

AGORA ON SECURITY KYÏV
European Youth Parliament Ukraine

Final Report



Programme

Agora Symposium Day 2

November 8, 2014

09:30 - 11:00	Discussions
	Financial dimension Environmental dimension
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee break
11:30 - 13:45	Discussions
	Military dimension Health dimension Governance dimension
13:45 - 14:45	Lunch
14:45 - 16:15	Discussions
	Trade dimension Energy dimension
16:15 - 16:30	Coffee break
16:30 - 18:00	Discussions
	Cyber dimension Agronomy dimension
18:00 - 19:00	Working groups
19:00 - 19:30	Closing of the Agora Symposium

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1 Final Report on the Financial Dimension

2 ***Free trade and breaking down national trade restrictions are founding principles of***
3 ***the EU. What should the balance be between these concepts and utilising economic***
4 ***sanctions to achieve foreign policy aims? What should be the role of the banking and***
5 ***financial sector in economic sanctions?***

6 Members of the Working Group

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8 **Maryna Petrenko (UA), Giulia Pilia (IT), Aleksander Pudłowski (PL), Nataliia**
9 **Senatorova (UA), Ozkal Sonmez (TR), Iryna Struk (UA), moderated by Noura Berrouba**
10 **(SE),**

11 Introduction

12 One of the founding principles of the European Union (EU) is the single market, which
13 introduced free movement of goods, services, capital and people. In the past seventy years
14 several steps have been taken in Europe to achieve this objective: the European Coal and
15 Steel Community (ECSC, 1951), the European Economic Community (EEC 1957), the
16 Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). In the course of the last
17 decades, the EU has also developed many Free Trade Agreements (FTA) which introduce
18 free trade zones with non-member countries.

19 However, the EU is not just an economic partnership, but also a political one, created after
20 the second world war to promote peace on the continent. Implementation of economic
21 sanctions is a method for dealing with severe violations and therefore works as a foreign
22 policy tool.

23 EU Member states have committed themselves to a Common Foreign Security Policy
24 (CFSP) for the EU. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSFP) aims to strengthen
25 the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in
26 Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management. To influence policies violating international law
27 or human rights, or policies that disregard rule of law or democratic principles, the EU has
28 designed sanctions of a diplomatic or economic nature.

29 The banking sector plays a crucial role in the implementation of economic sanctions. The
30 role of the banking and financial sector in foreign policy and economic sanctions has two
31 aspects. On the one hand, there is the possibility to use this sector and these stakeholders
32 in implementing economic sanctions through the freezing of assets. On the other hand, the
33 banking and financial sector can also be targeted in economic sanctions. One example of
34 this is the sanction tool the EU used against Iran in 2012 and are threatening to use against

35 Russia now: locking the country (and ultimately the banking and financial sector in the
36 country) out of the SWIFT interbank payments system¹.

37 Topic Analysis

38 With 28 Member States, the EU has to cope with the issue of compromising with conflicting
39 national interests in foreign policy. With the complexity of the EU decision-making process,
40 reaching an agreement is an even more difficult task. An additional obstacle arises as
41 individual Member States may benefit economically when a sanction is imposed by a non-
42 EU country on a competing EU state.

43 Within the subject of sanctions there is the inherent contradiction of the principle of free trade
44 and the economical constriction that sanctions are meant to impose. The aim of the EU is to
45 establish more FTA in general, but also with specific countries and regions, for example the
46 EU-ASEAN FTA. The application of sanctions has steadily increased during recent decades,
47 both by the EU and the United States. Both are influential actors and set examples that
48 influence the international approach to the function of sanctions. In that sense they are both
49 active in the contradiction of supporting free trade and at the same time enforcing economic
50 sanctions.

51 The EU system of autonomous sanctions ²includes diverse mechanisms aiming at various
52 effects. One problem the working group has identified is a lack of consistency and coherency
53 in the process of deciding to impose autonomous sanctions on third party countries, as a
54 case-to-case approach is being used, resulting in double standards and unequal treatment.
55 Examples of such cases include the lack of sanctions against countries with strong
56 economic relationships to the EU where repeated breaches of international law and human
57 rights have been made. From a short term perspective it may not be of interest to get rid of
58 these double standards that are serving national needs, but it may be in the EU's interests in
59 the long term.

60 Imposing sanctions can have unforeseeable effects and negative drawbacks, both in the
61 economic and political sector. An example of this unfavorable change of global setting would
62 be the strengthening of the relationship between Russia and China after EU sanctions were
63 imposed on Russia.

64 The participants of the working group consider embargos as one of the most radical
65 measures that can be imposed on other countries' economies. However, with such an action

¹ The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication system (SWIFT) is a secure messaging system used by more than 10 000 banks for international money transfers. Without SWIFT, banks and their customers can't readily send or receive money across the country's borders, which would have negative effects on trade, investment and millions of routine financial transactions. SWIFT has to comply with EU decisions because the organisation is incorporated under Belgian law.

² Certain EU measures are imposed by Resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The EU may however decide to apply autonomous measures in addition to the UN's measures or adopt restrictive measures autonomously.

a number of consequences can be expected. Among those consequences are the spread of grey markets ³such as the market created by Russia purchasing EU produced goods through third countries (such as Belarus and Turkey), oversupply, and changes in trade routes, which leads to the appearance of new market competitors. All of these consequences are problematic in themselves.

Moreover, when the targeted countries are politically and economically unstable, sanctions can have various unpredictable effects, which are not always considered.

Financial institutions face a common challenge caused by the need to comply with imposed sanction measures. Banks may suffer from reverse effects and results because the fractional reserve banking system ⁴is particularly sensitive to changes in liquidity. In particular banks with a high ratio of foreign assets in their portfolio are vulnerable to the consequences of freezing assets as this could result in a liquidity problem for the bank.

Avis

As something that is not regulated by international or national legislation, but only in compliance with the CFSP⁵, sanctions are applied with different standards from case to case, causing the aforementioned issue of double standards. A possible approach to tackle this issue is the drafting of a strict framework with general guidelines regulating the implementation and application of autonomous sanctions within the CFSP. The framework would be implemented through an actor-based approach, which would analyse the various reasons for which sanctions could be imposed, as well as the current situation and the possible effects different sanctions would lead to. Therefore, it would provide guidelines to ensure a higher consistency in imposing sanctions, as well as limiting the flexibility of cases of sanction application and the influence of previously established international relations.

In addition, governments and international organisations should base the sanctions' elaboration process on accurate and comprehensive analysis of the possible consequences. The establishment of an independent advisory body would fill this gap and provide the necessary analysis. Nevertheless, the group pointed out that due to the significant political agendas surrounding sanctions, such an organ can easily become politicised, risking inconsistency that would undermine its intention and purpose. Also, the group considered that in order to have a more comprehensive overview of the sanctions and to provide useful

³ A grey market is the trade of a commodity through distribution channels which, while legal, are unofficial, unauthorized, or unintended by the original manufacturer.

⁴ Fractional-reserve banking is the practice whereby a bank holds reserves (to satisfy demands for withdrawals) that are less than the amount of its customers' deposits. Reserves are held at the bank as currency, or as deposits in the bank's accounts at the central bank. Because bank deposits are usually considered money in their own right, fractional-reserve banking permits the money supply to grow beyond the amount of the underlying reserves of base money originally created by the central bank.

⁵ See Annex 1.

96 analysis for future cases, there should be more thorough evaluations of the effects of
97 sanctions imposed by the EU⁶.

98 The working group encourages the creation of an EU agency with the status of “Community
99 Agency”⁷. The agency’s task would be to research and analyse previously imposed
100 sanctions and their consequences.

101 A response to the economic impact of these interventions on the internal market is that the
102 governments which are involved in the sanction-making could take steps to compensate the
103 shortages and effects that will occur in the internal market. One of the options that could be
104 considered is the regulation of tariffs and, in more critical cases, even the function of
105 imposing a price ceiling. However, the effect and the impact of the issue needs in to be
106 addressed. Regarding the subject of possible long-term effects, governments and European
107 institutions also might have to deal with the possibility of general economic effects and, in
108 the end, even possible economic stagnation.

109 The group agreed that the European Commission should create a directive preventing EU
110 Member States from taking advantage of the opportunity to enter a new market when
111 another Member State is excluded from it by sanctions⁸. The working group agreed that the
112 process of creating such a directive is a lengthy and complicated process and therefore
113 decided not to further discuss the implementation of the directive as there was a lack of time.

114 In order to lower the level of the sanction-related risk of lack of liquidity for banks, the
115 working group suggested the adoption of a binding policy which would provide an action
116 plan with a set of preventive measures. Raising the level of bank reserves in proportion to
117 their foreign assets may lead to a lower level of income in a short-term perspective, but in
118 future it could protect the bank from liquidity problems if they are required to freeze assets
119 because of sanctions.

120 Another problem discussed was the vulnerability of certain sectors due to an over
121 dependency on a single supplier of goods, or on a certain consumer group. Countries should
122 be aware of the vulnerability of each of their own sectors with regards to all the possible
123 events, in order to be free in applying restrictive measures. The group believes the EU
124 needs to be completely independent and limit the vulnerability of its sectors. There was an
125 agreement that the most effective way to guarantee security and limit vulnerability of a
126 country is to diversify its import and export mix, both in terms of typology and in terms of
127 foreign supplier and/or consumer.

⁶ See Annex 2

⁷ A Community agency is a body governed by European public law; it is distinct from the Community Institutions (Council, Parliament, Commission, etc.) and has its own legal personality. It is set up by an act of secondary legislation in order to accomplish a very specific technical, scientific or managerial task.

⁸ An example can be the fact that the gap left by the sanctions on Russian products can enable Estonian and German goods to take over the Russian market.

To diminish the impact of consequences that may appear after implementation of embargos on several types of products, when developing the common trade policy, the focus should be on diversification of customers and supply markets, trying to seek not only the most profitable solution in the short term. It should rather try to look at the long-term perspective in order to reduce the level of reliance on a small number of suppliers or customers. Some participants argued that countries are already trying to diversify their suppliers, but that this drawback should be considered as a further incentive when developing diversification.

Annex

Annex 1. Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST+15114+2005+INIT>

Annex 2. Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force (Regulations based on Article 215 TFEU and Decisions adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy)

http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf

Annex 3. Sanctions vs human rights

"Restrictive measures must respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular due process and the right to an effective remedy in full conformity with the jurisprudence of the EU Courts."

http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm

1 Final Report on the Environmental Dimension

2 ***Climate change has caused increasingly severe weather conditions in recent years. In***
3 ***light of warnings of climate change-related conflicts, what should be done to ensure***
4 ***the safety of the European population and their food supply in this new environment?***

5 Members of the Working Group

6 **Alexandra Bitea (RO), Giorgi Elisashvili (GE), Darya Halavashka (GY), Lisa Lacroix**
7 **(DE), Iuliia Mishyna (UA), Robert Netzband (DE), Rafiz Novruzov (AZ), Sofiia Sergulia**
8 **(UA), Natalya Stupynets (UA), moderated by Drazen Puklavec (HR)**

9 Introduction

10 Recent research into climate change reveals alarming data. We should take into
11 consideration the fact that in the past three decades, more than a third of the world's natural
12 resources have been consumed. Based on the calculations of The Global Footprint
13 Network¹, humanity needs the capacity of 1.5 planets to sustain its current consumption
14 habits. However, it is important to note that this figure varies between different countries.²

15 In the 21st century the world is facing numerous challenges. One of the most crucial is
16 certainly climate change, of which the most significant cause is the burning of fossil fuels.
17 We emphasise that environmental changes have a global impact. The use of non-renewable
18 resources and environmentally damaging human activities like deforestation also contribute
19 to acceleration of global warming. Governments all over the world have to adapt to these
20 challenges, look for alternative sources of energy production and decrease CO₂ emissions.

