed in 1993 aiming to fulfil the right of Palestinian people to self-determination.

⁶ Fatah is the secular Palestinian political party and the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organisation currently in control of the West Bank.

⁷ **Labels** identify Israeli products made in the Occupied Territories, distinguishing them from those produced in Israel.

⁸ Occupied Territories refer to the territories occupied by Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967 and after.

⁹ As of 2015, Palestine was recognised by 9 out of the 28 EU Member States ('Palestine recognised as state in principle', The Independent, 17th December 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/palestine-recognised-as-a-state-in-principle-by-european-parliament-in-symbolic-vote-9930981.html>).

¹⁰ **Article 214** of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union is the first legal basis for humanitarian aid set by the EU.



- a. improve access to drinking water, electricity, and education,
- b. provide legal aid to Palestinians made homeless by the policy of occupation ¹²;

Human Rights

9. Calls for the European Commission to request and support the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to monitor potential human rights violations and conduct an investigation in the Occupied Territories;
10. Strongly condemns violations of international humanitarian law and human rights perpetrated by Israel and the PA, particularly in the Occupied Territories;

Rebuilding Relations

11. Reaffirms its condemnation of the extremist activity carried out by the military wing of Hamas whilst recognising the need for dialogue with the organisation;
12. Calls upon the Middle East Quartet¹³ to initiate bilateral negotiations between Israel and the PA, incorporating the Arab League¹⁴, to:
 - a. address the issue of the stateless Palestinian diaspora¹⁵,
 - b. plan the future administration of Jerusalem,
 - c. define the borders of both the State of Israel and Palestine,
 - d. reaffirm the importance of healthy economic relations between the parties.

¹¹ **The EU's general budget** has been used to fund aid projects in Palestine with 2.7 billion EUR allocated between 1994 - 2006.

¹² House demolition is a method utilised by the Israeli army (IDF) in the occupied territories against Palestinians.

¹³ **The Middle East Quartet** is a foursome involved in mediating the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict consisting of the UN, the US, the EU, and Russia.

¹⁴ The **Arab League's** main goal is to draw closer relations between Member States and ensure the interests of the Arab countries.

¹⁵ The **diaspora** are formed of Palestinian-originated communities living outside the region of Palestine.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE (SEDE)

Lords of War: In light of the fact that EU Member States are collectively amongst the world's three largest arms exporters, how should the EU consolidate the economic interests of Member States with the goals of peace, security and respect for human rights stated within the Common Security and Defence Policy?

Submitted by:

Joonas Ariva (EE), Martin Dirlinger (AT), Maciej Draguła (PL), Reinis Frēlihs (LV), Mariam Kunchuliya (UA), Lisa Leveque (FR), Nika Milinović (HR), Norbert Sobolak (UK), Nikita Sokolov (RU), Mathew Somers (IE), Elli Stogiannou (GR), Maxmilián Sup (CZ), Iustin Târgoveț (RO), Izabell Thunström (SE), Raphael Bek, Chairperson (AT)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Emphasising that one of the EU fundamental missions is to promote peace and security, as stated in its core treaties,
- B. Recognising that the defence sector had a turnover of EUR 97.3 billion in 2014¹ and is a major contributor to EU growth,
- C. Alarmed that corruption in the defence market accounts for 40%² of all corruption in global transactions,
- D. Appreciating the United Nations (UN) Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)³ even though it does not directly affect non-state actors,
- E. Further appreciating the recent update to the EU Common Military List⁴ to include the latest range of defence goods and technology,
- F. Pointing out that the Member States' mandatory annual reports on arms exports are often ambiguous, incomplete, and released too late to be relevant,
- G. Regretting that only 21 Member States made complete submissions to the 15th Annual Report on control of exports of military technology and equipment concerning 2014,
- H. Acknowledging that the increased spending of countries such as the USA, China, Russia, and allies within international organisations on defence goods pressure Member States to stay competitive and interoperable,
- I. Noting with regret that by granting export licences for defence goods delivered to politically unstable countries, Member States contribute to conflict and human rights violations,
- J. Taking into account that the EU Transparency Register⁵ is currently voluntary for the European Parliament and the European Commission,

¹ Defence Industries, European Commission, 3 March 2016.

² Corruption and the arms trade: sins of commission, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 7 June 2011.

³ Under the **UN Arms Trade Treaty** (ATT) the signing UN Member States regulate the international trade of conventional weapons, such as small arms, battle tanks, warships and aircraft, and work to prevent the diversion of arms and ammunition. Arms deliveries to non-state actors do not fall under the ATT.

⁴ The **EU Common Military List** sets the scope of military items that fall under legislation regarding defence goods.



- K. Strongly believing that citizens have the right to be informed about the arms export decisions of their national governments as they affect the security and well-being of their nation,
- L. Regretting that the eight criteria laid out in the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on Arms Exports:
 - i. are interpreted by Member States in a self-serving way, based on economic interest, which sometimes results in irresponsible exports,
 - ii. do not discourage Member States from irresponsibly granting export licences for defence goods,
- M. Noting with deep concern the widespread misinterpretation⁶ of Article 346 1(b)⁷ of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), distorting the single market and leading to irresponsible exports,
- N. Deeply concerned that Member States' exaggerated sensitivity over security matters are often used to legitimise non-disclosure of activities in the defence sector, resulting in lack of transparency in defence budgeting and procurement,
- O. Believing that offsets⁸ are, as stated by the European Union Institute for Security Studies⁹, discriminatory and market-distortive measures that go against the fundamental principles of free trade, as laid out in the EU treaties,
- P. Concerned by the findings of the impact study on the 'Defence Package' Directives on European Defence¹⁰, which conclude that the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC¹¹ on defence and security procurement under scrutiny and Directive 2009/43/EC¹² on intra-EU transfers of defence-related products has been insufficient,
- Q. Considering that technological developments make it increasingly more difficult to distinguish between purely military or civilian use of technology;

Accountability

1. Urges the European Commission to make the eight criteria in the Common Position legally binding for Member States;
2. Further urges the creation of an independent European Arms Control Authority reporting to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) to ensure responsible and uniform interpretation of the eight criteria, as suggested by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) of the European Parliament¹³;

⁵ The **EU Transparency Register** is a public database, in which information about lobbying actors and key data about their actions can be accessed.

⁶ Article 346 1(b) of the TFEU is applied quasi-automatically to most defence good contracts.

⁷ Article 346 1(b) of the TFEU allows for the exemption of production of, or trade in, arms, munitions, and war materials from the single market if they are connected with the protection of the essential interests of the Member States.

⁸ Offsets are compensations required by national authorities when purchasing defence equipment from non-national suppliers. They can take different forms, such as investments from the non-national supplier in the domestic industry of the purchasing authority, or the integration of national companies in the main contractor's supply chain.

⁹ Issue Brief 22: Article 346 and the qualified application of EU law to defence, European Union Institute for Security Studies, July 2014.

¹⁰ The impact of the '**defence package**' Directives on European Defence, Directorate-General for external policies, July 2015.

¹¹ **Directive 2009/81/EC** (also: procurement directive) intends to provide procurement rules tailor-made for defence and security markets and is supposed to lead to more transparency and competition. Most importantly, it should limit the use of the exception clause of Article 346.

¹² **Directive 2009/43/EC** (also: intra-Community Transfers Directive or the ICT Directive) simplifies intra-Community transfers of defence-related products, and specifically attempts to simplify and harmonise the conditions and rules for arms transfers between European Member States, and to reduce red tapes related to licensing both for defence companies (also called defence undertakings) and national authorities.

¹³ Resolution on arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 2015.



3. Calls upon the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to consider penalties for Member States which misinterpret the eight criteria when granting export licences;
4. Recommends that Member States hold companies accountable for irresponsible exports;

Transparency

5. Calls for the European External Action Service (EEAS)¹⁴ to:
 - a. adopt a standardised and periodical reporting and submission procedure, concerning information on actual exports and licence data to be applied across all Member States,
 - b. implement a live¹⁵, digital, and public database containing information regarding importer/exporter, price, and amount of the defence equipment traded by Member States;
6. Urges Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to introduce the promised mandatory transparency register¹⁶ across the European Parliament, the European Commission, as well as the Council by the end of 2016 in order to achieve high levels of transparency regarding the activities of lobbying in the defence industry;

Common Position

7. Asks the Council to add a mechanism to the Common Position that would automatically freeze export licences for arms, as requested by AFET¹⁷, to countries against which a European arms embargo has been established after the export control licence was granted;
8. Welcomes closer collaboration and support of NGOs that track and uncover corruption and misconduct in the defence market, such as Transparency International;

Single Market

9. Calls for enhanced consultations among Member States with regard to transfers of defence goods to fragile and unstable regions or countries;
10. Urges the ECJ to scrutinise cases related to Article 346 1(b) of the TFEU;
11. Supports the European Commission's opposition to offsets, and believes that Member States should be held accountable to prove that the specific offsets requirement imposed on the non-national supplier is a necessary and proportionate step;

Dual use Goods

12. Welcomes the ongoing work of the Commission and its intention to present a new legislative proposal on dual-use exports in the first half of 2016¹⁸;
13. Recalls the urgent need to address potentially harmful exports of Internet and Communication Technology (ICT) products and services from Member States to third countries;

¹⁴ The **European External Action Service (EEAS)** and its Division for Nonproliferation, Disarmament and Arms export control are active in arms export control, supporting responsibility and transparency, and promoting adherence to the highest regional and international standards, such as the Arms Trade Treaty and the EU Common Position on arms export control.

¹⁵ A **live database** would be updated as soon as information of new a record (new defense goods sale) is available.

¹⁶ Commission Work Programme 2015 – A new start, European Commission, 16 December 2014.

¹⁷ Resolution on arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, December 2015.

¹⁸ 2015 Export Control Forum – The export control policy review: state of play and prospects, European Commission, 7 December 2015



14. Calls on the HR/VP, the Member States, and the Commission to ensure synergy amongst the Wassenaar Arrangement¹⁹, the Common Military List of the EU, and the Dual-use Annex of the Regulation 428/2009 while paying particular attention to new technology of strategic importance such as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems²⁰ and surveillance technology.

¹⁹ The **Wassenaar Arrangement** is a multilateral export control regime with 41 participating states, including all EU Member States, concerning Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.

²⁰ **Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems** (also referred to as drones) are not addressed sufficiently in existing European legislation



FACT SHEET

THE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Export licences

In 2008 the Council adopted the Common Position on Arms Exports. Eight criteria were developed for the export of conventional arms. While Member States must consider these criteria when making decisions about granting export licences, the interpretation of the criteria is up to the Member States.

1. Respect for Member States' international obligations and commitments, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, and agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects;
2. Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law;
3. The internal situation in the country of final destination – Member States will not allow exports that would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination;
4. Preservation of regional peace, security and stability;
5. Security of Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries;
6. Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law;
7. Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions;
8. Compatibility of the exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with minimal diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.

Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Article 346 1(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows the exemption of the production of arms and related projects within the Union to fall under the rules of the single market if it is considered necessary for the protection of the essential interests of the Member State's security. Member States enjoy wide discretion when it comes to national security. The European Court of Justice has largely restrained itself from scrutinising the Article. The Commission has generally not paid sufficient attention to various cases. While recommendations for the scrutiny of the article exist, the European Parliament has reported that in practice the article is applied quasi automatically to most defence equipment contracts by Member States.

1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following rules:
 - a. no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
 - b. any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make changes to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS II (ECON II)

Tackling Tax Avoidance: Bearing in mind the economic and social consequences of multinational corporations (MNCs) aggressive use of corporate tax planning methods to lower their effective tax rates, how can the link between taxation and real economic activity be restored?

Submitted by:

Andra Acsintoae (RO), Eliza Badesku (RS), Wiktor Danel (PL), Keiron Golding (EE), Andreas Janssen (NL), Michaela Kadlecová (CZ), Dennis Makarov (DE), Eduards Miltiņš (LV), Sophia Navarre (AT), Solène Pigeon (FR), Alina Pisareva (RU), Nataliia Senatorova (UA), Gustav Wallgren (SE), Lewin Schmitt, Chairperson (DE)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Deeply disturbed by the harmful outflows of capital as profit earned in the EU is being transferred offshore,
- B. Alarmed by the aggressive tax avoidance practices of multinational corporations (MNCs) amounting to an annual loss of EUR 160-190 billion in Member States' tax revenues¹ which further stresses public budgets in times of economic difficulty,
- C. Recognising that Member States may be forced to raise taxes to compensate for these losses,
- D. Regretting that the complex international taxation system as well as legislative differences in Member States' tax regimes create legal loopholes,
- E. Bearing in mind that Member States' differing tax policy stances make comprehensive reforms and harmonisation of EU tax systems technically complicated and politically challenging,
- F. Acknowledging that the presence of MNCs is of vital importance for the economies of certain Member States such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands,
- G. Aware that private businesses' profit maximisation and competitiveness concerns constitute strong incentives for aggressive tax planning,
- H. Distressed that the competitive disadvantage suffered by small and medium sized enterprises puts them in an unfair position against MNCs employing tax avoidance methods,
- I. Concerned by the lack of transparency on Member States' national taxation of MNCs' profits and details of advance tax rulings²,

¹ European Parliamentary Research Service: 'Bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the European Union', p. 4



- J. Commending the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project³,
- K. Keeping in mind the BEPS Action 14 calling for an improvement of the existing double taxation dispute resolution mechanisms⁴,
- L. Noting with deep concern Member States' ambitions to undermine coordinated efforts in tackling tax avoidance by setting up patent box schemes⁵;
 - 1. Emphasises the need for a simplified and comprehensive EU-wide taxation system;
 - 2. Congratulates the European Commission for the relaunch of its Consolidated Common Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal⁶;