21 Renewable energy sources can be considered to be a crucial solution for the problems
22 caused by changes in climate. The working group defines renewable energy as energy that
23 is derived from sources that are naturally replenished, such as sunlight, wind, rain, tides,
24 wave power, hydro-electric power and geothermal heat. Renewable energy can be
25 particularly effective in replacing conventional fuels in four distinct areas: electricity
26 generation, domestic and small scale hot water and heating, transportation, and rural (off-
27 grid) energy services. Furthermore, we emphasise that we do not consider nuclear power as
28 a sustainable energy source for the future.

29

¹ see annex 1

² see annex 1

30 Topic Analysis

31 Due to humankind's irresponsibility, there have been many environmental catastrophes that
32 have resulted in great damage.³

33 Growing human demand for natural resources, driven by continued population growth and
34 increasing individual consumption, has resulted in large-scale land conversion
35 (deforestation, urbanisation) and the resulting loss of biodiversity. Based on the data from
36 multiple reports we can state that humans are consuming 30 % more resources than the
37 Earth can replenish each year. This leads to soil degradation, air and water pollution, and
38 dramatic decline of the populations of fish and other species.

39 The problems we face are worsening because populations and consumption are increasing
40 faster than technology finds new ways of increasing production from the nature.

41 Modern society is unaware of the negative consequences of the current rate of consumption.
42 Thus inefficient energy usage continues and energy production methods remain traditional.
43 All this leads to irreversible changes in the ecosystem

44 However, the working group did take into consideration that not all types of renewable
45 energy resources are environmentally friendly, and that some can have a significant
46 negative impact both on our lives and nature. For example, hydro-electric power stations
47 generate renewable energy, but they can have several negative impacts on the environment.
48 Since not all alternative methods of extracting energy are environmentally friendly, we
49 should review their use.

50 Switching to renewable energy sources could help to lower dependency on exhaustive
51 energy resources in the future, but the transition would be expensive. Once completed, it
52 could not only reduce energy prices, but also lower a nation's impact on the environment.
53 The biggest single obstacle to this change is the lobbying of the conventional energy
54 industry that aims to keep the public opinion sceptical about renewable energy production.
55 These fears should be answered and can be resolved through informational campaigns that
56 highlight the possible benefits, especially financial, for corporations and industries. A good
57 example is the German energy transition, its green NGOs and the Green Party.
58 Furthermore, strong public support of the renewable energy industry has allowed Germany
59 to stop using nuclear power and switch to renewable sources, shaping a more
60 environmentally friendly economy.

61 Reports from around the world compiled by the World Watch Institute show that global ice-
62 melting accelerated during the 1990s, which was also the warmest decade on record. Ice

³ see annex 2

63 melting raises the ocean level, changes ecosystems and even threatens urban areas in
64 coastal regions⁴.

65 The accelerating pace of global development and increasing quality of life lead to an ever
66 greater demand for water. Consequently, the volume of inefficiently used water is increasing
67 from day to day. The scarcity of fresh water is a crucial problem to solve. Currently 884
68 million people in the world drink unclean water. Because of this, annually 1,8 million people
69 die from polluted water consumption.⁵

70 Global warming and its consequences, such as extreme weather conditions, also heavily
71 impact on food production. For example, fish stocks decline due to water pollution and
72 increased sea surface temperatures, whilst grain production falls due to droughts and a
73 lower level of humidity. Consequently depleting fish stocks cause smaller fish catches. The
74 shortfall in demand for fish is then produced through fish farming. However, this method is
75 one of the most harmful aquaculture production practices, as it disrupts the marine
76 ecosystem.

77 Food resources are limited and the unequal geographical distribution of food production
78 results in 1 in 8 people across the world lacking adequate nutrition. Economic factors result
79 in the use inefficient food production methods, instead of the tailoring of methods to local
80 geography. Due to a lack of information, people do not change their food consumption
81 habits. That is why the food production industry continues to aggravate the global warming
82 problem.

83 **Avis**

84 Climate change is interconnected to many different areas. While discussing the topic the
85 working group decided to focus on four main issues: waste of natural resources, renewable
86 energy, water consumption and food production

87 The working group aimed to rethink consumption and thus realised that too many resources
88 are wasted. Even though scarcity of natural resources becomes more and more acute,
89 natural resources and the environment can be adequately preserved by investment in
90 conservation and anti-pollution activities such as reforestation, soil erosion prevention (such
91 as terracing)⁶, and cleaning of gas emission. In order to promote these activities, countries
92 need to encourage innovations, regulate and tax natural resource utilisation, and establish
93 governmental and non-governmental bodies for environmental monitoring.

94 We welcome certain lifestyle changes that an increasing percentage of the global population
95 is practicing such as purchasing products with less packaging, composting food scraps
96 rather than buying fertilizer, all of which preserve natural resources.

⁴ see annex 4

⁵ see annex 5

⁶ see annex 6

It is important to note that the transformation of the economy away from non-renewable energy resources to environmentally friendly energy production will significantly decrease the impact we have on the environment.

In addition we are aware of the tremendous risks of fracking and we discourage any usage of this technology. We follow the conviction that the future should not be nuclear, considering the problems of nuclear waste disposal, potential safety risks, as well as high indirect CO₂ emissions compared to, for example, wind energy.

The working group also suggests the introduction of strict energy efficiency standards for cars, housing and electronic devices, as well as for the industry and service sectors. In addition, support of research into renewable energy technologies would strengthen the sector and provide more funds for sustainable energy options rather than subsidising sources of “dirty energy”. A global initiative including national and local government in an economic strategy is needed to work towards reducing greenhouse gas levels and replant forests across the world.

We also welcome initiatives that reward sustainable business practices, like the Australian Business Award for Sustainability⁷ and tax cuts to support the attractiveness of green business.

Regarding management of water resources, we suggest a campaign on improving water purification methods. A proposed solution would be to obtain water from dew, along with seawater or rain. An estimated 70% of clean water is used for agriculture, however the processes involved pollute the water with many harmful chemicals. To solve this situation we can implement agriculture technologies such as drip-drop, purifying rain water or desalinating seawater.

The necessity for global discussion on water issues is evident. The global community has to pool its resources in order to solve this crucial problem. We hope that a new global strategy will be introduced at the United Nations Climate Change Conference⁸ of 2015 and that it will introduce stricter global regulations that equally include all countries.

We expect the COP21 to result in legislation that promotes the responsible usage of soil and encourages innovative technologies. Local responsible and sustainable food production, along with more affordable access to organic and fair trade products, should in particular be supported. We should also consider a smarter agriculture strategy and innovative methods in order to prevent waste of necessary resources.

⁷ see annex 6

⁸ see annex 7

129 Annex

130 Annex 1. The Global Footprint Network is an international think tank that provides Ecological
131 Footprint accounting tools to drive informed policy decisions in a resource-constrained world.

132 <http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/>

133 Annex 2. China has the largest ecological footprint, but on a per capita basis it falls slightly
134 below the average; if everybody on earth lived as a resident of China lives, only 1.2 planets
135 would be required. Qatar, on the other hand, has the highest per capita rate of consumption,
136 with each individual requiring the resources of 6.5 planets.

137 <http://www.countercurrents.org/yeo210813.htm>

138 Annex 3. During the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, more than 200 million gallons of crude oil
139 was released into the Gulf of Mexico for a total of 87 days, making it the biggest oil spill in
140 the U.S. history. 16.000 total miles of coastline have been affected and over 8.000 animals
141 were reported dead.

142 Annex 4. Data gathered at the website of World Watch Institute.

143 <http://www.worldwatch.org/melting-earths-ice-cover-reaches-new-high>

144 Annex 5. Information gathered at Water.org. <http://water.org/water-crisis/water-facts/water/>

145 Annex 6. In agriculture, a terrace is a piece of sloped plane that has been cut into a series of
146 successively receding flat surfaces or platforms, which resemble steps, for the purposes of
147 more effective farming.

148 Annex 7. The Australian Business Award for Sustainability recognises organisations that
149 execute initiatives that demonstrate leadership and commitment to sustainable business
150 practices.

151 Annex 8. The United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP21 or CMP11 will be held in
152 Paris, France in 2015. This will be the 21st yearly session of the Conference of the Parties
153 (COP 21) to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
154 and the 11th session of the Meeting of the Parties (CMP 11) to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The
155 conference objective is to achieve a legally binding and universal agreement on climate,
156 from all the nations of the world. Leadership of the negotiations is yet to be determined.

Final Report on the Military Dimension

In times of increasing geopolitical instability and decreasing defence budgets, how should the security of the EU Member States and their neighbours be ensured?

Members of the Working Group

Mohamed Atiek (CH), Tetiana Bochkarova (UA), Karina Gordiienko (UA), Blaž Grilj (SI), Anastasia Kovel (BY), Irina Kravchuk (UA), Vera Kristin Lamprecht (FR), Ahmed Sherbaz (UA), Jan Stehlík (CZ), moderated by Zosia Wosik (PL)

Introduction

In light of recent events in North Africa and the conflict in Ukraine, the European Union (EU) has had to accept that its borders are no longer secure with regards to military action. Taking into account that the approach and tools used by the EU can be considered to be inefficient, there is a need to rethink the defence strategy of the EU, as well as both indicating and solving the main problems with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). While doing so, it is important to keep in mind that due to the financial crisis, Member States have had to meet certain austerity measures and their defence budgets are becoming increasingly constrained.

The working group has defined crucial terms that will be relevant to the discussion. First of all, it has been recognised that the term “war” applies not just to military conflict, but could also apply to cyber, economic, energy and information conflicts, as well as hybrid conflicts. However, taking into account the character of this dimension, the military aspect will be the focus of this report. In addition, the working group uses the term “borders” in the traditional geographic sense, as this is what defines the boundaries of military intervention.

The working group has also decided that while talking about European security, it will focus on the measures that might be undertaken by the EU to secure its own security, as well as the stabilisation of its Neighbour States. By a Neighbour State the working group includes all the countries that belong to the European Neighbourhood Policy¹.

¹ see annex 1

27 Topic Analysis

28 Following the end of the Cold War and the financial crisis that disproportionately affected
29 Western countries, the world has been becoming increasingly multipolar. The EU has had to
30 strategically position itself in this changing geopolitical environment.

31 The working group decided to make a distinction in the power distribution on the regional
32 and global level. Political stakeholders act in a multipolar environment. However, due to the
33 recent events in Ukraine, on the European level, one might observe that the geopolitical
34 structure is increasingly changing towards a bipolar one, involving primarily the EU and
35 Russia as two main actors.

36 What has been exceptionally striking is that violations of international law have consistently
37 faced little ramifications, which has contributed to an unstable and unpredictable security
38 environment within the defined borders of Europe.

39 There are different threats that might affect the EU and its Neighbours. According to the
40 European Security Strategy, the EU should consider its engagement in the internal, regional
41 but also global conflicts². As far as the internal threats are concerned, the existence of
42 multiculturalism and minorities within Europe in some circumstances can be a threat to state
43 security. At times this has allowed the emergence of new actors who adopt a military
44 position within Europe. With the example of the annexation of Crimea, the EU has
45 experienced the foreign force aggression within the territory of its Neighbour State.
46 Moreover, the EU is still engaged in foreign missions, both civilian and military.

47 The solutions included in Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) aim at the EU
48 becoming a united and consistent actor in the international arena³. The TFEU also aims to
49 strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Furthermore, according to the
50 conclusions of the special European Council of December 19th-20th 2013 devoted to
51 defence, “the EU contributes to peace and stability in our Neighbourhood and in the broader
52 world⁴”. However, inequality and a lack of trust in the EU causes political conflicts and
53 controversial foreign policy decisions. Conflicting interests of EU Member States prevail over
54 the CSDP that is applied to all Members.