Judicial measures for closing existing loopholes within the EU

- 3. Supports the European Commission's investigations on Member States suspected of providing illegal State aid⁷ through advance tax rulings violating the principles of the EU Single Market;
- 4. Reaffirms that Value Added Tax (VAT) be charged on business-to-consumer services provided within the EU, based on the consumer's location and in accordance with the OECD International VAT/GST Guidelines⁸;
- 5. Calls upon the European Commission to assess the risks and benefits of patent box schemes in a timely and transparent manner;

Judicial measures for closing existing loopholes on a global scale

- 6. Endorses the Anti Tax Avoidance Directive⁹, in particular with regards to its provisions:
 - a. introducing exit taxation¹⁰ on the transfer of intellectual property,
 - b. limiting deductible interests payments from intercompany loan arrangements,
 - c. collecting taxes on dividends that have not been taxed outside the EU,
 - d. outlining the General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR)¹¹;
- 7. Recommends to extend the definition of MNCs' Permanent Establishment Status in the OECD Model Tax Convention¹² to include subsidiaries and auxiliary corporate structures;

² **Advance tax rulings** are means through which tax authorities grant a specific company clarity on how it is going to be taxed, which in some cases amounts to illegal State aid.

³ The **BEPS Project** is developed by the OECD/G20 and aims to equip governments with domestic and international instruments to address tax avoidance.

⁴ **Double (non-)taxation** describes whether or not a MNC is being taxed in more than just one jurisdiction, usually based on a bilateral agreement by the involved tax authorities.

⁵ A **patent box scheme** is a special tax regime for intellectual property (IP) revenues, usually designed as a tax incentive by offering reduced tax rates on revenue from IP licensing.

⁶ The **CCCTB** aims for a common set of rules for corporate tax calculations within the EU. While it would not take away Member States' sovereignty to set tax rates, it aims to consolidate the mechanisms used for asserting tax obligations.

⁷ **State aid** is any form of selective support by governments towards corporations and is interdicted by the EU's competition rules.

⁸ The **VAT/GST Guidelines** seek to address issues that arise from different VAT systems being applied in an uncoordinated way by setting standards that should ensure neutrality in cross-border trade.

⁹ The **Anti Tax Avoidance Directive** by the European Commission sets out six key anti-avoidance measures for Member States to counteract some of the most common types of aggressive tax planning.

¹⁰ **Exit taxes** are tax provisions triggered by the move of taxable assets to outside the EU.

¹¹ The **GAAR** aims to prevent Member States from granting tax benefits to those corporations who have established organisational structures with the primary purpose of avoiding paying tax.

¹² The **OECD Model Tax Convention** is an accord reached between OECD members that serves as a guideline for establishing international tax agreements.



8. Encourages the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)¹³ to assist the establishment of a Permanent Arbitration Tribunal for International Disputes, in coordination with the European Commission;

Measures to increase transparency

9. Strongly suggests the establishment of a common ownership register among Member State tax authorities which will keep records of EU's MNCs' properties, operating in line with the OECD's global standard on Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI)¹⁴;
10. Further recommends the improvement of the Tax Transparency Package (TTP)¹⁵ by standardising the report forms which would provide information on:
 - a. advanced tax rulings and cross-border tax arrangements,
 - b. MNCs' profits, number of employees, and assets;
11. Urges Member State tax authorities to prevent the abuse of double non-taxation clauses by requiring MNCs to submit information on the amount of tax due for their non-EU operations.

¹³ The **PCA** is an international organisation assisting temporary tribunals to resolve disputes amongst states, inter-governmental organisations, or private parties that derive from international agreements.

¹⁴ The **AEOI** is a global common reporting standard that includes an automatic mechanism for tax authorities to exchange relevant information.

¹⁵ The **TTP** was presented by the European Commission on 18 March, 2015 and outlines measures for increasing transparency on tax rulings.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT (DEVE)

Rethinking the Aid Architecture: In the wake of the World Humanitarian Summit 2016, how can the EU rethink its humanitarian assistance policy to ensure that it supports longer-term development while also meeting the needs of the ever-changing landscape of emergencies?

Submitted by:

Elodie Estier dos Santos (CH), Colin Ferrer (FR), Moonika Illison (EE), Nida Kadayifci (TU), Maria Koimtzoglou (GR), Carla Marin (ES), Katrina Milta (LV), Martina Plesníková (CZ), Sofia Pylypiuk (UA), Laoise Ryan (IE), Aisté Samuchovaitė (LT), Michael Steiner (AT), Sam Stronge (UK), Jan Szeląg (PL), Laura Hibberd, Chairperson (UK), Conall O'Rourke, Chairperson (IE)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Stressing the fact that the principles laid down in documents such as The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 2007¹ have been neither fully implemented nor respected,
- B. Acknowledging the differing relationships between individual Member States and recipients of aid²,
- C. Deeply concerned that certain Member States have used humanitarian aid as a tool to expand their political influence in recipient countries,
- D. Noting with regret the lack of structure and harmonisation in the provision of aid by both Member States and the EU to recipient countries, resulting in inefficient use of resources,
- E. Bearing in mind the continuing problem of aid dependency and the lack of clear planning for the transition from short-term humanitarian aid to long-term development,
- F. Alarmed by the inefficient use of funding, resulting from miscommunication between major stakeholders³,
- G. Conscious of the bureaucratic obstacles and restrictions imposed by governments and non-state actors on the supply of humanitarian aid and protection of personnel,
- H. Concerned by the complicated and lengthy administrative procedures enforced by the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)⁴ on potential partners and those applying for funding,

¹ **The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 2007** outlines the policy framework for the EU when acting in response to humanitarian crises. The Consensus sets out why, how and when the EU acts.

² **Recipients of aid** include South Sudan, Central African Republic, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sahel region, central and south America.

³ **Major stakeholders** include NGOs, UN agencies, and International Organisations.