² see annex 2

³ see annex 3

⁴ see annex 4

55 It is commonly believed that the inefficiency of CSDP is mainly caused by the lack of a
56 common European army. The working group has been discussing the advantages and
57 disadvantages of this concept.

58 The main advantages of a common European army are:

- 59 • Strong statement in favour of common defence;
- 60 • More credibility for the EU as a global actor - the necessity of setting common goals
61 and sharing one European vision;
- 62 • Act as a common deterrence (especially while confronting nuclear powers);
- 63 • Common European equipment (tackling the problems of inefficiency and creating
64 scope for innovations);
- 65 • Institutional efficiency (the lack of bureaucracy).

66 However, there are still difficulties that stop the EU Member States from creating a common
67 army, such as:

- 68 • Political integration is still not sufficient to create a common defence framework;
- 69 • Reservations over the idea of a “United States of Europe”, which the Member States
70 have not agreed upon;
- 71 • Resistance from nation states which are not willing to give up on their own armies;
- 72 • Theoretical neutral character of a few Member States;
- 73 • Lack of a common European command;
- 74 • The different interests of the Member States;
- 75 • Lower efficiency, as consensus agreement would need to be reached.

One should also acknowledge that the EU already possesses other instruments of military force, such as the Eurocorps⁵ and Battle Groups⁶. Both of these tools have proved to be ineffective: the latter was introduced in 2007, and to date it has never been deployed.

In addition, it is important to remember that the EU and its Member States function within the framework of other international organisations. It often happens that they overlap on both responsibility and mechanisms. As far as the military dimension is concerned, European cooperation with NATO is the most complex; 22 Member States of the EU are also NATO Members. It also has to be noted that the EU continues to be reliant on US security guarantees in Europe, although their geopolitical interest in the continent has considerably decreased.

Keeping this in mind, the working group discussed different possibilities for cooperation both with and without NATO, and believes that the most important are the following:

- The EU and NATO working as two separate actors;
- The division of labour between NATO and the EU: the Alliance should be responsible for the military interventions, and the EU for the Security Sector Reforms missions.

In light of the growing geopolitical instability and the lack of efficiency in European defence, the financial crisis has caused the EU to shrink its defence budgets. As a result, defence expenditure in Europe has been decreasing, whilst in other parts of the world it has increased. The overall European budget has decreased during the past three years (2011-2013) by 2.5% on average, while in Russia, Eurasia and Asia it has increased by an average of 6%⁷. However, one should keep in mind that a reduction of the defence budget is not necessarily linked to decrease in security. Increasing arms investment might be a symptom of the security dilemma. The decrease of EU military power is mainly caused by inefficient security and defence spending. The challenge that the EU now faces is how to make its defence efficient with the limited funds available.

⁵ see annex 5

⁶ see annex 6

⁷ see annex 7

101 Furthermore, public opinion within the EU tends to oppose an increase in defence budgets
102 due to a perception of guaranteed security and at the same time a loss of trust in military
103 institutions.

104 The working group has also acknowledged that the suggestions they have made apply only
105 to the current geopolitical situation and may be in need of further review in case of EU
106 enlargement. It has also been noted that the conditionality of accession to the EU does not
107 currently include any military aspect, which makes the CSDP hard to implement in new EU
108 Member States.

109 The working group has also acknowledged that the increasing geopolitical instability and the
110 military conflicts can cause the migration flows, which themselves can be treated as a
111 security threat. The EU has to deal with the dilemma between open and closed borders with
112 neighbouring countries.

113 **Avis**

114 In order to meet the aforementioned challenges to the security environment, the CSDP and
115 the European Security Strategy should be updated. The EU would shift its position from
116 global to more regional focus. The main fields where there is room for improvement are:

117 1) Transforming EU military capabilities

118 The working group members agreed that the structuring of the common European army
119 would be unrealistic and European officials can only consider it as a very long term solution.
120 However, the EU still needs a tool to guarantee its own security and to meet its international
121 responsibilities. Thus it is recommended that the existing Battle Groups would be replaced
122 by one Battle Group, which would consist of forces from every Member State. Within this
123 idea, there are two possible scenarios:

124 1. The establishment of a common EU Battle Group, structured through troops
125 chosen from the armies of EU Member States, on a rotational basis.

126 2. A permanent structured organisation with a permanent non-changing Battle Group,
127 answerable to the institutions of the EU.

128 The size of the Battle Group will be of a brigade size, which represents a number of 3000-
129 5000 troops. The makeup of these troops, will be determined according to the specialisation
130 of individual EU countries.

131 As far as the equipment deployment is concerned within the Battle Group, the working group
132 has suggested two different approaches. One possible proposal is that as countries progress
133 towards spending 2% of their GDP on defence (see section 2.). This money will also be used
134 to purchase new and standard equipment for the Battle Group. Therefore when training,
135 troops from all Member States will receive the same level of training, and will not undermine
136 the freedom of Member States in regards to equipment purchasing. The standard EU
137 equipment will allow all troops to be familiar with all forms of equipment used within the
138 Battle Group.

139 The second approach that has been developed by the working group is the pooling and
140 sharing of equipment. The EU contingents are fragmented and use many different types of
141 equipment. As a result, spare parts and ammunition are incompatible⁸ and personnel must
142 be trained to operate multiple technologies and communication networks. These
143 inefficiencies should be streamlined both for practicality and to reduce bureaucratic costs.
144 The EU Member States should strive towards making their military equipment more
145 compatible . This process can be gradual, i.e. Member States have the possibility to opt out
146 of this system and not all aspects of the military equipment have to be standardised.

147 Any national army could support the Battle Group. The help from the EU in case of any
148 foreign intervention would be guaranteed to Neighbour States in the treaties. Those Member
149 States which are constitutionally neutral would have to have a different role in building the
150 security environment; they would also be obliged to be more active in the SSR field.

151 The Battle Group would have to follow the following conditions of deployment:

152 • The Battle Group is to be deployed within the EU or the neighbouring
153 countries in case of a foreign state aggression, and only following an official request by the
154 nation state concerned.

⁸ see annex 8

155 • The EU shall refrain from deploying in ‘out of area’ (out of EU and its
156 Neighbourhood) military operations.

157 • The EU should retain the right to deploy SSR missions.

158 • The EU should transform the military missions outside of the EU
159 Neighbourhood into civilian missions, or alternatively transfer them under the command of
160 other regional or international organisations, or gradually phase them out completely.

161 The EU should not give up on the cooperation with other international organisations. It is
162 recommended to clearly define the division of responsibilities by establishing a hierarchy
163 wherein the EU would only intervene in cases where NATO and the UN do not. Also, a clear
164 division of labour should be established between NATO and the EU as far as “out-of-area
165 missions” are concerned, with NATO taking responsibility of the military missions and the EU
166 taking over the civilian ones.

167 2) Increasing the efficiency of the defence budget

168 In order to make sure that all Member States contribute equally to the common defence, it is
169 recommended to adopt a military spending target equivalent to 2% of GDP to cover both
170 European and national defence budgets. It is understandable that not every Member State is
171 now capable of meeting this criterion, however it is still a goal the EU should strive to meet. It
172 is also advisable to coordinate the military industry within the EU through promoting
173 competition and innovation.

174 It is believed that more funds should be allocated to raising public awareness of the security
175 issues the EU is facing, so as to increase public support for reaching the 2% target.

176 Countries looking to join the EU should strive to be a part of the pooling and sharing
177 framework, contribute to the common EU military capabilities, bring their military deployment
178 guidelines in line with those of the EU, and standardise their military equipment with that of
179 the EU before their accession to the EU. In the case of a change to EU borders, the above
180 security strategy should be reviewed.

181 As far as the border protection is concerned, action should not be limited to the capacity of
182 the Battle Group. Instead, border security may also be tackled by civilian law enforcement
183 units of the Member State concerned.

184 **Annex**

185 Annex 1. European Neighbourhood Policy website; http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/index_en.htm.

186 Annex 2. European Security Strategy;
187 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

188 Annex 3. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT)
189 [content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT)

190 Annex 4. EU Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy, 19-20
191 December 2013; http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_14417_en.htm.

192 Annex 5. Eurocorps is an intergovernmental army corps headquarters (HQ) based in
193 Strasbourg, France. The HQ was created in May 1992, activated in October 1993 and
194 declared operational in 1995. The Eurocorps HQ comprises approximately 1,000 soldiers
195 stationed in the headquarters in Strasbourg; <http://www.eurocorps.org/>.

196 Annex 6. EU Battlegroup is a military unit adhering to the CSDP of the EU. Often based on
197 contributions from a coalition of Member States, each of the eighteen Battlegroups consists
198 of a battalion-sized force (1,500 troops) reinforced with combat support elements. The groups
199 rotate actively, so that two are ready for deployment at all times. The forces are under the
200 direct control of the Council of the EU;
201 [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006eubattlegroups_](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006eubattlegroups_/091006eubattlegroups_en.pdf)
202 [091006eubattlegroups_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006eubattlegroups_/091006eubattlegroups_en.pdf).

203 Annex 7. Research Associate for Defence and Economics;
204 <http://www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2014-3bea/july-8d3b/iraq>.

205 Annex 8. GDP- based Targets in International Organisations;
206 [http://www.asoulforeurope.eu/sites/www.asoulforeurope.eu/files/media_pdf/ASFE%20GDP](http://www.asoulforeurope.eu/sites/www.asoulforeurope.eu/files/media_pdf/ASFE%20GDP%20Targets%20in%20International%20Organisations.pdf)
207 [%20Targets%20in%20International%20Organisations.pdf](http://www.asoulforeurope.eu/sites/www.asoulforeurope.eu/files/media_pdf/ASFE%20GDP%20Targets%20in%20International%20Organisations.pdf).

1 Final Report on the Health Dimension

2 ***How should Europe best combine preventative and curative measures to tackle HIV***
3 ***while considering competing fiscal priorities? To what extent should there be a***
4 ***common European approach?***

5 Members of the Working Group

6 **Aksana Antonchyk (BY), Ahmet Salih Celikyay (TR), Marta Franchuk (UA), Halyna**
7 **Kosenkova (UA), Illia Luzan (UA), Anna Maria Mechtcherine (FR), Piotr Filip Micula**
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9 **(GE), moderated by Tetiana Korniiichuk (UA)**

10 Introduction

11 HIV is a global threat. There are 35,5 million people currently living with HIV in the
12 world and 2,3 million HIV positive people in Europe. The most common ways of transmission
13 of the disease are contact with blood, semen, pre-seminal fluid, vaginal fluid or breast milk
14 (mother-to-child transmission). A lack of awareness about the virus and its transmission
15 remains among the main factors of the spread of HIV.

16 Demographic groups such as homosexuals, sex workers, transgender women,
17 prisoners and injecting drug users are more vulnerable to HIV infection. Social mistreatment
18 and stigmatisation of these people cause a significant increase in HIV transmission in the
19 respective societies.

20 According to UNAIDS data¹, 53% of the total funds for tackling HIV go to care and
21 treatment, 22% to prevention, with only 0.8% allocated to research, demonstrates that not
22 enough resources are dedicated to developing new treatments and cures.

23 During the past decade we have observed a decrease in the number of newly HIV
24 infected people in Western Europe and comparatively stable levels of infection in Central
25 Europe, whereas the infection level in Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine, remains high.
26 The main methods of transmission in this region are heterosexual unprotected sexual
27 contact and drug injection. The total number of HIV infected persons in Ukraine currently
28 amounts to more than 245,000 (01/01/2014), which is the highest number in Europe
29 (excluding Russia).