- I. Noting with regret the lack of inclusion of local actors and communities in countries experiencing crises, in areas such as:
 - i. decision making processes,
 - ii. organisation of crisis response,
 - iii. implementation of the agreed objectives,
- J. Noting the lack of compliance with and respect for the general international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocols of 1977, particularly the rules and principles regarding civilian protection;

Consensus

1. Strongly affirms the cost effectiveness of long-term development over short-term humanitarian aid to encourage Member States to implement the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid;
2. Reiterates the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence of humanitarian aid as recommended in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid;

Cooperation

3. Urges Member States to further cooperate with the EU and act in accordance with ECHO's core principles of effectiveness, economy and efficiency by:
 - a. working closer with the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection⁵,
 - b. increasing their communication with other Member States on their activities in humanitarian aid;
4. Requests that the EU and United Nations (UN) cooperate with host governments and non-state actors by diplomatic means to ensure that humanitarian aid and personnel are protected;
5. Seeks to prevent aid dependency through collaboration between ECHO and the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) using:
 - a. an affected area's existing natural resources,
 - b. new technologies in prevention and recovery, transportation, and communication,
 - c. training on crisis response in affected areas,
 - d. the expertise of local people;
6. Appeals for the expansion of the European Emergency Disaster Response Information System (EDRIS)⁶ to allow humanitarian aid actors to share real-time information of current and planned operations and assessed needs;

ECHO

7. Directs for a clear plan of transition from humanitarian aid to long-term development to become a requirement for prospective partners seeking funding from ECHO;
8. Calls upon ECHO to consolidate the process of project proposals and the Actor-ECHO Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA)⁷ such that:

⁴ **ECHO** is the EU's primary actor in the provision of humanitarian aid, providing funding for the assistance programs of its around 200 partners.

⁵ **Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection** is in charge of development cooperation policy in the wider framework of international cooperation, adapting to the evolving needs of partner countries.

⁶ **The EDRIS** Contains real time information on ECHO and Member States' contributions to Humanitarian Aid.

⁷ **The FPA** lays out the objectives for humanitarian aid assistance and is financed by the European Commission.



- a. prospective partners approach ECHO with a completed plan for action,
 - b. the plan is reviewed by ECHO and a decision is made,
 - c. the actor-ECHO FPA is signed and the funding is provided as soon as possible if the project is approved;
9. Encourages a change to the Actor-ECHO FPA to include clauses requiring humanitarian aid actors to:
- a. directly involve and when appropriate employ local actors, recipients and communities in the provision of humanitarian aid,
 - b. use local businesses and producers when providing humanitarian aid materials;

World Humanitarian Summit

10. Instructs the promotion of the implementation and respect for the International Humanitarian Law at the World Humanitarian Summit 2016.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS (DROI)

Greater Protection for the LGBTI: What steps can the EU take to ensure equal rights for all EU citizens, regardless of their gender identity whilst taking into account different approaches by Member States?

Submitted by:

Johannes Cuellar (CH), Anna Hultengard (SE), Maria Mautino (RO), Conall Molloy (IE), Tomáš Pacovský (CZ), Nadiia Railko (UA), Mélanie Rey-Arnaud (FR), Anastasia Stavridou (GR), Finja Strehmann (AT), Markuss Sūniņš (LV), Mariann Vohmar (EE), Maria Pashi, Chairperson (CY)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Affirming that the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and human rights as outlined in:
 - i. Articles 9, 10, 19 & 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)¹,
 - ii. Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU)²,
 - iii. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights³,
- B. Fully aware that Member States have sole competence on family law, education, and criminal law,
- C. Regretting that the EU currently lacks comprehensive policies and specific strategies to protect the fundamental rights of LGBTI people,
- D. Bearing in mind the varying approaches of Member States in the recognition of same-sex marriage and the legalisation of same-sex joint and step-child adoption,
- E. Aware of the existence of the European legal framework on hate speech, blasphemy and freedom of expression,
- F. Welcoming the Equal Treatment Directive⁴'s expansion of anti-discrimination law on the grounds of sexual orientation to include social protection, access to goods and education,

¹ Eur-Lex, Treaty of the Functioning of the EU, 2012 Retrieved from: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT>

² European Commission, Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, 2009 Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm

³ European Convention on Human Rights, European Commission, 2016 Retrieved from: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf



- G. Expressing its concern that Article 19 of the Employment Equality Directive⁵ does not:
- i. protect individuals on the grounds of gender identity,
 - ii. apply to all Member States,
- H. Deeply regretting the lack of legislation ensuring LGBTI people are not discriminated against by being:
- i. refused entry to visit their partner or children in hospital,
 - ii. declined medical treatment,
 - iii. diagnosed as mentally ill,
 - iv. prohibited from donating blood,
- I. Alarmed by the practice of sex assignment surgery⁶ on intersex children prevalent in 21 Member States⁷,
- J. Noting with regret that in certain Member States legal gender recognition requires:
- i. diagnosis of mental illness, gender dysphoria or the necessity of psychological tests,
 - ii. sexual reassignment surgery or other medical treatment,
- K. Recognising that the European Commission funds Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which promote LGBTI rights, combat discrimination, and advocate policy makers through the:
- i. Rights, Equality, and Citizenship (REC) programme⁸,
 - ii. European Social Fund (ESF)⁹,
- L. Realising they key role public opinion plays in the adoption and implementation of legislation,
- M. Recognising that culture, tradition and religion play an important role in the varied acceptance of LGBTI rights across the EU,
- N. Acknowledging the lack of information and discussion in educational institutions regarding LGBTI issues which perpetuates homophobia and transphobia,
- O. Noting with regret that LGBTI individuals are discriminated against by peers in educational institutions, with over 80% of respondents in Member States recalling negative comments/bullying of LGBTI youth in school¹⁰;

⁴ **The Equal Treatment Directive** is a proposed directive which will prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in education, social protection, and access to goods and services.

⁵ **The Employment Equality Directive** prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief, age, disability, and sexual orientation and applies to employment and occupation, vocational training, and membership of employer and employee organisations.

⁶ **Sex assignment surgery** is a genital reconstruction surgery performed on intersex persons in order to change their appearance to be closer to that of either traditional male or female genitals.

⁷ European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights (FRA), Focus The Fundamental Rights Situation of Intersex People, Retrieved from: <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/fundamental-rights-situation-intersex-people>

⁸ **The Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC)** is a programme that funds civil society organisations who are promoting LGBTI rights.

⁹ **The European Social Fund (ESF)** is a programme which supports jobs, assists those seeking jobs, and ensures fairer employment opportunities.



Human Rights

1. Calls upon the European Commission to initiate amendments to Article 21 of the CFREU and Articles 10 and 19 of the TFEU to include protection against discrimination on the grounds of gender identity;
2. Encourages the Working Party on Fundamental Rights, Citizens' Rights and Free Movement of Persons (FREMP) to create an EU-wide roadmap for Member States in order to:
 - a. tackle hate speech and hate crimes,
 - b. put an end to discrimination in health care,
 - c. ensure employment and access to education,
 - d. work towards the harmonisation of family law;
3. Strongly urges the European Commission and Member States to continue ensuring that the CFREU is implemented;

Public Opinion

4. Endorses the support of NGOs focusing on LGBTI issues through:
 - a. existing programmes such as the ESF and the REC,
 - b. the provision of additional funding to NGOs operating in Eastern Member States;
5. Recommends the Directorate General on Education and Culture¹¹ develop further educational programmes for youth on topics of sexual orientation and gender identity within Member States;
6. Calls upon Member States to legislate against LGBTI hate crimes and hate speech in line with the European legal framework on hate speech, blasphemy, and freedom of expression;

Equal Rights

7. Proposes an Open Method of Coordination (OMC)¹² between Member States regarding the legalisation of same-sex civil unions, civil partnerships, child and step-child adoption;
8. Strongly urges the Council of Ministers to adopt the European Commission's 2011 proposed Regulations on matrimonial property regimes and the property consequences of registered partnerships¹³;

¹⁰ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fear, isolation, discrimination common in Europe's LGBT community, 2013, Retrieved from: <http://fra.europa.eu/en/press-release/2013/fear-isolation-and-discrimination-common-europes-lgbt-community>

¹¹ The **Directorate General for Education and Culture** (DG EAC) is the executive branch of the European Union responsible for policy on education, culture, youth, languages, and sport.