30

¹ UNAIDS infographics on the use of resources allocated to HIV/AIDS response
http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/infographics/20110607_wheredoesmoneygo

31 Topic Analysis

HIV/AIDS is recognized by the international community as a threat to be resolved through international cooperation. This resulted in the establishment in 1996 of a Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Subsequently, the European Centre of Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) was established in 2005. As a result of the joint work of the European community and these institutions, the European Union has developed and started implementing the European Commission (EC)'s "Action Plan on HIV/AIDS in the EU and neighbouring countries for 2014-2016"² that covers six key points regarding HIV/AIDS transmission:

1. Politics, policies and involvement of civil society, wider society and stakeholders
2. Prevention
3. Priority regions and settings
4. Priority groups
5. Improving knowledge.
6. Monitoring and evaluation

Eastern Europe and Ukraine in particular remain the most problematic area for the European region. The lack of financial support in the Eastern European countries has been a crucial harmful influence. The EC's Action Plan amounts to approximately €57,5m annually. Moreover, unequal access to HIV testing, treatment and qualified specialists for providing proper individual treatment is still an issue for Eastern Europe. Not only is the implementation of the existing programmes weak, the implemented measures do not cover some risk groups such as prisoners and sex workers.

Experts from the UNDP that the working group has consulted have recognised that the HIV/AIDS issue requires more political attention. Governments and international institutions, private companies and non-governmental organisations are currently not equally involved in the search for a solution and strategy development. In some states, including Ukraine, NGOs and volunteers (rather than governments) are the main drivers of positive change. A solid legislative base is developed on a governmental level but fails to be properly implemented. Legal solutions are insufficient and there is a lack of actions with real impact. Furthermore, ineffective governance threatens the supply of the antiretroviral therapy for the infected, which can have a drastic impact on individual health of the patients as well as the overall infection rate. Unfortunately, available studies do not include the influence of corporate social responsibility programmes of private companies, as cooperation between public and private research sectors is a poorly covered issue in the region.

² European Commission (EC)'s "Action Plan on HIV/AIDS in the EU and neighbouring countries for 2014-2016"

http://ec.europa.eu/health/sti_prevention/docs/ec_hiv_actionplan_2014_en.pdf

66 HIV positive people face discrimination and stigma in most European countries and do not
67 enjoy the same human rights as HIV negative people. At the same time an absence of peer-
68 to-peer education contributes to the stigmatisation and spread of false information among
69 young people.

70 **Avis**

71 It has been repeatedly affirmed that every human being, regardless of their nationality,
72 citizenship, economical status, religion, sexual orientation or gender, has the right to equal
73 access to medical care, especially when their condition concerns public health. Every state
74 has an obligation to offer help to everyone who is seeking information, prevention, testing
75 and treatment of HIV/AIDS, as an individual with HIV needs access to treatment not only for
76 themselves but also as a matter of public risk management.

77 Within the working group there was repeated discussion of whether HIV testing should be
78 made compulsory for some categories (e.g. pregnant women in order to be able to increase
79 chances of healthy babies), however a solid opinion failed to be found, with the main
80 argument against this decision being that it is a violation of human rights.

81 The working group aims to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS and provide every European citizen
82 with access to information, free voluntary prevention, testing and treatment. In addition, the
83 group aims to further strengthen exchange and cooperation between the EU Member States
84 and Middle East and North African states represented in the European Council, UNAIDS,
85 WHO and HIV/AIDS-related international organisations as well as national and regional
86 NGOs. However, it is recognised that differences between Western and Eastern European
87 countries should be taken into serious consideration.

88 Having discussed the importance of a common European approach to the issue of tackling
89 HIV, it has been agreed that there is no necessity to create a new approach to resolve this
90 issue, but rather seek to improve the flaws of the existing strategy. The solutions suggested
91 below are aimed at combining the above analysis with the results of current implementation
92 of the EC's Action Plan.

93 Thus the working group expresses its support towards the Action Plan of the European
94 Commission on HIV/AIDS in the EU and neighbouring countries developed in 2011 and
95 welcome its prolongation in 2014. It has been agreed that the document provides a solid
96 basis for a common pan-European approach.

97 It has been concluded that all the significant aspects of the strategy are well developed,
98 comprehensive and feasible, and account for all the diversity of countries involved in solving
99 HIV/AIDS problem. However, upon researching the problem, the following suggestions have
100 been developed to improve the program, making it even more effective and considered:

- 101 1. The meeting between the European Commission and UNAIDS/WHO proposed in the
- 102 Action Plan should take place on a regular basis and involve HIV-related NGOs and
- 103 the private sector in order to keep HIV/AIDS visibility high on the political agenda and
- 104 ensure exchange of current challenges or progresses between HIV-related actors
- 105 and transfer of know-how between Western and Eastern European countries.
- 106 2. A common approach should be encouraged in medical and scientific spheres,
- 107 whereas prevention, education or legal approach are domestic competences, as they
- 108 should be solved considering regional features of each area. The information
- 109 awareness campaigns should be concentrated on a local level in order to consider
- 110 each region's cultural differences, religion and the provided level of health care.
- 111 3. The importance of anti-discrimination campaigns should be emphasised, to promote
- 112 eradication of negative attitudes towards HIV positive people, educate civil society,
- 113 combat stigma and prevent discrimination.
- 114 4. NGOs are encouraged to establish online platforms to develop peer to peer
- 115 education and reach out to the younger generation that is exposed to HIV risk.
- 116 5. The European Commission is recommended to encourage legal protection of HIV
- 117 positive individuals.

1 Final Report on the Governance Dimension

2 ***Electoral turnout in Europe is falling while distrust in traditional parties is rising.***
3 ***Against this background, how should good governance be ensured for all European***
4 ***people?***

5 Members of the Working Group

6 **Luka Dzagania (GE), Mateusz Dębowicz (PL), Iryna Graf (UA), Kristiina Silvan (HU),**
7 **Ann Solovyova (UA), Milan Thies (DE), Emmanuel Wackenheim (AT), Roksolana**
8 **Yusypchuk (UA), moderated by Francisco Santos (PT)**

9 Introduction

10 Electoral turnout in most European countries has experienced a sharp decline over the past
11 decade¹. Is it fair to conclude that the popular lack of interest in political participation has led
12 to the erosion of democratic institutions in the “Free World”²? Or is active non-voting a sign
13 that these institutions need to be reformed?

14 The existence of a functioning democratic system is crucial to the stable and secure
15 development and good governance of a country. According to the Commission of the
16 European Union the term good governance covers *“the fundamental interactions between the*
17 *state and society, i.e. the rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are articulated,*
18 *resources are managed and power is exercised in society. The quality of governance therefore often*
19 *depends on the state’s capacity to provide its citizens with the basic services needed to (reduce*
20 *poverty) and promote development”* ³ In essence, good governance isn’t about making the
21 “right” decisions; rather, it’s about creating an effective framework for democratic decision
22 making.

23 Topic Analysis

24 Good governance aims to provide security on all levels as security is considered to be a
25 basic human need. Stable governance gives a state the possibility to act and react efficiently
26 towards equal partners, such as other states, in addition to civil society movements. On an
27 international level, good governance can, amongst other aspects, prevent military conflicts
28 and provide communities with personal and environmental security, and personal liberty. In
29 terms of security, good governance refers to the ability to learn from the governance
30 successes and mistakes in conflict regions.

¹ Data in Annex 1

² Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations, 72 Foreign Aff. 22 (1992–1993)

³ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/sectoral_development_policies/r12524_en.htm
under “Overall framework”

A significant challenge for good governance in the 21st century is the lack of transparency⁴, referring to the availability of information about the actions of the government. Rule of law and free media are also considered to be essential.

The overlapping trend of the decrease of the interest of people to participate in the political process could also be attributed to a lack of political education. Political elites in power are not necessarily interested in motivating and educating the electorate to participate in the democratic process, since the lack of such participation ensures that they remain in power. Further possible reasons for the low voter turnout in different countries are the social circumstances of the low-income citizens. In some cases, economically disadvantaged people are blaming those in power for their problems and are not willing to acknowledge the political process of election; in other cases, the overly rigid electoral system requires the electorate to travel to the place of their registration, spending time and money, which most people are not willing to do. Another factor that influences the willingness of the people to participate in the elections is concerned with the political parties' dynamics. In some western European countries, major parties share most of the main values, making it difficult for the voters to differentiate between them. In other cases, the emergence of new and weak political parties attributes to the voters' distrust and therefore leads to poor political participation. Disillusionment with the effectiveness of voting, and therefore in the democratic process, is connected to the possibility of electoral fraud. The expected outcome is for the already ruling party/coalition to ensure its victory by abusing the administrative resources or rigging the results. The problem with decreasing voter turnout is that this is not only a symptom of a weakening democracy, but also a reason for further destabilization, a decline of the effectiveness of democratic institutions and a further increase in the legitimacy gap.

Civil society plays a crucial role in mediating government and society, because the tools for direct participation to the political decision making process remain limited. Elections only take place periodically, while the actors of civil society have continuous influence on state policies. If the government fails to include civil society in the decision making process, it might lose its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. This has a negative effect on both the trust of the electorate towards the institutions, as well as the emergence of external, non-institutional action in the form of protests. As the Greek⁵ and the Ukrainian⁶ cases demonstrate, protest movements can also radicalise and become anti-government in essence. This can lead to a vicious circle, since governments aim to marginalise such groups, sometimes even by the use of force. Political instability becomes a direct security threat when radicalised groups resort to criminal actions. At worst, badly governed states fail to ensure the basic security demands of their citizens and become vulnerable to transnational organised crime and extremist movements. We recognise that extremist movements, meaning those sharing

⁴ "(...)by 2010, a BBC World Service survey found corruption was the world's most talked about problem." under the year 2013 in <http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/history>

⁵ "Student march, gunman shoots police bus in greece" in <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/23/us-greece-unrest-idUSTRE4BM3HG20081223>

⁶ "The violence in ukraine is wrong - but we'll keep fighting for our freedom" as found in <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/20/violence-ukraine-wrong-fighting-for-freedom-protesters>

67 values which contradict the core values of the state's constitution, are a serious threat to
68 good governance and security.

69 External influence should not be understood only as an issue of political and state subjects,
70 but also as the involvement of business and private entities. When carried out through
71 bilateral agreements, foreign assistance can be beneficial to both parties in terms of
72 experience and good practice exchange and provide opportunities for improving the quality
73 of governance. However, there is a danger in foreign intervention, carried out by force or
74 manipulation (e.g. of public opinion), with the aim of decreasing independence and
75 sovereignty of the partner state. Additional negative consequences of foreign interference
76 can include the sponsoring of domestic radical elements, providing ground for the
77 emergence of protests, riots and other events that can limit the ability of the state to react to
78 emergencies accordingly.

79 **Avis**

80 This final report of the working group on governance also suggests a number of measures to
81 be taken to tackle the challenges listed in the section above.

82 One of the possible ways to increase electoral turnout and public trust among the youth in
83 politics is to introduce political education⁷ earlier on and to lower the eligible voting age⁸.
84 Political education could also address the issue of voters' perception of the blurring
85 boundaries between political parties, enabling the electorate to differentiate them.

86 The existence of functioning opposition would also provide a mechanism for narrowing the
87 legitimacy gap, representing the interests of the part of the voters who do not favor
88 mainstream policies. However, this could also lead to the rise of radical and populist parties.
89 At the same time there needs to be a consensus between the ruling party and the opposition
90 so that the supporters of different parties are not antagonised against each other and see
91 the shift of power between parties as acceptable.

92 Another suitable approach would be to simplify the electoral logistical procedures, allowing
93 the voters to vote at the place of their current residence⁹. This would enable such people to
94 exercise their civic rights at the place of their actual location. In some countries, these
95 procedures are well implemented and could be adopted for those countries that still need to
96 modernise their processes. In the working group's opinion, the measures listed above could
97 lead to the cessation of the turnout drop, providing a framework for the high-quality and

⁷ Taking into consideration the legal framework for the implementation of reforms in the educational systems of countries addressed in this paper.

⁸ While the results of research projects studying the effects of lowering eligible voting age to 16 or 17 remain mixed and vary from country to country, the potential decision about lowering the eligible voting age should be done at local level.

⁹ e. g. by implementing absentee voting, temporary registration at the local election commission or even e-voting. However, necessary measures must be taken in order to prevent electoral fraud

conscious participation of the voters, as opposed to introducing a compulsory voting system that could provide higher turnout but may not ensure democratic spirit.

Supporting interest groups that would work on solving the emerging problems and demands of the population together with the governing body might be one way to engage the population and political parties in a dialogue. Interest groups can act as intermediaries between the two, increasing the willingness of the society to engage in decision making processes. Regarding the issue of extremist movements and parties, we strongly advise not to marginalize the movement, but to reduce their power by incorporating them into the political process and forcing them to take responsibility for their suggestions. Furthermore, it is of essential importance to fight the ideologies instead.

In order to improve transparency, political parties might consider disclosing the procedures for forming the party lists, drafting the party agenda and the conduction of the electoral campaigns. Once voted into the power, the political parties should consider adhering to the transparent procedures involved in coalition forming, distribution of seats in the government and any further governmental actions. Additionally, the formation of the legislative framework should be conducted in a transparent manner and should aim to enhance and provide transparent electoral procedures. This could eliminate the possibilities of electoral fraud, enhance voters trust to political elites and make their figures and policies more attractive. Furthermore, the working group would like to emphasise the importance of the rule of law, and encourage governments to implement necessary means to provide transparency of the decision making process¹⁰.

The weakness of civil society participation can be addressed at three levels. Firstly, at the civil society level, secondly at the governmental level, thirdly at the regional and international levels. Different interest groups should firstly aim to co-operate both amongst themselves and with similar groups abroad, and then also with the government. They should also encourage the citizens to take part in civil society activities. Governments, on the other hand, should stimulate and recognise the legitimate influence of civil society actors in the decision making process. On a European level, the European Union can support civil society, push governments for more co-operation with civil society organisations, and offer the framework and common guidelines for collaboration across the region. The involvement of youth organizations, as members of civil society, could contribute to the political education and involvement of the youth.

Often external influence can have a negative effect on the actor. Internal institutions should aim to develop and enrich their structure and working processes without the permanent support of external actors. This will result in an internal stability and development that will exclude the need for foreign interference. In situations when the influence is needed, it should be mutually defined and agreed by both actors. Aside from the definition, other factors need consideration, such as limitation of the freedom of actions by foreign actors along with proper timelining.

¹⁰ for example through e-governance

137 **Annex**

138 Voter Turnout Dynamics at Parliamentary Elections

Country	Year - Voter turnout %		Latest
Bulgaria	2009 - 60,64%	2013 - 52,49%	2014 - 51,05%
France	2002 - 60.32%	2007 - 59.98%	2012 - 55.40%
Germany	2005 - 77,65%	2009 - 70,78%	2013 - 71,55%
Greece	2007 - 74,14%	2009 - 70,92%	2012 - 62,47%
Hungary	2006 - 67,57%	2010 - 64,38%	2014 - 61,84%
Russia	2003 - 55,67%	2007 - 63,71%	2011 - 60,10%
Turkey ¹¹	2002 - 79,28%	2007 - 84,25%	2011 - 87,59%
Ukraine	2007 - 62,03%	2012 - 57,40%	2014 - 52,42%

139 Source:

idea.int

¹¹ Voting in Turkey is compulsory

1 Final Report on the Trade Dimension

2 ***Small arms and light weaponry (SALW) used in active conflict zones can often be***
3 ***linked to Western arms producers and distributors. How should Europe set an***
4 ***example in ensuring that exports of SALW do not come to threaten international***
5 ***security?***

6 Members of the Working Group

7 **Olga Budinskaya (UA), Angelina Danko (UA), Nugzar Gadelia (GE), Olga Golovakina**
8 **(UA), Linda Lammensalo (FI), Pavlo Lepikhin (UA), Dmitriy Ostapchuk (UA), Tor**
9 **Pettersson (SE), Kateryna Shokalo (UA), Mustafa Zorbaz (TR), moderated by Sophie**
10 **Duffield (UK)**

11 Introduction

12 The relevance of the topic is explained by the increasing number of armed conflicts in the
13 world¹: North Africa, the Balkan Region, Eastern Europe, Caucasus Region and the Middle
14 East are some of the many examples. It is estimated that there are at least 639 million
15 firearms in circulation today². Long term conflicts may therefore be used by governments
16 and private arms producers to generate revenue. In particular, small arms and light weapons
17 (SALW, see Annex 1) are responsible for approximately 90% of civilian casualties³.
18 Therefore although when considered individually, one weapon may not be associated with
19 mass casualties, the number of weapons in circulation results in a large scale threat to
20 security.

21 Several terms were defined by the working group to clarify discussions. Firstly, a distinction
22 between a paramilitary group and rebel group was made. A paramilitary group was defined
23 as an armed group with a structure and organisation that is similar to the military, but is not
24 part of government forces. There may not be a clear motive; paramilitary groups may carry
25 out work that can be considered beneficial or may have financial motivations. In contrast, a
26 rebel group was defined as a group that may be paramilitary or non-combative, with a
27 political or religious motive, for example opposition to the government.

28 In addition, military aid was classed as aid which is used to assist a country or its people in
29 defence efforts, or to assist a poor country in maintaining control over its own territory. Many
30 countries receive military aid to suppress insurrections. Military aid can also be given to a
31 rebellion to help fight another country. It should be mentioned that the definition of military
32 aid is very often subject to disagreement.

¹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program,
<http://www.uu.se/en/media/news/article/?id=1724&area=2,3,16&typ=pm&na=&lang=en>

² Anup Shah, Global Issues, January 2006 (retrieved 06/11/14),
<http://www.globalissues.org/article/78/small-arms-they-cause-90-of-civilian-casualties>

³ *ibid.*

33 Topic Analysis

34 The first area discussed involved methods that deliberately provide weapons to conflict
35 zones. It was agreed that these direct methods were the leading cause of SALW proliferation
36 in conflict areas, are therefore required attention. This was divided into military aid, illegal
37 trade and legal trade.

38 Military aid is relevant to the arms trade as it can be used by governments to provide
39 weapons with the aim of resolving a conflict. The recipient may be either a second national
40 government or a leader of a rebel group; this results in strong political motivations attached
41 to military aid. The provision becomes problematic due to the problem of blowback⁴. It is
42 difficult to predict the long-term consequences of military aid, in particular whether the
43 weapons will unintentionally transfer into the wrong hands. An example of this is the
44 provision of weapons to the Iraqi state forces by the USA, which many agree has now
45 unintentionally supplied Islamic State⁵. As there is no legal framework to manage military
46 aid, it provides a loophole that allows weapons to end up in conflict zones; arms embargoes
47 only apply to the legal trade of arms, not military aid.

48 Illegal trade often involves a complex network of arms distributors that act on both an
49 international and local level. A stockpile of weapons will be obtained by an arms trafficker;
50 there are often strong links between such traffickers and international organised crime.
51 However, the supply of weapons to the network is complicated further by the fact that the
52 black market is also often tied to the legal arms trade, with weapons siphoned off from
53 legitimate transfers. In rare cases, the weapons may even be produced illegally. Once a
54 stockpile has been sourced, the weapons are then transferred down a network of distributors
55 until they reach a local level; this distribution may additionally involve paramilitary
56 organisations. This complex supply chain creates difficulties in focusing combative efforts.
57 Politically weak governments create additional complications, either through corruption or by
58 failing to shut down the network effectively. In the majority of cases, serial numbers are
59 removed from weapons to prevent them being traced.

60 There are several ways that corruption can play a role in illegal weapons distribution.
61 Powerful government officials may provide instruction to those in a lower position to facilitate
62 a transfer through, for example, forging paperwork. Alternatively, the corruption may occur
63 on a smaller level, with administrators following personal motivations (both financial and
64 political). Corruption in the military can result in the transfer of stockpiles of used weapons,
65 instead of their destruction. Finally, corruption in private arms producers was discussed, as
66 there is potential that a company could overproduce weapons and sell the surplus on the
67 black market. However, there was disagreement within the group over whether company
68 audits or government reporting would detect this activity. The difficulties in carrying out

⁴ Unintended adverse results of a political action or situation.

⁵ "Isis jihadis using captured arms and troop carriers from US and Saudis", The Guardian, September 2014

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/08/isis-jihadis-using-arms-troop-carriers-supplied-by-us-saudi-arabia>

audits when money transfers occur internationally and funds are held overseas was also raised.

Legal trade involves the production of weapons from private arms producers, which are then sold on to both private recipients, rebel groups and foreign governments. Although producers are often classed as private companies, the negotiation of arms deals is often more strongly influenced by national governments; it is governments that must approve an international arms deal. Thus political alliances are strong factors in whether an arms deal will occur. It is notable that the majority of arms exports are from countries that are permanent members of the UN security council (USA, Russia, China, UK and France) along with Germany. At 1,7 trillion US-Dollar a year, global military spending is now comparable to Cold War levels⁶. Whilst trade embargoes prevent the transfer of weapons directly to some conflict zones, it should be noted that there are many countries where there is active conflict, yet which are not under embargo, for example India and Pakistan in relation to the ongoing Kashmir conflict.

In order to better understand the ways in which legal trade in arms allows SALW to contribute to security threats, the working group agreed that it is necessary to analyse the legislation that governs such transfers; the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and EU Common Position were therefore discussed. Information on the legislation can be found in Annexes 2 and 3.

The main problem associated with the ATT is that it is not currently legally binding, as it has not yet been ratified by 50 countries⁷. This is particularly problematic as the US has not yet ratified the treaty, despite being the world's largest arms exporter. There are several reasons why national governments may object to the treaty. Firstly, the most significant is the concern that the ATT would threaten national sovereignty by preventing the export of arms to areas of political interest or allied countries. Fear of security threats can also drive governments to export arms to a region due to their wish to influence or demonstrate power. Secondly, some countries fear that the ATT would require them to restrict civilian gun laws; this is a particular problem for countries in which gun laws are liberal. Finally, the economic driving force could also be a factor; the ATT would result in restricted trade, leading to lower revenue.

Whilst the EU Common Position does provide a framework for countries to evaluate the security and humanitarian risks associated with an arms shipment, there are several criticisms. The most crucial is that the criteria are open to interpretation. This allows national interests and political will to influence the decision to grant a weapon export license. Governments interpret the criteria differently, resulting in no harmonisation of arms export decisions.

⁶ Anup Shah, Global Issues, June 2013 (retrieved 06/11/14), <http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending>

⁷ Ratification is the process by which national governments agree to adjust their laws in order to comply with new legislation. For the ATT to enter into force, it must be ratified by at least 50 countries.

The final area that the group prioritised was the economic factors that drive the trade in SALW. The ease of transfer of small arms, combined with the low price when compared to other types of weapon, results in high demand. Furthermore, weapons are high added value items⁸ thus providing a strong economic driving force for the continued sale of SALW.

Avis

1. Military Aid

When discussing military aid, a ban on providing SALW as part of military aid was suggested as a solution. However, it was pointed out that there would be problems with the feasibility of this proposal as it is not within EU jurisdiction. An additional proposal to tackle the responsible provision of military aid was to establish an EU body that would send rapporteurs to conflict zones prior to the provision of aid. These monitors would research, evaluate and review the situation and report on their recommendations. Therefore before a country sends military aid, they would be obliged to review the opinions of the investigators, allowing a more informed decision to be made. It would also allow for greater harmonisation of Member States' policies. However, it was further recognised that this would result in lengthy delays in the provision of military aid to a conflict area.