¹² **Open Method of Coordination** is a form of intergovernmental policy-making that does not result in binding EU legislative measures and does not require EU countries to introduce or amend their laws. Under this intergovernmental method, the EU countries are evaluated by one another with the Commission's role being limited to surveillance.



Anti-discrimination

9. Requests that European Commission expand the Equal Treatment Directive to include anti-discrimination on the grounds of gender identity;
10. Further recommends that the European Commission expands the parameters of protection under the Employment Equality Directive¹⁴ to include:
 - a. discrimination based on gender identity,
 - b. discrimination against intersex people;
11. Further encourages Member States to effectively work towards creating a more inclusive society for transgender, intersex, and non-binary citizens through the provision of gender neutral facilities in public institutions;

Healthcare

12. Asks Member States to reform their health care practices so that:
 - a. blood donation no longer discriminates against gay and bisexual men, and transgender women,
 - b. being LGBTI is not perceived as a medical condition,
 - c. the practice of performing involuntary and unnecessary sex assignment surgery ceases.

¹³ The **regulations** propose the increased jurisdiction, application of law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions on the property regimes of international couples, covering both matters of matrimonial property regimes and the property regimes and the property consequences of registered partnerships.

European Commission, Council Regulation, 2016 Retrieved from:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/property_matrimonial_en.pdf

¹⁴ The **Employment Equality Directive** prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion and belief, age, disability, and sexual orientation. It covers fields such as employment & occupation. The legislation sets out minimum requirements. Member States may therefore provide higher levels of protection against discrimination in national legislation.

Employment Equality Directive, European Commission, 2008. Retrieved from:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-69_en.html



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS II (LIBE II)

A New Chapter in the Fight Against Terrorism?: Following the terror attacks in Paris, a number of new measures have been proposed by the EU and Member States to address the increasing threats of terrorist attacks. How can the EU reshape its long-term counter terrorism strategy in light of these developments, to work towards the prevention of similar attacks in its territories?

Submitted by:

Lukas Burnar (AT), Sviatoslav Chernyshevskii (RU), Elie Elia (CY), Jan-Eric Fähnrich (DE), Stefan Georgescu (RO), Nadine Jansen (NL), Oleksii Kosobutskyi (UA), Daria Lochoshvili (GE), Gabriela Motyka (PL), Veeti Niskanen (FI), Lizaveta Salianik (BY), Ségolène Schrurs (BE), Rafail Tsiamis (GR), Nora Wilhelm, Chairperson (CH)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Alarmed by the increased threat posed by Islamist terrorism, with the Paris attack by Daesh¹ in November 2015 being the deadliest in France since World War II²,
- B. Noting that growing fear of terrorism leading to islamophobia and the targeting of minorities in Europe can cause further radicalisation and entrench extremist views,
- C. Deeply concerned by the unprecedented number of EU citizens drawn to extremist ideologies, with 5,000 estimated to have travelled to Iraq or Syria to undergo training in 2015 alone³,
- D. Stressing that counter-terrorism policy has to remain within the boundaries of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, particularly Art. 52(1)⁴,
- E. Fully alarmed by the organisational structure of Daesh as well as its extensive financial resources⁵,

¹ Daesh is an acronym for the Arabic phrase al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and is used by the opponents of the terrorist group for political reasons.

² Vale, P. (2015). Paris Attacks: At Least 127 Dead After Shootings, Suicide Attacks And Hostage Situation In French Capital. Retrieved from: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/11/14/paris-shooting_n_8558804.html

³ Gonzales, P. (2015). Vera Jourova : «Près de 6000 Européens sont partis faire le djihad». Le Figaro. Retrieved from: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2015/04/12/01003-20150412ARTFIG00128-vera-jourova-pres-de-6000-europeens-sont-partis-faire-le-djihad.php>

⁴ Art. 52(1) reads: Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Retrieved from: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT>



- F. Seriously concerned by Member States' nationalistic attitudes and the lack of cooperation in terms of counter-terrorism policy which weakens the European prevention and response to terrorist attacks,
- G. Noting with regret that the 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CTS)⁶ remains unrevised and has not been utilised as a framework for the EU and Member States' counter-terrorism policies,
- H. Conscious that counter-terrorism involves several policy areas and the EU competences are limited in education, social policy, and security and defence,
- I. Profoundly concerned by modern terrorists groups' use of the Internet and new communication technologies to disseminate propaganda and interact with potential recruits,
- J. Convinced that the lack of information around the cultural backgrounds of European minorities from Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries impedes their integration and fosters discrimination,
- K. Observing with regret the inconsistent and incomplete implementation of EU-wide counter-terrorism policies, especially regarding:
 - i. the usage of existing databases to share crucial information,
 - ii. external border control through European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex),
 - iii. preparedness for an attack using Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) weapons⁷,
 - iv. the threat of cyber-terrorism,
- L. Further noting various problems with EU-wide databases used for counter-terrorism, such as:
 - i. a lack of participation by Member States in the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA)⁸,
 - ii. the registration of "foreign fighters" in the Europol Information System (EIS)⁹ by only 14 Member States¹⁰,
 - iii. 60% of all data from Focal Point (FP) Travellers¹¹ coming from only five Member States and one third country¹²,
- M. Deploing the insufficient police and judicial cooperation over cross-border terrorist activities within the EU, such as:

⁵ The 2015 GDP of Daesh is estimated at USD 6 billion. (2015). Degraded, not yet destroyed. The Economist. Retrieved from: <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21679802-self-styled-caliphates-income-taking-pounding-degraded-not-yet-destroyed?src=scn/fb/te/pe/ed/degradednotyetdestroyed>

⁶ The Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CTS) is the EU's strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, through a strategic commitment focusing on the four pillars of prevent, protect, pursue and respond.

⁷ Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) refers to weaponised or non-weaponised chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials that can cause significant harm.

⁸ SIENA enables secure exchange of operational and strategic crime-related information and intelligence between Europol, Member States and third parties that have cooperation agreements with Europol.

⁹ EIS is the reference system for offences, individuals involved, and other related data to support Member States, Europol and its cooperation partners in their fight against organised crime, terrorism.

¹⁰ Kerchove, G. (2015). Report on counter-terrorist action progress. Council of the European Union. Retrieved from: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14734-2015-COR-1/en/pdf>

¹¹ FP Travelers supports EU and US law enforcement to counter foreign fighters when they return to Europe from i.e. Syria or Iraq, through identifying facilitators of travel and recruitment as well as sources of financing.

¹² Europol. (2015). Improving information and intelligence exchange in the area of counter terrorism across the EU. Council of the European Union. Retrieved from: <http://statewatch.org/news/2015/apr/eu-council-europol-exchange-of-intelligence-7272-15.pdf>



- i. the absence of legislation criminalising all types of actions promoting terrorism or preparing for the execution of a terrorist attack,
 - ii. scarce use of existing structures like the European Judicial Network (EJN),
 - N. Appreciating the impact of the EU-US Terrorism Financing Tracking Programme (TFTP)¹³ which has generated more than 14,500 intelligence leads since its inception¹⁴,
 - O. Affirming the European Commission's view that the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive¹⁵ would bring critical progress in the fight against terrorism,
 - P. Recognising the importance of the Integrated Political Crisis Response (ICPR) and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)'s role in coordinating emergency reaction units in the aftermath of terrorist attacks,
 - Q. Stressing the importance of Member States' efficient support to all victims of terrorist attacks and minorities at risk of suffering a backlash;
1. Calls for the Presidency of the European Council and the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) to suggest a revision of the CTS and establish it as the basis and framework for all further EU counter-terrorism policy;
 2. Affirms the need for the EU to focus on preventive measures addressing the root causes of terrorism and the improvement of collaboration between all stakeholders;
 3. Proclaims that before exploring new counter-terrorism measures that potentially restrict fundamental rights and freedoms, the EU should make full use of the existing structures;

Prevent

4. Suggests that the funding and personnel of Europol's Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU), introduced in 2015, be increased;
5. Proposes the DG Migration and Home Affairs strengthens the role of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) to:
 - a. include responses to requests for support from Member States,
 - b. serve as a coordination hub for prevention initiatives inside and outside EU;
6. Commends the expansion the European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services' (EUOPRIS) mandate to promote exchange on best practices in training local actors on how to prevent radicalisation in prisons by the European Agenda on Security;
7. Invites all Member States to ratify the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation on Education and Training (ET 2020);
8. Recommends the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) extend the capacity of existing agencies such as Syria Strategic Communication Team (SSCAT);

Protect

¹³ The TFTP is an international agreement on financial messaging data transfers to the U.S for purposes of identifying, tracking and pursuing terrorists and their networks.

¹⁴ Europol. (2015). Enhancing counter terrorism capabilities at EU level: European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol and counter terrorism related information sharing. Note. Retrieved from: <http://www.statwatch.org/news/2015/nov/eu-council-europol-ECTC-14244-15.pdf>

¹⁵ The proposal for a Directive on PNR, regulating the use of PNR data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences was finally endorsed by the LIBE Committee in December 2015.



9. Endorses the European Commission's proposal for a single European Border and Coast Guard designed to support all Schengen countries in meeting recent challenges like migration and internal security;
10. Supports the EU CBRN Action Plan based on the 2007 JHA Decision which prioritises CBRN security on a European level and enhances Europe's preparedness for such attacks;
11. Encourages all Member States to ratify the Convention on Cybercrime;
12. Asks that the Europol's European Cybercrime Centre becomes a central information hub for law enforcement in the area of cybercrime across the EU;

Pursue

13. Strongly urges all stakeholders to make thorough use of existing databases and duly contribute to them;
14. Welcomes the declaration of the EU CTC to extend the usage of the Prüm Framework by all Member States to its full potential through:
 - a. the implementation of their legal obligations,
 - b. the integration of the network with their own systems,
 - c. the automation of comparison of DNA profiles, fingerprint data and vehicle registration data;
15. Approves the proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism implementing new international standards to, amongst others, criminalise travel abroad or the support thereof, for terrorism purposes;
16. Urges the European Parliament and the Council of the EU to vote in favour of the aforementioned Directive;
17. Requests the European Commission reconsider the creation of a complementary EU system for tracking terrorist financing (EU TFTP)¹⁶;
18. Calls upon the European Parliament and Council of the EU to vote in favour of the EU PNR Directive;
19. Further encourages the police and judicial forces of Member States investigating terrorism related offences to take use of EJM for the execution of arrests, freezing of assets, and confiscation orders;

Respond

20. Expresses its hope that all Member States will ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;
21. Reiterates its support for the proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism.

¹⁶ After concluding in its Communication of November 2013 that the case to present a proposal for an EU TFTP was not clearly demonstrated, the European Commission positively mentioned the tool again in February 2016 in its latest Action Plan to strengthen the fight against terrorist financing.



FACT SHEET

THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS II

Prevent

Europol's Internet Referral Unit (EU IR) refers the terrorism-related content to Internet service providers for their removal, and supports Member States with operational and strategic analysis.

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) brings together practitioners from around Europe working on the prevention of radicalisation.

Syria Strategic Communication Team (SSCAT) is a pilot project financed by the EU, whose aim is to exchange best practices in the area of strategic communication to preventing radicalisation.

Education and Training 2020 (ET 2020) is the strategic framework for cooperation in education amongst Member States.

European Agenda on Security has defined terrorism as one of three priorities and emphasises the importance of information exchange and cross-border cooperation.

Protect

EU CBRN Action Plan provides an all-hazard approach focusing on the prevention, detection, preparedness and response to CBRN threats.

The European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), founded in 2013, aims to strengthen the law enforcement response to cybercrime in the EU. It serves as a central hub for criminal information and intelligence.

The Council's **Budapest Convention on Cybercrime** seeks to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime.

The creation of a **European Border and Coast Guard** was proposed by the Commission in 2015 to meet the new challenges faced by the Schengen area, both as regards migration and internal security.

Pursue

The proposal for a **Directive on PNR (Passenger Name Record)**, regulating the use of PNR data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences was finally endorsed by the LIBE Committee in December 2015.

European Judicial Network (EJN) is a network of national authorities in charge of international judicial cooperation, judicial authorities seeking to improve, facilitate and speed up international judicial cooperation.

A proposal for a **Directive on Combating Terrorism** has been put forward at the end of 2015 by the European Commission. It criminalises travel to third countries with terrorist intentions and complements the EU policy in the area of victims' rights.

The **Prüm framework** enables Member States to do searches in the DNA analysis files, fingerprint identification systems and vehicle registration databases.

Respond

The **Integrated Political Crisis Response (ICPR)** permits a coordinated response at the EU level and the necessary support from EU institutions and services in the context of a crisis and its evolution.