2. Illegal Trade

In resolving the illicit trade of SALW, the group realised the need to prioritise either the international arms traffickers who operate higher in the network, or the local level distributors who directly sell the arms. Whilst it may be more effective to tackle the problem higher up in the network, and therefore closer to the source, this is difficult and requires a greater amount of international cooperation; prosecuting the local dealers is normally easier to implement. Thus there is a contradiction between what is effective, and what is easy.

The group also considered how to prevent weapons stockpiles from leaking and agreed that greater efforts should be taken on an international level to destroy existing stockpiles. A suggestion was to increase the effectiveness of agreements such as the NATO Partnership Trust Fund (PTF)⁹. This could be achieved by increasing the size of the fund to allow more stockpiles be addressed.

Whilst the group recognised that education is an important tool to counter corruption, it was agreed that discussing anti-corruption methods is outside the scope of the topic.

EU countries should increase their standards of weapon production by the inclusion of sufficient marking or serial numbers on ammunition to ensure it is easily traceable. This will ensure that if the ammunition falls into the wrong hands, the actors involved in the transfer of the goods will be held to account and the distribution scrutinised. This will provide an extra

⁸ A value added product describes instances when a firm processes or assembles components and raw materials to create a product that has a much higher net worth than the original parts.

⁹ Trust Fund projects assist principally with the safe destruction of stockpiles of surplus and obsolete landmines, weapons and munitions. Individual Allies and partners develop Trust Funds to implement practical demilitarizations and defence transformation projects in non-NATO countries.

tracing tool in addition to serial numbers of guns, which can often be removed. It was recognised by the group that whilst this suggestion would be more effective if implemented on a global level, there is only jurisdiction for implementation within the EU.

3. Legal Trade

In order to create better harmonisation within the EU Common Position, the working group would suggest the inclusion of a post-embargo toolbox (PET) (see Annex 4). By periodically sharing detailed information on arms exports to countries that have recently been released from embargoes, there is the potential for greater cooperation and transparency between Member States. If a country interpreted the Common Position in a way that justified an arms exports, when other countries had refused to grant a license, there would be a resulting political pressure on the exporting country. However, there is uncertainty over whether political pressure alone is effective enough to influence national policies. In addition, the action to be taken if a country refused to share information on its exports was unclear.

It was agreed that in order to be as effective as possible, the PET should be implemented on a UN level, rather than solely EU. This would ensure that the largest exporters (USA, Russia and China) were also covered by the policy. However the group recognised the infeasibility of this, especially as the UN ATT is not yet legally binding. In addition, political pressure would be likely to be too weak a tool to change the policies of global superpowers such as the USA and Russia.

Whilst the above proposals aim to tackle the problem from the supply side, the working group also considered the possibility of addressing it by curbing demand. However, as this would involve solving arms conflicts, the group decided it was not feasible to propose concrete solutions.

Annex

Annex 1. SALW - Small Arms and Light Weaponry

According to the UN International Tracing Instrument (2005), SALW is “any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or to launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action on an explosive, excluding antique small arms and light weapons or their replicas. This includes guns for individual use, along with weapons designed to be used by a crew 2-3 people, such as a heavy machine guns or anti aircraft missiles”.

Annex 2. United Nations Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty has two main aims. Firstly, it calls for potential arms deals to be evaluated in order to determine whether they might enable buyers to carry out genocide,

174 crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Secondly, the treaty also seeks to prevent
175 conventional military weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists or organized criminal
176 groups, and to stop deals that would violate UN arms embargoes. The scope of the treaty
177 covers many categories of conventional arms, including SALW. It also highlights the need to
178 establish and maintain a national control system.

179 Annex 3. EU Common Position

180 Firstly the EU common position requires member States to assess export licenses according
181 to criteria such as respect for human rights, the internal situation of final destinations,
182 preservation of regional peace, security and stability and national security. Secondly, it
183 requires Member States to submit annual reports on their export and import activity.

184 Annex 4. Post-embargo toolbox

185 An obligation for governments who export SALW (and other weaponry) to countries who
186 have recently been under a trade or economic-embargo to report on the nature of the
187 exports. Countries would be obligated to justify their interpretation of the EU common
188 position if they wish to export to a country which has recently been under an embargo to the
189 European Union's Commission. Governments are obligated to report every three months.

1 Final Report on the Energy Dimension

2 *Traditional means of energy production using fossil fuels seem increasingly unstable.*
3 *How should Europe best respond to increasing energy demand? Where should the*
4 *balance be between securing smart energy usage and sustainable energy supply?*

5 Members of the Working Group

6 **Mariam Darakhvelidze (GE), Krystina Dudko (BY), Ganna Koicheva (UA), Anton**
7 **Nikolaev (AT), Tomasz Maria Pytko (PL), Alina Savchenko (UA), Matthijs Versteeg**
8 **(NL), Alexander Wilming (DE), Yulia Yegorova (UA), moderated by Mariam Chubabria**
9 **(GE)**

10 Introduction

11 Energy security is a major challenge to current European politics. Recent political
12 developments in Ukraine open a new window of opportunity for European citizens to re-think
13 the energy security of Europe. European states must ensure that the energy flows from non-
14 European Union supplier states are constant and that energy is provided at an affordable
15 price. Moreover, bearing in mind the European Union's (EU) commitments towards the
16 Kyoto Protocol, European politicians should re-think how to make European energy
17 consumption more efficient, sustainable and environmentally friendly.

18 The EU should accept the fact that it is heading toward a T-junction in which muddling
19 through is not an option; therefore the Union should either choose to go left or right. Left
20 referring to dissolution of the Union, taking one step back in the integration process and
21 going right refers to entering the path of a political union.

22 Topic Analysis

23 The working group on Energy Dimension acknowledges the value of the European motto
24 "United in Diversity", however a union of 28 different Member States creates challenges in
25 reaching a consensus, due to the many national interests and perspectives. The different
26 national interests of Member States are due to their diverse economic situations, social
27 factors, energy mixes, dependences on energy imports and historical factors.

28 The working group acknowledges that the EU has been making progress in regards to the
29 creation of a common energy policy, however the implementation phase is lagging behind.
30 The working group acknowledged the fact that while some Member States have been
31 relatively successful in implementing the "Energy 2020 - A strategy for competitive,
32 sustainable and secure energy" (later Energy 2020) (Annex 1), not all the states produced
33 such progress. As was stated during the discussions there is a gap between the official
34 framework and the reality in energy policy.

Moreover, the working group considers that the Union lacks a consensus on energy issues in the long-term perspective. The inability of the Member States to agree on a common long-term strategy was revealed several weeks ago, when the Heads of EU States could not agree on a “climate and energy policy for 2030”.

The creation of common European energy market is a matter of major financial commitments, which is not currently available in the European budgets. Moreover, the development of alternative energy sources (solar energy, wind energy, shale gas, biomass, and others) requires big investments in the first stage of production, which is not feasible for some Member States due economic weakness.

Some Member States do not have an attractive business environment for energy companies producing and providing alternative energy supplies. Due to this fact not all the consumers in Europe have equal access to various energy supplies and they can not enjoy cheaper prices. For example, while Dutch and German citizens are able to chose their own energy suppliers, it is not the same story in the most other Member States.

The domestic markets of the Member States are still dominated by state-owned energy companies. Innovative ideas regarding alternative energy production are suppressed by International Oil and Gas Companies (IOGCs). IOGCs purchase innovative patents regarding renewable and alternative energy production. In addition, the fact that these IOGC are very active in lobbying makes it hard to adopt environmentally friendly policies. Therefore, IOGC dominance prolongs EU dependence on fossil fuel (oil and gas) imports.

Hacking the old paradigms of energy security is even harder due to the fact that political systems in Europe are usually focused on short-term gains rather than long-term strategies. In general, politicians are concerned with achieving short-term goals in order to ensure their re-election. Moreover, citizens are not well informed about the importance of ecologically friendly energy consumption and thus cannot influence politicians.

In addition to that it is important to note that governments are usually supporting or even subsidizing big national energy companies, which are often referred to as “National Champions”. Therefore, the European energy system preserves its monopolistic players.

Moreover, the working group truly believes in the power of civil society in Europe and thinks that if the citizens are well informed on the benefits and positive effects of the supporting ecologically friendly energy consumption, they can soon acquire self-sufficiency in the energy sphere. This way European consumer will be less dependent on (unstable) external energy imports.

Besides the internal sphere of energy security the external sphere, meaning geopolitical perspective, also needs to be touched upon. An issue of Russia using energy as a political weapon has been specifically discussed extensively. In general, the EU is dependent on the energy supply coming from Russia (Annex 2) and the MENA (Middle Eastern and North

African) region. With regard to the securitization of the supply (gas) coming from Russia, the EU should acknowledge the interdependency that exists between these two actors rather than an asymmetric dependency, due to the fact that the EU represents a strong market of 500 million consumers. The EU can effectively use this in order to strengthen its bargaining position.

To be more precise, the group considered the lack of natural gas supply routes to Europe as one of the risk factors. Currently Europe is receiving natural gas from Russia through three offshore pipelines. Any sort of disruption of energy flow is connected with high security risks. Moreover, there are concerns that there is a lack of interconnections between Member States. The European Union has to acknowledge that more connections with energy suppliers leads to less dependency.

Besides the energy supply coming from Russia the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is important for providing fossil fuels to the European energy market. Usually, countries in these regions mostly have to deal with unstable domestic political situations or conflicts, wars and revolutions which lead to insecure supply of energy to the EU. Furthermore, the working group considered the Union as reluctant to discuss democracy issues in the MENA region when it comes to the energy supplier states, because they are more concerned with securing energy supply rather than supporting democratization processes.

When discussing the geopolitical aspect of energy security, one needs to stress that conflict will occur in the Arctics. The upcoming exhaustion of fossil fuels (which is estimated to be in 50-100 years) will lead to geopolitical conflict among the littoral states of the North Pole (USA, Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, almost the EU), who will claim parts of the Arctic in order to explore oil. It was concluded that in order to avoid serious confrontation among the global powers in the upcoming decades, Europeans should think about how to avoid this potential confrontation.

Avis

In order to ensure energy security in Europe, EU energy policies should be transformed from legislative norms into real practices. The implementation of the regulations should be actively assisted by key EU institutions, with the support of the Member States' governments.

The working group believes that one means of achieving energy security in Europe will be through energy market liberalisation. A liberalised energy market in Europe will ensure energy market diversification, which will decreasing energy prices. For this reason the group supports the energy market liberalisation policies suggested by the European Commission (namely the Third Energy Package). According to the Third Energy Package (Annex 3) the European energy market will be free from the monopolist energy companies, suppliers and will have to pay less for energy. For this reason the group invites media and NGOs to increase the public awareness on the necessity of switching to alternative energy sources.

111 In order to promote the development of alternative energy production the working group
112 encourages the governments of Member States to subsidise such industrial enterprises in
113 the initial stage. This way private energy companies will be encouraged to make long-term
114 financial commitments. In order to increase trust in alternative energy sources the working
115 group thinks that more investment should be made in research.

116 The EU should act more strongly and launch more effective actions against Russian energy
117 policies which contradict the Third Energy Package. The EU is the largest market in the
118 world and it should use this leverage against Russia. While negotiating with Russia, the EU
119 should be united as a single voice in order to avoid small Member States in Eastern and
120 Central Europe being subjected to Russian manipulation. Metaphorically speaking, Russia's
121 behaviour can be associated to the following proverb: "barking dogs do not bite". That is
122 why European states should be firm while discussions.