The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) was set up to support a coordinated and quicker response to disasters using resources from the countries participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, written by the Council of Europe, sets forth a number of principles according to which States are to develop specific policies to protect the rights of minorities.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS II (AFCO II)

Addressing British Sentiment: In light of the imminent referendum in Britain on whether to remain in the EU, what stance should the EU take on the renegotiations and how far should the EU try to accommodate Britain's 'wish list' in order to ensure their continued support for the European project?

Submitted by:

Sonja Berger (AT), Sophia Bilenko (UA), Cansu Zeynep Dölek (TR), Lucy Fowler (UK), Elizabete Gaile (LV), Kamila Giec (PL), Tereza Kalousová (CZ), Marie Lapayre (FR), Sofia Mitrousi (GR), Ultan O'Rourke (IE), Anete Hela Pulk (EE), Kasparas Ragaišis (LT), Alcidia Ramos Barros (CH), Dorothea Weber, Chairperson (DE)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Acknowledging the result of the European Council renegotiation in February 2016, where Britain's 'wish list'¹ was widely accommodated,
- B. Noting with regret the increasing dissatisfaction of both civilians and politicians on:
 - i. the lack of sovereignty within the EU, especially on the matter of social benefits granted to other EU citizens,
 - ii. their excessive national contributions to the EU budget, in the case of financially stronger Member States,
 - iii. the pressure and control financially stronger Member States exert on financially weaker Member States,
 - iv. the highly unnecessary bureaucracy regarding trade policies,
 - v. the unequal flow and distribution of refugees,
- C. Fully alarmed that the possibility of Brexit enhances the influence of Eurosceptic parties²,
- D. Noting with deep concern that Member States' governments may use the British renegotiations as leverage to demand individual opt-outs and to hold their own referenda,
- E. Fully aware of the possibility that the potential dissociation from the EU in the case of a Member State's withdrawal will likely result in difficulties in international cooperation and longer bureaucratic processes,

¹The renegotiation results include that references to an ever-closer union do not apply to the United Kingdom, and there is an emergency break for suspending benefit payments for EU citizens in the UK.

²Polls in the UK have shown a move towards the UK Independence Party.



- F. Deeply concerned about the changes and difficulties which in case of a Member State's exit, tourists, its citizens living in other Member States and EU citizens living in that Member State will experience,
 - G. Taking into consideration that the UK's importance as the second largest economy and one of the main contributors to the EU budget, might lead to high economic losses in case of an exit, which would need to be compensated for by the remaining Member States,
 - H. Recognising that political instability caused by a potential exit of a Member State, particularly the UK, would bring financial instability, making the EU market unappealing to foreign investors,
 - I. Alarmed by the possibility that private enterprises will face new challenges due to the weakened Single Market³ following the exit of a Member State, especially the UK,
 - J. Taking into account that Brexit would reduce the EU's international influence due to the strength of the British economy and Britain's close relationship with the USA,
 - K. Conscious that the UK may experience weaker political status and weakened trade relations both within and outside of Europe during the negotiations of new treaties,
 - L. Recognising with concern that Brexit could result in the fragmentation of the UK;
1. Highlights the fact that the clauses herein do not address speculations regarding the consequences of the potential Brexit or any other possible withdrawal from the EU;

Sovereignty

2. Urges the European Council to reconsider the preamble of the Treaty on European Union, which obliges all Member States to aspire towards an "ever closer union"⁴;
3. Promotes a Europe à la carte⁵ model which would grant Member States more flexibility while maintaining the four freedoms⁶ of the EU outlined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union⁷;
4. Calls upon the European Council to renegotiate the distribution of competences⁸ between the Member States and the European Union;
5. Requests the European Commission to initiate a treaty change to implement possible alterations to the distributions of competences;
6. Proposes the active involvement of the legislative bodies of Member States in cutting red tape⁹ by:

³**The Single Market** refers to the EU as one territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods and services.

⁴**The Treaty on European Union** forms the basis of EU law, by setting out general principles of the EU's purpose, the governance of its central institutions, as well as the rules on external, foreign and security policy.

⁵**Europe à la carte** is the idea of a non-uniform method of European integration which allows Member States to select policies, as if from a menu, and involve themselves fully in those policies, while retaining a minimum number of common objectives. Europe 'à la carte' is already a reality with some Member States being part of the Eurozone and others not.

⁶**The four freedoms** refer to the free movement of goods, workers, capital, and the freedom to provide services.

⁷**The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union** forms the detailed basis of **EU law**, by setting out the scope of the EU's authority to legislate and the principles of law in those areas where EU law operates.

⁸ Some competences rest with the EU, others with the participating Member States. There are exclusive competences, shared competences, supporting competences.

⁹**Red tape** is a series of actions or complicated tasks that seem unnecessary but that a government or organization requires you to do in order to get or do something.



- a. reviewing regulations approved by the European Commission during the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)¹⁰ process,
- b. reforming existing regulations firstly on an EU level and then on a national level in the afore-mentioned way;

Domino effect

7. Encourages enhancing education on the benefits of EU membership through:
 - a. recommending that Member States introduce education on the EU to their national curricula, following the examples of Austria and Germany,
 - b. allocating EU funding for existing and new projects such as ‘Understanding Europe’¹¹ and the European Youth Parliament;

Maintaining European cooperation

8. Appeals to any Member State which leaves the EU to:
 - a. stay active in European foreign affairs by communicating through annual summits,
 - b. keep their position in the Single Market,
 - c. establish and implement mutually beneficial agreements in areas such as but not limited to intercultural exchange, research and internal security.

¹⁰**The RIA** is a systemic approach to critically assessing the positive and negative effects of proposed and existing regulations and non-regulatory alternatives.

¹¹**“Understanding Europe”** is a project of the Schwarzkopf Foundation, which organises EU crash courses in schools to give young people a basic understanding of European politics.



MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS I (LIBE I)

Moving Beyond the Border Crisis: In light of the ongoing refugee crisis and the differing political responses from Member States, how can the EU ensure that its short-term measures are translated into a holistic approach to the crisis?

Submitted by:

Cheyenne Alves (PT), Başak Berument (TR), Aurora Dell'Agli (IT), Tomáš Foster (CZ), Camille Garnier (FR), Erik Jahn (DE), Ida Lindqvist (FI), Judit Lladós (ES), Matas Merfeldas (LT), Dilara Öztürk (CH), Eva Prskalo (BE), Viktoria Ruci (AL), João Moreira, Chairperson (PT)

The European Youth Parliament,

- A. Aware that in 2015, over a million migrants and refugees arrived in Europe by sea¹ and there were over 1.2 million asylum applications in EU countries²,
- B. Deeply conscious that as of 3 March 2016, only around 10% of migrants from Syria and Iraq had reached Europe, with the vast majority registering in Turkey (2.7 million), Lebanon (1.1 million) and Jordan (639,704)³,
- C. Alarmed by the fact that the aforementioned countries provide no legal protection or status allowing asylum seekers to officially and permanently work, reside, or seek refugee status,
- D. Profoundly concerned that Gulf countries such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have not offered any resettlement places to Syrian refugees, despite their geographic proximity to the main refugee points of departure,
- E. Deeply disturbed that in 2015 more than 3,770 migrants⁴ are estimated to have died while attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe,
- F. Aware that the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex)⁵ failed to adequately tackle the smuggling of people across the Mediterranean,
- G. Noting with deep concern that around 90%⁶ of migrants were illegally smuggled into the EU in 2015,

¹ Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response. UNHCR. 2016. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php>

² Asylum Statistics. Eurostat. 2016. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics

³ Inter-agency information sharing portal. UNHCR. 2016. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>

⁴ Missing Migrants Project. International Organization for Migration. 2016. Retrieved from <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean>

⁵ **Frontex** is the European Agency that promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights applying the concept of Integrated Border Management.



- H. Emphasising that differing national asylum systems have been an important factor in the differences between number of asylum claims made in each Member State,
- I. Alarmed by the establishment of temporary border controls and the erection of razor wire fences along some Member States' borders within the Schengen Zone,
- J. Noting with regret that the European Commission's mandatory quota system to distribute 160,000 refugees across Member States has only managed to reallocate 272⁷ refugees roughly four months after its implementation,
- K. Fully believing that the Regulation No 604/2013⁸ is outdated, inadequate and unable to cope with such a large number of migrant arrivals, as demonstrated by only 13,210 asylum applications out of over 800,000 arrivals being registered in Greece in 2015⁹,
- L. Fully aware of the challenges of integrating refugees into a new social, economic, and cultural background, particularly with regards to:
 - i. social acceptance in a community,
 - ii. the recognition of previously attained educational degrees,
 - iii. access to the job market,
- M. Observing that the majority of migrants and refugees possess high levels of education, such as in the Netherlands where 30% of registered Syrian asylum seekers in the first half of 2015 had a university or equivalent education and almost 70% had secondary education¹⁰,
- N. Concerned with the biased and negative portrayal of migrants and refugees by mass media outlets and in far right propaganda;

Tackling the Mediterranean death tolls and the proliferation of people smuggling

- 1. Urges that the European Commission's proposal of establishing a European Border and Coast Guard is implemented before June 2016, immediately prioritising search and rescue operations that combine infrastructure, expertise and best practises from Frontex's Mare Nostrum and Triton operations;
- 2. Directs Europol's European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC)¹¹ to closely cooperate with Turkish, Lebanese and Libyan authorities in the dismantling of smuggling networks across the Mediterranean;
- 3. Encourages a sustained and coordinated response from civil society and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) through:
 - a. active voluntary involvement in search and rescue operations,
 - b. the improvement of immediate reception conditions through measures such as the provision of clothes, medical assistance and collection of leftover food from restaurants and supermarkets,

⁶ European Migrant Smuggling Centre. Europol. 2016. Retrieved from https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/EMSC_launch

⁷ Refugees Daily. UNHCR. 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=568e0e875>

⁸ **Regulation No 604/2013**, Commonly known as the Dublin Regulation, establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)

⁹ Asylum and managed migration. Eurostat. 2016. Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database>

¹⁰ The Economist. Cambridge Occupational Analysts. 2015. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/news/business/21679791-businesses-could-benefit-and-refugees-integrate-faster-if-newcomers-europe-were-able?fsrc=scn/fb/te/pe/ed/gettingnewarrivalstowork>

¹¹ **European Migrant Smuggling Centre** - The goal of the Centre is to proactively support EU Member States in dismantling criminal networks involved in organised migrant smuggling.



- c. raising awareness on online registration opportunities to donate to and volunteer in refugee camps;

Reshaping the Dublin System and adaptation of the refugee redistribution quota system

4. Asks the European Commission to initiate the amendment of Regulation No 604/2013 so as to abolish the criteria demanding refugees apply for asylum in their first country of entry in the EU;
5. Strongly affirms the need to adapt the European Commission's mandatory refugee redistribution quota system which would:
 - a. be used for allocating refugees across Member States according to periodic assessments of their financial, geographic and demographic capacities,
 - b. allow Member States to allocate funds to support the quota system's financial and logistical requirements instead of accepting refugees;
6. Recommends that the European Commission further empowers and increases the number of hotspots¹² for migrant registration and fingerprint processing upon entrance into the EU in countries that receive the vast majority of migrants and refugees, such as Greece and Italy;
7. Designates that after the registration and fingerprint processing in the dedicated hotspots:
 - a. refugees will be allocated to a single responsible Member State based on the quota system in place and family reunification considerations already at the hotspots,
 - b. the responsible Member State is then legally obliged to transfer the designated refugees into its territory where they will officially apply for asylum,
 - c. in case of a positive decision the assessment of the migrant's education level and language skills should follow, thereby guiding and facilitating their entrance in the job market or education system;
8. Declares accordingly the immense importance of full compliance with the Schengen Area requirements allowing the establishment of border control mechanisms solely in case of emergency;
9. Expresses its hope that Member States can still strive towards the harmonisation of their asylum systems while maintaining their national sovereignty;

Integration of refugees in asylum-granting countries

10. Affirms that refugees constitute a strategic long-term economic and demographic advantage for an ageing European continent;
11. Trusts civil society and educational institutions to play a key role in the integration of refugees into societies by:
 - a. encouraging higher education students to enrich their curriculum by voluntarily offering language and cultural courses adaptable to all age groups,
 - b. promoting the creation of exchange programmes and internships in refugee camps and hotspots for higher education students,
 - c. offering local volunteering opportunities to refugees such as helping elderly people, working at orphanages, and undertaking community work;

Foreign affairs and diplomatic relationships

¹² **Hotspots** are EU-run reception centres in frontline Member States like Italy and Greece that identify and fingerprint migrants and refugees.



12. Calls upon the Gulf countries to assume a more active role within the region and provide humanitarian aid to neighbouring countries struggling with overwhelming numbers of migrants and refugees;
13. Calls for donor nations, NGOs, and the private sector to increase voluntary contributions to the United Nation's Annual Programme Budget, improving their presence and the conditions in refugee camps all over Europe, Northern Africa, and the Middle East;
14. Supports the recent developments on the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan aimed at progressively helping to reduce people smuggling, deaths at sea, and improving conditions for refugees waiting to seek asylum in Europe;
15. Further suggests that:
 - a. the deal should be expanded as soon as possible to include asylum seekers of all nationalities,
 - b. the funding granted by the EU for the Turkish Facility for Refugees, humanitarian assistance to refugees and education of Syrian children should be carefully supervised and monitored,
 - c. 6-month and renewable working visas in Turkish territory for refugees should be included in Europe's negotiation requests.



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Charitable Trust



An Roinn Gnóthaí Eachtracha agus Trádála
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