123 Having considered the dependence on external energy supplier states as a main security
124 concern, the working group suggests several ways of specific actions:

- 125 • construction of as many natural gas pipeline interconnections as possible.
126 Respectively, the working group supports the future natural gas pipeline projects
127 from Russia (South Stream pipeline project) or from other regions (Trans-Adriatic
128 Pipeline from Azerbaijan)
- 129 • need of the construction of more liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals. The working
130 group positively evaluates an LNG terminal construction in Lithuania and in Poland.
131 Increasing the share of LNG on the European energy market will further ensure a
132 decrease in energy prices.
- 133 • Building pipeline interconnections between the Member States and making them able
134 to switch the flows (known as a reverse flow), which will make the European energy
135 market more interconnected and secure.
136

137 Green energy policies and efficient energy use in Europe is considered to decrease the need
138 to collaborate with MENA authoritarian regimes. As long as there will be no need to support
139 the dictatorships, suppliers of energy to Europe, Europeans will be more open to criticize
140 wrongdoings of MENA governments and be active supporters of democratisation processes.

141 In order for the environmentally friendly and self-sufficient energy supply be widespread in
142 Europe success stories should be shared among the Member States. For example,
143 Germany actively assists Poland in the market liberalisation process.

- 144 1. Reflecting on the suggestions from other participants of the ASK14, the working
145 group further discussed an issue of non-EU transit European states in the EU-Russia
146 energy negotiations. The countries in focus are Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
147 Moldova, Turkey, and Ukraine. Due to the Russian political or economic influence
148 over those states, some alternative pipeline projects towards the Union have not


been implemented (such as Nabucco and others). That is why the working group suggests creation of an energy union between those non-EU transit states. This way these Eastern European states will be able to protect their national interests against Russian as well as European one.

Annex

Annex 1. Energy 2020- On 10 November 2010, the European Commission has adopted the Communication "Energy 2020 - A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy"

The Communication defines the energy priorities for the next ten years and sets the actions to be taken in order to tackle the challenges of saving energy, achieving a market with competitive prices and secure supplies, boosting technological leadership, and effectively negotiate with our international partners.

Annex 2.



169

Annex 3. On 19 September 2007, the European Commission (EC) adopted the third package of legislative proposals for electricity and gas markets. A competitive and integrated energy market allows European consumers to choose between different suppliers and all suppliers, irrespective of their size, to access the market.

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/legislation/third_legislative_package_en.htm

1 Final Report on the Cyber Dimension

2 ***It is projected that nine billion people will be living on planet Earth in the year 2050.***
3 ***With increasing economic well-being driving demand for agricultural commodities,***
4 ***how should Europe ensure domestic and international food security while protecting***
5 ***the environment and farmers' livelihoods?***

6 Members of the Working Group

7 **Andrzej Kozłowski (PL), Rasmus Kriest (DE), Anhellina Marchuk (BY), Aleksandr**
8 **Pashevich (RU), Martin Pichler (AT), Fanni Pusztai (HU), Sophia Pylypyuk (UA), Olga**
9 **Rigo (UA), Nicole Sprenger (DE), Ayman Stitou (UA), moderated by Jacob Etzel (AT)**

10 Introduction

11 Making cyberspace a safe environment poses immense difficulties towards law enforcement,
12 courts, legislators, politicians, software and hardware development, etc. Many approaches of
13 how to establish security in the classical way are hardly applicable in cyberspace. Besides
14 the classical policy dilemma between citizens' privacy and effective law enforcement
15 (through surveillance) in cyberspace, a whole new range of problems occur: the online
16 currency Bitcoin (see: Annex 2) can be used to technically obfuscate the sources of payment
17 or funding in a way that is not comparable to traditional financial transactions; the TOR¹
18 network allows for nearly perfect anonymisation; and perfect encryption technologies exist.

19 Topic Analysis

20 Cyberspace is highly technology-driven and subject to frequent changes. Predictions about
21 mainstreaming trends include the internet of things, cloud computing, active and passive
22 near field communication, wearable technology, and the domination of internet connected
23 portable devices.

24 Applying classical **state theory concepts** and the system of anarchic state environment
25 leads to the perception of cyberspace as being a "*failed state*" or being excluded from
26 existing state sovereignty as governments fail to perform basic state functions. Countries are
27 losing their supreme power in the cyber sphere.

28 The three main actors in cyber security are the United States, China and Russia. The **United**
29 **States** is globally perceived as the strongest player in both cyber counter crime and
30 espionage and still the largest producer of software. The latter leads to high risks of
31 backdoor engineering. **China** has the highest number of internet users and protects its
32 cyberspace infrastructure through the Golden Shield Project ("Great Firewall of China")
33 which is also an instrument to enforce state censorship. Exploitation vulnerability arises from

¹ formerly: "The Onion Router".

the widespread use of piracy software leading to low updating ability. **Russia** has been conducting sophisticated cyber operations against Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine in the past. Cyber espionage is done in all areas, e.g. in the energy sector. Russia can be perceived as a sanctuary for cyber criminals. Additionally, Israel has been developing strong cyber capabilities both regarding counter cybercrime and defence. An ideological fight can be seen between Russia/China and US/EU on whether cyberspace needs strong government supervision and censorship.

A **risk analysis** has been conducted by the working group with risk being defined as the product of impact and probability of a certain threat. A comprehensive cyber risk assessment matrix can be found in Annex 1.

Legislation: Internet law is generally perceived as poorly developed, projects such as the proposed Hungarian law on taxation of internet use are widely rejected by citizens. There is no specific definition of whether cyber law is an EU competency; it might fall under criminal law, consumer protection, civil law, etc. and competency might be different in each area.

One of the high risk threats is **national cyber espionage**. As most (technical) data is available today in digital manners, cyber espionage is growing strongly in significance. The main actor of national espionage is China, mainly for the reason of industrial espionage. US cyber espionage is mainly based on the Patriotic Act and therefore seen as according to law. National cyber espionage is related to the theory of security dilemma which occurs based on the main objectives of states: survival (which in turn is related to power). There is a need to find a good balance between freedom and security.

Board executives of **critical infrastructure** (CI) companies are often not perfectly built into the framework of cyber security. Whilst small CI companies might have difficulties to be large enough for good security infrastructure, sophisticated security operations can become a market advantage for larger suppliers in an oligopolistic surrounding. The CI structures of some countries create a need to respect subsidiarity in risk mitigation.

For many cyberspace users the risk of **bank data being stolen or online banking being exploited** is a primary security concern. Credit card fraud is particularly widespread in Eastern European countries. Credit card companies and banks usually offer different authentication methods whereas only multi-factor authentication combining at least one secret (e.g. a password) and one token (e.g. a card) can be seen as reasonably safe. **E-commerce fraud** in general is regulated by the Council of Europe's Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime though countries like Russia have not yet ratified the treaty.

The development of stronger surveillance and governmental data analysis could lead to **Orwellian scenarios**. Whereas a majority of countries try to block immoral content such as Nazism or child pornography, Russia, China and others are deploying structured censorship. This is usually done by domain name blocking or server confiscation.

Data leakage: At risk are personal emails, passwords, online banking details, online bill paying, online shopping, instant messaging, photographs as well as scans of documents such as passports, tax forms, and other sources of personal data. Data leakage might occur both in home and work environments. Common gateways are missing encryption, physically leaking information (stolen devices, prints, etc.) and lack of software updating.

Since its very beginnings, cyberspace has also offered means for **organised crime and terrorism**. Every advantage that the cyberspace gives society is also available to criminals. Better banking infrastructure and the occurrence of Bitcoin help terrorists to receive funding; the cross-border structure of the cyberspace offers criminals more possibilities to choose a preferable jurisdiction; asynchronous and cheap mass communication, often in real-time, supports the typical cell structure of terrorism; perceived as unbreakable encryption methods offer perfect obfuscation. The definitions of organised crime and terrorism are subject to political notions and political manipulation, e.g. according to some existing definitions Arab Spring movements could have been characterised as terrorist or organised crime movements.

Avis

While giving advice on how to tackle specific cyber risks the working group has elaborated on the balance of freedom of speech and censorship in cyberspace, the feasibility of the application of classical state theory on cyberspace and different concepts of privacy in the online world.

As a first starting point to battle cyber threats, strong encryption should be used with every communication protocol by default. Additionally, the current development of new protocols that allow stronger attribution of data will be helpful.

The working group has discussed the feasibility, but widely rejected the concept of dividing cyberspace into two spheres: a first one being regulated and under surveillance providing a safe space for commerce operations, critical infrastructure, etc.; a second one adhering to total freedom.

Applying concepts of classical state theory towards the cyberspace the following questions emerge:

- How can the Internet be democratised? Particular spheres, such as online forums or the Wikipedia encyclopedia already show sophisticated democratic structures. Can they, in a bottom-up process, bring democratic authority to cyberspace?
- Today's countries have evolved from centuries of political anarchy. Can these processes be applied to the cyberspace and how can we accelerate them?

- What are the benefits of getting the cyberspace democratically or as a state developed.

The working group deems answers to the aforementioned questions a key to establish sovereignty in cyberspace so that cyber risks can be successfully targeted.

Regarding particular threats, the working group proposes the following measures:

National cyber espionage: The feasibility of national cyber espionage is based on a cost/benefits approach whereas the costs can be increased by better attack prevention and protection on the target side and benefits can be decreased for example by applying open data concepts. By reducing the profit of espionage its extent might be reducible. Comparable to nuclear or chemical disarmament a decrease in national cyber espionage should be reachable with a multilateral approach. It is necessary to communicate to the international community that extensive nation cyber espionage consumes high amounts of money and creates mistrust whereas security could also be established by other means.

The working group has discussed the establishment of country blocks similar to the Five Eyes alliance² restrict internal and bundle external spying as this might reduce the overall amount of national cyber espionage.

Advanced persistent threats: It is necessary to raise education and awareness on risks (social engineering, phishing³, etc.), not only in formal education, but also addressing older generations as they are an important target group. Resources to detect and fight advanced persistent threats need to be made available to the public, e.g. through help hotlines. Fraud websites need to be systematically detected and banned. A particular threat is posed by domain names that try to imitate common internet services and lead to raud websites, for example "facebok.com".

Critical infrastructure (CI) protection: Governments should offer capabilities to assist CI companies with securing their assets, such as consultancy and international best-practice sharing. Cutting of CI from the internet is strongly encouraged as it adds additional security. Company board members should be required to enroll on cyber threat workshop programmes. It is vital that CI corporations have elaborate risk management and contingency planning for different time periods. Governments should set the following requirements to be met by CI companies:

- minimum requirements - outage thresholds and passing simulations
- cyber incident reporting requirements
- incident information sharing

Stolen bank data: The working group emphasises the importance of multi-factor authentication and considers banks as part of critical infrastructure.

² The United Kingdom - United States Agreement (UKUSA) covers Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

³ Phishing = password fishing.

141 **Cyber risk prevention for companies:** The European Union should by issuance of a
142 directive get companies audited regarding minimum cyber security requirements connected
143 with a (fiscal) bonus-malus system that rewards good preventative measures.

144 **Cyber law enforcement:** There is a strong need for continuing training of state prosecutors
145 on cybercrime as threats in this sphere change so rapidly. There is also a need for enhanced
146 Eurojust (see Annex 2) cooperation and stronger exchange between national counter
147 cybercrime units. Blocking of cyberspace content should adhere to constitutionality,
148 therefore only a national approach to the topic is feasible. The working group emphasises
149 that any surveillance shall be based on the rule of law and require case-by-case
150 authorisation⁴.

151 **Organised crime:** Fighting organised crime might be done through stronger monitoring of
152 cyber activities and preventative measures that target potential criminals and the wider
153 public.

154 The working group has discussed the establishment of an international organisation within
155 the UN system or adhering to its principles - maximum outreach and equal impact in
156 decision making for its members - that monitors and controls the cyberspace, provides
157 cybercrime analysis towards INTERPOL and national law enforcement and by thus making
158 institutions such as NSA less necessary.

159 **Hacked hardware:** Police cyber units should systematically collect compromised hardware
160 for analytical purposes.

161 Annex

162 Annex 1. Cyber Risk Matrix

163 *Risk = Consequence * Likelihood*

164 The working group assessed the risk of cyber risk threats based on a matrix approach by
165 defining risk as the product of likelihood and consequence. Consequence means the impact
166 of the threat on society as a whole instead of the personal effect. Likelihood is high if the
167 threat is already appearing frequently or almost certain to happen in the future, whereas it is
168 low if the threat is rarely occurring or might happen in the future.

⁴ This might be done by a judge (example: Austria) or a prosecutor (example: Poland).

Consequence	Catastrophic	Hacking of military equipment Solar storms Information warfare in cyberspace	Censorship Governments and companies attacking citizen privacy	Nation espionage Advanced persistent threats Hacking critical infrastructure
	Moderate	Technical bugs	Hacked hardware Organised crime / terrorism Malware E-commerce fraud	Viruses Stolen bank data DDoS attacks Commercial secret leakage
	Insignificant	...	Telecommunication interception Location tracking	Personal information leakage Spam Users publish personal information
		Rare / Might happen	Happening / Possible	Frequent / Certain
Likelihood				

169

170 Annex 2. Explanations

171 **Bitcoin** is an online currency that has been developed to realise the following features:
172 decentralisation, untraceability and easy online usage. Payments work peer-to-peer. The
173 underlying concept is to offer computing capacity to verify and record payments. At the
174 moment, bitcoins can easily be exchanged to traditional currencies.

175 **TOR** is a widespread anonymity network offering an obfuscation method where users
176 connect to the internet with special software. Information packages are randomly routed
177 through a series of other users' computers all around the world similar to the layers of an
178 onion creating a nearly untraceable access to the internet.

179 **Advanced Persistent Threats** are cyber threats that by sophisticated means and over a
180 long time target specific targets such as particular persons, organisations or machines. They
181 might continuously monitor and extract data and make use of multiple exploits. An example
182 is the Stuxnet virus originating from US cyber units targeting Iranian nuclear enrichment
183 centrifuges.

184 **Eurojust** is the European Union's judicial cooperation unit. Eurojust stimulates and improves
185 the coordination of investigations and prosecutions between the competent authorities in the
186 Member States and improves the cooperation between the competent authorities of the
187 Member States, in particular by facilitating the execution of international mutual legal
188 assistance and the implementation of extradition requests. Eurojust supports in any way
189 possible the competent authorities of the Member States to render their investigations and
190 prosecutions more effective when dealing with cross-border crime.⁵

⁵ Source: <http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/>.

191 Middle East and North Africa is defined as consisting of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq,
192 Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
193 Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Western Sahara.

1 Final Report on the Agronomy Dimension

2 ***It is projected that nine billion people will be living on planet Earth in the year 2050.***
3 ***With increasing economic well-being driving demand for agricultural commodities,***
4 ***how should Europe ensure domestic and international food security while protecting***
5 ***the environment and farmers' livelihoods?***

6 Members of the Working Group

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11 Introduction

12 Nutritional status impacts an individual's ability to grow, to learn, to work, and to fight
13 disease. However, even nowadays, the nutritional and food security question and its
14 possible development is quite uncertain.

15 The world population has increased drastically in the last century. The rate of population
16 growth has fallen in the developed world; however, in developing countries the population is
17 still growing rapidly. Feeding these people constitutes a unique challenge for the global
18 community. Especially as these countries become richer, their citizens desire more resource
19 intensive food.

20 Agronomy is a complex interdisciplinary study, touching topics such as ecology, health,
21 biosafety, economics and politics. Advances in agronomy will be necessary in order to
22 supply the world population with food, especially taking climate change into consideration.
23 We cannot afford to allow the population growth to be coupled with unsustainable production
24 methods. This would endanger soil quality, increase carbon dioxide emissions, worsen
25 pollution and increase consumption of nonrenewable resources.

26 Topic Analysis

27 Climate change adversely affects agricultural conditions in certain regions and causes unpredictable
28 yields. Deforestation, driven by agriculture, leads to a loss of biodiversity and a reduction of the
29 planet's ability to absorb the emissions of industrial activity (deforestation causes as much as 30% of
30 annual greenhouse gas emissions¹). According to Eurostat, meat production is responsible for 9% of
31 greenhouse gas emissions². This proportion is likely to increase as Africa and South-East Asia become

¹ see annex 1

² see annex 2

32 wealthier and their demand for protein rich food increases. The growing world population puts
33 pressure on valuable farming land.

34 There is a dubious correlation between corporate profitability and promotion of food security. Three
35 central challenges have been outlined:

- 36 1. Malnutrition³ decreases life expectancy and causes permanent health damage, leading to
37 susceptibility to illnesses and viruses, especially in developing countries.
- 38 2. Genetically Modified (GM) food. On the one hand, such technologies can create crops that
39 are resistant to pesticides, do not need herbicides, have very strong tolerance towards
40 different temperature levels, do not demand special environmental conditions and may
41 contain more minerals and vitamins than normal food. On the other hand, GM technologies
42 can cause allergic reactions, have unpredictable influences on the human body, lead to
43 extinction of species and create potential imbalances for the entire ecosystem.
- 44 3. Poor farming practices in developing countries.

45 Furthermore, using pesticides, fertilisers, antibiotics and growth stimulants can impact human
46 health. Acute health problems may occur, such as abdominal pain, dizziness, headaches, nausea,
47 vomiting, skin and eye problems in the short term and leukemia, lymphoma, brain cancer as well as
48 long term illnesses.

49 Nowadays, global free market principles prevail. Global competition can conflict with national
50 interests, if the loss of less competitive production results in a decrease in national revenue and
51 employment. From an economic perspective only 5%⁴ of the European Union (EU) labour force is
52 employed in the agricultural sector and it generates only 2.3%⁵ of the EU Gross Domestic Product.
53 However, 42% of the EU budget is spent on agriculture.⁶

54 The EU supports the farming sector through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP has
55 several objectives: increasing productivity, ensuring that farmers earn a living wage, stabilising
56 markets and providing consumers with food at reasonable prices.

57 The CAP has two main pillars: the Single Farm Payment, also known as the Single Payment Scheme,
58 and the Rural Development Fund. The Single Farm Payment scheme subsidises farms. The amount of
59 compensation is dependent on the size of the farm; in order to qualify, the farm must comply with
60 European regulations. The Rural Development Fund supports peripheral regions of Europe by
61 improving education through diversification of the countryside economy and improving

³ see annex 3

⁴ see annex 4

⁵ see annex 5

⁶ see annex 6

62 infrastructure. The Single Farm Payment scheme amounted to approximately 31% of the EU's annual
63 budget in 2013 while the Rural Development Fund took 11 %⁷.

64 **Avis**

65 The food that we produce to feed 9 billion people must be produced sustainably. The international
66 community should encourage efficient use of land resources, but not at the cost of excessive
67 deforestation, which in the short term increases amount of arable land available, however in the
68 long term causes tremendous harm to the environment. Reducing animal product consumption will
69 reduce deforestation as animal product production requires huge grain inputs. In addition, it will
70 lower greenhouse gas emissions.

71 One possible malnutrition prevention measure is education. Increasing undergraduate enrollment in
72 agronomy colleges in the developing countries, encouraging the faculty to participate in
73 interdisciplinary workshops and raising awareness among local farm communities can improve
74 multilateral communication on future agriculture challenges. The promotion of the Global
75 Foodbanking Network⁸ among states, public and private agricultural businesses, as well as the
76 launch of the global framework for sharing experiences, innovations, and (depreciated) machinery
77 are relevant ways to fight hunger.

78 Free market principles appear to be the most suitable climate for the efficient means of food
79 production, yet it is hard to control exploitation and promote sustainability in such conditions. The
80 rising demand for food calls for the development of international cooperation, in particular sharing
81 food and experience, strategic planning and global agronomic development.

82 In terms of rational food waste management, the use of compost as organic fertilizer is strongly
83 recommended. Encouraging HoReCa (hotels, restaurants and cafes) as well as grocery stores to
84 donate extra food to the food banks can help tackle food waste.

85 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) should be one of the actors in rationalising international trade
86 in the agricultural sphere outside the EU in order to support agricultural regions. Interdisciplinary
87 research and innovations on agriculture should be further invested all around the world to improve
88 the productivity of land and stimulate efficiency.

89 Investing in technologies and the findings of non-profit organisations such as the Norman Borlaug
90 Heritage Foundation⁹ (for e.g. "the micro-irrigation system" or the Green revolution process) or the
91 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation could have a positive long-term effect on the agricultural sector
92 worldwide.

⁷ see annex 7

⁸ see annex 8

⁹ see annex 9

Apart from existing food quality regulations (Good Manufacturing Practice, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points¹⁰) we emphasize the importance of enforcing standards of the Quality Assurance Standards, including ISO 9000 and ES 29000. For instance, one of these regulations concerns the requirement for products which contain GM organisms to state this on the packaging all over the world.

The working group supports the recently established Seed Bank on a global level for planting in case seed reserves elsewhere are destroyed.

In order to promote sustainable development, part of the working group is in favor of imposing extra import tariffs on non fair-trade certified products from developing economies. However, alarmed by the negative consequences this would have on the competitive position of non fair-trade products manufactured in developing countries, some of the group members believe that enabling more food imports from developing countries would boost their economic growth.

The CAP minimum prices, at which the EU promises to buy agricultural products grown within the EU, encourage farmers to produce more than the market indicates is necessary. This is expensive: flooding third world countries with subsidised products makes it harder for farmers in developing countries to earn a living and increases carbon emissions by producing products that will be wasted.

We support subsidies for small farms with cultural value, however subsidies to large industrial farms need to be restrained. We offer to do this by limiting the payment per hectare of arable farm land which currently exist in the CAP. We support cooperative farms in which multiple small farm owners invest together in equipment, infrastructure and other purchases which would be too expensive for a single farmer to afford.

Annex

Annex 1. Deforestation and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions Publication by Council on Foreign Relations
<http://www.cfr.org/forests-and-land-management/deforestation-greenhouse-gas-emissions/p14919>

Annex 2. Agriculture and Climate Change by the European Commission

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/envir/report/en/clima_en/report_en.htm

Annex 3. **Malnutrition:** A term used to refer to any condition in which the body does not receive enough nutrients for proper function. Malnutrition may range from mild to severe and life-threatening. It can be a result of starvation, in which a person has an inadequate intake of calories, or it may be related to a deficiency of one particular nutrient (for example, vitamin C deficiency). Malnutrition can also occur because a person cannot properly digest or absorb nutrients from the food they consume, as may occur with certain medical conditions.
<http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/mobileart.asp?articlekey=88521>

¹⁰ see annex 10

- 127 Annex 4. The World Factbook by Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America
128 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2048.html>
- 129 Annex 5. Agriculture in the European Union and the Member States - Statistical factsheets by the
130 Comission on Agriculture and Rural Development
131 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/factsheets/index_en.htm
- 132 Annex 6. Multi Annual Financial framework (MFF) by ECR Group Policy Paper
133 <http://ecrgroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/euoparlamet-brozura-mff-a4-web2.pdf>
- 134 Annex 7. Rural Alberta Development Fund 2013 Annual Report
135 http://www.radf.ca/uploads/radf_annual_report_12-13.pdf
- 136 Annex 8. Global Foodbanking Network is a global not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating
137 world hunger through food banking.
138 <http://www.foodbanking.org/>
- 139 Annex 9. Norman Borlaug Heritage Foundation challenges our citizenry through the arts, sciences
140 and humanities to better understand important global issues including hunger, world peace, cultural
141 diversity, leadership, agricultural science, the environment, and service learning.
142 <http://www.normanborlaug.org/>
- 143 Annex 10. Guidelines on HACCP, GMP and GHP for ASEAN Food SMEs by EC-ASEAN Economic
144 Cooperation Programme on Standards, Quality and Conformity Assesment
145 http://ec.europa.eu/food/training/haccp_en.pdf



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